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Abstract 
This present work addresses Kant’s project of transcendental deduction of the pure concepts 
of understanding with regard to its question, assumptions, and arguments. Unlike many interpreters, 
I propose that Kant’s question in transcendental deduction is meta-semantic in the metaphysical 
sense. By rejecting all the possible rival theories, Kant convincingly shows the necessity of his 
Copernican solution and the plausibility of the view of “no necessary connection without necessary 
instantiation”. I argue that Kant develops different lines of arguments in transcendental deduction: 
the argument from cognition, the argument from self-consciousness, the argument from judgment 
and the argument from perception, and that all of them are primarily not anti-skeptical, but 
explanatory in character.  
This interpretation of Kant’s transcendental deduction reveals how seriously Kant takes his 
transcendental path to be necessary and why Kant’s approach should be viewed as problem-
oriented, rather than foundation-motivated. 
 
 
Die vorliegende Arbeit beschäftigt sich mit Kants Projekt der transzendentalen Deduktion 
der reinen Verstandesbegriffe hinsichtlich ihrer Fragen, Annahmen, und Argumente. Anders als 
viele Interpreten schlage ich vor, dass Kants Fragestellung in der transzendentalen Deduktion im 
metaphysischen Sinne meta-semantisch ist. Indem er alle möglichen konkurrierenden Theorien 
ablehnt, zeigt Kant überzeugend die Notwendigkeit seiner kopernikanischen Lösung und die 
Plausibilität der Auffassung von „keiner notwendigen Verknüpfung ohne notwendige 
Instanziierung“. Ich werde argumentiert, dass Kant verschiedene Argumentationsansätze in der 
transzendentalen Deduktion entwickelt: das Argument aus der Erkenntnis, das Argument aus dem 
Selbstbewusstsein, das Argument aus dem Urteil und das Argument aus der Wahrnehmung, und 
dass sie alle in erster Linie nicht im Wesen anti-skeptisch, sondern erklärend sind.  
Diese von mir vorgeschlagene Interpretation von Kants transzendentaler Deduktion zeigt, 
wie ernst Kant seinen transzendentalen Weg für notwendig hält und warum Kants Ansatz vor 
allem als problemorientiert, nicht aber als gründungsmotiviert angesehen werden sollte. 
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Introduction 
(a) The Idea of the Transcendental Deduction 
We have a variety of concepts that weave themselves into our experience. Some of them seem 
remote from reality, such as the fictional concepts “dragon”, “perpetual motion machine”, for we 
cannot encounter their instances in experience. Some of them seem near to reality, such as the 
observational concept “panda”, or the theoretical concept “DNA”, for we could find their 
instances in experience, albeit in different ways. However, some concepts such as “causation” and 
“necessity” seem stranger,: sometimes they seem remote from reality, for we cannot encounter 
their instances in experience in the way we do in the case of observational and theoretical concepts; 
yet sometimes they seem near to reality, for we nevertheless cannot help presupposing their 
existence in experience.  
These concepts seem indispensable to the world. We could easily conceive a world like ours 
without a dragon. Indeed, we do not need to beg the counterfactual scenario, since many civil 
communities do not have the concept “dragon”. Curiously, it seems even more difficult to conceive 
a world like ours without causation than to conceive a world like ours without panda. The point 
could be put by a metaphor: we could conceive that a building can stand without a particular 
building block, which could be missing or replaced by another one; however, we could hardly 
conceive that a building can stand without its architect structure. 
The reasons are complex. First, these concepts are relational. They are not those concepts 
whose objects we could easily pick up. Second, these concepts are fundamental. These concepts 
underlie many ordinary relational concepts like “burning”, “being heavy”. Third, these concepts 
are universal. It seems that any state of affairs in the world could not be described without reference 
to these concepts. Kant calls these peculiar concepts “the pure concepts of understanding” or 
“categories”, and he holds that they are the same in kind and limited in number. 
In Critique of Pure Reason, Kant introduces a pair of legal terms “quid juris” and “quid facti”, 
namely, “the questions about what is lawful” and “that which concerns the fact” (A84/B116) to 
designate the two most important questions concerning the nature of concepts: the acquisition of a 
concept, and the referential force of a concept.1 For the latter question, Kant further borrows the 
                                                     
1 In fact, the distinction between “quid juris” and “quid facti” is not always helpful in Kant’s text. When Kant 
introduces this pair of term, he seems to suggest that they are respectively applied to the pure concepts and the 
empirical concepts. However, it turns out that they constitute a twofold structure of question that is equally applied 
to both pure concepts and empirical concepts. Moreover, I do not think that the term “quid juris” by itself is adequate 
to indicate that the nature of transcendental deduction is justificatory and normative. As I will mention latter, I do 
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deduction in legal matter and defines it as “to establish the entitlement or the legal claim” 
(A84/B116) with respect to its lawfulness. Kant officially defines transcendental deduction as “the 
explanation of the way in which concepts a priori can relate to objects” (A85/B117). 
As Henrich remarks, “[t]he Transcendental Deduction of the categories is the very heart of 
the Critique of Pure Reason”.2 Indeed, it seems that the status of the Transcendental Deduction can 
hardly be overestimated. In the Preface to the 1781 Critique Kant wrote that “I know of no 
investigations that would be more important for getting to the bottom of the faculty that we call 
understanding and at the same time for determining the rules and limits of its employment than 
those that I have undertaken in the second part of the Transcendental Analytic, under the title of 
the Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding; they have also cost me the most, but not, I hope, 
unrewarded effort.” (A xvi) 
The body part of the Critique could be understood as a project of scrutinizing human cognitive 
faculties. From the perspective of a theory of faculties, the Transcendental Deduction occupies a 
central place. This is not because the faculty of understanding is higher than that of sensibility is, 
nor because the investigation of understanding goes deeper than that of sensibility does. The 
centrality of the Transcendental Deduction lies in that it is designed to be the bridging part between 
his theory of sensibility and that of understanding. Not only does it contain an extension of his 
investigation of understanding in the Metaphysical Deduction in the form of its metaphysical use,3 
but it also contains an important supplement account of his previous doctrine of sensibility in the 
Aesthetic with respect to the singularity of space and time. 
In another place, Kant credits the question of transcendental deduction as the “the key to the 
whole secret of metaphysics” (AA 10:130). The question of the grounding relation of 
representation to object assumes a supreme status in all metaphysical questions. The formulation of 
the question marks the emergence of a secure course of metaphysics, and the answer to the 
question brings about decisive influences on the solution to almost all other hard questions in 
metaphysics: the synthetic a priori truths, the antinomies, the necessary connection of objects, 
personal identity, etc. 
The Transcendental deduction is difficult because “a difficulty is revealed here that we did 
not encounter in the field of sensibility, namely how subjective conditions of thinking should 
have objective validity, i.e., yield conditions of the possibility of all cognition of objects” (A89-
                                                     
not think that Kant’s term “explanation” alone could make a case for an explanatory reading of transcendental 
deduction, either. Rather, the nature of transcendental deduction as argument depends on what Kant actually does. 
2 Henrich 1969, 640. 
3 For a valuable introduction to the Metaphysical Deduction see Longuenesse 2006. 
3 
 
90/B122). Kant holds that the difficulty of transcendental deduction lies in that we cannot preclude 
the logical possibility that the concepts as subjective thinking could be empty and uninstantiated 
without being related to the world. Yet, I think that the genuine difficulty goes deeper: to pose the 
question of how a concept could be a part of the world is simply to make a categorical mistake. A 
concept cannot become a part of the world, because we cannot force a member of the system of 
concepts to be a member of the system of things. Space and time are no concepts, so there is no 
difficulty for them to be a part of the world. Categories are concepts, so the difficulty arises.4 
 
(b) The Metaphysical Reading Recommended 
The present work is a study of Kant’s transcendental deduction of categories in regard to its 
assumptions and arguments. It is not primarily a study of the Metaphysical Deduction or Principles, 
though I will make reference to them when I find it necessary. It is not a study of the question as 
to the relationship between sensibility and understanding, which has drawn the primary interest in 
the form of the dispute between conceptualism and non-conceptualism in recent years.5 Rather, 
my study presupposes that conceptualism is correct.6 The primary aim of this study is to examine 
the nature of the arguments in the Transcendental Deduction and the hidden assumptions that 
motivate these arguments. 
In this work, I will embrace a metaphysical, rather than an epistemological, reading of the 
Transcendental Deduction. The metaphysical reading of the Critique has a long tradition.7 While 
the metaphysical reading was one of the mainstream views of the ways of reading the Critique, it 
was largely overlooked in the wake of the Kant renaissance in the 1960s. For instance, Strawson 
famously proposes that we should isolate Kant’ analytic arguments from his transcendental 
idealism.8 The eager to purify Kant from the contaminating metaphysics is nothing but a symptom 
                                                     
4 See my discussion of the schema in Chapter 5. 
5 Many recent studies on transcendental deduction take the conceptualism debate as a primary challenge. See Vinci 
2014 and Schulting 2017. 
6 The Transcendental Deduction is usually viewed as providing key supports to the conceptualist reading of Kant’s 
mental states. See Griffith 2012, Gomes 2013, Landers 2015. In a valuable review, McLear also recognizes that 
transcendental deduction is often invoked by conceptualists. See McLear 2014. 
7 Due to the neo-Kantians, the dominant reading of the Critique has long been epistemological. From the twenties of 
last century onwards, however, a strong trend of metaphysical reading has begun to be felt in Germany. The 
contributors includes not only some of the most famous historians of philosophy such as Marx Wundt (1924) and 
Heinz Heimsoeth (1956), but also some of the most leading philosophers such as Martin Heidegger (1929) and 
Nicolai Hartmann (1921). The reevaluation of the nature of the Critique is, albeit not merely, a symptom of the 
philosophical turns in the early decades of the twentieth century. 
8 For more details see Strawson 1966, 5-7. For instance, Strawson writes explicitly that “[t]he doctrines of 
transcendental idealism, and the associated picture of the receiving and ordering apparatus of the mind producing 
Nature as we know it out of the unknowable reality of things as they are in themselves, are undoubtedly the chief 
obstacles to a sympathetic understanding of the Critique.” (2002, 6) 
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in the history of philosophy of the general hostility to metaphysics traced back to the logical 
empiricism and ordinary language school. Thanks to W.V.O. Quine and David Lewis, now 
philosophers feel free to adopt the more liberal forms of metaphysics. In recent years, a number 
of new metaphysical readings have flourished in interpreting transcendental idealism.9 One might 
expect that the more friendly metaphysical reading could yield more profitable results in other 
topics. 
What I will do here is to argue for its sub-thesis that the Transcendental Deduction is primarily 
metaphysical in character. Indeed, the issue of the relation of representation (cognition) to object 
seems to encourage an epistemological question. Kant’s investigation into the cognitive faculties 
also looks like nothing more than a study of the source of knowledge. However, there are important 
reasons to hold that a metaphysical reading does more justice to and makes better sense of Kant’s 
Transcendental Deduction. The widespread use of representation, cognition, and faculty at most 
offers the subject matter of the study. It does not immediately justify the epistemological nature of 
the Transcendental Deduction. What matters is the nature of the question concerning the subject 
matter and the way the question is approached. Even if the subject matter is knowledge, it does 
not imply that any study of it is epistemological in nature; rather, we are justified to have a 
metaphysics of knowledge. 10  The dismissal of the metaphysical reading even results in the 
inconsistency of the notion of metaphysics itself: when the laws of nature are legislated by God, it 
is undoubtedly a proper metaphysics; when the laws of nature are legislated by the human 
understanding, it becomes a shameful psychology.11 
In the Critique, Kant officially defines the transcendental deduction of pure concepts as “the 
explanation of the way in which concepts a priori can relate to objects” (A85/B117). Kant does not 
immediately pose a metaphysical question as to whether there is necessary connection in the world, 
or how it is possible for there to be necessary connection in the world. Rather, Kant articulates the 
question with a survey of concepts, and it seems to suggest that Kant would like to retain a semantic 
dimension in his approach to the question.12 As Kant further indicates, the question that the 
                                                     
9 This new metaphysical reading is known as the metaphysical two-aspect view. See Langton 1998, Allais 2007, 
Rosefeldt 2007. 
10 See Hossack 2007. 
11 There is no denying that there is a number of psychological details in the A-Deduction when Kant accounts for 
how the experiences are made possible by categories. However, Kant soon takes notice of it and he claims that those 
details are not essential to the aim of the Transcendental Deduction. Therefore, Kant draws a clear-cut distinction 
between psychology and philosophy and introduces reproduction and association in a merely contrastive context. 
12 For the broad semantic approach to the Critique see Hanna 2001. Hanna proposes that the Critique is concerned 
with cognitive semantics, and he believes that it is a reading that synthesizes the one-sided logico-semantical reading 
and philosophical-psychological reading. Later I will argue that there are two distinct levels in Kant’s theoretical 
philosophy in general and transcendental deduction in particular. On the surface level, it is concerned with the 
semantic question of the representation of object. But this semantic level has to be grounded in a deeper meta-
5 
 
Transcendental Deduction attempts to address is not so much the relation of representation to 
object as the ground of the relation of representation to object. Therefore, I argue that the nature of 
Kant’s puzzle is metaphysical in character. As Kant’s the solution to the puzzle, the Copernican 
Revolution is essentially to articulate a new grounding model of the relation of representation of 
object. Furthermore, Kant takes the question as the secret of all systems of metaphysics. It turns 
out that the resolution of the secret has global ramifications for a variety of other metaphysical 
questions, most notably the synthetic a priori truths and the mathematical antinomies. (Others 
include the necessary connection of objects, the identity of self-consciousness, the synthetic 
contingent truth, and the unity of space, etc.) Finally, Kant deeply clings to a variety of largely 
metaphysical assumptions such that the motivations and constraints of Kant’s solution to his 
puzzle are metaphysical. For instance, Kant believes that the semantic notions of truth, reference 
and predication must be causally grounded. 
 
(c) The Lines of Argument 
On my reading, the Transcendental Deduction consists of a variety of lines of argument, each 
of which draws on different theoretical and conceptual resources. The arguments in the 
Transcendental Deduction could be divided into the argument from cognition, the argument from 
self-consciousness, the argument from judgment, and the argument from perception.13 
To separate different and independent lines of arguments has a twofold motivation. On the 
one hand, it is required by the fact that Kant writes different versions of arguments for the deduction 
of categories. While Kant insists that the difference “concerns only the manner of presentation, 
and not the ground of explanation” (AA 4:476), it is precisely the different presentations of Kant’s 
project of transcendental deduction that is brought under scrutiny. On the other hand, it helps 
maximally exploit the potential of each argument. For instance, if we take seriously Kant’s 
abstraction strategy in the B-Deduction, one consequence is that, on my reading, the first part of 
the B-Deduction makes an indirect, if not trivial, contribution to the second part of the B-
Deduction. If we retain the independence of the argument from self-consciousness in the B-
                                                     
semantical level, on which Kant is concerned with the metaphysical ground of certain semantic facts such as a priori 
reference or synthetic a priori truths. On my reading, the semantic question is addressed properly in Kant’s Logic, yet 
the further metaphysical question is the genuine preoccupation of Critique. For the semantic reading of 
Transcendental Deduction and especially the synthetic unity of transcendental apperception see Dickerson 2003. 
Dickerson argues that the question of the unity of the manifold in Kant is a representational parallel of the question 
of the unity of proposition in early analytic philosophy. In Chapter 6 I will suggest that this reading is misguiding, 
since on the one hand, not all intuitions are propositional, and, on the other hand, the unity of judgment is not a 
problem at all for Kant. 
13 There are other ways of reading the lines of arguments in the Deduction. See Pereboom 1995. 
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Deduction and read it as a successor argument for the argument from above in the A-Deduction 
independently of the strategic context, we do not worry that the respect of Kant’s official claims 
on his strategy would undermine the expected utmost importance of the argument from self-
consciousness. 
According to my interpretation, all of the four lines of arguments share a common two-phase 
structure.14 In the first phase of argument, Kant starts his argument from different acknowledged 
facts and it turns out that all the arguments from these different premises are convergent to the a 
priori synthetic unity. In the second phase of argument, Kant proceeds from the a priori synthetic 
unity through the synthesis to the category. We might consider a premise of the argument as the 
entrance to the a priori synthetic unity, or to the transcendental path. Therefore, we have different 
entrances to the same destination. 
Since in the first phase different arguments take different routes, I will concentrate on the 
first phase of every argument for synthetic unity. As we will see, the a priori synthetic unity is a more 
specific expression of a priori determination, and the atemporalized expression of the 
transcendental schema. In fact, one central difficulty of Kant’s arguments is how to uncover the 
synthetic unity from different phenomena. Since in the second phase every argument takes a 
common route, I will discuss the second phase of the argument for category only in some argument. 
The second phase of the arguments could be understood as how the categories make the objects 
possible. Construed in this light, my strategy could be further justified by Kant’s remark that “the 
answer to the question how the categories make such experience possible is important enough for 
completing the deduction where possible, with respect to the principal end of the system, namely, the 
determination of the limits of pure reason, it is in no way compulsory, but merely meritorious.” (AA 
4:474f) Compared to the arguments for the transcendental path, the specific arguments in the 
Transcendental Deduction are indeed not essential to Kant’s purpose. 
 
(d) Anti-Skepticism 
It was widely believed that the Critique in general and the Transcendental Deduction in 
particular are committed to the anti-skeptical project. The anti-skeptical reading of the Critique was 
once the dominant and almost the only correct interpretation, which was once powerfully defended 
and developed by the most notable Kant scholars such as Strawson, Bennett, and Wolff.15 It is fair 
                                                     
14 This general two-phases reading should be distinguished from the two-part structure in the B-Deduction. 
15 See Strawson 1966, Bennett 1966, and Wolff 1963. For criticisms see Ameriks 1978. 
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to say that the renaissance of Kant study in English-speaking countries is closely associated with 
the promise of Critique’s anti-skeptical potential that is felt by these pioneers. Even today many still 
hold that the Critique is organized by a variety of responses to skepticism.16 For some of them, to 
address skepticism and to develop a reformed metaphysics are two sides of the same coin.17 This 
traditional dominant interpretation decisively creates the atmosphere in which the Transcendental 
Deduction is studied. Some of the most important interpretations of the arguments in the 
Transcendental Deduction made by Henrich and Guyer assume that the various arguments Kant 
develops contain the element of or serve the aim of anti-skepticism. 
However, I believe that this view is mistaken, and the arguments in the Transcendental 
Deduction are not primarily skeptical. There are different interpretations for rejecting an anti-
skeptical reading. According to one line of interpretation, Kant cannot refute Hume. Watkins argues 
that Kant’s model of causation is different from that of Hume. Since there is no commensurability 
between the two models, Kant is not in a position to refute Hume.18 I think that the incomparability 
is too strong since it deprives all possible sensible response to the Humean skepticism of the entire 
Critique.19 
I would rather pursue another moderate line of interpretation, according to which Kant need 
not refute the Humean skepticism in the Transcendental Deduction.20 In my view, a campaign 
against the Humean skepticism is a concern of the Critique. On Kant’s own construal, he both need 
and can successfully refute Hume. Yet, it is not a concern of the Transcendental Deduction. Before 
Kant gets his deduction off the ground, the Humean variant of skepticism has been discharged.21 
What Kant is doing in Deduction is taking a further step to give an alternative account of the 
causation in particular and real connection in general.22 Therefore, Kant’s response consists of a 
negative and a positive part. Kant first raises separate and anterior arguments to refute the Humean 
skepticism by the counterexample of mathematics and then develops a positive alternative account 
in the Deduction. While Kant’s positive account could be seen as a response to skepticism in the 
                                                     
16 The most systematic efforts are made by Forster 2008 and Guyer 2008. 
17 See Forster 2008. This idea is even not without trace in Strawson 1966. 
18 See Watkins 2005, 230-297. 
19 For an objection to the exclusion of any event-based model of causation from Kant see Chignell and Pereboom 
2010. 
20 See Engstrom 1994. 
21 It is no doubt that Kant does offer an argument from mathematics against Humean skepticism. Whether the 
argument is successful or not is quite another issue. In his refutation, Kant are committed to the following two 
assumptions: (1) mathematics is synthetic a priori, and (2) stands or falls together. The first assumption is of more 
interest, what it reflects is not so much the specific difference on the nature of mathematics as the methodological 
divergence in response to knowledge in general. For the former assumption see Chapter 2. 
22 The 1787 Critique is not a complement, but a replacement of the 1781 Critique. 
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broad sense, yet it could hardly be qualified as a refutation, since the refutation is presupposed, rather 
than implied.23 
I maintain that an anti-skeptical reading does not do justice to Kant’s arguments. One striking 
fact is that the premises of the arguments in the Transcendental Deduction suggest that they are 
not anti-skeptical in nature. As I have noted, Kant develops different lines of arguments for the 
reality of categories. Kant’s arguments start with cognition, self-consciousness, judgment, and 
perception. However, most of the premises are too strong to be acceptable by the skeptics, and 
only the argument from self-consciousness might be qualified as a promising anti-skeptical 
argument. The thickness of these premises leaves an anti-skeptical reading unmotivated.  
The anti-skeptical reading is extraordinarily uncharitable to Kant. According to the anti-
skeptical reading, a number of Kant’s arguments simply beg the question of the skeptics in one 
way or another.24 In addition, if Kant’s arguments are intended to target at the Humean skepticism, 
Kant should start with the premises, with which the Humeans must be ready to agree. By starting 
with the thick premises Kant seems to have no idea of Humeans’ point at all. Finally, it implicitly 
throws Kant into a dilemma, in which either horn is undesirable: if the Transcendental Deduction 
is anti-skeptical, then it is question-begging; if it is not, then it is trivial. On either horn the polemical 
force of the Transcendental Deduction is entirely cast into doubt. In confrontation with the 
arguments with thick premises, the natural and charitable move is not to insist on the anti-skeptical 
reading and to conclude that Kant must be wrong in begging the question of the skeptics, but to 
think about whether the anti-skepticism is still charitable and profitable for understanding the 
character of Kant’s arguments. 
However, it does not imply that the Transcendental Deduction cannot be anti-skeptical at any 
rate. As we will see, I take the arguments to be primarily explanatory. The explanatory reading 
prefers thicker premises, whereas the anti-skeptical reading requires thinner premises. It leaves 
open to the possibility that a regressive argument can become anti-skeptical if its premise happens 
to be accepted by the skeptics. 
In a broad sense, the Transcendental Deduction could also be interpreted as anti-skeptical. 
Skepticism could be defined as the negation of the knowledge with regard to some domain of 
objects. Where there is a claim to knowledge, there can be a correspondent species of skepticism 
in virtue of its negating the claim to knowledge. As long as the conclusion of the Transcendental 
                                                     
23 For a recent defense of the anti-skeptical reading of the Critique see Guyer 2008. Guyer complains that the anti-
skepticism should not be understood too narrowly by denying its logical validity.  
24 The question-begging objection is repeatedly raised by Guyer 1987. 
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Deduction makes claim to the knowledge of the validity of categories, it could be read as a kind of 
anti-skepticism against the opponent to its claim. However, this conception of anti-skepticism is 
trivial and uninteresting. 
 
(e) Toward an Explanatory Reading 
I propose that the arguments in the Deduction are primarily explanatory. This reading is not 
entirely new, since it is closely related to Ameriks’ regressive reading, which has long been an 
important alternative to the anti-skeptical reading. In an influential article, Ameriks arouses the new 
interest in the question of the nature of the argument in the Transcendental Deduction by arguing 
that the argument in the Transcendental Deduction is not anti-skeptical in nature.25 
In response to the anti-skeptical reading, Ameriks introduces and popularizes the distinction 
between the progressive and regressive reading of the arguments in the Critique, which shapes the 
basic landscape of the debate about the nature of the argument in the Transcendental Deduction. 
The divergence between the two readings is rooted in the different ways of evaluating the role of 
skepticism in the Transcendental Deduction. According to Ameriks, an argument is progressive if 
it argues from the preconditions of knowledge to knowledge, and an argument is regressive if it 
argues from the knowledge to the preconditions of knowledge. In other words, the progressive 
argument supplies the sufficient condition of knowledge, whereas the regressive argument supplies 
the necessary condition for of knowledge. Ameriks seems to suggest that the progressive and the 
regressive reading of the Transcendental Deduction are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive. 
While Ameriks is correct in pointing out that the argument in the Transcendental Deduction 
is not primarily anti-skeptical in character, and that it is regressive by proceeding from a body of 
knowledge to the preconditions of the knowledge, I think that his specific proposal leaves open to 
several objections. First, the scope of knowledge that is to be explained is too narrow. An argument 
from empirical knowledge that the skeptics call into question is not the only way for an argument 
                                                     
25 See Ameriks 1978. Ameriks’ regressive reading of Transcendental Deduction is motivated by the fact that the 
argument from geometry in the Transcendental Aesthetic is a paradigmatic regressive argument. It is profitable to 
think that the argument in the Transcendental Deduction parallels the argument from geometry in its structure and 
aim. Therefore, the argument in the Transcendental Deduction is also an argument from the actuality of synthetic a 
priori propositions. One could level the criticism to the Transcendental Aesthetic on which Ameriks’ basic idea relies 
so much by arguing that the argument from geometry is only a product in the 1783 Prolegomena to any Future 
Metaphysics That will be Able to Come Forward as Science (abbreviated as Progolomena thereafter), which is known as 
presented in a regressive manner. It is unfounded to infer that the argument in B-Deduction is also regressive, since 
that argument from self-consciousness is taken over not from the Prologomena, but from the argument from above in 
the 1781 Critique, which is equally known as organized in a progressive manner. I suggest we should turn to the 
Transcendental Deduction to see what Kant really does in text without expecting too much the hypothetical structural 
similarity in argument. 
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to be regressive. As I have mentioned, there are many lines of argument with different premises. I 
believe that all of the arguments are regressive, and the argument from empirical knowledge is 
merely one of them. The regressive reading is applicable even to the argument from self-
consciousness, which is widely regarded as one paradigmatic anti-skeptical argument. Confined by 
the argument from empirical knowledge of object, Ameriks does not even worry that a regressive 
argument might be anti-skeptical. For Ameriks, the notion of the regressive argument is simply co-
extensive with that of the anti-skeptical argument. 
Second, no such argument from empirical knowledge could even be found in Kant’s B-
Deduction 26  While Ameriks is inspired by the argument from geometry in Transcendental 
Aesthetic, he correctly does not identify the argument in the Transcendental Deduction also as 
starting from synthetic a priori propositions. Rather, he holds that the argument is premised with 
empirical knowledge. While this kind of argument is present in A-Deduction and known as the 
argument from below, no such argument could be found in B-Deduction, which is precisely 
Ameriks’ target-text. In addition, Ameriks contends that self-consciousness is derived as the 
necessary condition from empirical knowledge. However, I believe that self-consciousness is the 
premise of Kant’s master argument in B-Deduction. On this point, the followers of anti-skepticism 
reading are correct.  
In spite of his rejection of the anti-skeptical reading, I think that Ameriks is still committed 
to the agenda that is set by his opponents. According to the agenda, the central issue in the 
Transcendental Deduction concerns the relationship between a priori self-knowledge and the 
empirical knowledge of object: either the self-knowledge is derived from the empirical knowledge 
possible, or vice versa. In his interpretation of the argument in the Transcendental Deduction, 
Ameriks misidentifies the regressive argument as the argument that runs in an opposite direction 
to the anti-skeptical reading, namely, the one from empirical knowledge to self-consciousness.  
I would like to argue for two distinctive theses to distance myself from other regressive 
readings. First, I will argue that all the arguments within the Transcendental Deduction are primarily 
explanatory.27 Essentially, the character of Kant’s general strategy is problem-oriented, rather than 
foundation-based. These arguments are explanatory not merely in the sense that their premises contain 
                                                     
26 In addition, there is no such argument from the synthetic a priori truths. Kant does have an explicit argument from 
the laws of nature that could be taken as the synthetic a priori truths in A-Deduction. As I will show in Chapter 5, it 
is merely an argument for the idealism of physical objects, rather than one for the reality of categories. According to 
my interpretation, idealism is merely a necessary yet insufficient condition of the reality of categories. 
27 These arguments are explanatory, not because Kant officially defines transcendental deduction as an 
“explanation”, which is hardly of any help, since Kant uses explanation in a quite loose sense that includes some kind 
of analysis. See R2950 (AA 16:585), R2994 (AA 16:606), and R3005 (AA 16:610-611). 
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a body of knowledge or a range of phenomena that are to be regressively explained, as Ameriks 
has suggested. I want to argue for something stronger. These arguments are explanatory in the 
sense that at least in certain crucial steps they follow the logic of explanation, which is formally 
equivalent to the logical fallacy of affirming the consequent. In other words, they are not valid. 
Therefore, these arguments are not abductive, rather than deductive. Here I would like to make 
two brief precautions. First, I am not arguing that Kant intends his arguments to be merely abductive. 
In both editions of the Deduction, we do find Kant’s clear indication of the necessary condition 
by “only because”. However, Kant seems to assert it without arguing for it, for it is difficult to find 
any actual argument of this kind within the scope of the Transcendental Deduction. Second, I am 
not arguing that the verdict of the abductive nature the arguments is final. As we will see, Kant 
offers additional arguments for the necessity of the Copernican model in other places. 
This reading might come as a surprise. Ameriks believes that a regressive argument supplies 
necessary condition for knowledge, while a progressive argument supplies sufficient condition for 
knowledge. However, I think that a regressive argument from knowledge can give sufficient 
conditions, too. And it is precisely in this sense of the inference to sufficient condition that these 
arguments are called explanatory.28 On my reading, what differentiates the regressive argument is 
the explanatory order of the argument, rather than the inferential direction of the argument. The 
price is that the argument is not valid. However, not every good argument must be valid.  
The explanatory reading sheds new light on our understanding of the structure of the 
arguments. The premises of the arguments usually state certain phenomena, and then the 
conclusion of these arguments functions as the theory that can explain the phenomena.29 These 
phenomena range widely. Most, if not all, of the phenomena do not have the so-called Cartesian 
evidence immune from radical skepticism. What they have in common is instead that they are well-
established in ordinary human life and widely recognized by sensible human minds. One important 
consequence of the abductive reading is to see Kant’s conclusion (the Copernican model) as a theory. 
A theory has many features: it is insusceptible to observational access, otherwise it would be data, 
rather than theory; it has competitors, otherwise, it would be implicational, rather than explanatory; 
and it has many theoretical virtues, otherwise it could not be evaluated. Generally, the rival 
philosophical theories are evaluated not in terms of empirical adequacy, because in most cases they 
are equivalent in empirical adequacy. As we will see, Kant extends the realm of the empirical data 
                                                     
28 I do not think that it implies that the anti-skeptical progressive reading is correct.  
29 Henrich is insightful in pointing out Kant is concerned more of the solutions to the problems than of the first 
principle. I believe that my explanatory reading is consistent with Henrich’s insight, though I do not think that his 
proposal of Kant’s strategy of theory avoidance is convincing. See Henrich 1992 and 2008. 
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by including modal truths such that different theories can be evaluated by explanatory power. 
Therefore, I contend that Critique should be read as the groundwork of his entire philosophy. It is a 
philosophical grounding not only for his philosophy of the natural and that of the moral but also 
for his logic and anthropology. The facts concerning cognition and consciousness Kant 
respectively assumes in logic and anthropology stand in need of further explanation, and it is the 
Critique that offers such fundamental explanation. 
Second, I propose that the arguments in the Transcendental Deduction are metaphysical. 
According to Ameriks, the arguments in the Transcendental Deduction are regressive in the sense 
of arguing for the preconditions of knowledge. However, the conception of the preconditions of 
knowledge is too loose.30 I am convinced that the arguments in the Transcendental Deduction could 
be specified in finer terms, namely, in terms of the metaphysical grounding relation. Therefore, I 
propose a metaphysical interpretation that the arguments in the Transcendental Deduction are 
arguments for metaphysical ground.31 All metaphysical facts stand in the metaphysical relation of 
grounding, in which they are either ground or consequence to another. Grounds and consequences 
constitute a metaphysical hierarchy in virtue of grounding. Construed in this light, a progressive 
argument proceeds from ground to consequence, while a regressive argument proceeds from 
consequence to ground. Therefore, all of the four lines of arguments in the Transcendental 
Deduction fall under the category of the argument from consequence. 
There is a metaphysical parallel to the abductive character of explanatory argument.32 The 
metaphysical relation of ground to consequence is determinate; if a ground is posited, then its 
consequence is posited, too. By contrast, the metaphysical relation of consequence to ground is 
indeterminate; if a consequence is posited, then its ground is not thereby posited, for it could have 
other different possible determinate grounds. (B276) 33  If one would like to suggest that the 
                                                     
30 Cassam formulates a novel model of explaining how knowledge is possible, which is characterized by a multi-levels 
response. According to Cassam, “[a] multi-levels response operates at three levels. Level 1 identifies means of 
acquiring the allegedly problematic knowledge. Level 2 is the obstacle-removing level, the level at which obstacles to the 
acquisition of knowledge by the proposed means are overcome or dissipated. Finally, Level 3 seeks to identify 
necessary background conditions for the acquisition of the relevant knowledge by the proposed means.” (2007, 51) Cassam 
rejects the anti-skeptical reading, and he believes that the argument from geometry for transcendental idealism is 
explanatory. While it seems that Cassam’s distinctive interpretation loosely falls under the category of regressive 
reading, he explicitly dismisses a general regressive interpretation. For instance, Cassam does not think that regressive 
argument plays any role in accounting for the possibility of empirical knowledge, as he remarks that “[t]he problem is 
not that Kant doesn’t use regressive transcendental arguments but that he doesn’t use them to answer (HPek).” 
(2007, 58) Fortunately, Cassam (2008) later clarifies his position by explicitly embracing a regressive argument.  
31 See Edgar 2010 for an explanatory reading with reference to the structure problem of the B-Deduction. Edgar 
embraces a cognitive reading of the Critique, and he thinks that the explanation is a description of the operation, rather 
than concerns the causal mechanism of mind. 
32 Here I use abduction in a more general and historical sense of the inference to the sufficient condition, rather than 
in the modern sense of the inference to the best explanation. 
33 See Kant’s Refutation of Idealism added to the 1787 Critique. 
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arguments in the Transcendental Deduction are deductive, then one’s major task is to make the 
inference determinate.  
 
(f) The Necessity of the Transcendental Path 
Intuitively, to attribute a merely abductive reading to the arguments in the Transcendental 
Deduction is far from satisfactory. In fact, Kant explicitly warns us that it is incorrect to read the 
arguments in the Transcendental Deduction as merely abductive. Consider Kant’s principle of 
transcendental deduction: 
 
The transcendental deduction of all a priori concepts therefore has a principle toward which the entire 
investigation must be directed namely this: that they must be recognized as a priori conditions of the 
possibility of experiences (whether of the intuition that is encountered in them, or of the thinking). 
(A94/B126) 
 
This passage is familiar, yet it seldom calls serious attention.34 I find that Kant’s formulation 
of the principle of transcendental deduction is intriguing. Kant not only offers a guidance but also 
poses a challenge. Kant does not merely say that if the a priori concepts are the conditions of the 
possibility of experience, then they are related to objects. If that is the case, then what Kant does 
is merely to offer an abductive argument by showing that the former is the sufficient condition of the 
latter. Rather, what Kant actually says is that a priori concepts must be the conditions of the 
possibility of experiences. That is to say, there is no other way to prove the relation of a priori 
concepts to objects than by showing that they are the conditions of the possibility of experience. 
If the principle is taken seriously, Kant is obliged to offer a deductive argument by showing that the 
former also the necessary condition of the latter. 
If Kant is to contend that the reality of a priori concepts implies that they are the conditions 
of experience, both positive and negative argumentative strategies are available to him. On the 
positive strategy, Kant could show that a priori concepts as conditions of experience are conceptually 
implied by the reality of a priori concepts. In fact, some has been tempted to read the line of reasoning 
“the synthetic unity---the synthesis----categories” in the second phase of argument as “a chain of 
implications” without qualification.35 However, dangers are hidden in this strategy. To find the 
                                                     
34 As far as I see, most commentators fail to call attention to this principle, let alone prove that categories are related 
to objects of experience only if categories are the conditions of experience. Probably, it is because they assume that 
Kant argues deductively at the very start. 
35 Van Cleve 1999, 87. 
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sufficient conditions for some fact is easier than to find the necessary conditions. Many conceptual 
entailments are not that transparent, and some of them are even illusions, at least they tacitly assume 
unjustified premises. Normally, we do not have insight into the illusion. We often mistake 
abductive inferences as deductive ones without being aware of the assumptions of the argument. 
Then, how can we make sure that the conceptual implication is less controversial? 
Another negative and more indirect strategy is disjunctive syllogism. Kant could show the 
necessity of a theory by excluding all other alternatives. Suppose that there are four possible paths 
T1, T2, T3 and T4 that can allegedly explain the data D, and that they constitute an exclusive 
disjunction. The argument is deductive if one can argue by elimination that T4 is right because T1, 
T2, and T3 are wrong. It must be kept in mind that the elimination of any other alternative should 
not presuppose the correctness of the desired alternatives. It is noteworthy that when Kant 
eliminate the other theories, 36 he can also evaluate them in terms of the explanatory adequacy. On 
this strategy, the sufficiency and the necessity of the transcendental path are argued for in two quite 
different ways.  
In order to vindicate the necessity of the transcendental path, Kant owes us an account that 
virtually all other possible systems are doomed to fail. It is no easy task. To be sure, Kant does say 
something relevant within Transcendental Deduction. However, what Kant says is quite weak. Kant 
passes over it so fast that many readers fail to be conscious of it as if this problem is neither 
important nor difficult.37 Kant makes the inference that transcendental deduction must be correct 
precisely because the empirical deduction is incorrect. (A87/B119) Unfortunately, this argument is 
desperately incomplete. Kant’s rejection of empirical deduction assumes that the empirical path is 
the only rival to the transcendental path. The argument is convincing only if an additional premise 
is justified that there are only two paths of deduction: one is the empirical path, and the other is 
the transcendental path.38 
One could object that it is likely that the empirical and the transcendental path are not jointly 
exhaustive. The limitation of the historical context might make Kant fail to have a survey of the 
alternatives other than the Leibnizian-Wolffian rationalism and the Lockean-Humean empiricism. 
One might wonder, for instance, why the Cartesian rationalism seems not a serious and genuine 
                                                     
36 It is even true of the empiricism. 
37 Kant explicitly claims that “the sole manner of a possible deduction of pure a priori cognition is conceded, namely 
that which takes the transcendental path” (A87/B119). 
38 This might be justified by appeal to the grounding dilemma: either object makes representation possible or 
representation makes object possible. Kant can be regarded as providing an argument by disjunctive syllogism. 
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option for Kant. This question becomes even more pressing when we take into consideration the 
fact that our contemporary non-empiricists are not Kantians, but Cartesians.39  
As we will see, there is some element of truth when Kant takes the empirical path as the only 
rival theory to his critical philosophy in 1781. However, it is not the starting point of Kant’s long 
journey in pursuit of the answer to his puzzle. Before the 1772 Herz letter Kant had begun his 
engagement with other philosophical systems. Neither is it the destination of Kant’s long journey. In 
1780s Kant felt the threat of the middle way and he incorporated the logical fanatical path into the 
1787 Critique; in 1790s the Plato renaissance in Germany led Kant to reconsider the fanatical 
mystical path. In order to illuminate Kant’s sustained effort, we must make reference to his 
publications other than the Critique and to his fragmentary notes so as to establish the list of 
philosophical systems he has taken into account. 
Even if we admit that Kant takes all important philosophers in history under scrutiny, we still 
could raise the doubt whether Kant makes dialogue only with those systems of philosophy that can 
historically contingently come into his view. It is conceivable that there could be other 
philosophical systems in the future or even in an alternative history, which are entirely not 
accessible to Kant. It is likely that Kant’s own system is also overcome by the new systems in the 
future. Therefore, Kant must justify a stronger thesis that all other possible systems of philosophy 
are doomed. 
In reply, Kant is convinced that his puzzle is “the key to the whole secret of metaphysics” 
(AA 10:130), and all important metaphysical systems are virtually making response to the puzzle 
by presupposing some kind of the grounding relation of representation of object. Kant classifies 
the previous great philosophical systems into several categories, which are mutually exclusive and 
jointly exhaustive, and then he reconstructs the spectrum in terms of the model of ground. The 
great philosophical systems appear to be historical and contingent, but each of them occupies a 
unique position in the spectrum. By reconstructing the new philosophical spectrum, Kant elevates 
his examination of the philosophical paths from the historical level to the systematic level. 
Consequently, Kant is in a position to raise knocking-down objections to virtually every possible 
philosophical path by attacking their grounding models of the relation of representation to object. 
Another critically important distinction between Kant’s arguments for the sufficiency of the 
transcendental path and his arguments for its necessity is concerned with the nature of the premise 
of the arguments. In his argument for the sufficiency, Kant starts with non-semantic facts and proceeds 
                                                     
39 See Bonjour 1998 and Bealer 2002. 
16 
 
to the explanation of these facts. These non-semantic facts include the necessary connection of 
objects, the identity of self-consciousness, the necessary connection of concepts in judgment, and 
the singularity of space. In his argument for the necessity, by contrast, Kant starts with the semantic 
facts and then proceeds to the only explanation of these facts by eliminating all other rival theories. 
These semantic facts include the a priori reference of categories and the synthetic a priori truths. The 
non-semantic facts initially appear less relevant to the reality of the categories, and that is where 
the explanatory powers of Kant’s Copernican model of grounding lie.  
The vindication of the necessity of Kant’s transcendental path and the hidden deductive 
character is of vital importance. As far as I can see, the most fatal objection to the project of the 
transcendental deduction is that Kant commits the modal fallacy by conflating the de dicto necessity 
and the de re necessity. This ramifications of the objection destroy the entire Copernican Revolution: 
not only categories but also space and time are thrown into question. As soon as we prove that the 
transcendental path is necessary, we will find that Kant does not make an invalid argument at all. 
The de re claim that empirical objects have necessary properties is not the negligence but the intention 
of Kant’s view of “no necessary connection without necessary instantiation”. 
Furthermore, it enables us to evaluate the Analytic. We should not overestimate the 
independent significance of the Analogies. The friends of transcendental arguments have widely 
believed that transcendental argument represents the best of Kant’s intentions, and they should be 
separated from the context of “transcendental psychology”. Likewise, Guyer has powerfully argued 
for the failure of the project in the Transcendental Deduction and the success of the arguments in 
Kant’s Principles.40 However, arguments in the Analogies cannot stand on their own, because they 
cannot possibly preclude the possibility that our constitutions happen to be representing the 
objects in a systematically accurate way. It is nothing but the ghost of the model of common ground 
Kant attempts to dispel in Transcendental Deduction before the Analogies.41 
 
(g) Aufbau 
My dissertation will be divided into two parts. Part I runs from Chapter 1 to Chapter 5, and 
Part II runs from Chapter 6 to Chapter 9. In Part I, I will argue for the prior assumption that a priori 
                                                     
40 Henrich famously argues that deduction in transcendental deduction is not used in a logical sense, but in a legal 
sense. It does not refer to the traditionally conceived species of inference from general to particular; rather, it refers 
to a variety of practical reasoning. In spite of its plausibility, Henrich’s non-deductive and practical reading of 
deduction does not imply that no logical rigor should be expected or found in transcendental deduction. See Henrich 
1989a. 
41 In effect, this line of thought resonates with Stroud’s famous objection to transcendental argument. See Stroud 
1968.   
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concepts must be the conditions of the objects of experience if they are to be related to objects, 
which Kant calls “the principle of transcendental deduction”. Particularly, I will justify the necessity 
of the transcendental path against the background where explaining synthetic a priori proposition 
is considered as a measure of the success of the grounding model of the reference of representation 
to object. I will reconstruct the philosophical spectrum with reference to the model of the 
representation and the object, and I would like to suggest that Kant has a much more macroscopic 
view on this issue. Kant delineates three most important alternatives by their grounding model, 
and he explicitly dubs different labels on them: (i) for the empirical path, the object makes the 
representation possible; (ii) for the mystical fanatical path, the representation makes the object 
possible; and (iii) for the logical fanatical path, a third thing makes both the representation and the 
object possible. From Chapter 2 to Chapter 4, these three paths will be examined chapter by 
chapter. All of these three paths seem to exhaust all the possible alternatives. However, Kant thinks 
that none of them is desirable; all of them suffer from various objections and run counter to Kant’s 
most committed assumptions: explanatory rationalism, causal realism, and epistemic atheism. In 
Chapter 5, it turns out that Kant discovers a new transcendental path in which the representation 
makes the object possible not in the sense of a priori production but in the sense of a priori 
determination. 
After showing that only the grounding model of the transcendental path is viable in Part I, in 
Part II, I will turn to Kant’s arguments for the reality of the categories by explaining a variety of 
phenomena that are related to yet not identified with synthetic a priori propositions. I believe that 
there are four basic lines of argument drawing on different theoretical resources: the argument 
from cognition, the argument from self-consciousness, the arguments from judgment, and the 
official argument. From Chapter 6 to Chapter 9, these four lines of arguments will be addressed 
one by one. The previously established Copernican grounding model can serve as a test for these 
arguments; any picture drawn by each independent argument should be compatible with and even 
entail the Copernican model. Metaphysically, I suggest that all these arguments lead to a modally 
distinctive metaphysical picture of the world: no necessary connection without necessary 
instantiation. Methodologically, I propose that none of these arguments is anti-skeptical; rather, all 
of them carry heavy philosophical presuppositions (the actuality of science, objective 
representation with semantic value, personal identity, the truth-claim of synthetic propositions, the 
laws of nature, etc.). In my view, Kant’s fundamental strategy is explanatory in character: to explore 
the theoretical potential of these philosophical premises and to make them compatible with each 
other so as to produce maximum explanatory benefits. Along the course of exploration, Kant’s 
most fundamental assumptions on theoretical norms will also be revealed. 
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(h) Notes on the Texts 
Sources: All references to Kant are to the Akademie Ausgabe: Immanuel Kant, Kant’s gesammelte 
Schriften, ed. Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften and Deutsche Akademie der 
Wissenschaften zu Berlin (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1900–). The Critique of Pure Reason is cited according 
to the standard A/B edition and page number (e.g. Axxx/Bxxx). And other works than the Critique 
of Pure Reason are cited according to volume and page number (e.g. AA x:xx).  
Translation: Unless otherwise noted, the translations of Kant’s text are mainly from The 
Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. A few of them are modified when I find 
necessary. 
Abbreviation: I will refer to Kant’s individual works by abbreviations of their English titles 
with key words in their titles (e.g. Critique for Critique of Pure Reason). In particular, I will often refer 
to the two editions of Critique of Pure Reason as 1781 Critique and 1787 Critique in order to call 
attention to the chronological order of their publication and the development of his views. The 
abbreviations for the titles of other Kant’s works will be noted in the body part of this work. 
Emphasis: For the quotation from Kant, I will follow the editors of the Cambridge Edition 
in rendering Kant’s original Latin in italics and the original Fettdruck in bold. Within quoted Kantian 
texts, my emphasis is still indicated and explicitly noted by italics. 
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Chapter 1  The Problems of the Transcendental Deduction 
1.1 Introduction 
While the label of transcendental deduction becomes popular only after the publication of 
Critique of Pure Reason in 1781, the explicit formulation of the general question can at least be traced 
to Kant’s famous letter to his former student Marcus Herz on February 21st. 1772. Even before 
1772, it was not without trace in its historical origin.42 
In fact, Kant has different formulations of the problem of transcendental deduction, and he 
is convinced that it is theoretically profitable to resolve the puzzle of transcendental deduction. 
According to Kant’s official claim, the Transcendental Deduction addresses the question as to how 
concepts can be related to objects a priori. According to the Introduction to the entire Critique, the 
Transcendental Deduction is supposed to answer the question as to how the a priori synthetic 
propositions in physical science are possible. Despite the different formulations, there is little 
difficulty to recognize them as the same problem. In addition to the central problem, the 
Transcendental Deduction brings us many other explanatory bonuses that are not formulated 
explicitly. The A-Deduction offers an explanation of how experience, or empirical cognition, is 
generated, by means of which it complements an account of the metaphysical origin of objects. 
The B-Deduction gives an answer to the question as to on what the empirical synthetic judgment 
is grounded. 
Before we inquire into transcendental deduction, I would like to make brief comments on 
question as to whether an independent study of transcendental deduction is possible. By and large, 
this question usually is whether the beginning of a study of transcendental deduction could be 
independent of Kant’s idealism. Initially, it seems plausible to suggest that the project of 
transcendental deduction depends on his theory of idealism, since it seems that Kant’s idealistic 
theory of space and time both restricts and inspires Kant. 
On the one hand, Kant’s theory of idealism appears temporally earlier than transcendental 
deduction. It seems that Kant’s solution to the puzzle could be inspired by his views on the 
transcendental idealism of space and time.43 Kant’s articulation of idealism appears in his On the 
Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intellectual World (1770)44, where the four space-arguments 
and time arguments have taken their standard shape. However, the general problem of the 
grounding relation of the representation to the object was formulated in the famous Herz letter in 
                                                     
42 For a valuable study on the history of transcendental deduction see Carl 1989. 
43 See Rosefeldt 2013.  
44 Abbreviated as Inaugural Dissertation thereafter. 
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1772 and the publication of his solution to the problem came as late as the publication of the 1781 
Critique. 
On the other hand, Kant’s view on categories in the Transcendental Deduction could be 
restricted by his views on transcendental ideality of space and time in the Aesthetic. The above 
historical facts accord well with the architectonic of Critique, where the Aesthetic also precedes the 
Transcendental Deduction. In the Critique, Kant establishes the idealism of space and time and 
therefore he establishes the mind-dependence of physical objects. It seems that when we begin to 
settle the issue of transcendental deduction, we have already been thrown into an idealistic world. 
The conclusion of the Transcendental Deduction must be consistent with the consequences of 
idealism. 
While I agree that the Transcendental Deduction depends on idealism in one sense or another, 
it would be too hasty to conclude that Transcendental Deduction must presuppose the result of 
Aesthetic that space and time are the forms of sensible intuition. The idealism of physical objects 
turns out be a necessary condition for the objective reality of categories. It does not imply that in 
the very beginning of transcendental deduction we have committed to the theory of idealism. 
Moreover, Kant’s theory of space and time is far from the only way he arrives at idealism. Kant 
has other means to derive his doctrine of idealism without making an appeal to his theory of 
sensibility.45 
In section 1.2, I will examine Kant’s formulation of the problem of representation of object 
in the famous Herz letter. I will propose that Kant’s puzzle concerns the ground of the reference 
of intellectual concepts, and it should be understood as meta-semantic or, more specifically, 
metaphysical in character. In this light, the difficulty of transcendental deduction is that it seems 
that no grounding model could match the case of the reference of categories. In section 1.3, I will 
examine Kant’s formulation of the question of how the synthetic a priori propositions are possible. 
I propose that Kant’s previous objective reality formulation and this synthetic apriority formulation 
essentially address the same question, in spite of some differences. I suggest that it is profitable to 
understand respectively the synthetic a priori propositions as explanandum, and the objectivity reality 
of categories as explanans. In section 1.4, I will survey the philosophical systems that are taken into 
account by Kant: the system of occult quality, the empirical path, the mystical fanatical path, and 
the logical fanatical path, and then reconstruct a spectrum for these systems with reference to the 
grounding relation of representation to object. In section 1.5, I will consider Kant’s most 
fundamental assumptions: the explanatory rationalism, the causal realism, and the epistemic 
                                                     
45 See Chapter 5. 
21 
 
atheism, which play crucial roles in Kant’s systematic rejection of the previous philosophical 
systems. 
 
1.2 The Secret of Metaphysics 
1.2.1 A Meta-semantic Reading of Kant’s Puzzle 
In his famous letter to Herz on February 21, 1772, Kant writes that “I noticed that I still 
lacked something essential, something that in my long metaphysical studies I, as well as others, and 
failed to consider and which in fact constitutes the key to the whole secret of metaphysics, hitherto 
still hidden from itself. I asked myself this question: On what ground is the relation (Beziehung) of 
that in us which we call ‘representation’ to the object based?” (AA 10:130) 
In the most general sense, a representation could be mental, linguistic, or pictorial, etc. Since 
Kant keeps mental representations in mind, in the following I will take representations as mental 
one without qualification. Kant’s mental conception of representation could be understood in two 
different senses. In most cases, representation could be understood in a broad sense in which it 
signifies the mental state whatsoever. In this sense, the generic term of representation is primitive, and 
it cannot be defined non-circularly.46 As Kant indicates, not all mental states are representational, 
i.e., have a relation to object. Occasionally, Kant seems to suggest that representation could be 
understood in a narrower sense, in which representation refers to representational mental states.47 The 
narrow sense of representation is synonymous with Kant’s technical notion of cognition, which is 
defined as the conscious representation of object.48 Representation in the narrow sense is a species 
of representation in the broad sense. In this narrow sense, representation implies intentionality, 
and therefore all representations are representational. Since in the Herz letter Kant seems to assume 
that representation must have relation to object, here I take representation to be used in the narrow 
sense.49 
The term “relation” in locution “the relation of representation to object” is both ambiguous 
and obscure. Firstly, the term ‘relation’ does not specify the nature of the relation in which 
representation and object stand. Secondly, the term ‘relation’ does not specify the asymmetry of the 
relation in which representation and object stand. In my view, the relation of representation to 
                                                     
46 In his numerous transcripts of lectures on logic, this view appears repeatedly. See the Vienna Logic (AA 24:805). 
47 For instance, Kant hints that all representations “represent something in me only insofar as they belong with all 
the others to one consciousness”. (A116) 
48 See Chapter 6 for a more systematic survey of the definition of cognition. 
49 As we will see in Chapter 5, Kant’s commitment to the representationality or intentionality of representation is 
much deeper than we might think. 
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object is a semantic relation of reference. Obviously, the relation of representation to object a binary 
relation, one between representation x and object y. Firstly, the relation of representation is 
asymmetrical; if one can say x represents y, it does not follow that y represents x. The semantic 
relation of reference is partly transitive; if x represents y, and y represents z,, then it does not preclude 
the possibility that x represents z.50 In the following, I will use ‘reference’ or ‘reference relation’ in 
place of the generic term of ‘relation’ to indicate the semantic and asymmetrical character of 
representing relation. 
Although I propose a semantic reading, contra to a causal reading, of the relation of representation 
to object in the Herz letter, in any event it does not follow that Kant’s question is a semantic one 
intended to show that representations refer to objects. As Kant writes clearly, the question he has 
in mind is not about “the relation of that in us which we call ‘representation’ to the object”, which 
is a semantic question. Rather, his question is about the ground of “the relation of that in us which 
we call ‘representation’ to the object”, which is not merely a semantic question.  
In order to illustrate the point, one analogy to the theory of reference in the philosophy of 
language could be made in service. The reference in language is a relation between linguistic 
expression and object. One central task of semantics is to assign semantic values to linguistic 
expression. Reference is widely regarded as the primary semantic value of the linguistic expression. 
By assigning reference to linguistic expression one can have a minimal semantics, i.e. referential 
semantics, for a purely extensional language. But referential semantics merely provides us with the 
answer to the question what the referent of a linguistic expression is. Referential semantics by itself does 
not answer further questions such as what it is for a reference relation to obtain and what the ground of the 
reference of a linguistic expression to its object is. This further kind of questions is meta-question. Since the 
target-question is a semantic question, it is a meta-semantic question. It is the task of meta-
semantics to answer the question by developing a theory of reference. 
Both linguistic expression and mental representation are intentional in character. The above 
analysis of referential expression could be extended and applied to mental representation. In the 
same vein, what Kant finds puzzling is not the referential relation of representation to object, but 
the ground of the reference of representation to object. In other words, what Kant finds problematic 
is not the first-order question of reference, but a meta-question of the ground of reference. Construed 
in this light, Kant’s question is not semantic, but meta-semantic. 
                                                     
50 Kant’s discussion of the second-order representation is not common. It seems that sometimes Kant holds that 
judgment is a second-order representation. In his discussion of the logical use of understanding, Kant writes that 
“[j]udgment is therefore the mediate cognition of an object, hence the representation of a representation of it” (A68/B93). 
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The question of the ground of reference relation is not only meta-semantic, but it is also 
metaphysical. The meta-semantic question could be metaphysical, but it also could be epistemological. 
How could we determine the precise character of the meta-semantic question? Note that Kant is 
inquiring into the ground of the reference relation, it is natural to suppose that he is concerned 
primarily with a metaphysical question. The question is metaphysical not only in a loose historical 
as well as a distinctive Kantian sense but also in the contemporary sense. First, the notion of ground 
is an important metaphysical notion in German philosophy in the eighteenth century. Wolff, 
Baumgarten, Crusius and many others make a continuous contribution to the philosophical 
literature concerning the notion of ground.51 Its centrality in Kant is reflected by the fact that the 
question of the ground of reference is referred to “the key to the whole secret of metaphysics”. 
Second, this question is metaphysical in a contemporary proper sense. One typical meta-question 
with regard to a specific domain is to ask whether there exist facts and property distinctive of that 
domain. In meta-ethics, we can ask whether the moral discourse commits us to the existence of 
moral facts and moral properties. In meta-semantics, we can ask whether the semantic discourse 
commits us to the existence of semantic facts and semantic properties. Both of them are widely 
recognized as characteristically metaphysical questions.52 
Kant’s question is not metaphysical in the sense of coping with the ontology of semantic facts and 
semantic properties such as reference. Rather, it is metaphysical in the sense of giving the ground of semantic 
facts and semantic properties. In effect, Kant is asking how the reference of representation to object is 
possible. One might object that the meta-semantic reading of Kant’s puzzle comes down to 
nothing but a causal reading of the “relation of representation to object” which I have rejected 
earlier. To be sure, Kant is not always careful to distinguish the different senses of relation, and 
sometimes he directly hits upon the question of metaphysical ground without mentioning the 
semantic surprastructure.53 Nevertheless, I believe that it is profitable to disambiguate the distinct 
levels of the question. As we will see in Chapter 5, it is precisely this effort that enables us to resolve 
the apparent inconsistency or circularity in Kant’s Transcendental Deduction. 
In pursuing the question of the ground of the reference, Kant is tacitly assuming that the 
reference of representation to object must have a ground: for any representation x and object y, if 
x refers to y, there must be a ground g for the reference to hold. The assumption of the ground 
                                                     
51 For detailed discussions see Watkins 2005 and Stang 2016. 
52 For Kant grounding is a metaphysical binary relation between two things, and derivatively between two facts. It is 
both asymmetrical and transitive. Precisely because ground is also relational, the confusion between two levels arise. 
53 Take Kant’s paradigmatic formulation of the question in §14 for example. After introducing the necessary relation 
of representation to its object, Kant immediately touches upon the metaphysical relation of making-possible, i.e., that 
of grounding. (A92/B124-125) 
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must be understood against Kant’s larger picture of the general assumption of explanatory 
rationalism, and thus metaphysical rationalism. Explanatory rationalism is the view that everything 
can be explained. Although Kant never makes it explicit in his publication, there is no doubt that 
explanatory rationalism is precisely his working assumption. Applied to the specific realm of reference, 
explanatory rationalism implies that every reference relation has a ground. If representability of all 
empirical representation has their own ground, then a priori ones should have, too. 
Kant also frequently employs the term “objective reality” or “objective validity” to signify 
“the relation of representation to object”.54 The question is whether the notion of objective reality 
is semantic or metaphysical. Since the objective reality of a representation could be proved by both 
its being lawful and its being a fact, i.e., by both quid juris and quid facti, it seems that Kant imposes 
metaphysical constraints upon the semantic relation of reference. In addition, in some argument 
Kant presupposes a strong notion of objectivity which demands not only the relationship of 
correspondence but also that of the real ground. Therefore, I propose that by the objective reality 
what Kant has in mind is the meta-semantic notion of really grounded reference. 
 
1.2.2 Kinds of Representation and their Grounding Models 
Before we answer the question what the ground is for reference relation to hold, we should 
be clear of the domain-specific nature of ground. Different kinds of representation have different 
kinds of reference relation, and different kinds of reference relation have different kinds of ground. 
Then, what kinds of representations are there for Kant?  
Let’s reconstruct the kinds of representation according to the twofold distinction as follows. 
In terms of the source of representation, all representations are divided into sensible and intellectual 
ones. In terms of the immediacy of representations, all representations are divided between intuitive and 
conceptual ones. According to the combination of the twofold distinction, there are four kinds of 
representations that can be taken under discussion: empirical intuition, intellectual intuition, 
empirical concepts, and intellectual concepts. In spite of the difference, the relation of each and 
every kind of representation must have a ground.  
                                                     
54 I think that in most cases objective reality and objective validity are equivalent. Kant also uses objective validity in 
other different senses. Occasionally, Kant equates objective validity as truth; (A125) in Prologomena, Kant defines the 
objective validity of a judgment as necessary universal validity (for everyone), which is usually understood as truth-
capable. (AA 4:298) Therefore, I will only use the term ‘objective reality’ to signify the relation of representation to 
object and leaves term ‘objective validity’ for the notion of truth-aptness, which has been convincingly defended by 
Prauss (1971) and Thöle (1991). 
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Unfortunately, in the Herz letter Kant does not discuss the four kinds of representation in 
the way I have suggested earlier. In fact, Kant draws distinctions within intuition and within 
intellect respectively. Insofar as intuitions are concerned, the relation of representation to the object 
in terms of passive-active distinction, namely, two opposite directions of causation. Insofar as 
intellectual representations are concerned, the relation of representation to the object in terms of 
intuitive-discursive distinction, namely, the two distinct kinds of intellect. Since intuition and 
intellect is not mutually exclusive, this twofold distinction is doomed to be extensionally intersected and 
unexhausted. Therefore, the twofold distinction produces only three kinds of representations. It is 
in the case of intellectual intuition where the twofold distinction has an overlap, whereas it is in the 
case of intellectual concept where the twofold distinction has a gap. Nonetheless, the overlap and 
the gap in Kant’s own twofold distinction does not bother us. My focus is on what the ground of 
every kind of representation is, rather than on whether the division of representations is logically 
acceptable. It suffices if the result of the division is jointly exhaustive. Fortunately, Kant adds the 
discussion of intellectual concept to the list, and thus there are four kinds of representation which 
are extensionally exhaustive. 
Although every relation of representation to object has a ground, they have entirely different 
modes of ground. On Kant’s view, the reference of sensible intuition rests on the fact of human 
affection where object makes representation possible; the reference of intellectual intuition rests on 
the fact of divine creation that representation makes object possible; and the reference of empirical 
concept rests on the fact of logical reflection that object makes representation possible. 
Underlying both cases of human affection and divine creation it is the model of cause and effect that is 
at work. On this model, the effect is brought into existence by its cause.55 However, empirical 
concepts are acquired from sensible intuition not in the way sensible intuitions arise from the object 
through causation. While the derivation of empirical concepts can be loosely subsumed under the 
generic model of ground to consequence, the species of the model of cause and effect loses its weight here. 
As Kant makes clear, it is the matter rather than the existence of empirical concept that is derived 
from sensible intuition. Therefore, it does not fall under the category of the model of causation. In 
addition to its matter, the form of the empirical concept is originated from the logical use of 
understanding.56 
On Kant’s view, the reference of sensible intuition rests on human affection where the object 
makes the representation possible; the reference of intellectual intuition rests on divine creation where 
                                                     
55 The underlying assumption is that this analysis is unobjectionable only insofar as existence is concerned. 
56 For a detailed account for the logical origin of concept see Kant’s Logic (AA 9:94-95). 
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the representation makes the object possible; and the reference of empirical concept rests on logical 
reflection where the object makes the representation possible.  
The ground of the reference of representation to object rests upon a grounding relation of ground 
to consequence. Kant is committed to the following assumption: if there is a real ground for the 
reference relation of x to y to hold, then the ground is either the fact that x is the ground of y, or 
the fact that y is the ground of x. The semantic relation of reference derives its referential power from 
the metaphysical grounding relation between representation and object. Therefore, Kant is committed 
to a broadly causal theory of reference: for any representation x and object y, x refers to y only if x 
is the ground of y, or y is the ground of x. In the case of the reference of representation to object, 
there is no external ground can be pursued; it cannot be that it is z that grounds both x and y. The 
candidate ground can only be internal. Since grounding relation is also binary, either x grounds y 
or y grounds x. 
All of these three kinds of representation can be made intelligible, for all of them are taking 
either horn of the grounding dilemma, though the specific model might differ. However, things are 
different in the case of intellectual concepts. We simply cannot find out which horn intellectual 
concepts can be caught on, for “they are neither caused by the object nor do they bring the object 
itself into being” (AA 10:130). Intellectual concepts simply cannot accommodate with any alternative 
in the previously discussed framework. Intellectual concepts are neither intellectual intuition, for 
they are discursive and general representations, which cannot bring the object into existence; nor 
are they empirical concepts, for they have their origin in the nature of soul, rather than in the object. 
To put it in another way, they are something between intellectual intuitions and empirical concepts. 
It is precisely because they do not fall in either category to fit any mode of explanation that makes 
them a puzzle. In fact, any one of the other three models of grounding representation to object 
cannot even shed light on the case of intellectual concepts, either. 
There could be two responses to this predicament of intellectual concepts. One response 
could be that intellectual concepts cannot take either horn of the dilemma because the dilemma is 
false. The other response could be that intellectual concepts can take either horn of the dilemma 
because the dilemma should be properly understood. In the Critique, Kant makes move along the 
line of the second response. Kant does think that there is a dilemma, and the case of a priori 
concepts of understanding must take one horn of the dilemma. I will develop it in Chapter 5. 
 
1.3 The Mystery of Metaphysics 
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1.3.1 A New Riddle? 
In his 1772 letter to Herz, Kant claims that “the whole secret of metaphysics” lies in the general 
question of the ground of the reference of our representations to object. In light of this novel 
articulation of metaphysical problem, Kant’s puzzle is how pure concepts of understanding can be related 
to object. In addition, Kant maintains that in his long metaphysical studies this secret fails to be 
considered by him as well as other philosophers so far. Presumably, Kant is not saying that this 
question has never been tackled in any guise in the history of philosophy. Rather, Kant is saying 
that no one in history has explicitly formulated this problem in the general form, and attached the 
unparalleled importance to it. If the problem of the ground of reference is taken literally as “the 
whole secret of metaphysics”, it is natural to suppose that the grounding problem should stand as 
the leading question in Kant’s future magnum opus in metaphysics, whatever title his masterpiece bears. 
The metaphysical scene in Kant’s mature work Critique appears to be a little bit unexpected, 
however. To be sure, in the Book of Doctrine Kant’s general strategy is first to isolate and identify 
the a priori elements in the faculties of sensibility, understanding, and reason, and then to show 
whether (and how) these a priori representations are related to objects. Transcendental Aesthetic, 
Transcendental Analytic, and Transcendental Dialectic share the following general argumentative 
structure in common: 
 
(1) For certain representations Rs, Rs are a priori. 
(2) If Rs are a priori representations, then they are objectively valid. 
(3) Rs are objectively valid. (By modus ponens) 
 
Everything goes well. However, the centrality of the grounding problem seems to be 
compromised by the Introduction in the 1781 Critique. After introducing the distinction between 
analytic and synthetic judgments, Kant writes “that in synthetic judgments I must have in addition 
to the concept of the subject something else (X) on which the understanding depends in cognizing a 
predicate that does not lie in that concept as nevertheless belonging to it” (A7-8). In the case of 
empirical judgments or judgments of experience, there is no difficulty here, and the third thing X is 
“the complete experience of the object I think through concept” (B11).  
In the case of synthetic a priori judgments, however, the third thing X is “mystery” (A10/B23), 
as Kant claims. Kant stresses the importance and novelty of the formulation of the question as 
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such. On Kant’s view, from ancient times philosophers failed to raise this question. If the question 
of philosophy is misidentified, there is no wonder why all great philosophical systems hitherto 
constitute nothing more than merely vain attempts. In confrontation with the mystery of synthetic 
a priori judgments, Kant identifies the task of elucidation of the mystery as “uncover the ground of 
the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments” (A10).  
In the 1787 Critique, the conflict between the question of the objective reality of representation 
and that of the synthetic apriority of judgments is not alleviated but aggravated. In the 1781 Critique, 
the distraction of synthetic a priori judgments is at most disturbing. In the 1787 Critique, however, 
Kant’s official preoccupation on the question of synthetic a priori judgments is made even more 
evident, and it is particularly so in the new additions Kant makes to the 1787 Critique. 
The Introduction to the 1787 Critique is more detailed in length and more carefully designed 
in structure. In this revised and enlarged Introduction, the added Section V and Section VI are 
meant to sharpen the focus on synthetic a priori judgments. Section V is titled as “Synthetic a priori 
judgments are contained as principles in all theoretical sciences of reason” (B14), which intends to establish 
that synthetic a priori judgments do exist, after explicating what synthetic a priori judgments mean in 
Section IV. Section VI is titled “The general problem of pure reason” (B19) is used to refer to the “how 
are synthetic judgments a priori possible”. Here is how Kant introduces the general problem of pure 
reason: “[t]he real problem of pure reason is now contained in the question: How are synthetic 
judgments a priori possible?”(ibid.) Then Kant explicitly links the fate of metaphysics with the 
failure of the identification of “the real problem”. While Kant’s conviction is retained that there 
must be some fundamental mistake in previous systems of metaphysics, now it seems that Kant’s 
vision on the nature of the problem is radically transformed. As Kant writes: 
 
That metaphysics has until now remained in such a vacillating state of uncertainty and contradictions 
is to be ascribed solely to the cause that no one has previously thought of this problem and perhaps 
even of the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments. (B19) 
 
In the 1781 Critique Kant proceeds in the Doctrine of Elements as if the central question of 
synthetic apriority does not exist. In contrast, in the 1787 Critique the question of synthetic apriority 
not only is formulated in the Introduction, but also plays a conspicuous role in the body part of 
Critique. In fact, Kant’s brief analysis of the logical order between that-question and how-possible 
question In the Introduction has betrayed that the argumentative potential of the question is to be 
exploited. It creates the expectations of the repercussions in the structure of the argument, and it 
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is made felt especially in Transcendental Aesthetic. Kant makes substantial changes in both the 
content and the structure of the Aesthetic. Based on the Prolegomena, Kant not only rewrites the 
arguments from mathematics, where the actuality of synthetic a priori propositions is indispensably 
involved as the premises, but also separates them from Metaphysical Exposition and allocates it 
under Transcendental Exposition to indicate its independence from the old space and time 
arguments originated in his Inaugural Dissertation. At the end of the Aesthetic in the 1787 Critique, 
Kant adds a brief section titled “Conclusion of the Transcendental Aesthetic”. In Conclusion, Kant gives 
a definitive and explicit answer to the question of synthetic a priori propositions in order to show 
that this question is always taken seriously and kept in mind: 
 
Here we now have one of the required pieces for the solution of the general problem of transcendental 
philosophy - how are synthetic a priori propositions possible? - namely pure a priori intuitions, 
space and time, in which, if we want to go beyond the given concept in an a priori judgment, we 
encounter that which is to be discovered a priori and synthetically connected with it, not in the concept 
but in the intuition that corresponds to it; but on this ground such a judgment never extends beyond 
the objects of the senses and can hold only for objects of possible experience. (B73) 
 
This new formulation of the mystery of metaphysics in terms of the ground of the synthetic 
a priori truths brings about a twofold worry. On the superficial level, it seems that the official claim of 
elucidating the mystery in the Introduction stands in tension with the actual general argumentative 
structure in the Aesthetic, the Analytic, and the Dialectic. It creates the impression that Kant raises 
one question in the Introduction and then answers another distinct question in the following body part. 
On the bottom level, it seems that in the Critique we have a superficially distinct question from 
Kant’s puzzle in the Herz letter. One might wonder whether Kant changes his mind in identifying 
the problem of metaphysics, or whether the centrality of the question of the ground of reference 
is compromised or even replaced by another question. 
 
1.3.2 The Objective Reality and the Synthetic Apriority  
In order to discharge the twofold worry, I would like to clarify the relationship between the 
between objective reality formulation and synthetic apriority formulation of Kant’s puzzle. One 
charitable proposal is that the two superficially distinct questions are virtually identical. Many striking 
parallels could be found in the way Kant formulates and answers the question. The label “mystery” 
hidden in synthetic a priori judgments is analogous to the “secret of metaphysics” in the Herz letter. 
The manner in which Kant his puzzle in the Critique is reminiscent of that in the Herz letter Both 
30 
 
the Herz letter and the Critique introduces the semantic dimension that is essentially representational. 
The former introduces the reference of concepts, while the latter introduces the truth of judgment. 
Both the Herz letter and the Critique concerns not the semantic question, but the meta-semantic 
question of the ground of the semantic fact. Kant explicitly identifies the endeavor to decipher the 
mystery of reason as to “uncover the ground of the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments” (A10). 
In some other place, Kant suggests that the question of the ground of something is equivalent to the 
question of how something is possible by using them interchangeably. Again, we come across a striking 
parallel of transcendental deduction to the philosophy of language. Kant is committed to a general 
causal theory of semantics: not only reference but also truth must have some causal ground such 
that they could perform their representational function. Both in the Herz letter and in the Critique 
Kant articulates a general question and then identifies one species of the general question as a 
philosophical puzzle. In both cases the ground of empirical concept and the ground of the 
empirical judgment are unproblematic. In the Herz letter, Kant believes that there is difficulty in 
understanding the ground of the reference of a priori concepts. In the Critique, Kant does not think 
that we run into troubles in explaining the ground of the synthetic a priori truths.57 Besides these 
interesting parallels, even Kant himself occasionally slides from the question of synthetic apriority 
to that of objective reality. (A155-157/B194-196) 
Despite the striking parallel of the question of objective reality with that of synthetic apriority, 
we should be cautious to make such a straightforward identification since that the generality of the 
scope of the two questions is different. The difference in the scope of the two questions arises 
from the multiple roles played by the pure concepts of understanding. The pure concepts of 
understanding can have different uses in synthetic judgment. First, synthetic judgment involves the 
explicit use of pure concepts of understanding. Take the concept of the relation of cause and effect 
for instance: 
 
(1) Everything that happens has a cause. 
 
The concept of cause functions as predicate and thereby makes explicit appearance in the 
synthetic proposition. However, the use of pure concepts of understanding in judgments is not 
                                                     
57 We can even formulate an analogous dilemma for synthetic truths: for synthetic truths either experience makes 
synthetic truth possible or synthetic truth judgment makes experience possible. The former case is synthetic 
empirical judgment, while the latter case is synthetic a priori judgment. This fictional dilemma for synthetic 
judgments seems to fall under the category of “synthetic representation” (A92/B124), whose use is introduced by 
Kant’s into his first formulation of the grounding dilemma in §14 of the Critique. 
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exhausted by its explicit use in synthetic a priori judgments. They also play a role in their implicit 
use in synthetic empirical judgments such as: 
 
(2) All bodies are heavy.  
(3) The sun warms the stone. 
 
In the first example, the concept of bodies and that of heavy instantiate the inherence relation 
between substance and accident, while in the second example the concept of sun-warming and that 
of stone-warmed invoke the causation relation between cause and effect.  
In many texts after the 1781 Critique Kant assigns the various roles to the categories. In 1783 
Prologomena, Kant confers the truth-conductive role to the implicit use of pure concepts so as to 
elevate the subjectively valid judgments of perception to the objectively valid judgments of 
experience. In 1787 Critique, Kant assigns the role of determiner to the implicit use of pure concepts 
so as to fix the undetermined relation between concept and judgment. If pure concepts of 
understanding play a role in synthetic empirical judgments as well as in synthetic a priori judgments, 
the previously suggested parallel between the two questions is not entirely true, but virtually true. 
 
1.3.3 Data and Theory 
The above analysis shows not the identity but the parallelism between the two questions. In 
fact, Kant explicitly claims that that the answer to the possibility of the synthetic a priori truth is 
nothing other than the ground of a priori reference, namely, the grounding model of the 
representation of the object. This is made most evident in the place where Kant introduces his own 
Copernican Revolution: 
 
Up to now it has been assumed that all our cognition must conform to the objects; but all attempts to 
find out something about them a priori through concepts that would extend our cognition have, on this 
presupposition, come to nothing. 
Hence let us once try whether we do not get farther with the problems of metaphysics by 
assuming that the objects must conform to our cognition, which would agree better with the requested 
possibility of an a priori cognition of them, which is to establish something about objects before they 
are given to us. (Bxvi) 
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The assumption that “all our cognition must conform to the objects” and the assumption that 
“the objects must conform to our cognition” are two grounding models of the reference of 
representations to objects. In this context, they are employed for the reference of the intellectual 
concepts, but for testing whether we could make progress in explaining the synthetic a priori truths. 
Kant further suggests that the relationship between the synthetic a priori truths and the model 
that pure concepts ground objects is nothing but the relationship between data and a theory.  Kant 
identifies the existence of synthetic a priori propositions as data and identifies the relation of 
representation to object as theory, or rather, the assumption of a certain theory. If the existence of 
synthetic a priori propositions is regarded as data, it means that their existence is non-negotiated. 
Kant would not argue with those who deny the existence of synthetic a priori propositions, just as 
he would not argue with those who deny the existence of the regularity in nature.  
Synthetic a priori propositions become a definitive criterion to examine whether all the theories 
that had been put forward in history are successful. If explaining the possibility of synthetic a priori 
propositions is the problem of metaphysics, then we can define the success of any metaphysical 
system as such: for any metaphysical theory T, T is a successful theory if and only if T explains the 
possibility of synthetic a priori propositions. Even Kant’s own theory is no exception. Kant’s own 
theory could be rejected as well if it does not explain the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments. 
Therefore, it also enables the reader to see whether transcendental philosophy fulfills the promises it 
makes. 
If all previous philosophical theories are nothing but a series of failures, it is very natural to 
conjecture that it must be the case that the previously failed systems might share a common false 
assumption in their theories. Guided by this idea, the task now is not only to revise those old theories 
but also to identify and abandon the false assumption to accommodate with data.58 In the case of 
explaining synthetic apriority, the assumption Kant makes explicit and brings before us is the model 
representation and object, or of mind and world. If Kant’s conjecture stands, then the correct 
grounding model of representation and object should help to generate the explanation of the data of 
synthetic a priori propositions. 
One might ask why Kant does not instead continue taking the reference of representation to 
object as data. As we have seen in 1.1, the ground of the reference of representation to object 
precisely presupposes that the existence of the semantic relation of categories to objects. In other 
                                                     
58 Any philosophical theory makes a set of assumptions: some of them are more explicit, while some of them are 
more implicit. Consider Aristotle’s classical foundationalist theory of the structure of knowledge and justification. 
One crucial assumption Aristotle makes is that the world is knowable, or we do have knowledge. 
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words, Kant makes the a priori reference as data. If we formulate Kant’s puzzle in terms of the 
ground of the reference of categories to objects, then we are assuming the reference of concepts. If 
we formulate Kant’s puzzle in terms of the ground of the synthetic a priori propositions, then we 
are assuming the truth of propositions. I think that we should not overestimate the difference. As 
we will see, Kant does offer such an argument from the reference of categories in Transcendental 
Deduction. While “the manner of presentation” alters, “the ground of explanation” remains 
unchanged. I think that the most important reason is perhaps that such that they are more suitable 
to be the point of departure. The truth of synthetic a priori propositions is instantiated by those 
successful sciences, and widely recognized by different philosophers. By contrast, different 
philosophers vary in what kind of representation exists and whether it should play a key role, so 
the reference of representation is called into question at the very beginning.59 In fact, we have found 
that even in the Herz letter different philosophical systems seem to prefer different kinds of 
representation. 
In the following chapters, we will see how Kant takes three philosophical paths under 
consideration and finally rejects them. The reason all philosophical paths are assessed to fail 
precisely because none of them can successfully explain the possibility of synthetic a priori 
propositions. The fact that the inability of the previous philosophical systems cannot elucidate the 
“mystery” is merely a symptom. Kant’s final diagnosis is that all of them assume an incorrect model 
of mind and world. The fact the previous attempts do not challenge the traditional model of mind 
and world is the ultimate reason why they are doomed to fail.  
 
1.4 Reconstruction of the Philosophical Spectrum 
1.4.1 Lists of Systems 
Kant surprisingly has a quite complete list of philosophical systems at his disposal as early as 
in the Reflection 4275, which is dated to one year or two immediately before his 1772 letter to 
Herz. In R4275 Kant writes: 
 
Intuitions of the senses (in accordance with sensible form and matter) yield synthetic propositions that 
are objective. Crusius explains the real principle of reason on the basis of the systemate praeformationis 
(from subjective principiis); Locke, on the basis of influxu physico like Aristotele; Plato and Malebranche, from 
intuitu intellectuali; we, on the basis of epigenesist from the use of the natural laws of reason. 
                                                     
59 From the truth-conditional semantical point of view, truth seems to be more fundamental.  
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The common sense of human beings, sensus veri et falsi, is a qualitas occulta.60 (AA 17: 492) 
 
Since the real principles of reason are taken as the target of explanation, it seems to be 
assumed without proof that everyone believes that there are such principles. I take “the real 
principle of reason” in question as the equivalent expression of “the real principle” formulated in 
1772 letter to Herz. Whether the real principles pertain to reason or to understanding does not 
matter, for Kant’s the distinction between understanding and reason has not yet been well-
established, and it is not surprising to find the frequent interchangeable use of understanding and 
reason within. Even in the Herz letter, Kant is careless about the difference between understanding 
and reason. Kant writes, for instance, “I sought to reduce transcendental philosophy (that is to say, 
all the concepts belonging to completely pure reason) to a certain number of categories” (AA 10:132). 
However, Kant was previously talking about the intellectual concepts that pertain to human 
understanding. 
According to Kant, for the explanation of the real principles there exist five alternatives: the 
preformation-system represented by Crusius, the system of physical influx by Aristotle and Locke, 
the system of intellectual intuition represented by Plato and Malebranche, and the system of 
epigenesis advocated by Kant himself, and finally the system of occult qualities for which no 
representative is mentioned. For explaining the real principles, the five rival systems appeal 
respectively to a variety of representations as the key to the solution: Aristotle and Locke resort a 
posteriori acquired concepts, Plato and Malebranche to a priori innate intuitions, Crusius to a priori 
innate concepts, and Kant to a priori acquired concepts. It is remarkable that this early list of the 
philosophical systems is quite complete; it includes all the three main positions to which that Kant 
will devote his most efforts in his subsequent years. As we shall see in the immediate following, the 
identification of and insistence on these five basic rival systems are retained well into the 1780s.61 
This list of rival philosophical systems in the early 1770s is far from the only one in Kant’s 
writing. Kant’s most detailed discussion of the different paths taken by rival theories is contained 
in R5637 written in the 1780s: 
                                                     
60 The focus of this note is on the different ways of the acquisition of putative pure representations, which should be 
a task for metaphysical deduction or transcendental derivation, rather than for transcendental deduction. Different 
ways of the acquisition of putative representation yield different kinds of representation. As I have noted earlier, each 
kind of representation is matched with a distinctive mode of the ground of the reference of representation to object. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that Kant attaches the labels of these systems to the grounding models of the reference 
of representation to object as well. 
61 In fact, there is still one position left out in this list; however, it does not enjoy as the same status as the five 
positions do. 
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Reason, which will not let this restriction62 stand, supposes that our experience and also our a priori 
cognition pertain immediately to objects and not first to the subjective conditions of sensibility and 
apperception and by their means to unknown objects that can be represented only through the former. 
Hence it]… strikes off on different paths. 1. The empirical path and universality through induction. 2. 
The fanatical path of intuition through the understanding. 3. That of predetermination through innate 
concepts. 4. The qualitas occulta of the healthy understanding, which gives no account. [P. III.] If one 
concedes this, then all critique of pure reason is suspended and the door is opened wide to all sorts of 
fiction. Hence it belongs to the discipline of pure reason to investigate it and to bar these paths in 
accordance with its discoveries. (AA 18:272) 
 
Kant’s study of paths reappears with all its essentials intact in the same Reflection: 
 
Not only does reason overlook the ideality of the objects of the senses, it also bristles against this as it 
does against everything that restricts its sphere of influence. Hence it is necessary to investigate the 
paths that it takes. The first is empiricism. […]There thus remain epigenesis, mystical intuition, and 
involution. Finally there is also the qualitas occulta of common reason. (AA 18:273) 
 
It is difficult to overestimate the systematic importance of R5673 for understanding the 
philosophical spectrum Kant keeps in mind. Here Kant explicitly claims that they are the paths of 
reason. In R5649, Kant also claims that they are the paths of metaphysics. (AA 18:296)63 By paths Kant 
understands radically distinct systems that differ from each other not only in specific details but 
also in fundamental orientations. In the hope of resolving the secret of metaphysics, different paths 
of reason resort to different kinds of representation and commit to different models of the 
grounding relation of representation to object. 
In his mature philosophy, Kant offers a most complete description of the alternative paths of 
metaphysics. According to the first quotation, Kant enumerates four paths that could lead us astray: 
(i) the empirical path of induction; (ii) the fanatical path of intuition through the understanding; (iii) 
the fanatical path of predetermination through innate concepts; and (iv) the path of occult qualities 
of the healthy understanding. 
The empirical path is the system of physical influx, or empiricism, endorsed by Aristotle and Locke. 
This first path aims at acquiring absolutely universal (and necessary) propositions through inductive 
inference. The fanatical path of intuition through the understanding is the system of hyperphysical influx, 
                                                     
62The restriction in question refers back to the fact that the appearances “are given only through the synthesis” (AA 
18:272). 
63 R5649 is dated to the latter half of 1780s. 
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or that of mystical intuition, represented by Plato and Malebranche. This second path 
characteristically postulates an understanding which can intuit by means of which ideas are 
immediately apprehended. The fanatical path of predetermination through innate concepts is the 
system of pre-established intellectual harmony, or that of preformation or involution, represented by Leibniz 
and Crusius. This third path attempts to make appeal to inborn concepts to formulate judgments. 
The path of occult qualities of the healthy understanding is the system of common sense. While 
Kant does not mention the representatives, from the Prologomena we know that the system of 
common sense or healthy understanding is represented by Reid, Oswald, Beattie, and Priestley. 
(AA 4:258) This forth path is characteristic of invoking common sense without giving further 
explanation.64 
 
1.4.2 The Spectrum Reconstructed 
The above list of five philosophical systems includes ancient philosophers as well as modern 
philosophers. Initially, this list appears haphazard. On a closer reading, it is by no means an arbitrary 
enumeration of the historically preeminent predecessors that strikes Kant. Rather, I believe that 
the paths of reason or metaphysics in the list is selected in a logically merited manner: they are not 
only mutually exclusive but also jointly exhaustive concerning some specific philosophical 
questions. As we will see, the question that concerns all of these paths is nothing but what Kant 
dubs “the secret of metaphysics”, namely, the ground of the reference of representation to object. 
In the following, I would like to show how these paths are logically rigorously ordered. Let’s 
first consider a general case in metaphysics. If x and y are systematically correlated, there are 
following basic models for explaining the co-variation in terms of the ground of reference: (i) no 
ground model, (ii) real ground model (iii) common ground model, (iv) infinite ground model. They 
are not mutually exclusive, though jointly exhaustive: 
 
(1) If the relation in question exists, then the relation is either contingent or necessary. 
(1.1) If the relation of x to y is contingent, there is no ground for this relation.  
(1.2) If the relation of x to y is necessary, there is some ground for this relation, and the relation is either 
ideal or real. 
                                                     
64 According to the theory of healthy understanding, the truth and falsity can be simply judged on the basis of 
“common sense of human being”, in other words, the truth or falsity is simply being asserted without being 
accounted. This belongs to the least discussed systems. 
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(1.2.1) If the relation of x to y is necessary and ideal, then there is common ground for the relation. 
(1.2.2) If the relation of x to y is necessary and real, then there is real ground for the relation. 
(1.2.2.1) If the relation of x to y is necessary and real, then it could be case that x grounds y. 
(1.2.2.2) If the relation of x to y is necessary and real, then it could be case that y grounds x. 
 
When the general models of ground are applied to the reference relation of representation 
and object, then we have the following picture: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Picture 1 
According to this reconstruction, we have a spectrum of the philosophical positions that are 
mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive. I believe that I could fill the positions in the spectrum 
with Kant’s list of philosophical systems: (i) the system of occult qualities assumes a no ground model; 
(1) If the relation of 
representation to object exists, 
then the relation is either contingent
or necessary.
(1.1) If the relation of 
representation to object is 
contingent, there is no ground for this 
relation. (the system of occult 
quality)
(1.2) If the relation of 
representation to object is necessary, 
there is some ground for this relation.
(1.2.1)If the relation of 
representation to object is necessary
and ideal, then there is common 
ground for the relation. (the logical 
fanatical path)
(1.2.2) If the relation of 
representation to object is necessary
and real, then there is real ground
for the relation, and either object-
ground model, or representation-
ground model.
(1.2.2.1)If the relation of 
representation to object is necessary
and real, then it is the object that 
grounds the representation. (the 
empirical path)
(1.2.2.2)If the relation of 
representation to object is necessary
and real, then it is the 
representation that grounds the 
object. (the mystical fanatical path)
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(ii) the system of pre-established intellectual harmony assumes a common ground model; 65 (iii) the 
system of physical influx assumes a real ground model in one direction; (iv) the system of 
hyperphysical influx assumes a real ground model in the other direction. 
Therefore, Kant’s list of the systems is by no means arbitrary. Rather, it is a carefully registered 
list where all possible alternatives to the problem of the ground of the reference of representation 
to object are mutually exclusive and jointly exhausted. Since the four rival paths of metaphysics are 
correspondent to the models of representation and object, it follows that the four paths of 
metaphysics are also mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive.  
For one thing, all these four rival paths are not only incompatible with each other, but also 
irreducible to each other. When one adopts some system of explanation, it is impossible for him to 
adopt any other systems at the same time. The actual philosophical system is complex, however. It 
does not prevent one system from being adopted by another when some assumption is held 
temporarily, or when some complementary argument is made.66 For another, it seems impossible 
to conceive any further system that could be taken into account. Of course, the tree of the 
grounding model can be further divided as long as some underlying assumption is not detected. 
No matter how it is further divided, and no matter how fine-grained the modal status of each 
putative case is, it does not prevent the now fourfold division from being extensionally exhaustive. 
The list means something more for Kant: it means that the more fine-grained putative modal case 
is not instantiated in history and represented by any philosopher. It is not an accident. It means 
that the more fine-grained modal alternatives are philosophically unmotivated. 
 
1.5 Paths and Assumptions 
All these philosophical paths take into account the following five philosophical desiderata: 
the scientific actualism, the explanatory rationalism, the causal realism, the epistemic atheism, and 
the metaphysical realism. And each of them cannot accept all the desiderata at the same time. We 
could illustrate this point by the following picture: 
 
                                                     
65 It is noteworthy that the model of common ground has two further species: the particular pre-established harmony 
and the general pre-established harmony. 
66 See Chapter 3 for the former case. The mystical fanatical path is characteristic of the model that representation 
grounds object. However, the ensuing complementary argument makes it liable to collapse into pre-established 
harmony. See chapter 2 and chapter 4 for the latter case. Both the empirical path and the logical fanatical path are 
taken to be committed to the system of occult quality when additional assumption is made. 
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                                       scientific actualism (rejected by empirical path) 
 
 
         explanatory rationalism                                                               explanatory atheism                                                        
         (rejected by occult qualities)                                                      (rejected by mystical fanatical path) 
   
 
                                                 causal realism                  metaphysical realism                                                                               
               (rejected by logical fanatical path)                   (rejected by transcendental path) 
 
 
1.5.1 The Explanatory Rationalism 
The explanatory rationalism is a term dubbed by Jonathan Bennett. It refers to the view that 
everything can be explained. In A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics, Bennett writes: “Spinoza assumed that 
whatever is the case can be explained-that if P then there is a reason why P. I call this ‘explanatory 
rationalism’. It is the refusal to admit brute facts-ones which just are so, for no reason.”67 
Although Kant does not make explanatory rationalism explicit in the Critique, there are traces 
in his notes that he does endorse this view at least as a methodology. In Reflection 5637 dated to 
1780s, Kant writes: “[n]ow reason abhors principles that are not its own work. It is its maxim to 
assume that everything can be explained. Consequently no sensible primitive intuition.” (AA 18: 
275) Whereas in this note the maxim of reason that “everything can be explained” is specifically 
targeted to “sensible primitive intuition”, there should be little doubt for its generality in the 
application. It is clear that explanatory rationalism is Kant’s view. It is far from clear, however, 
what the nature of explanatory rationalism is. 
It is not difficult to see that explanatory rationalism, if true, entails metaphysical rationalism. If 
everything can be explained, and if everything is explained in such a way, then it amounts to saying that 
                                                     
67 See Bennett 1984, 29. 
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everything has a metaphysical ground. Then, we fall back into the principle of sufficient ground 
(or reason) and its unwelcoming consequence of necessitarianism. It is difficult to attribute to Kant 
such a radical view. It flatly contradicts with Kant’s endeavor to restrict the principle of sufficient 
ground into experience in his Second Analogy. One might ask why Kant resurrects it after he has 
buried it. 
No matter how to read Kant in the light of critical philosophy, I think that it is difficult to cut 
off its relation to the principle of sufficient ground. Even more I think that Kant indeed implicitly 
assumes a qualified version of metaphysical rationalism. The notorious question of the noumenal affection 
is only the symptom of this qualified metaphysical rationalism.68 What we should be cautious about 
is not metaphysical rationalism, but its unqualified version. As we will see, Kant modifies the 
metaphysical rationalism with important qualifications, and the qualifications are nothing but his 
other two great assumptions. 
Explanatory anti-rationalism claims that the world that is required to explain is the 
fundamental level of reality such that there is no further ground. That is, the world is simply the 
way it is, and there is no further need not to explain it. The system of occult qualities is precisely 
committed to the ontological version of explanatory anti-rationalism. It is not difficult to see why 
the system of occult qualifies is the antithesis of explanatory rationalism. While explanatory 
rationalism claims that everything can be explained, in the system of occult qualifies the healthy 
understanding “gives no account” (AA 18: 272). In the same Reflection, Kant later writes that “[t]he 
so-called healthy understanding is an asylum ignorantiae” (AA 18: 275). 
By charging it as the refugee for the ignorant, Kant’s unmistakable dismissal of occult qualifies 
is understandable. Remember that “reason abhors principles that are not its own work”, In R4783 
dated to the period between 1775 and 1779 Kant says “qualitates occultae” “are contrary to reason”. 
Reason abhors occult qualities most. It is also confirmed by R5654 dated to the period between 
1788 and 1789: 
 
I [crossed out: still work my way toward] climb even through difficult subtleties to the peak of principles, 
not so much as if the healthy understanding would not be able to get there without this detour, but 
                                                     
68 The metaphysical rationalism is a deeply plausible view. In physics physicists believe that the heat can be explained 
in terms of molecular movement. They do not explain the physical constant such as the speed of light. In philosophy 
some philosophers believe that the world consisting of the concrete individual particulars is not the fundamental 
level of reality, and they believe that the phenomena of the agreement of attributes of particulars can be further 
explained by invoking universal. But they do not think that the universal needs to be further explained. To some 
extent, the reason is that they do not want to have the explanation ad infinitum. 
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rather in order to entirely rob of power all of the sophistical subtleties that are raised against it. (AA 
18:313) 
 
In his 1786 Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science69, Kant writes: 
 
In the doctrine of nature, the absolutely empty and the absolutely dense are approximately what blind 
accident and blind fate are in metaphysical science, namely, an obstacle to the governance of reason, 
whereby it is either supplanted by fabrication or lulled to rest on the pillow of occult qualities. (AA 
4:532) 
 
In fact, there are two versions of explanatory anti-rationalism. What Kant intends to argue 
against in the above is an ontological version of explanatory anti-rationalism. The other version of 
explanatory rationalism is epistemological, and it claims that we are not entitled to search the ground 
of the way the world is. That is, the world is all that seems to be the way it is such that we cannot 
explain it. In Chapter 2 we will find that certain kind of Humean philosophy ends up with falling 
into this epistemological version of the explanatory anti-rationalism. 
 
1.5.2 The Causal Realism 
Causal realism is the view that if x and y are systematically co-varied, their agreement must be 
real: either x grounds y or y grounds x. This view is the negation of the common ground model. 
According to the common ground model, if x and y are systematically co-varied, their agreement 
can be ideal, namely, there is no real connection between x and y, and the phenomena of the 
agreement of x and y are caused by a common ground. 
This assumption is built into the way in which Kant formulates the dilemma of ground of 
representability. In §14 Kant articulates the dilemma as follows: 
 
There are only two possible cases in which synthetic representation and its objects can come together, 
necessarily relate to each other, and, as it were, meet each other: Either if the object alone makes the 
representation possible, or if the representation alone makes the object possible. If it is the first, then 
this relation is only empirical, and the representation is never possible a priori. And this is the case with 
appearance in respect of that in it which belongs to sensation. But if it is the second, then since 
representation in itself (for we are not here talking about its causality by means of the will) does not 
                                                     
69 Abbreviated as Metaphysical Foundations thereafter. 
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produce its object as far as its existence is concerned, the representation is still determinant of the 
object a priori if it is possible through it alone to cognize something as an object. (A92/B124-125) 
 
In the A-Deduction it seems that Kant merely considers the case of a dilemma while 
overlooking the possibility that there is a middle way between the two horns. In fact, it is perfectly 
possible that a representation agrees with an object neither in virtue of the fact that the object 
makes the representation possible nor in virtue of the fact that the representation makes the object 
possible, rather in virtue of the fact that a common cause makes both the representation and the 
object possible. 
In the entire A-Deduction Kant does not say anything about the middle way of the common 
ground model. In the B-Deduction, by contrast, Kant takes this possibility into account, and it 
seems to suggest that Kant intends to fill the previous gap in his argument. In §27 “the Result of 
this deduction”, Kant still writes that “there are only two ways in which a necessary agreement of 
experience with the concepts of its objects can be thought: either the experience makes these 
concepts possible or these concepts make the experience possible” (B166-167). After introducing 
the dilemma, Kant continues to write that the previous dilemma leaves open “a middle way 
between the only two, already named ways, namely, that the categories were neither self-thought 
a priori first principles of our cognition nor drawn from experience” (B167).  
However, the form of the dilemma is retained, and the neglected possibility is introduced as 
an afterthought. One might wonder why Kant does not replace the old dilemma with an explicit 
trilemma. In my view, the manner in which Kant addresses the alternative of the “middle way” 
indicates that Kant does not think the third possibility of “the middle way” as a genuine alternative. 
As I understand it, the fundamental reason lies in that “the middle way” flatly contradicts with 
causal realism, one of Kant’s most underlying assumptions he never makes explicit in the Critique. 
That is why Kant does not formulate an explicit trilemma. 
What immediately guides Kant’s formulation of the dilemma of the ground of representability 
is his own peculiar conception of objectivity. According to Kant, a representation is objective or has 
relation to object if either the representation makes the object possible or the object makes the 
representation possible. To have relation to object is not simply a matter of correctly mirroring the 
reality. The mirroring relation of representation must presuppose a causal track. The track can only 
have two directions: one is from representation to object, and the other is from object to 
representation. The middle way fails to be genuinely objective precisely because it fails to be either 
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case of the two possibilities. This characteristic conception of objectivity rests upon the general 
assumption of causal realism that the ground of real relation must be a real ground.  
 
1.5.3 The Epistemic Atheism 
According to epistemic atheism, we are capable of explaining our knowledge in particular and 
all our mental states in general without appeal to God. The two great representatives of empiricism 
Locke and Hume could be seen as the initiator and defender of the deeply plausible view that might 
be labeled as epistemic atheism. In their study of human understanding, God plays no role in 
accounting for the ways of idea, the basic building blocks of human mentality. 
In Descartes, our privileged access to mind is merely epistemological: the mind is better 
known than the body. God still plays an important role in endowing us with innate ideas 
indispensable for the certainty of human knowledge. With the expelling of innate ideas from mental 
geography by Locke, our privileged access to our mental states is not only epistemological but also 
physiological. The generation, passing-away, and other behaviors of ideas have nothing to do with 
God. It only has something to do with our understanding. The realm of the human mental gains 
independence from the absolute and ubiquitous dominion of God. In one important sense, human 
beings have the dominion over their mental realm just as God has His dominion in the physical 
realm. God could still play an omnipotent and omnipresent role in the physical universe; He is the 
creators of the creatures, and He is the legislator of the laws of nature. But it does not play any role 
in any episode of our mental life in general and in accounting for human knowledge in particular. 
Nowadays, epistemic atheism is almost a truism. However, in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
century, the idea of epistemic atheism was astonishingly revolutionary in Germany. It is the view 
held by the minority, rather than by the majority. In the long run, it can be seen as an early phase 
of the naturalization of philosophy. The dominant view at that time was its negation, epistemic 
theism, and there are various forms of epistemic theism. 
According to the explanatory rationalism, everything can be explained. If explanatory 
rationalism literally quantifies over everything that exists, it naturally invites the notorious infinite 
regress in explanation. Taken metaphysically, the explanatory infinite regress collapses into the view 
that everything has a ground and that there exists no first ground. 
The general positive response to infinite regress is to find a terminator which can stop the 
infinite regress. This terminator of regress must be an ungrounded ground, or unexplained explanan. 
Traditionally, the role of the terminator of the regress is played by God. Pre-critical Kant is non-
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exception. In The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God (1763)70, 
Kant takes over the idea by arguing that God is “the ultimate real ground of all other possibilities” 
(AA 2:83). 
In the critical period, however, Kant expels the role of God from the human mental realm. 
One reason is that we do not know a priori that God plays the role of the terminator. In analogy to 
Kant’s pre-critical view that we cannot analyze the concept of the world that exists from the 
concept of the will of God, Kant can equally claim that we cannot analyze the concept of the 
common cause of representation and object from the concept of God. 
Furthermore, there is deeper worry about the explanatory legitimacy of the move to appeal 
to God. God is not merely a common cause; rather it is an infinite cause. As an infinite cause God 
can cause any possible thing and thus God can be invoked as a general cause. Since everything can 
be explained by appealing to God. The worry is that to say something is caused by God is to say 
nothing informative. The explanation by appeal to God amounts to give no explanation at all. 
In the following three chapters, I will show how these different paths are committed to these 
assumptions, and why they are led astray. 
  
                                                     
70 Abbreviated as The Only Possible Argument thereafter. 
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Chapter 2  Against the Empirical Path 
2.1 Introduction 
Empiricism is a generally successful position. In explaining a certain domain of knowledge, 
it is not so much the dominant view as almost the only correct view. On some point, even the most 
robust rationalist would not challenge it. Empiricism survives and thrives today; even many 
contemporary philosophers are self-proclaimed empiricists. Furthermore, empiricism is not only 
plausible but also resilient. Much room can be left with empiricists if empiricism is properly 
qualified. It is even incorporated and appropriated by many opponents. For instance, Kant himself 
is an example. Another example is Bertrand Russell, who is also a preeminent Platonist. In the 
recent several decades the reductive metaphysics associated with empiricism has been kept alive in 
contemporary philosophy; Hume was hailed as the hero of contemporary metaphysics. 
It is noteworthy that for Kant empiricism is the empiricism in an unqualified manner. A 
qualified and hybrid version of empiricism is not empiricism. Then, what precisely is the criterion 
of empiricism? For Kant, the essential character of the empirical path lies in the unique grounding 
model: the object makes the representation possible. The empiricist epistemology is only the 
suprastructure of this metaphysical foundation. Any position incompatible with this grounding 
model cannot be called empiricism. For example, Hume makes an appeal to analysis to explain 
logic and mathematics, while Russell resorts to intellectual acquaintance to explain the knowledge 
of universals. According to this criterion, Hume is an empiricist, for analysis is consistent with the 
grounding model, while Russell is not an empiricist, for the rational insight runs counter with the 
model. Neither is Kant an empiricist despite his incorporation of some key elements of empiricist 
epistemology, since his famous Copernican Revolution goes in the opposite direction to that of 
empiricism. 
For Kant, the empiricism is the most viable position in his philosophical spectrum. In Critique, 
Kant even creates the impression that empiricism is the only rival theory to his transcendental 
philosophy with regard to the problem of the deduction of categories. Kant does not merely claim 
that transcendental deduction is distinguished from empirical deduction (derivation) since the 
former concerns the lawfulness (quid juris) while the latter concerns the fact (quid facti). (A84/B116) 
Kant even speaks as if transcendental deduction and empirical deduction are the only two 
alternatives with respect to the question of the objective reality of categories. In rejecting the 
empirical deduction of categories, Kant writes: 
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It is therefore clear that only a transcendental and never an empirical deduction of them can be given, 
and that in regard to pure a priori concepts empirical deductions are nothing but idle attempts, which 
can occupy only those who have not grasped the entirely distinctive nature of these cognitions. 
(A87/B119) 
 
Given the assumption that either the empirical path or transcendental path is correct, Kant 
makes the inference that transcendental deduction must be the correct path precisely because the 
empirical deduction is incorrect. 
However, this view is incomplete, if not mistaken. During the silent decade empiricism as the 
only viable alternative to transcendental philosophy is only a temporary result of Kant’s journey in 
pursuit of the answer to the question of the ground of the relation of representation to object. 
Nonetheless, there is an element of truth in the appearance of the empirical path as the only 
alternative to the transcendental path. Empiricism is an explanatorily conservative position free 
from “all sorts of wild notions and every pious and speculative brainstorm” (AA 10:132). In fact, 
it turns out that empiricism is viable precisely because it is the only philosophy with which Kant 
shares the same explanatory norm. Kant’s basic charge is not that empiricism is explanatorily illegitimate, 
but that it is explanatorily inadequate.71 
Both Kant and empiricists are committed to the assumption that might be labeled as the 
epistemic atheism or even the mental atheism. According to the epistemic atheism, our endeavor 
of explaining our knowledge in particular and our mental states in general should not resort to God. 
In fact, the two great representatives of empiricism, Locke and Hume, could be seen as the 
defenders of the deeply plausible view.72 For Locke, our privilege to our mental states is not only 
epistemological but also metaphysical. The realm of the mental gains independence from the 
absolute and ubiquitous dominion of God. God creates our physical constitution, but He does not 
play any constitutive role in our mental life.73 The idea of epistemic atheism is revolutionary compared 
to the dominant view in German philosophy. Kant is a continental follower of this tradition. 
As a result, Kant’s attack on the empirical path is radically different from his criticism on the 
fanatical path that will be taken under scrutiny in subsequent two chapters. One primary 
controversy between Kant and empiricists is concentrated on the identification and interpretation 
                                                     
71 Occasionally, Kant attributes to Locke the view that synthetic a priori truths are actual. More famously, in the 
Critique Kant believes that Locke attempts to make empirical deduction of a priori knowledge. Therefore, it is not that 
accurate to accuse empiricist project of explanatory inadequacy. However, under the pressure of fundamental 
limitation of induction, empiricist soon abandons this line of attempt. We’d better see empiricist as more aware of 
the limitation of induction such that they in effect do not acknowledge the existence of synthetic a priori knowledge. 
72 Kant might believe that another classical empiricist George Berkeley is closer to Plato and Malebranche. See 
Kenneth P. Winkler (2008). 
73 For instance, Malebranche’s famous doctrine of vision in God stands in opposition to this idea. 
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of the domain of knowledge. Therefore, they disagree with each other primarily on what the premise 
of the argument is, rather than on how the argument should proceed. As we will see, beneath their difference 
lies a much more profound opposition: empiricists endorse a methodist epistemology, while Kant 
embraces a particularist epistemology. 
In Kant’s view, the ancient philosopher Aristotle and modern philosopher Locke are the 
paradigmatic representatives of the empirical path, because both of them are the followers of the 
system of physical influx, which is committed to grounding model that “the object makes the 
representation possible”.74 In the following, I will put aside Aristotle and focus on Locke. Kant’s 
reception of Locke is peculiar; Locke’s empiricism is understood as an attempt to explain the 
existence of synthetic a priori propositions. In fact, Locke seems to have little interest in explaining 
the synthetic a priori propositions. In addition to Locke, I will also spend some time on Hume’s 
distinctive system, which is regarded as a consistent version of empiricism. First of all, Hume does 
say something important on a priori knowledge, which marks a great progress in the empirical path. 
Moreover, the methodism presupposed by Hume constitutes the antithesis of the particularist strand 
in Kant’s epistemology. Finally, it turns out how the empiricism consistently developed by Hume 
paradoxically results in a species of explanatory anti-rationalism, which is inconsistent with the 
causal realism assumed by Locke’s empiricism. The literature on Kant and empiricism is abundant, 
so one might wonder whether there is anything interesting that could be said.  
In section 2.2, I will first reconstruct the epistemology of the empirical path and delineate 
different routes of Kant’s criticisms. As Kant himself makes clear, there are two lines of arguments 
against the empirical path: the argument from sciences, and the argument from experience. In 
section 2.3, I will quickly go through this more familiar argument from mathematics and penetrate 
to its assumption and its deepest divergence from Kant in approach: the empiricists are methodists, 
while Kant is a particularist. In section 2.4, I will take a more careful analysis of this less known 
argument from experience. I will argue that Kant has only one unified conception of experience 
and that Kant’s claim that experience cannot teach necessity and his claim that experience contains 
necessity are perfectly compatible. In section 2.5, I will suggest that in denying modality the 
Humean metaphysics is committed to the system of occult quality, which does not only deprive 
the system of the explanatory power but also turns against to the grounding model of Locke’s 
physical influx. 
 
                                                     
74 In fact, the more paradigmatic contemporary representatives of radical empiricism are John Stuart Mill and W.V.O 
Quine. 
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2.2 The Radical Empiricist Epistemology 
The central tenet of radical empiricist epistemology can be summarized as follows: 
 
(REE1): all human knowledge is derived from experience.  
 
The radical empiricist epistemology could be understood as formulated in different terms and 
emphasizing different things. It can be understood as a claim on the scope of knowledge that (F1) 
all human knowledge is derived from experience. It could also be understood as a claim on the source 
of knowledge that (F2) all human knowledge is derived from experience. Or more explicitly, it can 
be read as: (F2*) experience is the only source of human knowledge.75 
In spite of their difference, the source formulation and the scope formulation equivalently 
express the same thing. If experience is the only source of human knowledge, then all human 
knowledge is derived from experience. Equivalently, if all human knowledge is derived from 
experience, then experience is the only source of human knowledge. 
Interestingly, Kant offers two routes of criticism respectively against the scope claim and the 
source claim of radical empiricist epistemology. Both objections are not something entirely new; 
they are reminiscent of Leibniz’s two fundamental objections to Locke in his New Essays on Human 
Understanding.76 
Along the first route, Kant raises the mistake objection to the source claim of radical empiricist 
epistemology. Kant holds that Locke “committed the error of taking the occasion for acquiring 
these concepts, namely experience, as their source” (AA 18:14).77 In the Introduction to 1787 
Critique, Kant famously writes that “although all our cognition commences with experience, yet 
it does not on that account all arise from experience” (B1). By noting this difference, Kant is trying 
to highlight that there is an important distinction between the source of knowledge and the occasion of 
knowledge. Both source and occasion can be understood as the species of the genus of cause. Kant 
sometimes ascribes the role of cause to occasion and call it “occasional cause” (A86/B118). When it 
                                                     
75 It also could be understood as committing to a more implicit and more fundamental claim that underlies empiricist 
epistemology: (3) the claim on means: all human knowledge is derived from experience. In fact, it captures the grounding 
model of “the object makes the representation possible”. 
76 See Leibniz 1996. 
77 Kant writes in R4866 as follows: “Locke a physiologist of reason, the origin of concepts. He committed the error 
of taking the occasion for acquiring these concepts, namely experience, as their source. Nevertheless he also made 
use of them beyond the bounds of experience.” (AA 18:14). The consequence of Locke’s mistake of occasion for 
source is that he attempts to derive the concepts of understanding for experience solely on the grounds. 
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comes to the origin of cognition, source and ground are used interchangeably, and thus the source 
of knowledge can be seen as the genuinely original cause. In the case of empirical concepts and 
empirical knowledge, the source of knowledge and the occasion of knowledge are co-extensive, 
and thus their distinction seems to be insignificant. In the case of pure concepts and a priori 
knowledge, however, the difference is significant.78 
Along the second route, Kant levels the poverty objection that the scope claim of radical 
empiricist epistemology is explanatorily inadequate because it fails to account a great number of 
phenomena. In fact, the poverty in the scope of empiricist epistemology is precisely rooted in its 
mistake of the source of knowledge. Since the occasion thesis that all human knowledge is occasioned 
by experience is true, if it is taken in conjunction with the mistake of experience as the occasion of 
knowledge for the source of knowledge, it immediately follows that all human knowledge is derived from 
experience. 
Since the poverty objection and the mistake objection are substantially equivalent, in the 
following I will concentrate on examining Kant’s arguments based on his poverty objection. I leave 
aside Kant’s mistake objection not because Kant does not develop arguments along this route, 
neither because these arguments are not important.79 Rather, I focus on Kant’s scope objection 
simply because the arguments along the route is more congenial to the presentation of my 
arguments such that they could reveal better Kant’s premise and strategy in this campaign against 
empiricism. 
Kant’s objection to the explanatory inadequacy of radical empiricist epistemology is encapsulated 
in the Reflection 5637 dated to the early 1780s: 
 
Hence it is necessary to investigate the paths that it takes. The first is empiricism. But not only does a 
priori mathematical cognition refute the falsehood of this putative origin of our cognition, but also the 
concepts that are present in experience contain a necessity (cause) that experience cannot teach. (AA 
18:273) 
 
This Reflection is noteworthy precisely because it concisely contains Kant’s two most 
important arguments against the poverty of the scope of empiricist epistemology: one is the 
                                                     
78 As Kant remarks, “in the case of all cognition, we can search in experience, if not for the principle of their 
possibility, then for the occasional causes” (A86/B118). 
79 For instance, Kant’s arguments in Metaphysical Exposition can be seen as developed along the line of source 
Critique. Two source objection! Kant argues that there are a priori elements in our faculty of sensibility, which are 
largely ignored by his predecessors and contemporaries. 
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argument from sciences80, and the other is the argument from experience. In the following, I will examine 
them one by one. 81  As we shall see, the basic idea of Kant’s argument against empiricist 
epistemology is quite simple: empiricist epistemology as a theory is falsified by some fact. However, 
the controversy between empiricism and Kant is not easy to settle, for it is difficult for both parties 
to reach consensus on what counts as fact. In exploring Kant’s engagement with empiricism, we 
will see both parties differ not only in some specific assumptions but also in the conception of the 
approach to epistemology. 
 
2.3 The Argument from Sciences 
The argument from mathematics figures as Kant’s master argument against empiricist 
epistemology.82 In the Introduction to 1787 Critique, Kant betrays his view for the actuality of 
sciences: “[n]ow it is easy to show that in human cognition there actually are such necessary and in 
the strictest sense universal, thus pure a priori judgments. If one wants an example from the sciences, 
one need only look at all the propositions of mathematics; if one would have one from the 
commonest use of the understanding, the proposition that every alteration must have a cause will 
do” (B4-B5). 
Here Kant explicitly endorses the actuality thesis and the apriority thesis of sciences (including 
pure mathematics and pure physics): 
 
(1) Mathematics is actual.83 
(2) Mathematics is a priori.84  
 
The conjunction of (1) and (2) entails the actuality of a priori knowledge in sciences: 
                                                     
80 Here I use the unusual plural form “sciences” to highlight the different and limited discipline of science in Kant’s 
particular conception. 
81 Because mathematics is not our focus in Transcendental Deduction, I will call more attention to the second 
argument from experience. 
82 Traditionally, the argument is understood as the objection to induction. 
83 For Kant to say that a science is actual is to say that it is correct; for instance, Kant mentions that a genuinely 
scientific proposition is “real and correct” (A209/B254). For Kant’s historical account of the actuality of science see 
the Preface to the 1787 Critique (Bvii-Bxv).  
84 Here a priori does not presuppose knowledge and thereby implies truth; otherwise the actuality thesis of science 
would be redundant. Rather, a priori is a constraint imposed on conditionals: if some proposition p is a priori, then p is 
necessarily true if it is true at all. 
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(3) Some a priori knowledge exists.  
 
Obviously, the a priori knowledge is not derived from experience, then it can be used as a 
counterexample to the scope claim that empiricist epistemology contends: (EE) All human knowledge 
is derived from experience. However, the existence of a priori knowledge in sciences is squarely 
consistent with empiricist epistemology. Since the former is undoubtedly true, the latter must be 
false. 
Due to his limited knowledge of Hume, Kant is unaware of the fact that Hume has drawn 
the distinction between relations of ideas and matters of fact, the one that is usually thought to 
anticipate his own analytic/synthetic distinction. Neither does Kant know that Hume’s philosophy 
of mathematics rests precisely on this distinction, which enables him to cope with the challenge on 
the empiricism’s infamous inability to explain mathematics. As Hume writes in An Enquiry concerning 
Human Understanding: 
 
ALL the objects of human reason or enquiry may naturally be divided into two kinds, to wit, Relations 
of Ideas and Matters of Fact. Of the first kind are the sciences of Geometry, Algebra, and Arithmetic… 
discoverable by the mere operation of thought, without dependence on what is any where existent in 
the universe… Matters of fact, which are the second objects of human reason, are not ascertained in 
the same manner; nor is our evidence of their truth, however great, of a like nature with the foregoing. 
(1999, 108) 
 
Hume has at his disposal the resources to develop a qualified empiricist epistemology of which 
Kant would have the slightest idea in mind. It is widely held that the Humean distinction between 
relations of ideas and matters of fact coincides with the semantic analytic/synthetic distinction, the 
epistemological a priori/a posteriori distinction, and necessary/contingent metaphysical distinction. 
Therefore, qualified moderate empiricist epistemology (MEE) could be easily reformulated in 
Kant’s terminology as follows: 
 
(1) All human knowledge is either synthetic or analytic. 
(2) All synthetic knowledge is empirical, i.e. known a posteriori. 
(3) All a priori knowledge is analytic. 
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Fortunately, this much more plausible version of empiricist epistemology does not worry 
Kant. In Introduction I and II in 1787 Critique, Kant takes himself to have successfully refuted the 
empiricist epistemology by appealing to the apriority of mathematics. Introduction V is intended 
to criticize the rationalist explanation of mathematics upheld by the “analysts of human reason” 
(B14). Under the influence of Leibniz, German rationalists are also convinced that mathematics is 
analytic a priori, so Introduction V can be seen as a response to moderate empiricist epistemology. 
After drawing the analytic/synthetic distinction in Introduction IV, in Introduction V Kant 
contends that mathematics is not only a priori but also synthetic. The basic idea of Kant’s objections 
to the analytic explanation of the apriority of mathematics is that the analytic understanding of 
mathematics arises partly from the misidentification of the necessary condition as the explanatory 
ground, and partly from the confusion axiom and theorem in mathematics. By ascribing synthetic 
character to mathematics, the argument against radical empiricist epistemology by appeal to 
mathematics now could be turned against moderate empiricist epistemology. Now the 
counterexample to moderate empiricist epistemology is instead: 
 
(3*) Some synthetic a priori knowledge exists.  
 
Since the apriority of mathematics is the consensus between the two parties, the only room 
left for empiricists is to argue that mathematics is not synthetic. Thus, the debate comes down to 
whether mathematics is synthetic or analytic. If mathematics is synthetic, then moderate empiricist 
epistemology perishes; if it is analytic, then moderate empiricist epistemology survives. For my 
present purpose, I will not delve into the controversy. As the passage indicates, one thing for sure 
is that Kant obviously takes the actuality of synthetic a priori proposition as a non-negotiable fact, 
a phenomenon for which different paths are obliged to offer explanation, and a mystery to which 
different paths attempt to make response. 
Furthermore, there exists nonetheless a much deeper methodological difference between Hume 
and Kant. Since the distinction between relations of ideas and matters of fact is exhaustive, it 
commits Hume to the radical view that empiricist epistemology is exhaustive in explaining human 
knowledge. In his Enquiry, Hume famously writes: 
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If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, Does it 
contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning 
concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames: For it can contain nothing but 
sophistry and illusion. (1999, 211) 
 
Obviously, the “abstract reasoning” is concerned with the relations of ideas, i.e. analytic truth, 
and the “experimental reasoning” with the matter of fact, i.e. synthetic truth. In claiming that all 
human knowledge takes either synthetic form or analytic form, the disjunction at issue is an exclusive 
one. This exclusive disjunction thesis in moderate empiricist epistemology entails an 
Exhaustiveness Thesis: 
 
(ET) Moderate empiricist epistemology exhausts all human knowledge. 
 
The clear-cut dichotomy of knowledge about the world and the trivial knowledge about 
judgment or language exhausts all intellectually respectable knowledge. Therefore, one important 
consequence of moderate empiricist epistemology is that there is no other genuine knowledge than 
that falling under these two categories. In effect, Hume gives a prescriptive claim that sets a 
criterion to distinguish knowledge from non-knowledge: everything that cannot be derived from 
experience or conceptual analysis does not count as knowledge. With this sharp distinction in hand, 
Hume conducts his skeptical project against metaphysics and theology. The stands or falls of the 
skeptical project depend on the truth or falsity of Hume’s fork. 
By contrast, Kant insists that we have a body of knowledge in science in the first place. Then, 
the conflict between Hume and Kant comes down to the two entirely incompatible approaches to 
epistemology: Hume is a methodist in epistemology, whereas Kant is a particularist in epistemology. 
Hume begins with a general criterion of knowledge, while Kant starts with some instances of 
knowledge. In what follows I will give a brief introduction to the methodism and particularism. 
In a series of works, Roderick Chisholm articulates the problem of the criterion in 
epistemology, which bears upon dogmatism and skepticism.85 The problem of criteria arises from 
the following dilemma in epistemology. As Chisholm argues, (i) we cannot know whether some 
belief B is true unless we know the criterion that can distinguish the true belief from the false one. 
(ii) We cannot know, however, whether the criterion in question succeeds unless we can tell 
                                                     
85 For an elaborate discussion see Chisholm 1982, 61-75. For a concise introduction see Chisholm 1989, 6-7. 
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whether the criterion yields right results; but (iii) we can do (ii) only if we have already known which 
beliefs are true and which beliefs are false. Whenever one seeks to figure out the criterion of 
knowledge, he finds himself caught in a vicious circle. Furthermore, it can be equivalently 
formulated as the exact same thing happens whenever one seeks to pick out the cases of knowledge. 
Chisholm further reformulates the problem of criteria by two most fundamental 
epistemological questions: (A) What do we know? Or, what is the extent of our knowledge? (B) 
How are we to decide whether we know? Or, what are the criteria of knowledge? Chisholm maintains 
that one cannot answer either question without begging the question. If it is conceded that one 
must answer either question in a question-begging way, then two strategies are available. If we 
know the answer to (A), then we know the answer to (B). Alternatively, if we know the answer to 
(B), we know the answer to (A). As it has been seen above, one must be caught in the vicious circle 
as soon as he attempts to answer either question. The former is dubbed as particularism, whereas 
the latter as methodism (or generalism). Chisholm draws the distinction between particularism and 
methodism. Particularists hold that one has already known the answer to (A), and then one can use 
(A) to figure out the answer to (B). On the other hand, methodists maintain that one has known 
the answer to (B), and then he can use (B) to figure out the answer to (A). A kind of skepticism 
arises from the above dilemma by refusing to answer either question in a non-question-begging 
way. The skeptics believe that one cannot answer (A) without answering (B), and equally one 
cannot answer (B) without answering (A), and thus any attempt to figure out the answer to either 
question is doomed to be bogged in the vicious circularity. For Chisholm, Locke and Hume are 
methodists, while Thomas Reid and G. E. Moore are particularists.86 Chisholm sides himself with 
the camp of particularism. 
Humean empiricist epistemology is committed to a methodist epistemology, according to 
which we can determine the extent of knowledge by the criterion of knowledge. Put somehow 
differently, the methodist epistemology says that we can determine the scope of knowledge by 
determining the source of knowledge. While empiricist epistemology launches a bitter campaign against 
pretentious rationalist epistemology, empiricism unites with rationalism on an underlying level by 
sharing the same methodist epistemological approach. In a more moderate form, empiricism 
                                                     
86 Alternatively, Sosa (1980) holds that Descartes as well as Hume are paradigmatic methodistst. In fact, the images 
of these great philosophers are more complex. As a generalist, Descartes has the particularist bent for the knowledge 
that I exist seems to be an instance of knowledge. The empiricists should have a less confidence on their criterion for 
the criterion is somehow established by induction. Strikingly, Kant provides a non-epistemic account of the progress 
of science to establish the criterion of knowledge. 
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articulates the characteristic empiricist scheme as follows: for any proposition p, p is an instance of 
knowledge if it is derived from experience (or from conceptual analysis). 
Basically, empiricists believe that all ideas are derived from experience, which in turn are 
furnished by sensory organs. Furthermore, sensory organs are the only reliable faculty apt to 
produce knowledge or building blocks of knowledge. Therefore, the empiricist epistemology is 
preceded by formulating some criterion of knowledge and correspondently by postulating some 
faculties of mind. Humean empiricist epistemology commits itself to a scheme in determining 
knowledge: for any p, p is an instance of knowledge if it meets some criterion of knowledge and 
matched by appropriate epistemic faculty. 
Kant’s argument by the actuality of science is not merely directed against empiricist 
epistemology in particular, it also represents a fundamental break with the previous modern 
epistemology. In a more underlying level, Kant’s affirms the actuality of synthetic a priori knowledge 
before epistemically justifying them. 
 
2.4 The Argument from Experience 
Now I turn to Kant’s argument from experience. This second argument is equally important 
yet less known. In the Introduction II in 1787 Critique, Kant famously writes, “[e]xperience teaches 
us, to be sure, that something is constituted thus and so, but not that it could not be otherwise” 
(B3). According to the empiricist epistemology, however, experience cannot teach us that something 
“cannot be otherwise”. To be sure, we can infer possibility from actuality. As Kant makes clear, 
this kind of purely logical modality is not his chief concern. (A222) What is to Kant’s concern is 
whether things are necessarily so; for instance, we do not know whether there are unactualized 
possibilities. Since empiricist epistemology does not provide us the knowledge of the necessity of 
things, thus it is characteristic of modal poverty. 
In the next paragraph Kant writes: 
 
Even without requiring such examples for the proof of the reality of pure a priori principles in our 
cognition, one could establish their indispensability for the possibility of experience itself, thus 
establish it a priori. For where would experience itself get its certainty if all rules in accordance with 
which it proceeds were themselves in turn always empirical, thus contingent? (B5) 
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As this passage indicates, experience itself is not the example of synthetic a priori principles, 
therefore I separate the argument from experience from the argument from sciences. However, a 
priori principles are instantiated in experience. These a priori principles indispensable for experience 
are referred back to the synthetic principles discussed in the above: “if one would have one from 
the commonest use of the understanding, the proposition that every alteration must have a cause 
will do; indeed in the latter the very concept of a cause so obviously contains the concept of a 
necessity of connection with an effect and a strict universality of rule[.]” (B4-B5) Since the 
proposition that every alteration must have a cause is integral to and instantiated in experience, 
experience contains the concept of cause and thereby the modal concept of the necessity of the 
connection with effect.  
Now the tension is felt in Kant’s expression that “the concepts that are present in experience 
contain a necessity (cause) that experience cannot teach”. Now we have the following two claims 
concerning experience at issue: 
 
(1) Experience does contain necessity. 
(2) Experience cannot teach us necessity. 
 
Now we simultaneously have two claims concerning the relationship between experience and 
necessity, and one is affirmative, while the other is negative. The apparent tension between two 
claims often tempts commentators to think that Kant’s two claims are incompatible. The solution 
to this incompatibility is to suggest that Kant’s notion of experience is ambiguous; Kant 
systematically equivocates between a strong and a weak meaning of experience. The strong notion 
of experience is the connected perceptions in accordance with the general laws of nature, whereas 
the weak notion of experience is no more than episodes of sensations.87  
On my reading, however, this view is incorrect. It is important to see that these two claims 
are not immediately incompatible with each other. The former is a metaphysical claim that (1) there 
exists necessity in experience. In contrast, the latter is an epistemological claim that (2) we cannot know 
necessity from experience.  
Rather, I suggest that Kant has a unified notion of experience, and this notion is 
fundamentally metaphysical. The appearance of the tension between (1) and (2) arises from the 
                                                     
87 See Beck 1978, 40, and Guyer 1987, 80-81. 
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fact that Kant has a metaphysical use of experience and an epistemological use of experience. That 
is, this single notion of experience sometimes occurs in an extensional context to yield the claim 
that (EC) it is the case that O is necessary, whereas it sometimes occurs in an intensional context to 
yield the sentence that (IC) it is unknowable that O is necessary. To be sure, Kant is not always careful 
on this point, but it is clear that he does note that there is a subtle difference in the uses of 
experience than empiricists themselves do. 
Kant’s definition of experience is expounded in as follows: 
 
“[Experience] is nothing other than the synthetic unity of the appearances in accordance with concepts.” 
(A108) 
 
“[Experience] is therefore a synthesis of perceptions, which is not itself contained in perception but 
contains the synthetic unity of the manifold of perception in one consciousness[.]” (B218) 
 
This is what I call the metaphysical notion of experience, where experience is constitutionally 
defined as the synthetic unity of empirical perceptions. In epistemological context, experience is 
typically regarded as epistemic source or means. Typically, it is often used as a verb, or as an object of 
prepositions; for instance, “from experience” is to indicate the epistemic source, or “by means of 
experience” or “through experience” is to indicate epistemic means. Take the following text for 
instance: “[n]ow cognition of objects can be generated from perceptions, either through a mere 
play of imagination or by means of experience.” (A376) 
Interestingly, there are texts in which both uses of experience make appearance. For instance, 
Kant writes: “the empirical laws can only obtain and be found by means of experience, and indeed in 
accord with its original laws, in accordance with which experience itself first becomes possible”. In 
this passage, “by means of experience” clearly indicates an epistemological use, whereas the 
following “experience itself” is used as a metaphysical use. 
I suggest that in the metaphysical context experience is experience per se, whereas in the 
epistemological context experience is experience relative to empiricist epistemology, where it is used as the 
empirical method or the means of experience as means. Therefore, the seemingly paradoxical expression 
“experience contains a necessity (cause) that experience cannot teach” strikes us at the first glance 
now can be relieved as perfectly compatible. 
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As I have noted, the claim (1) experience contains necessity and the claim (2) experience 
cannot teach necessity are not incompatible. One can hold (1) and (2) at the same time without any 
incoherence being involved. Despite their compatibility, the difference between the two claims 
does suggest an epistemic gap between them. The metaphysical claim (1) indicates that there is 
necessary truth in the world, whereas the epistemological claim (2) says that we do not know such 
truth. The scope of knowledge allowed by empiricist epistemology cannot exhaust the scope of 
truth. 
When Kant claims that there exits necessity in experience, he is obviously not suggesting that 
this claim is beyond our knowledge. Rather, he is making a claim to knowledge; we do know that 
there exists necessity in experience. If Kant as well as empiricists is ascribed to the Semantic 
Antirealism Thesis that all truths are knowable truths, then there is a cheap equivalence between 
truth and knowledge; one does not only infer from knowledge to truth, one is also allowed to infer 
from truth to knowledge. Combined with Semantic Antirealism Thesis that (3) truth entails 
knowledge, it follows from the metaphysical claim that experience contains necessity the 
epistemological claim that  
 
(4) Some knowledge of natural necessity exists. 
 
Remember that: 
 
(2) Experience does not teach us the knowledge of necessity. 
 
Taken (2) and (4) together, it suggests that empiricist epistemology is incomplete. However, 
empiricist epistemology does not merely commit to (2), it also lays claim to the exhaustiveness 
thesis: 
 
(5) All human knowledge (or truths) is exhausted by empiricist epistemology. 
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Remember that in the argument from sciences how mathematics refutes empiricist 
epistemology. By the same token, the epistemological claim on necessity in experience refutes the 
Exhaustiveness Thesis and thereby the empiricist epistemology. 
Now we could put together three following claims: 
 
(1) Experience contains necessity. 
(2) Experience cannot teach necessity.  
(3) All human knowledge is exhausted by empiricist epistemology. 
 
These three claims constitute an inconsistent triad. Both empiricists and Kant are bound to 
reject at least one of them. In the previous argument, Kant accepts (1) and (2) but rejects (3). Since 
it is an inconsistent triad, empiricists are left room to reply to Kant’s argument by avoiding their 
commitment to some claim. In fact, empiricists accept (2) and (3) but reject (1). This move is as 
reasonable as it is unavoidable. Indeed, almost virtually all philosophers arrive at the consensus on 
the fundamental limitation of the induction of (2) that the epistemic reach of induction cannot be 
extended to necessity or absolute universality. 88  Empiricists are no exception. Empiricist 
epistemology in (3) is distinctive of empiricists. 
Adherents of empiricist epistemology might reply that the knowledge of necessity is 
controversial. Empiricists could argue that there is no necessary truth in the world as claimed by 
Kant, for the truths that cannot be exhausted by empiricist epistemology simply do not exist. 
Empiricist epistemology is a powerful weapon against all kinds of metaphysical illusions. To appeal 
to controversial metaphysical claims to revise empiricist epistemology simply misses the point. Again, 
we fall back to the same situation that we are confronted with as that in the previous argument 
from mathematics. The dispute between two parties is one regarding what premise is acceptable, 
and it comes down to the conflict between methodism and particularism. 
It is almost a truism that experience cannot teach us the necessary truth. Kant fully appreciates 
how the modal poverty thesis exerts a devastating consequence when it is taken in conjunction 
with the empiricist epistemology. The empiricist epistemology cannot provide us with the 
                                                     
88 The necessity and the absolute universality are taken by Kant as the two marks of a priori propositions, and 
therefore they are co-extensive. (B3-B4) Note that the necessity in question should not be understood in terms of 
possible world. For more details on the relationship between the a priori and its two marks see Casullo 2003. 
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knowledge that is unconditionally true. It holds independently what the world is like. Thus, one of 
Kant’s deepest worry is that experience cannot teach us the necessary truth even if the experience in 
fact contains necessary truths. The fault of the empiricist epistemology is not that it happens to be false, 
but it always leaves out modal truths, and thereby it precludes the possibility of expressing the 
necessary truth. Hence, the empiricist epistemology is not a mirror of reality; rather, it is a barrier 
for modality. 
 
2.5 The Modal Indeterminacy, Occult Quality, and Explanatory Rationalism  
We cannot empirically perceive the necessary connection between events; nor are we 
endowed with a special faculty capable of insight into such a necessary connection. In conjunction 
with the Semantic Antirealism Thesis, from the epistemic claim that we do not have knowledge of 
necessity it follows that:  
 
(4) There is no necessity in experience. 
 
In rejecting that there is any necessity in experience, one might be tempted to infer from the 
empiricist epistemology to a preeminent metaphysics, i.e., the Humean metaphysics. The Humean 
metaphysics is inspired by Hume, but it does not imply that it is embraced by Hume. According to 
Humean metaphysics, there is no necessary connection in the world. The world is a mosaic figured 
by spatiotemporally distributed particulars, and there is nothing over and above the local particulars 
in space and time. Laws of nature are nothing but constant regularity, and the causation is nothing 
but the constant conjunction. As Hume nicely captures in the §58 of the Enquiry: “All events seem 
entirely loose and separate. One event follows another; but we never can observe any tie between 
them. They seem conjoined, but never connected.”89 
In spite of the temptation, the reasoning from empiricist epistemology to Humean Mosaic is 
fallacious. In the intensional context of knowledge, we cannot infer from the denial of the knowledge 
of existence to the knowledge of the denial of existence. If the empiricist epistemology is driven consistently 
to its logical conclusion, what we have is not the contingency in the world, but the modal indeterminacy 
in the world. That is, neither can one derive necessity from experience, nor can one derive 
contingency. In Kant’s terminology, empiricist epistemology would say that neither experience can 
                                                     
89 Hume 1999, 144. 
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teach us that it could not be otherwise, nor can it teach us that it could be otherwise.  Consequently, the 
world is crude-grained in modality as long as one is committed to empiricist epistemology. We only 
know that it is so, and we do not know whether it is so necessarily or contingently. We cannot have 
a finer-grained picture of the world where its modal structure is specified. 
Kant is far from satisfied with modal indeterminacy. The Transcendental Deduction shows 
that the world is not modally indeterminate. Rather, the world is modally fine-grained, and it is 
much fine-grained than one might think. The way we gain insight into the modal structure of the 
world is by acknowledging the existence of certain modal knowledge and by assuming a particularist 
epistemology in the first place.90  
One important consequence of the modal indeterminacy of empiricist epistemology is that it 
deprives us of why-knowledge and leaves us only that-knowledge. For Kant, the why-knowledge 
is the knowledge of ground.91 According to the empiricist epistemology, we do not have the 
knowledge that it cannot be otherwise, which is equivalent to the knowledge of that it must be so. On 
the rationalist paradigm, something is necessarily so because it is a consequence necessitated by its 
ground. Therefore, we are deprived of the knowledge of something as a consequence of a ground. Since the 
notion of ground and that of consequence are inter-definable, this means that we do not have 
knowledge of the ground. The knowledge of ground is nothing but an explanation, so no genuine 
explanation could be given. Since both the notion of cause and that of law presuppose the notion 
of necessity and ground, we can give neither causal explanation nor nomic explanation. What 
empiricist epistemology ends up with is not even some explanatory gap, but an utterly explanatory 
void.92 
At this moment, it is not difficult to see that the Humean metaphysics collapses into a species 
of the system of occult quality, represented by common sense theorists. It has now become more 
widely accepted that, in spite of their focal difference, Hume and Reid bear a striking resemblance 
in their upholding both naturalism and skepticism.93 Here we find that Hume and common sense 
theorists converge also on another issue: both of them are committed to the assumption of 
explanatory anti-rationalism that everything is simply the case without further explanation.94 This 
                                                     
90 For more details on modal indeterminacy see 6.5. 
91 See Stang 2016, 128. 
92 Nevertheless, many contemporary philosophers believe that even facing this seemingly fatal modal objection the 
empiricism could be saved. In my view, since Kant has a very specific and even narrow conception of the empiricist 
epistemology, which is characterized by perception, reflection and induction, he would take the contemporary 
attempts as beyond the limit of the framework of empiricism. 
93 See Van Cleve 2015, 301-318. 
94 Like most of his contemporaries, Kant is convinced that Reid and Hume are profoundly opposite to each other, 
and he famously sides with Hume in his introduction to 1783 Prologomena. Kant’s evaluation of Hume’s attack on the 
connection of cause and effect is followed by his comments on Hume’s common sense opponents: “But fate, ever 
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is precisely the antithesis to one of Kant’s most underlying assumptions. According to Kant’s 
explanatory rationalism, everything must be explained.  Explanatory rationalism as a 
methodological thesis implies ontological rationalism that everything contingent must be a ground. 
Here we could further distinguish two versions of explanatory anti-rationalism. One version 
of explanatory anti-rationalism is ontological, and it is embraced by common sense theorists. 
Ontological anti-rationalism claims that the world is all that seems to be the way it is such that we 
need not explain it. The other version is epistemological, and it is embraced by Hume. Epistemological 
anti-rationalism claims that the world is all that seems to be the way it is such that we cannot explain 
it. The latter epistemological version is subtler, since it first philosophically reflects on our epistemic 
capacity, and then claims that we are not epistemically entitled to search the ground of the way the 
world is. 
The system of occult quality also commits Hume to be inconsistent with Locke. On Kant’s 
interpretation, the representative of empirical path Locke is an advocate of physical influx, the view 
that causation is explicable in terms of transferring influence from one object to the other. Therefore, 
Locke is endorsing the causal realism. However, when the empirical path is pushed to its logical 
consequence, causation in general is viewed simply as a metaphysical illusion. Hence, Humean 
metaphysics is incompatible with any kind of positive theory of causation, and it is incompatible 
with physical influx theory of causation, to which Locke is committed. 
 
 
 
  
                                                     
ill-disposed toward metaphysics, would have it that Hume was understood by no one. One cannot, without feeling a 
certain pain, behold how utterly and completely his opponents, Reid, Oswald, Beattie, and finally Priestley, missed the 
point of his problem, and misjudged his hints for improvement –constantly taking for granted just what he doubted, 
and, conversely, proving with vehemence and, more often than not, with great insolence exactly what it had never 
entered his mind to doubt – so that everything remained in its old condition, as if nothing had happened.” (AA 
4:258) 
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Chapter 3  Against the Mystical Fanatical Path 
3.1 Introduction 
Kant refers to the mystical path as “the fanatical path of intuition through the understanding” 
(AA 18:272). “Intuition through understanding” is nothing but the intellectual intuition by means 
of which an object is produced. As I have mentioned, this is the reason why this fanatical path 
could be regarded as caught on the second horn of the original dilemma of the Relation Problem 
concerning representation and object. The mystical fanatical path is characteristic of (i) enthusiasm, 
(ii) mysticism, (iii) innatism. Enthusiasm and innatism are common to both fanatical paths, yet only 
mysticism is peculiar to the mystical system of the fanatical path. I will merely discuss the enthusiasm 
and the mysticism of mystical fanatical path in this chapter, and leave Kant’s response to on innatism 
to the next chapter. 
Although “fanatical” and “enthusiastic” does not stem from the same root, I still take them 
to be synonymous since they are used interchangeably by Kant. In Reflection 4452 dated to 1772 
Kant writes: “[t]he objects are sensitive; only the use of reason with respect to them takes place in 
accordance with merely intellectual laws; if the objects are intellectual, then this is a form of 
enthusiasm.” (AA 17:557) By “enthusiasm” Kant refers to the position that mistakes sensible objects 
as intellectual ones. The use of the label is new,95 but the message it conveys is familiar to us: it is 
nothing other than the famous charge that Leibniz “intellectualized the sensible world” 
(A271/B327). 
Mysticism is characteristic of advocating that our cognition are means (i) ineffable or 
incommunicable or (ii) unanalyzable, and historically mysticism is closely associated with one or 
another sort of intuition. On the one hand, mysticism is the rational insight of “mind’s eye”. On 
the other hand, it dismisses the expressiveness of our conceptual apparatus. In short, the mystical 
fanatical path commits enthusiasm in that the sensible objects are mistaken as the intellectual ones, 
and it commits mysticism in that it confers a special intuition to the human mind. As we shall see, 
Kant rests his objections to enthusiasm and to mysticism respectively upon two distinctions 
fundamental to his philosophy: the former one is the sensibility/understanding distinction, and the 
latter one is the intuition/concept distinction. Whereas Kant vehemently attacks empiricism for its 
                                                     
95 In Critique, “enthusiasm” is used in contrast to “skepticism” and it is applied to Locke (B128). Therefore, it seems 
that Kant here introduces a new use of enthusiasm which is somewhat different from that in the Critique. Due the 
stereotype of the empiricism/rationalism opposition, one even might raise the doubt whether Kant’s use of 
enthusiasm is consistent. However, it is not difficult to see that the use in Reflection is compatible with that in 
Critique and that the former could be regarded as a species of the latter, since the latter is defined a in a general sense 
of not being “kept within limits by indeterminate recommendations of moderation” (B128). 
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explanatory inadequacy, he still sees empiricists as allies in that they could reach consensus on what 
an acceptable philosophical explanation should be. The fanatical path, however, falls prey to the 
far more serious defect of explanatory illegitimacy.96  
I the case of the mystical fanatical path, Plato and Malebranche are regarded by Kant as the 
representatives. In the case of the empirical path, Aristotle and Locke are analogously regarded as 
the representatives. Although Kant says little on Aristotle, his texts on the two moderns Locke and 
Hume are abundant. That is why in the previous chapter I discuss Locke and Hume rather than 
Aristotle. In this chapter, however, it might be a surprise to many that the target will be directed 
not to the modern philosopher Malebranche, but to the ancient philosopher Plato. In fact, Kant’s 
early texts on Malebranche as well as on Plato are scanty and meager, but this situation does not 
last after the publication of the 1787 Critique. Kant’s increasing critical engagement with Plato 
extends from the 1780s well into the 1790s. In addition to the Critique, it is also recorded in his 
account of the history of philosophy presented in the transcripts of his lectures on logic and on 
metaphysics, for instance, in Dohna-Wundlacken Logic (1792), in Metaphysik Mrongovius (1782/1783) 
and in Metaphysik Vigilantius (1794-1795).97 In particular, Kant’s view on Plato is most systematically 
and intensively presented first in Reflection 6080 titled On Philosophical Enthusiasm dated to the 
1780s (AA 18:434-437) and then in his polemical essay On a Recently Prominent Tone of Superiority in 
Philosophy (AA: 8:389-406)98 . In a number of texts on the enthusiasm, it is Plato rather than 
Malebranche who always resides at the center of discussion. Furthermore, Kant reconstructs a 
three-stage development of the enthusiasm of which Plato is not only the very origin but also the 
most philosophical.99 
Kant’s preoccupation of Plato is not drawn out of the air; rather, it is the symptom of the 
philosophical interest of the time. In the late eighteenth century, Germany witnessed a revival in 
the interest in Plato. Serious studies as well as new translations and editions of Plato’s work 
emerged. From the 1770s onward the wave had already begun to be felt, and by the 1790s the Plato 
renaissance was well established and it even influenced the ongoing philosophical debate.100 
Not all the consequences of the Platonic renaissance were welcoming, however. With the 
growing interests in Plato, many laymen were attracted by the exoteric aspects of Platonism. These 
                                                     
96 For a version of account of mysticism and Kant’s ally with empiricism and rationalism against it see Henrich 2008, 
65-81. 
97 I follow the titles given in the Cambridge Edition, and I will keep the German titles for the untranslated lectures in 
the Cambridge Edition. 
98 Abbreviated as Tone thereafter. 
99 For Kant’s own account of a three-stage development of enthusiasm see R6051 (AA 18:438). 
100 See Wundt 1941 and Beiser 2009, 364-365. 
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Platonic enthusiasts even assured themselves that they uncovered a genuine philosophical insight 
or method superior to all other philosophies. This insight or method is resistant to conceptual 
analysis and discursive thought. In fact, Kant’s 1796 essay Tone is a product of his reaction to the 
Plato renaissance in Germany in general and the exoteric aspect of Platonism in particular. In spite 
of its polemical character, it reveals more explicitly than any other Kant’s texts the tension between 
the two images of Plato Kant has in mind: one is Plato the letter writer, whilst the other is Plato the 
academy. Therefore, it is in this very text that we are in a position to be liberated from the one-sided 
negative impression of Plato in the Critique and to be offered a chance to appreciate a more complex 
image of Plato in Kant. 
The problem in the case of the empirical path is that the studies of empiricists are too many, 
whereas the problem in the case of the mystical fanatical path is that the studies of Plato are too 
few. While Plato and his system are briefly discussed in the Herz letter, it hardly changes the fact 
that the second literature on Kant’s project of transcendental deduction lacks the serious interest 
in the independent study of Plato. On the one hand, it is due to the reason that Kant does not 
mention Plato in the first half of the Critique at all, and Kant’s post-Critique works are not given its 
due. On the other hand, it is due to the reason that by Copernican Revolution Kant’s transcendental 
path replaces Plato’s mystical fanatical path as the representative of the grounding model that “the 
representation makes the object possible”. As I will show in Chapter 5, while both paths are 
committed to the grounding model that “the representation makes the object possible”, they 
represent the only two possible ways of grounding object in representation: to make object possible 
in virtue of making it actual, and to make the object possible by making it determinate. Given Kant’s 
famous distinction between existence and property, it is by no means a negligible difference. 
In section 3.2, I will first reconstruct the Platonic epistemology and its metaphysics. 
Interestingly, Kant attributes to Plato an argument from geometry that bears a striking similarity to 
his own. In section 3.3, by examining Plato’s argument from mathematics, we are revealed that 
Plato is heading in a wrong direction by erroneously assuming that apriority entails intellectuality. 
And then I will argue that, contrary to what many would expect, Kant does provide arguments for 
the seemingly brute fact that intellectual intuition is not human. In the ensuing section 3.4, I will 
investigate into Kant’s remedy of introducing mystical intuition, and I will suggest that this 
complementary argument is not only insufficient, but also incompatible with Kant’s fundamental 
assumption of causal realism. 
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3.2 The Platonic Epistemology and Metaphysics 
One presumably worry of Kant’s approach to Plato is how much the respective philosophical 
concerns of the two philosophers could converge, and to what extent their vocabularies are 
commensurable. Initially, this worry might appear superfluous. Our original motivation to 
approach to Plato is that this great representative of mystical fanatical path occupies a distinctive 
place in Kant’s spectrum of philosophical systems. Nonetheless, a further problem still remains 
whether Kant offers any formulation of Plato’s specific argument in addition to a mere location of 
the latter’s position in the philosophical spectrum.  
As I have noted, however, the objective reality problem is not the only way Kant articulates 
his central metaphysical concern. If I would like to follow my strategy in approaching the empirical 
path by initiating with examining the scope of knowledge, the commensurability question becomes 
pressing. At least it appears more difficult to formulate the ancient philosopher Plato’s doctrine 
than those of the moderns (say, Locke or Crusius) in Kantian terms. In the 1787 Critique Kant even 
claims that the analytic-synthetic distinction or the like is unavailable to Plato, and the problem of 
synthetic a priori propositions never occurs to him as to other ancient philosophers. (A10f) 
Fortunately, this difficulty is alleviated by Kant himself. Kant not only defines Plato’s position 
but also presents his reformulations of Plato’s arguments with reference to both questions. In On 
Philosophical Enthusiasm Kant reformulates Plato’s argument in terms of the problem of objective 
reality. In Tone, by contrast, Kant reconstructs Plato’s argument in terms of the problem of 
synthetic apriority. Thus, Kant’s own philosophy and Plato’s philosophy share the 
commensurability in substance. 
In Tone (1796), Kant construes Plato’s philosophy as a distinctive endeavor aiming at resolving 
the mystery of metaphysics. It should be kept in mind that for Kant how general and how 
systematic the mystery of synthetic a priori propositions is. The problem of synthetic a priori 
propositions is not only the puzzle for Kant alone. Neither is it merely a problem for modern philosophy. 
One is tempted to think so if he notices that it presupposes a doctrine of ideas or representations, 
which is flourishing precisely in modern philosophy. Rather, it is the riddle of metaphysics in general. All 
systems of metaphysics in history could be understood as a series of attempts in approaching and 
tackling this question in different disguised forms. 
Before we delve Plato’s epistemology, two caveats are worth making. While Platonism is a 
general and complex position, what Kant bears in mind is Mathematical Platonism and Christianized 
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Platonism. First, Kant’s reformulation of Platonism is concentrated on his philosophy of geometry. 101 It 
is well known that the concern of transcendental deduction is not the philosophy of mathematics, 
but metaphysics. 102  One might naturally wonder whether the attempt of explaining geometry 
should be a proper part of transcendental deduction. It must be conceded that in the strict sense 
such a study does go beyond the task of the deduction of categories. In any case, however, it is not 
redundant. The formulations of and solutions to general Relation Problem bring into focus the 
various possible grounding relations between representation and object yet, to some extent, distract 
itself from the kinds of representation. In this light, the exploration of one distinctive kind of 
grounding relation of representation to object is not only beneficial but also obligatory. 
Second, when Kant refers to the doctrine of Plato, he is not referring Platonism per se, but to 
Christianized Platonism. The chief difference between Platonism per se and Christianized Platonism 
lies in the metaphysical status of the Platonic Ideas. According to Plato, all Ideas as abstract objects 
are immutable, eternal, and uncreated. In spite of their subordination to the Idea of Good, in any case 
all the Ideas other than this most sublime one not created by it. According to Christianity, God is the 
creator of all beings and the source of all truths, and only God is immutable, eternal, and uncreated. 
Therefore, the uncreated nature of Platonic Ideas and the uncreated and even omnipotent nature 
of Christian God forms a tension. The Christianized Platonism relieves the tension by arguing that 
all Platonic Ideas are not only the archetypes of the sensible particulars but also the divine Ideas of 
God. The Ideas are created by God, and they can be destroyed by God as well. They are still 
immutable, eternal, and uncreated in the sense that they are not created or changed for any reason 
by anything in addition to God. 
According to Kant, the mystical fanatical path represented by Plato is committed to the 
following epistemology: 
 
(MRE1) Empirical knowledge is derived from experience. 
(MRE2) Synthetic a priori knowledge is acquired by intellectual intuition. (Dilemma)  
                                                     
101 In Critique, mathematics is divided into geometry and arithmetic. The philosophy of these two branches of 
mathematics have their different respective historical predecessors. Plato is the first philosopher who attempts to 
resolve the “wonders of shapes” in geometry, whereas Pythogoras is the first philosopher who attempts to resolve 
the “wonder of numbers” in arithmetic. In practice Kant’s emphasis is more attached to geometry than to arithmetic, 
and, as a matter of fact, Kant’s discussion of Plato is far more informative, I will concentrate myself on Plato’s 
endeavor in explaining geometry. 
102 For Kant there is a subtle yet qualitative difference between the study of the nature of space and that of 
magnitude. 
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It is not difficult to see that, on Kant’s interpretation, Plato is in effect adherent to a qualified 
empiricism. In explaining empirical knowledge, Plato claims that empirical knowledge is derived from 
experience as well. On the basis of the confinement of empiricism, Plato makes great progress 
beyond the confinement of empiricism. Compared to Locke, Plato is correct in identifying the 
actuality of a priori knowledge. Compared to Hume, Plato is correct in identifying the a priori 
knowledge is synthetic and thereby tracking the source of a priori knowledge to intuition rather than to 
concept. Therefore, Plato does not suffer from the poverty objection to scope. However, Plato leaves 
open to the mistake objection with respect to source. In the case of the empirical path, Kant’s mistake 
objection with respect to the epistemic source is targeted toward the faculty of sensibility. When it 
comes to the mystical fanatical path, as we will see, his mistake objection with respect the source 
of knowledge is mostly directed to the faculty of understanding, and he further identifies that the 
misconception of sensibility is a result of the misconception of understanding. 
As we will see, while Plato’s argument from the synthetic a priori propositions starts with the 
epistemological premise, it is an argument toward the explanatory grounds of some set of knowledge. 
If Kant’s interpretation of Plato’s argument is explanatory in character, it could be viewed as 
pursuing the sufficient conditions of synthetic a priori propositions. However, the interpreted 
argument is also an analysis of the necessary conditions of these synthetic a priori propositions. The 
evaluation of Kant’s reconstruction must be made from both aspects.  
On Kant’s interpretation, Plato’s argument from the synthetic a priori propositions is very 
complex. For the expository purpose, I understand this argument as two-staged in structure: at the 
first stage, Kant proposes a naïve argument, however, it soon turns out that this naïve argument is 
unsound; in at the second stage, based on the native one, Kant develops a more sophisticated 
argument in the hope of remedying the deficiency of the naïve argument, which falls prey to other 
serious objections. In the following, I will in turn discuss these two sub-arguments. 
 
3.3 Against the Naïve Argument for Intellection Intuition 
3.3.1 From the A Priori to the Intellectual 
According to my reconstruction drawing on Tone as the primary material, the following 
argument is attributed to Plato: 
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(1) Synthetic a priori propositions (e.g. mathematics) are actual. 
(2) Synthetic a priori propositions (e.g. mathematics) requires a priori intuition. 
(3) A priori intuition is intellectual. (by Coextension Assumption) 
 
Steps from (1) to (3) constitutes what I call the naïve argument. In order to explain the mystery 
of synthetic a priori propositions, the naïve argument shows how intellectual intuition is introduced. 
In the course of argument, Plato is credited by Kant as proceeding “consistently”. It does not mean 
that Plato’s argument is sound; rather, it means that it does not contradict with his own principle such 
that his own position is coherent. If the argument turns out to be unacceptable, it is natural to look 
at which premise is open to criticism. 
Kant’s reconstruction of Plato’s naïve argument is reminiscent of his own argument from 
geometry first developed in Prolegomena and then taken over, in a more concise way, in 1787 Critique. 
First, both arguments start from the premise that synthetic a priori propositions exist, which is the 
consequence of the conjunction between actuality thesis of mathematics and the synthetic apriority 
thesis of mathematics. Kant attributes both the actuality thesis and the synthetic apriority thesis of 
mathematics to Plato: 
 
(1.1) Mathematics is actual. 
(1.2) Mathematics is synthetic a priori. 
(1.3) Synthetic a priori propositions are actual. 
 
        Plato acknowledges not only that mathematics exists, but also that there is something mysterious 
in mathematics. It is plausible to suppose that the “wonders of shapes” (AA 8:392) that fascinates 
Plato is nothing but the a priori character of mathematics that is closely associated with the 
perfection in the geometrical figure, which is characteristic of necessity and universality. Distancing 
from German rationalists, Kant aligns himself with Plato in agreeing that mathematics is synthetic. 
In other words, Kant is not alone in arguing against the dominant view in Germany that 
mathematics is analytic; rather, he roots himself in a respectable tradition stemming from antiquity. 
However, it seems that the syntheticity view of mathematics is inconsistent with the intuitivity 
view of understanding. The analytic/synthetic distinction is drawn in terms of the positive 
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characterization of the analytic, which in turn rests on the notion of conceptual analysis.103 The 
conceptual analysis further presupposes that human understanding is discursive, i.e. think by means 
of concept. Consequently, to attribute to Plato a synthetic view of mathematics is to commit Plato 
to a discursive model of human understanding. Since Kant maintains that the distinction between 
intuitiveness and discursivity is mutually exclusive when applied to human understanding, at this 
point Plato has been forced to preclude the possibility that human understanding can be intuitive, 
which is precisely the conclusion he would draw.  
In response to this worry, one could propose that the meaning of syntheticity could be 
positively defined without reference to analyticity and discursivity. If some proposition is synthetic, 
then it means that the truth of the proposition must be determined with reference to the object. The 
truth of the synthetic proposition cannot be determined by the relationship between the content 
of the subject concept and that of the predicate concept; instead, it must be determined with 
reference to the third thing that goes beyond the content of the subject and predicate of the 
proposition. When it comes to geometry, it is very plausible to attribute to Plato the view that 
geometrical propositions are true of geometrical objects. 
The similarity between the two arguments is reflected not only in premise but also in structure 
and strategy. Kant’s own argument from geometry is divided into two steps. The first step is to 
argue that geometry requires a priori intuition, and the second step is to accommodate a priori intuition 
in human faculty by identifying it as the forms of sensibility. Similarly, Plato’s naïve argument from 
geometry is also divided into two steps. The first step, by the same token, is to argue that synthetic 
a priori propositions require a priori intuition, and the second step is to trace the a priori intuition to 
the faculty of understanding. The underlying strategy is characterized by identifying what kind of 
representation is required if it is to play the explanatory role in accounting for geometry, and then to 
individuating this explanatory role, that is, to show that there exists this kind of representation by 
locating it in some cognitive faculty. 
On Kant’s interpretation, Plato takes a splendid first step to victory in (2). Plato is correct in 
identifying that it is a priori intuitions, rather than concepts, that are the key to the solution of the 
apriority of mathematics, and he is also correct in believing that a priori intuition does exist (AA 
8:391f). However, Plato is only halfway to fulfilling his promise of explaining the “wonders of 
shapes”. In (3) Plato’s argument decisively diverges from Kant’s view by tracing a priori intuition to 
understanding, rather than to sensibility. 
                                                     
103 See Anderson 2015. 
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Given the initial striking resemblance, it is natural to ask on what account Plato’s explanation 
of geometry is led astray such that in the final step he draws a quite different conclusion from 
Kant’s own in the Prologomena. It is easy to see that, in order for the inference to go through, Plato 
should be committed to the following assumption: 
 
(A1) All and only a priori knowledge is intellectual. 
 
In fact, Kant does explicitly ascribe this assumption to Plato in R4851: “Plato took all a priori 
cognition to be intellectual. Leibniz too, and thus they did not recognize the sensible in space and 
time. Leibniz also explains it as intellectual but confused.” (AA 18:9) In conjunction with (A1), 
from (2) it immediately follows that synthetic a priori propositions in mathematics are traced back 
to and explained by the intuition of intellect. Given both the a priori/empirical distinction and the 
sensible/intellectual distinction are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive, it is easy to derive 
that 
 
(A2) All and only sensible knowledge is empirical. 
 
One consequence of the co-extension between the intellectual and the a priori is the co-
extension between the sensible and the empirical. In effect, this line of reasoning establishes the 
Co-extensionality Thesis that a priori/empirical distinction in knowledge is co-extensive with the 
sensible/intellectual distinction in mind. When he writes that “one distinguished intellectual 
cognitions from empirical ones and understood the latter when one called them sensible” (AA 
18:438), what Kant has in mind is probably that we are used to understanding the empirical 
knowledge in terms of the sensible knowledge. While (A1) is relatively unfamiliar to the readers, 
(A2) is the target attacked by Kant repeatedly. 
If one turns his objection on the assumption of Co-extensionality Thesis, the objection would 
be the most knocking-down one. By denying the assumption that makes Plato’s inference to go 
through, it claims that intellectual intuition is not a necessary condition for explaining synthetic a priori 
propositions in mathematics. However, Kant does level such an objection. This objection to the 
co-extensionality assumption presupposes that the truth of his positive views that space and time 
are forms of sensibility and that they are a priori. In effect, denying the assumption does nothing 
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other than saying that since Kant’s argument from geometry is right, then Plato’s rival argument is 
wrong. To make this move will undermine my overall strategy to bring the different possible paths 
under scrutiny. The strategy of examining other rival paths intends to prove that the transcendental 
path is correct precisely because other alternatives are incorrect; not the other way around. In the 
following, I will proceed to examine whether intellectual intuition is a sufficient condition for 
explaining synthetic a priori propositions as if the Co-extensionality Thesis holds and it has been 
established that intellectual intuition is a necessary condition. As we will see, attacking the assumption 
of the inference from (2) to (3) is not the only objection Kant can raise to Plato’s naïve argument. 
In fact, Kant will level a series of subsequent criticisms on the idea of intellectual intuition. 
Both the a priori/empirical distinction with regard to knowledge and the sensible/intellectual 
distinction with regard to mind are the two indispensable pillars of Kant’s edifice of epistemology. 
However, the question still leaves open as to which distinction is primary in its importance. This is 
made explicit in the R4851 dated to between 1776 and 1778: 
 
Acquisitae are a priori or a posteriori acquisitae, the former are not always intellectual. Thus the division of 
cognition into sensitive and intellectual is not the primary one, rather the division into a priori or a 
posteriori cognition. The former is either sensible or intellectual. (AA 18:8) 
 
On Kant’s interpretation, the traditional view is that the faculty distinction between sensibility 
and understanding is primary. However, Kant holds this view is incorrect. Rather, the distinction 
between the a priori and the a posteriori should assume primacy. Interestingly, Kant further identifies 
the Co-extensionality Thesis as the root of the misguided traditional view. Kant argues that not all 
a priori representations are intellectual. Rather, some a priori representations are sensible. Kant’s 
suggestion seems to be that if the co-extension between sensible/intellectual distinction and a 
priori/a posteriori distinction holds, it leaves unmotivated to and pay attention to and analyze 
sensibility for identifying a priori acquired representation. It is noteworthy that what Kant says is 
not that the Co-extensionality Thesis entails the primacy of the faculty distinction, but that the 
former encourages the latter. 
In order to liberate ourselves from this traditional prejudice, the key is to take the distinction 
between the a priori and the a posteriori as the primary one in the division of cognition. Therefore, 
the remedy is to locate and separate the a priori elements from human cognition in the first place, and 
then to examine whether they are to be attributed to sensibility or to understanding. Kant is not 
formulating a metaphysical thesis that a priori representation is a genus, and sensible and intellectual 
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representations are its species that flies in the face of the obvious intersection of the twofold 
distinction. Rather, what Kant formulates is a methodological thesis that in practice we should proceed 
from the a priori/a posteriori distinction to sensible/intellectual distinction as if a priori representation 
is a genus, and sensible and intellectual representations are their species. 
In any event, Kant’s suggestion is not casual; rather, he takes it seriously. This methodology 
is employed rigorously and built into the architectonic of both editions of Critique. As is well known, 
the Critique is characteristic of the scrutiny of human faculties by ascending from sensibility through 
understanding to reason. This structure remains untouched throughout two editions. Nevertheless, 
this grand design of the Critique does not dwarf the fact that the critique of the three human 
cognitive faculties is preceded by and grounded in the more fundamental distinction between the 
empirical and the a priori cognition in both editions of Introduction to the Critique, which is the 
proper starting point of Kant’s critical project. 
In effect, this objection to the primacy of the faculty distinction between sensibility and 
intellectual with respect to human cognition is distinctive of Kant’s critical philosophy. It 
constitutes a straightforward response to anyone who suspects that the endeavor of critique of 
human faculty has started off well before Kant published his Critique. For instance, in his unfriendly 
review of the 1781 Critique, Eberhard commented that “the Leibnizian philosophy contains just as 
much of a critique of reason as the more recent one, whereby it nevertheless introduces a 
dogmatism grounded in a careful analysis of the cognitive faculties, therefore containing everything 
that is true in the latter, but still more besides in a grounded extension of the domain of the 
understanding” (AA 8:187). One of Eberhard’s points is that the distinction between sensibility 
and understanding has already been found in Leibniz and the originality of the Critique is thereby 
distracted.104 
Kant himself is ready to accept the view that the distinction between sensibility and 
understanding is not novel. He even traces the distinction between sensible and intellectual 
knowledge back to the philosophy before Plato. In his own latter addition to Reflection 6051 
around the 1780s, Kant writes: “Even before Plato one distinguished intellectual cognitions from 
empirical ones and understood the latter when one called them sensible, and thus certainly made a 
distinction between intelligible and sensible things. One held all a priori cognition to be intellectual, 
thus even mathematics; and since various sensitive things, and actually only these, can be cognized 
a priori, one had examples of a supposedly intellectual cognition.” (AA 18:348) This tradition 
extends to Leibniz as well: “Plato took all a priori cognition to be intellectual. Leibniz too, and thus 
                                                     
104 For Eberhard’s criticisms see the translator’s introduction to On a Discovery in Camrbidge edition of Kant’s works. 
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they did not recognize the sensible in space and time. Leibniz also explains it as intellectual but 
confused.” (AA 18:9)105 
Therefore, Eberhard levels his criticism on a straw man for he not only misses but also 
misunderstands precisely one of the most distinctive feature of Critique. What is of utmost 
importance to the critical project of human faculties is not the distinction between sensibility and 
understanding, but that between apriority and aposteriority. In spite of taking over the faculty 
distinction, Leibniz takes the faculty distinction to be logical on the one hand, and he does not 
attach primary importance to the a priori/a posteriori distinction on the other hand. Consequently, 
Leibniz falls under the category of dogmatism characteristic of not being able to critique human 
faculties in advance and thereby he is no exception to Kant’s ruthless and relentless attack.  
Neither is Kant unaware of the superficially similar work done by his contemporaries. Tetens, 
for instance, published his Philosophical Search on Human Nature and Its Development (Philosophische 
Versuche über die Menschliche Natur und ihre Entwicklung) in 1777, one devoted to the study of the 
nature of human mind.106 Rather, Kant closely studied Tetens’ work, and it bears the witness that 
Kant even often leaves the work opened while composing Critique. Kant is equally aware of the 
unmistakable difference between his project and that of Tetens. In Reflection 4901 dated between 
1776 and 1778, Kant writes: “Tetens investigates the concept of pure reason merely subjectively 
(human nature), I investigate them objectively. The former analysis is empirical, the latter 
transcendental.” (AA 18:23) For Kant, one key to distancing his own transcendental study from 
Tetens’ empirical study lies in Kant the primary distinction in the critical project is assumed by that 
between the a priori and empirical cognition. 
 
3.3.2 Kant’s Objections to the Intellectual Intuition 
Kant’s official objection to Plato’s attribution of intuition to intellect is that intellectual 
intuition is not human. Insofar as the explanatory aim is concerned, it amounts to suggesting that 
Plato’s naïve argument is irrelevant. Although Kant often sounds like that the discursivity of human 
understanding is a brute fact which does not need to be justified, he nonetheless offers an array of 
independent arguments for the rejection of intellectual intuition as human. Most of the arguments 
can be found in R5637 dated probably to early 1780s: 
                                                     
105 In fact, Kant’s conception of the sensibility/intellect distinction is radically distinct from all of his predecessors. 
For Kant’s innovative theory of mind see Chapter 9. 
106 For Tetens’ important role in the development of Kant’s critical philosophy see De Vleeschauwer 1962, 68-88. 
For a comparative study of Tetens and Kant see Allison 2015, 143-163. 
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Among all of our thoughts there is not the least trace of the intuition of objects other than those 
of the senses and no thoughts that pertain to anything other than the exposition of appearances. An 
intellectual intuition of objects outside of us, that do not exist through us, also seems to be impossible. 
If one assumes intellectual intuitions, this yields no cognition of the understanding through 
concepts and thus no thought and also no communicable cognition. (AA 18:274-275) 
 
In the first paragraph of the R5637 Kant offers two arguments for the rejection of intellectual 
intuition as human: one is empirical, and the other is conceptual. The empirical reason is that “[a]mong 
all of our thoughts there is not the least trace of the intuition of objects” other than our concepts 
of objects. Empirically, there is no slightest sign that our thoughts consist of concepts through 
which objects cannot be given, though they can be thought. This is Kant’s most famous reason to 
reject intellectual intuition as human, and it gives people the impression that Kant does not have 
any argument against intellectual intuition at all. 
A more obscure argument is that the notion of “intellectual intuition of objects outside of us” 
is conceptually self-defeating. Kant seems to suggest that “objects outside us” implies that they “do 
not exist through us”, i.e. their existence is independent of mind. However, “intellectual intuition” 
means nothing but the very kind of representation that produces the object, that is, the existence 
of objects is dependent on mind. If combined together, then the notion of “intellectual intuition 
of objects outside of us” commits to that objects outside us are dependent on us and independent 
of us at the same time. For both reasons, the view that our understanding could be intuitive does 
not have any chance to be correct. 
The second paragraph is difficult, for the communicability of cognition is a rare topic in Kant, 
which involves the relationship between language and mental representation. Apparently, Kant is 
charging that the introduction of intellectual intuition of eliciting the incommunicability of 
cognition. The final aim of the argument is also targeted against the non-humanity of intellectual 
intuition. The argument is essentially one by modus tollens: if we have intellectual intuition, then we 
would have no communicable cognition. Since we do have communicable cognition, we do not 
have intellectual intuition. The crucial premise of the argument is obviously the conditional claim 
that if we have intellectual intuition, then it invites uncommunicable cognition. I think that Kant’s 
argument for this conditional claim can be reconstructed as follows: 
 
(1) Only predicate can be communicable. 
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(2) If we have intellectual intuition, then we have no concepts and thus no predicate.  
(3) We do not have communicable cognition. 
 
        In the following, I will first sketch an outline of what Kant would say in regard to the 
relationship between mental representation and language, and then suggest a way of reading this 
passage with reference to the linguistic analogue of representation. The foundation of my reading 
is to assume that Kant’s conviction that our understanding is discursive is the key to the explanation 
of the phenomena of publicity of propositional knowledge. 
        For (1): Our words and sentences are physical expressions of mental representation. General 
terms are linguistic expressions of concepts, while singular terms such as demonstratives are 
expressions of intuitions.107 Now let’s assume that this is Kant’ view of the relationship between 
language and mental representation. Then, the communicability of our representations can be 
explained with reference to their linguistic analogue. There is a fundamental difference between 
general terms and demonstratives. General terms are not context-sensitive, whereas demonstrative 
are. Only by general terms can we express ourselves independently of the presence of the referents. 
By the same token, there is a fundamental difference between concepts and intuition.  
Concepts are the representations that have fixed descriptive content by means of which one can 
understand other’s words without the presence of objects referred to by the concepts. Unlike 
concepts, intuitions are not associated with the descriptive content. One cannot communicate or 
even express himself only with the aid of demonstratives like ‘this’ or ‘that’.108 
Only with the aid of the fixed descriptive content in concept can we overcome the limitation 
of the descriptive emptiness of the demonstrative. Therefore, the communicability of our cognition 
draws on the generality of our concept, and the possession of concept in turn draws on the 
discursivity of mind.109 
For (2): Even if our intellect is capable of intuition, why cannot we are also equipped with 
concepts as well? It seems perfectly possible that our understanding can have the logical use of 
understanding, which is compatible with the intellectual intuition that is identified as it real use. 
                                                     
107 For Kant, singular terms such as proper names are disguised general term. 
108 Strictly speaking, in Kant intuition is expressed by pronoun “it”. (B142) In fact, the descriptive emptiness of 
intuition constitutes one motivation for Kant to exclude intuition from the immediate components of judgments and 
to embrace the view that we think by predicate. 
109 As Kant observes in R4634, “[w]e know any object only through predicates that we can say or think 
of it” (AA 17:616). In the same vein, it is not controversial if we attribute to Kant the claim that we can 
communicate only through predicates. 
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Kant does not say anything on this point. In order to preclude this possibility, Kant has to commit 
himself to the assumption that the discursivity of understanding must be thorough, that is, any use of 
understanding must be concerned with general and reflected representations as long at least one use 
of understanding is so. Now that human understanding is intuitive in its real use, then it leaves no 
room for a discursive logical use.110 
 
3.4 Against the Sophisticated Argument by Mystical Intuition 
3.4.1 The Mystical Intuition Introduced 
In spite of the objections, Plato is no fool who would bite the bullet to say that human beings 
are capable of intellectual intuition. And neither is he attributed to such a view by Kant. Indeed, it 
is doubtful whether any philosopher has embraced such a wildly implausible view in history. In 
confrontation of the objections, Plato develops a sophisticated argument based on the naïve 
argument.111 In the following, I will reconstruct the second stage of Plato’s argument by drawing 
on R6080 On Philosophical Enthusiasm as the primary material, and I will make reference to Tone 
when necessary. Plato’s sophisticated argument runs from the denial of the humanity of intellectual 
intuition to the introduction of mystical intuition. 
 
(4) Intellectual intuition is non-human. 
(5) Intellectual intuition is divine Ideas. 
(6) Ideas are conferred on human beings only derivatively and indirectly at their birth by God, and 
we human beings become acquainted with the Ideas in virtue of mystical intuition. 
 
On Kant’s interpretation, Plato immediately identifies intellectual intuition as the kind of 
representation distinctive of divine understanding, from which Ideas are yielded as the archetype 
of things. Idea archetypa is the representation that brings object into being, and it is also called original 
representation. The object the divine Idea produces is the archetype of all things: it is the cause of 
                                                     
110 In the framework of the intuition/concept distinction, in addition to the thoroughness assumption, Kant is also 
committed to the assumption that we have no complete concept at disposal, and to the assumption that no intuition 
can be employed in judgment. 
111 In denying that intellectual intuition is human, Kant attributes to the sophisticated Plato the view that human 
understanding is essentially discursive. 
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all beings; it is perfect at all points; and it is the causally inert abstract objects that do not exist in 
space and time. 
Now it turns out that the required kind of a priori representation is intellectual yet not human. 
At best, it can be proved that mathematics is made intelligible for God. What does it have to do 
with our human beings? It seems that we are not approaching to, but distanced from, the objective 
of making intelligible synthetic a priori propositions. Plato is not to be deferred; he takes a detour to 
the destination. Convinced by his previous argument, Plato believes that intellectual intuition is 
indispensable in accounting for a priori knowledge such as mathematics, and he also believes that 
intellectual intuition is non-human. There is an obvious gap between the human and the divine. Plato 
is quite clear that some further account must be given so as to bridge the gap. In other words, the 
above objections show that intellectual intuition is only necessary yet not sufficient condition for 
explaining mathematics. Even if we grant that intellectual intuition is not a sufficient condition, it 
still leaves open whether intellectual intuition must conjoin other conditions to yield a sufficient 
condition. On Kant’s construal, this is precisely the point where Plato’s famous doctrine of innate 
ideas and recollection step onto the stage. As it will be shown, in this detour a longer story is to be 
told about how human understanding is indirectly acquainted with these Ideas of intellectual 
intuition. 
On Kant’s account, Plato tells a complex and obscure story roughly like this: since human 
understanding falls short of the intellectual intuition, therefore they must stand in a communion 
relation to God who uniquely possesses this supreme faculty. These innate ideas folded in human 
mind stem from its communion with God. The a priori knowledge of these ideas is nothing but the 
recollection of the old ideas. 
No matter what details are involved in the story, one thing for sure is that we human beings 
must have epistemic access to the archetypes in the divine understanding. Kant dubs “mystical 
intuition” to designate our access to divine ideas and he introduces this apparatus to bridge the gap 
between human cognition and divine Ideas and thereby to enable human beings immediately 
acquainted with Platonic ideas. This representation introduced by Kant is intuitive because the ideas 
are “immediately understood”, rather than “inborn concepts that are believed”; it is mystical because 
we have to participate in this by appeal to “the communion with God”, since the ideas are in God 
yet “we could not participate in those on our own”. (AA 18:435) 
Kant does not say much about the nature of mystical intuition, but we can infer the features 
it is supposed to have. First, that the mystical intuition Kant introduces is distinct from intellectual 
intuition and sensible intuition. According to the sophisticated argument, Plato assigns different 
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roles to intellectual intuition and mystical intuition: intellectual intuition plays the role of creator and 
giver of the object, whereas mystical intuition plays the role of epistemic access to the object. 
Moreover, like any other kind of intuition, the object of mystical intuition is non-discursively 
related and non-propositional. Like intellectual intuition, mystical intuition is not sensible in that it is 
immune from the causal affection as the sensible intuition is; otherwise, it will collapse into Kant’s 
pure sensible intuition. Like sensible intuition, mystical intuition is receptive in that it cannot produce 
any object as the divine intellectual intuition does.  
The label of mystical intuition is unfamiliar in Kant’s philosophy. However, the idea of 
intellectual perception behind label is commonplace in the history of philosophy; indeed, it is one 
hallmark of classical epistemological rationalism. In antiquity, Plato recognizes that we can have an 
immediate intellectual grasp of rational insight into the abstract objects. In early modern time, 
Malebranche holds that our pure understanding perceives clearly and distinctly of Ideas as abstract 
entities in God.112 It is fair to classify Malebranche as another representative of the mystical 
fanatical path.113 
 
3.4.2 The Objections to Mystical Intuition  
(a) The Insufficiency of Mystical Intuition 
Now even if we grant that there is mystical intuition residing in human mind without 
conflicting with Kant’s theory of mind, and even if it is possible to render us to communicate with 
divine ideas, as Kant himself points out, mystical intuition simply cannot do the job it is expected 
to do. Kant raises the following objection: “since it is probable that between us and God there is a 
great scale of beings that extends from us to Him — genii, astral spirits, eons — one could first 
attain communion with these and with the prelude to intellectual original intuitions.” (AA 18:435) 
This objection to mystical intuition is fatal. Even if we grant that we do possess mystical 
communion with God, the way of communion with God could be not that simplistic as we might 
expect such that we could not commune with the Platonic Ideas. As Kant notes, it is probable that 
there are beings between we human beings and God, but human mystical intuition cannot tell 
whether we are in communion with God or with other beings that are superior to us yet inferior to 
                                                     
112 It should be noted that Malebranche’s notion of pure understanding is distinct from Kant’s notion of intuitive 
understanding. Malebranche’s notion of pure understanding is a synthesis of the Cartesian pure understanding and 
Augustinian divine illumination. For Malebranche the pure understanding is human and it is contrasted with sense 
perception. While it is capable of singular representation, it does create object. 
113 This respectable tradition is revived by contemporary rationalists such as Bealer and Bonjour. 
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God. When we actually attain communion with such other beings, we might mistake this 
communion as one with God. Archetypes are only peculiar to God, and we cannot find them 
anywhere else than in communion with God. Therefore, in the prelude to communion with God, 
we might mistake something else as divine Ideas. 
Kant’s point is that mystical intuition is necessary yet insufficient for guaranteeing us to have an 
immediate intuition of the divine Ideas as archetypes. The introduction of mystical intuition is 
motivated by equipping us with faculty that enables us to receive Ideas. Now it turns out that 
mystical intuition by itself is not a reliable source for individuating Ideas that we want. It amounts 
to saying that even in conjunction with mystical intuition, Plato still does not give the sufficient 
condition to explain the synthetic a priori propositions in mathematics. When we take into account 
Kant’s view that not all a priori representations are intellectual, intellectual intuition turns out to be 
neither necessary nor sufficient condition for geometry. 
Kant does not say anything more about how to save the mystical fanatical path. He seems to 
believe that he has done enough to show that mystical fanatical path is hopeless and that this should 
be the end of the story. It is not difficult for us to infer that, in order to explain the synthetic a priori 
propositions, Kant must embrace the doctrine of divine reliabilism, according to which God 
guarantees our mystical intuition to be a proper faculty to have epistemic access to Ideas. Kant can 
hardly miss this possibility of appeal to divine reliabilism. Since Crusius is a chief representative of 
divine reliabilism, I will leave Kant’s criticisms on divine reliabilism to the next chapter. 
 
(b) The Faculty Objection and Explanatory Rationalism 
In the case of intellectual intuition, the question is raised whether it is human in spite of its 
allegedly indispensable role in explaining mathematics. The answer is obvious; we human beings 
are incapable of intellectual intuition. Unlike intellectual intuition, it is far from obvious that we are 
equally incapable of mystical intuition. In the history of philosophy, it is not rare to encounter the 
doctrine that we human beings are endowed with a special insight into the ultimate reality behind 
the appearances. 
Even if the mystical intuition is not straightforwardly non-human, a further question could 
nonetheless be raised as to how the mystical intuition can be accommodated with Kant’s theory of 
mind. By this question I do not mean whether mystical intuition could actually be found in what 
Kant’s theory of mind literally says. I mean instead whether it can be compatible with the general 
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criteria of Kant sets for any coherent theory of mind. For instance, Kant’s pure intuition could be 
accommodated to his framework of human faculties by being identified as the form of sensibility. 
Initially, it seems not difficult to locate mystical intuition in a theory of mind. The mystical 
intuition is merely a mystical variant of the more general perception of intellect in the history of 
philosophy. To be sure, it is the dominant view from Plato to account for our knowledge of abstract 
entities. However, it is not compatible with the constraint imposed by Kant. In Kant’s philosophy, 
understanding can be defined as the epistemic faculty of which spontaneity is its essential property, 
and sensibility can be defined as the epistemic faculty of which receptivity is its essential property. 
In common practice, the spontaneity of understanding is defined in broadly causal terms; a faculty is 
spontaneous only if its activity is not subject to causal affection from without. Obviously, this definition is 
derived from a negation of the definition of sensibility in positive causal terms. Since understanding 
is free from causal affection, it can be credited as a faculty of freedom, which accords with our 
intuitive understanding of the voluntariness of thinking activity, i.e. that we can think whenever we 
will. According to this criterion, understanding is adequate to be distinguished from sensibility in 
most cases. As my earlier formulation suggests, freedom from causal affection is only a necessary 
condition for the spontaneity of a faculty. 
In my view, Kant has a demanding, and even peculiar, positive conception of spontaneity. 
According to this positive definition, a faculty is spontaneous if and only if it can produce something 
from within. I call this the radical spontaneity thesis. To be sure, Kant does not make explicit this 
characterization of spontaneity in his work. But it could be regarded as a working definition that 
underlies Kant’s texts about both human and divine kinds of understanding. The distinction 
between divine intuitive understanding and human discursive understanding does not merely lie in 
whether the understanding represents through marks or not. Divine understanding is spontaneous 
in that it can produce the object from its representation, and human understanding is spontaneous in that 
it can produce transcendental content into the manifold. Therefore, both the positive notion of sensibility 
and that of understanding are defined in broadly causal terms. 
As it stands, mystical intuition is spontaneous in the negative sense, since its working does 
not suffer from causal affection from without. However, it obviously falls short of being 
spontaneous in a more demanding positive sense, since it cannot produce anything from within. 
According to Kant’s scheme, however, the distinction between intuitive understanding and 
discursive one is exhaustive. The “either-or” distinction is so entrenched that simply no room can 
be made for mystical intuition in Kant’s philosophy of mind. The crux is that between sensibility 
and understanding there is no middle way of non-causal intellectual perception of abstract entities. 
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This is the very reason why mystical intuition cannot be accommodated with Kant’s philosophy of 
mind.  
In the previous analysis, I assume the tenability of Kant’s theory of mind without giving 
justification for it. The followers of the mystical fanatical path might want to escape the “either receptive 
or spontaneous” dilemma by rejecting Kant’s philosophy of mind. It seems that the incompatibility 
objection simply begs the question of the friends of mystical intuition. What I have said amounts 
to saying that because Kant’s theory of faculties is right, other theories of faculties is wrong. I still 
owe the friends a justification of Kant’s theory of faculties. Kant’s objection does not beg the 
question of the friends of mystical intuition. Kant’s radical spontaneity thesis is not drawn out of 
the air. As we will see, it is instead derived from Kant’s assumptions of explanatory rationalism and 
causal realism, which constitute Kant’s most fundamental motivation to raise his objection to 
mystical intuition. While Kant might differ with his foes in underlying assumptions, it does not 
make him immediately question-begging. 
 
3.4.3 The Causal Objection and the Causal Realism 
The introduction of mystical intuition is incompatible with the Kant’s most underlying 
assumptions of explanatory rationalism and causal realism. According to Kant’s explanatory rationalism, 
in order for knowledge to be possible, there must be a ground for representation to have relation 
to object. If the intellectual perception can represent Platonic Ideas, it cannot be a coincidence. 
There must be some ground for the possibility of representing reality. According to Kant’s causal 
realism, this ground should be a real one. Either one relatum causes the other relatum, or vice versa. 
It cannot be the case that both relata stand in an ideal relation initiated by a common cause. In 
other words, the supervenience characterization of the relation of causation does not suffice. 
Given his underlying assumptions, Kant’s most fundamental objection to mystical intuition 
is that it cannot account for the ground of the relation of mystical intuition to divine Ideas, since 
mystical intuition is neither causally spontaneous nor receptive. In effect, this objection is targeted 
not only to mystical intuition but also to anything like the perception of intellect. 
In the case of sense perception, this question is easy to answer. Sense perception can represent 
reality precisely because sense perception is grounded in reality by being affected by the latter. 
When it comes to intellectual perception, the question of grounding becomes much thornier. The 
friends of the perception of intellect cannot give an account of why such “eyes of mind” can 
represent reality as Kant requires. On some narrow notion of natural causation, the grounding simply 
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seems impossible. Since the Platonic abstract entities are causally inert, neither can they have causal 
efficacy nor can they receive causal efficacy. For Kant, the causal innerness of Platonic abstract 
entities holds only insofar as the scope of restricted to natural causation. Divine causation is immune 
from the restriction, and to relate Ideas with God is not historically practiced, but also 
philosophically tenable. 
Mystical intuition or intellectual perception simply mirrors the reality without influencing reality. 
Therefore, it is committed to the mirroring model of knowledge. Kant’s point is that there is simply 
no way of taking advantage of the mirroring model of representation without paying the price of 
giving an account of the ground of the representability. Kant’s criticism can be seen as against the 
mirroring model of knowledge, according to which the eye of mind can simply represent the world 
as it is. In fact, even the mirror metaphor is not proper; the mirror image is also grounded in 
something.114 
   Kant’s objection to mystical intuition is reminiscent of Paul Benacerraf’s celebrated causal 
objection to mathematical Platonism, which is a case of the general problem of integration 
challenge articulated by Christopher Peacock.115 The point of Benacerraf’s objection is that it is 
impossible to provide both a satisfactory epistemology and a respectable semantics for 
mathematical Platonism at the same time. The mathematical Platonism is successful in providing 
the appropriate truth conditions for mathematical sentences. However, it fails to be accommodated 
with a causal account of epistemology since abstract objects are causally inert and inaccessible for 
sense perception. If we cannot develop a satisfactory epistemology, it renders the set of abstract 
objects entirely mysterious. 
In fact, this is not a new objection. One of the oldest and most perennial objections to 
Platonism is that it cannot account for how we can have access to abstract entities if abstract objects 
are causally inert. Normally, the epistemology of mathematical Platonism makes an appeal to some 
sort of perception of intellect or rational insight, which can mirror or reflect the abstract objects without 
bearing causal relation to them. The standard reply of mathematical Platonism to this objection is 
to bite the bullet by saying that our access to abstract objects does not draw on sense perception 
but on some sort of perception of intellect.116 The intellectual perception does not have to satisfy the 
criterion that the account of knowledge in general must be causal. 
                                                     
114 See Benacerraf 1973. 
115 See Peacock 1999, 1-12. 
116 The most celebrated defenders of this view in modern era are Descartes and Malebranche. 
84 
 
Benacerraf revives this old objection while keeping an eye on the contemporary requirement 
for a respectable epistemology. Obviously, Benacerraf’s objection assumes that a respectable theory 
of knowledge is a causal theory of knowledge. Mathematical Platonism is untenable precisely because 
its correspondent epistemology cannot be causal. Nowadays the causal theory of knowledge is well-
motivated. On the one hand, the paradigmatic case of perceptual knowledge lends credence to it; 
on the other hand, it is congenial with the naturalist approach to epistemology. 
Interestingly, Kant’s objection to mystical intuition bears superficial similarity with 
Benacerraf’s celebrated objection to mathematical Platonism. Both of them endorse a causal theory 
of knowledge. Both Kant and Benacerraf agree that the representation of object presupposed by 
knowledge is not an epistemic luck, but an epistemic achievement.  Therefore, there must be some 
causal track to guarantee the reliability of knowledge.117 
Kant’s conception of causation or grounding is more general than a contemporary causal 
theory of knowledge would permit. The latter is committed to a physiologically casual theory of 
knowledge. By contrast, Kant extends it to a metaphysically causal theory of knowledge. Metaphysical 
causation is more permissive than physical or physiological causation. Metaphysical causation even 
includes, say, the creation of object by means of which intellectual intuition, which is obviously 
incompatible with a naturalistic approach to epistemology.  
Kant is convinced that it is a presupposition of knowledge that every kind of representing 
relation must have a metaphysical ground. Platonism is not a respectable position insofar as it 
invokes God in explaining knowledge. However, Platonism is a respectable position, insofar as 
Platonism offers an account of the ground of the relation of representation to object. Kant’s 
previous objection to Platonism is not that this kind of causation or creation presupposed by 
intellectual intuition is illegitimate, but that it is not ours. When it comes to mystical intuition, Kant’s 
point is significantly different. The problem of mystical intuition lies not in that the representation 
of object is magical, but in that this relation is groundless: mystical intuition is incompatible neither 
with empirical path nor with the transcendental path. 
In line with this general requirement, Kant himself provides a causal theory of a priori 
knowledge. As we will see in Chapter 5, in his own transcendental path Kant draws a distinctive 
idealistic conclusion. In short, the difference between Platonic rationalism and transcendental 
philosophy lies in whether to introduce a third thing, namely, God, or to change the established notion of 
the second thing, namely, object. Now Kant is rejecting the alternative of introducing God and his 
                                                     
117 Roughly speaking, the problem of the relation of representation, or cognition, to object is the presupposition of the 
problem of knowledge. 
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intellectual intuition and discarding the underlying realistic metaphysics. Kant discards realism for 
idealism for two reasons: on the one hand, we cannot produce abstract entities, since they are not 
ontologically inferior; on the other hand, we cannot contact them, either, since they are causally inert,  
For Kant, Platonism is wildly implausible. Kant’s move is to reject Platonism at the price of 
reviving idealism. Since idealism is generally regarded as incompatible with naturalism, it is even 
worse for a naturalist.118 What allies Kant and the causal theorists of knowledge is not epistemic 
naturalism, but epistemic atheism. Although both of them are motivated by the rejection to introduce 
supernatural entities, epistemic atheism cannot be deflated into epistemic naturalism. Epistemic 
atheism is a broader view than epistemic naturalism: the former implies the latter, but not vice 
versa. Therefore, the difference between Benacerraf and Kant comes down to the difference in 
their deeper philosophical commitment. Benacerraf’s requirement of the causal account of 
knowledge is motivated by epistemic naturalism, whereas Kant’s demand on the ground of the relation 
of representation to object is guided by his explanatory rationalism. 
Now the only possible way for rationalists to escape the mystical intuition is to resort to divine 
reliabilism. They do not have a chance, however. As we will see in next chapter, in examining the 
logical fanatical path, Kant mounts an array of arguments against this move for its being guilty of 
explanatory anti-rationalism and of epistemic theism. At a bottom level, Kant’s project against the 
logical fanatical path constitutes a knocking-down objection to the neglected alternative: the 
Cartesian epistemology. 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                     
118 For the compatibility between naturalism and Platonism see Linsky and Zalta 1995. 
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Chapter 4  Against the Logical Fanatical Path 
4.1 Introduction 
The logical variant of the fanatical path is also a species of the fanatical path. Like its mystical 
relative, the logical variant is committed to (1) enthusiasm, (2) innatism, but it does not commit to 
mysticism. In contradistinction to mysticism, Kant dubs the label “logical system”, as he writes in 
R5637 dated to 1780s: “the logical system of the cognitions of the understanding is either empirical 
or transcendental. The former Aristotle and Locke, the latter either the system of epigenesis or that 
of involution, acquired or inborn.”(AA 18:275) As R5637 indicates, the logical system includes a 
variety of positions: the system of physical influx, the system of epigenesis, and the system of 
preformation. What these logical systems have in common is their allegiance that what figures in 
the explanation of a priori knowledge is not intuitions, but concepts, by means of which thought 
can be made explicable. 
In the Herz letter and other places, Leibniz and Crusius are regarded as the representatives 
of the logical fanatical path. In the following, I will choose Kant’s contemporary German 
philosopher Crusius as the focus of my study. As Crusius’ German contemporary, Kant’s 
knowledge about his works is unparalleled in following respects. Kant’s knowledge of Plato is 
desperately unreliable; he mistakes the Christianized Plato as Plato himself. By contrast, Kant has 
first-hand and in-time knowledge of Crusius. Kant’s knowledge of Hume is deplorably incomplete; 
he mistakes some of Hume’s views for all his views. By contrast, Kant has complete and systematic 
knowledge of Crusius. 
As the most preeminent opponent to the dominant Leibniz-Wolffian philosophy before Kant, 
Crusius’ philosophy represents an important alternative to Wolff, Baumgarten, Meier, etc. In spite 
of their difference, Crusius is still lumped together with Wolff as “dogmatic to the highest degree” 
(AA 18:33). However, Kant does not dismiss their positive role in philosophizing, and his attitude 
is recorded in what follows in R4936: “through the new paths that they trod they at least prevented 
understanding from allowing its rights to become superannuated in stupid idleness and still 
preserved the seed for a more secure knowledge.” (AA 18:33-34) 
Strikingly, many elements in Kant’s transcendental philosophy are anticipated in Crusius. 
Both Crusius and Kant acknowledge the actuality of the synthetic a priori propositions in 
metaphysics; both of them believe that there are supreme principles for this kind of propositions 
in the same way the principle of the contradiction for the analytic propositions; both of them are 
convinced that objective necessity must be found in subjective necessity. Crusian philosophy can 
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be seen as an interesting halfway house to transcendental philosophy. Indeed, Kant occasionally 
classifies it together with his own philosophy under the label of transcendental philosophy. (AA 
18:275) Perhaps it is in Crusian philosophy that we can see, far more clearly than in anywhere else, 
what assumptions prevent Crusius from launching Copernican Revolution, and where Kant 
decisively takes his departure from the traditional rationalist metaphysics. Crusius revives a 
Cartesian epistemology in Germany, which fills the last gap in Kant’s philosophical spectrum. 
After the publication of 1781 Critque, Kant became increasingly aware of the systematic 
importance of the “middle way” represented by the logical fanatical path, and he made various 
attempts to tackle this issue in his publicaitons such as Prologomena, Meaphysical Foundaiton and the 
1787 Critique. In effect, the logical fanatical path is arguably the most important rival theory to 
Kant’s transcendental path. One the one hand, the empirical path does not acknowledge the 
existence of the synthetic a priori truths, and the mystical fanatical path is replaced by Kant’s own 
transcendental path. On the other hand, the logical fanatical path is commited to the Cartesian 
rationalist epistemology that is still kept alive in more moderate forms in contemporary philosophy.  
Commentators generally recognize Crusius’ formative influence on Kant, and the studies on 
Crusius are diffusing in direction. Nevertheless, I will approach Crusius in a different manner by 
thematizing and concentrating on the defined issue of the relation of representation to object and 
by unifying the two pillars of the criterion of truth and intellectual pre-established harmony in a 
single system. In section 4.2, I will reconstruct Crusius’ epistemology and its metaphysical 
foundation with reference to his criterion of truth and intellectual pre-established harmony. In 
section 4.3, I will argue that Crusius’ argument for the criterion of truth cannot go through, since 
the assumption that apriority implies innateness is untenable. Even if the inference is 
unproblematic, the criterion of truth itself is vulnerable to several objections. For instance, the 
innateness of the criterion of truth commits Crusius to the rationalist version of occult quality, 
which runs counter to Kant’s explanatory rationalism. In section 4.4, I will show in what sense 
Crusius is ironically a follower of the system of pre-established harmony, to which he shows open 
hostility. While the logical fanatical path represents the plausible “middle way”, Kant’s raises a 
number of criticisms to this intellectual pre-established harmony. On the bottom level, the logical 
fanatical path is compatible neither with causal realism nor with epistemic atheism. 
 
4.2 The Crusian Epistemology and Metaphysics 
Kant’s criticisms of Crusius are overall, comprehensive and fruitful, and they almost touch 
every aspect of the latter’s theoretical philosophy. In spite of this, we cannot find any text that can 
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be paralleled in its entirety and systematicity to those on Plato; it is true that Kant’s Inquiry Concerning 
the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality (1764)119 includes a most detailed and 
informative discussion of Crusius in the pre-critical period. However, Kant makes a quite different 
point on Crusius in his critical period; and the point he makes in Prolegomena (1783) and in the 
Critique (1787) also differs in important respects. Therefore, in the following, I will reconstruct 
Kant’s interpretations and criticisms of Crusius from a wide range of Kant’s texts.120 
Crusius maintains that there are three highest principles of reason concerning the 
distinguishing features of things and non-things. The first principle is (1) the principle of 
contradiction that nothing can be and not be at the same time, which is widely recognized for its 
validity. In contrast to the orthodoxical Wolffians, Crusius makes the crucial move of restricting 
the scope of the validity of the principle of contradiction. Crusius makes the contention that not all 
that cannot be thought can be explained in terms of the principle of contradiction, and thus he 
puts the non-logical unthinkability on a par with the logical unthinkability. In addition to the 
principle of contradiction, Crusius formulates two novel non-logical supreme principles: (A) the 
principle of the inseparable: what cannot be thought apart from each other also cannot exist 
apart from each other, and (B) the principle of the uncombinable: what cannot be thought with 
and next to each other also cannot exist with and next to each other.121 
Crusius is not content with formulating the principle of inseparability and that of 
uncombinability; rather, he further explores the foundation of all these three principles. According 
to Crusius, the three previous principles are only parts of the highest distinguishing feature of the 
truth “that what cannot be thought as such is not possible or actual, and that, by contrast, what can be thought is 
possible”122. In effect, Crusius claims that epistemic conceivability and metaphysical possibility are 
co-extensive. 
Although in Crusius’ mind the three highest principles are concerned with the existence of 
things, they are apt to be reformulated as concerned with the truth of propositions. Crusius draws 
a distinction between the formal and material principles in metaphysics. The principle of non-
contradiction is the supreme principle of all formal principles, and the principle of inseparability 
and that of uncombinability are supreme principles of all material principles. In other words, the 
three highest principles could be construed as the grounds of the truths of these propositions. The 
                                                     
119 Abbreviated as Inquiry thereafter. 
120 Again, what matters is not what Crusius says, but how Kant conceives Crusius. The following reconstruction is 
primarily based on Kant’s reception of Crusius in his works. This outlining of Crusian philosophy draws on the 
translation of Crusius by Watkins 2009. 
121 See Watkins 2009, 140. 
122 Watkins 2009, 140-141. 
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principle of non-contradiction is the highest principle that grounds all formal principles. The 
principle of inseparability and that of uncombinability are the two highest principles that ground all 
material principles. 
Note that for Crusius the distinction is drawn within metaphysics, for which Crusius so writes: 
“[t]here are two kinds of truths. Some are contingent, […] However, others are necessary[…]. 
Now, metaphysics ought to treat of necessary truths. [. . .]” 123 . It is clear that for Crusius 
metaphysics is assumed to be concerned with necessary truths. By acknowledging the material 
metaphysical principle Crusius is committed to the view that there are necessary truths which are 
unexplainable by appeal to the principle of non-contradiction. 
The status of the highest principle of understanding is ambivalent. In most cases, Crusius 
takes the highest principle of understanding as metaphysical. In other cases, Crusius also accords this 
highest principle with epistemic function, and he refers to it as the criterion of truth, by means of which 
we can distinguish truth from error. When it functions as an epistemic criterion of truth, it is 
reformulated by Kant as “what cannot be thought as other than true is true” (AA 2:295). In the 
following I will call it the C-criterion of truth (named after Crusius): 
 
For any p, p is true if and only if p cannot be thought other than true. 
 
So we have to reformulate the Crusian philosophy in Kant’s terminology such that we are 
able to be in a position to compare them. In my view, the Crusian formal/material distinction is 
co-extensive with the Kantian analytic/synthetic distinction. The formal principles of metaphysics 
rest on the principle of non-contradiction. Consequently, the material principles can be defined 
negatively as those that do not rest on the principle of non-contradiction.124  
The Crusian distinction between material and formal principles does not merely anticipate 
Kant, and it is even taken over by Kant. The Reflections dated to the middle and late 1760s lends 
evidence to this view. Kant adopts the terminology of material and formal principle in his 
unpublished notes in a typical Crusian way. More importantly, he uses metaphysical principles and 
                                                     
123 Watkins 2009, 137-138. 
124 On a simplistic interpretation, these two distinctions are even synonymous. However, the complexity of Kant’s 
definition of analyticity should be underrated. Traditionally, it is the non-contradiction characterization, rather than 
containment characterization, lies at the center of Kant’s notion of analyticity. Recently, Anderson argues that the 
containment account of the analyticity is fundamental. For Kant’s threefold definition of analyticity see Anderson 
2015. 
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synthetic ones interchangeably. In the Reflection 3922 dated to 1769 Kant writes: “[m]aterial 
principles seem to be: whatever happens, must have a ground. Every successive series has a 
beginning.” (AA 17:346) And in one following paragraph, Kant continues: “[a]nother synthetic 
principle is: whatever thinks is only a simple subject.” (AA 17:347) 
In the R3923 Kant further links the analytic/synthetic distinction to the formal and material 
aspects of human cognition: “[s]ome principles are analytic and concern the formal aspect of 
distinctness in our cognition. Some are synthetic and concern the material aspect, in which case 
they are the arithmetical, geometrical, and chronological principles.” (AA 17:348)125 
In Kant’s terminology, to say that all truths in metaphysics are necessary is just to say that all 
propositions are a priori. By acknowledging the actuality of material principle in metaphysics, it is 
safe to conclude that Crusius is in effect committed to both the actuality thesis and the synthetic 
apriority thesis and thus to their conjunction that the synthetic a priori propositions are actual. 
Since the explanation of the analytic propositions is as unproblematic for Cusius as for others, 
in the following I will reconstruct Crusius’ account for the possibility of the synthetic a priori 
propositions: 
 
(4.1) The synthetic a priori propositions are actual. 
(4.2) The ground of the synthetic a priori propositions is the C-criterion, namely, the nature of 
understanding. (C-criterion of truth) 
(4.3) The C-criterion as the contingent mental structure is implanted by God. (Divine Reliabilism)  
 
For (4.1): Compared to the Platonic argument, it is less awkward to reformulate the Crusian 
argument in Kant’s terminology. Crusius identifies a new kind of a priori knowledge which cannot 
be explained by the principle of non-contradiction. Kant considers this as a crucial progress; in his 
pre-critical work Inquiry, Kant writes: “Crusius is also right to criticize other schools of philosophy 
for ignoring these material principles and adhering merely to formal principles. For on their basis 
alone it really is not possible to prove anything at all.” (AA 2:295) 
                                                     
125 The difference between the two distinctions should be called into attention. For Kant analytic propositions are 
not truths in metaphysics, but instantiations of rules in logic. 
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The existence of the synthetic a priori propositions underpins the anti-empiricist view that not 
all knowledge is derived from experience. This point is less significant, for the actuality of the a 
priori propositions is commonplace in German rationalist tradition. In fact, the coextension 
between necessity, analyticity, and apriority lies at the heart of the German rationalist tradition. In 
a more significant sense, however, this move can be seen as a deviation from the traditional 
rationalist view by arguing that not all a priori knowledge draws on conceptual analysis. 
For (4.2): Crusius does not only acknowledge the existence of the synthetic a priori 
propositions, and he is also committed to the assumption of the ground of truth that every truth must 
have a ground. Therefore, there must be a supreme principle of truth for the synthetic a priori, as the 
principle of contradiction for the analytic a priori propositions. Even if the synthetic a priori 
propositions are indemonstrable, initially it does not imply that there is no criterion for us to tell 
the true from the false. Crusius introduces the C-criterion as the criterion of the truth of the 
synthetic a priori propositions: for any proposition p, p is true if and only if p cannot be thought 
other than true. According to Crusius, the C-criterion of truth that “what cannot be thought as 
other than true is true” is identified with “the essence of our understanding”126. The unthinkability 
or inconceivability is nothing other than the innate principle, or the contingent structure of human 
mind that is endowed to us along with our existence. 
For (4.3): Kant refers to the C-criterion of truth as innate or implanted. If the C-criterion of 
truth is not an utterly contingent fact, then there must be an implanter of it. Not surprisingly, 
Crusius identifies this implanter as God. Since the C-criterion of truth is a general rule, this appeal 
to God revives Leibnizian pre-established harmony. The system of pre-established harmony is 
essentially a common cause model. On this model, Crusius claims that thoughts and things outside 
of thoughts co-vary without genuinely causing each other. 
Kant agrees with Crusius that there are synthetic a priori propositions. However, Kant 
disagrees with the Crusian explanation of them, and he mounts a number of harsh criticisms of 
(4.2) and (4.3). The following two sections are devoted to examining them respectively. In this 
course, Kant reveals most of his fundamental assumptions, which turn out to have important 
consequence for making intelligible the motivations of Kant’s criticisms. 
 
4.3 Against the C-Criterion of Truth 
                                                     
126 Watkins 2009, 143. 
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4.3.1 From the A Priori to the Innate 
Consider the first two steps of the above argument attributed to Crusius: 
 
(4.1) The synthetic a priori propositions are actual. 
(4.2) The ground of the synthetic a priori propositions is the C-criterion, namely, the nature of 
understanding. (C-criterion of truth) 
 
In order for the inference from (4.1) to (4.2) to go through, Crusius is committed to the 
following assumption: 
 
(A4.1) All and only a priori representations are innate. 
 
Given that both the distinction between the a priori and the empirical and that between the 
innate and the acquired are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive, in taking the assumption (4.1) 
Crusius is enforced to embrace another assumption: 
 
(A4.2) All and only empirical representations are acquired. 
 
From the fact that both the a priori/empirical and the innate/acquired distinctions are 
mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive, it is tempting to infer that the twofold distinctions are 
co-extensive. In fact, it is even alluring to take a further step to hold that the twofold distinctions 
are not only co-extensive but also co-intensive. In other words, they are just different terminological 
expressions of the same conceptual distinction. 
However, Kant firmly rejects such a co-extensive reading by arguing for the existence of the 
acquired a priori representation.127 In the following, I will first survey the notion of acquisition and 
then examine its relevance to the argument from (4.1) to (4.2). The idea of a priori acquisition might 
seem striking, but it is not rare even in Kant’s publications. In his Inaugural Dissertation, Kant points 
                                                     
127 For a discussion of the qualitative difference between rationalists’ innate ideas and Kant’s a priori representations 
see Zöller 1989. 
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out that one could acquire the pure concepts of understanding “by attending to its actions on the 
occasion of an experience” (AA 2:395). In his private note R3930 dated to 1969, Kant offers a 
more elaborate version of a priori acquisition by suggesting that the pure concepts of understanding 
are abstracted “from the law of the understanding for comparing, combining, or separating 
abstracted concepts” (AA 17:352). To be sure, the fact that Kant does not adopt this abstraction 
theory of the acquisition of the a priori concepts of understanding in the Critique suggests that he 
might have a different story in his career of publishing his Inaugural Dissertation. However, it is 
adequate to show that there are indeed a priori concepts which are acquired, rather than inborn.  
Kant draws the distinction between the a priori acquisition and the a posteriori acquisition. In 
the R4851 dated to 1776-1778, Kant explicitly writes: “Whether concepts are mere educta or producta.” 
(AA 18:8) After several lines, Kant continues that “[a]cquisitae are a priori or a posteriori acquisitae” 
(AA 18:8). Kant sometimes discusses acquired representations with a different set of terminology. 
In On a Discovery whereby any New Critique of Pure Reason is to be Made Superfluous by an Older One128, 
Kant draws a further distinction between the original acquisition129 and the derivative acquisition 
within acquired representations. The original acquisition is applied to the representations that 
“previously did not yet exist at all, and so did not belong to anything prior to this act” (AA 8:221). 
These representations are nothing other than categories as well as space and time. Correspondently, 
the derivative acquisition is applied to empirical intuitions and concepts. 
Kant further characterizes the mechanisms underlying both kinds of acquisition are radically 
different. In illustrating producta in the R4851, Kant writes: “[p]roducta either through physical 
(empirical) influence or through the consciousness of the formal constitution of our sensibility and 
understanding on the occasion of experience, hence producta a priori, not a posteriori.” (AA 18:8) On 
the one hand, both the a priori acquisition and the a posteriori acquisition are initiated “on the 
occasion of experience”. On the other hand, they also operate differently: the a posteriori acquisition 
is grounded by physical influence, while the a priori acquisition is grounded by consciousness. 
Then, what is the difference between the innate and the a priori acquired concepts? As Kant 
explains, all a priori concepts are acquired “on the occasion of experience”. Therefore, the 
difference between the innate and the a priori acquired concepts could be formulated in terms of 
their temporal relations to experience. The innate concepts are temporally anterior to experience, 
while the acquired concepts are not so. Consequently, Kant’s disentanglement of the innate with 
                                                     
128 Abbreviated as On a Discovery thereafter. 
129 It is borrowed from the use in natural right. 
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the a priori constitutes a defense of temporal empiricism, according to which “all our cognition 
commences with experience” (B1).130 
In order to explain why (A4.2) is more fundamental, we should make reference to Kant’s 
mistake objection to the source of representation or knowledge.131 The failure to distinguish the 
original cause from the occasional cause applies not only to the followers of the empirical path but 
also to those of the logical fanatical path. If the innate concepts are anterior to human experience, 
it is tempting to think that all other representations are acquired not only on the occasion of but also 
from experience. If someone is committed to (a) a qualified empiricism without distinguishing the 
original cause from the occasional source, and (b) the existence of synthetic a priori truths whose 
explanation is in order, then it seems necessary that these truths are explained by innate 
representations rather than acquired ones. 
Strictly speaking, what the existence of the acquired a priori representation challenges is the 
claim (A4.1.1) that all a priori representations are innate. In other words, it is consistent with the 
claim (A4.1.2) that only a priori representations are innate, or the claim (A4.1.2*) that all innate 
representations are a priori. Nevertheless, it suffices to falsify the claim (4.1) that all and only a priori 
representations are innate. Since the assumption (A4.1) is untenable, Crusius’ argument from (4.1) 
to (4.2) cannot go through. 
Since the a priori is not co-extensive with the innate, the a priori/empirical distinction and the 
innate/acquired distinction are not co-extensive; rather, there exists an intersection between the 
twofold distinction. The difference between the twofold distinction could be captured in 
intensional terms: the a priori/empirical distinction is formulated in terms of the original cause of a 
representation, while the innate/acquired distinction is formulated in terms of the temporal relation 
of representation to experience. 
Now it turns out that the classical empiricism and the Cartesian rationalism are the two sides 
of the same coin.132 To be sure, empiricism and rationalism display an apparent difference: the 
empiricists believe that ideas are derived from experience, while the rationalists insist that there are 
innate ideas in addition to empirical ones. As Kant reveals, however, both empiricism and 
rationalism mistake of the occasion of knowledge for the source of it. What distinguishes them is 
merely that rationalists admit a wider scope of knowledge to be explained. Due to the failure to 
distinguish the occasion and the origin, once the rationalists find that a priori knowledge cannot be 
                                                     
130 For Kant’s critical engagement with various kinds of empiricism see Winkler 2010. 
131 See Chapter 2. 
132 Since Leibniz is of a dispositional view of innate ideas and distinguishes the occasion of knowledge and the source 
of knowledge, he is understandably not the target under attack. 
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explained by experience, they are unavoidably driven to the opposite of the empiricists by making 
an appeal to innate ideas. The surprising convergence between the empirical path and the fanatical 
path is not rare. As we will see later, Kant shows that both Crusius and Hume end up with 
skepticism. Together with Kant’s distinctive model of ground, we come to see better why Kant 
and his transcendental path should be reduced neither to the empirical path nor to the fanatical 
path. 
In fact, Kant does not only deny the inference from the a priori to the innate but also denies 
the existence of innate ideas themselves. As Kant makes it clear, “[t]he Critique admits absolutely 
no implanted or innate representations” (AA 8:221). All representations, may they be a priori or a 
posteriori, are acquired. For Kant, innate a priori and acquired a priori representations are not two 
species of which a priori representations are the genus. Rather, a priori concepts must be acquired, 
rather than innate. The point is not that the notion of innate ideas is conceptually incoherent or 
empirically unfounded, but that they are incompatible with some of Kant’s most committed 
assumptions such that they are rendered explanatorily illegitimate. 
I would like to remind the reader that Kant’s view on innatism is quite complex, and we 
should be cautious in clarifying Kant’s precise position. On my reading, Kant is an adherent both 
to representational anti-innatism and to constitutional innatism. As I have mentioned, Kant rejects 
empiricism in general and its mistake of the occasion for the source of knowledge in particular, but 
it is incorrect to suggest that he is an advocate of innate ideas, which is widely considered as one 
hallmark of rationalism. In fact, from his early career, Kant has distanced himself from the 
rationalist view that apriority implies innateness; he instead attempts to disentangle the notion of a 
priori from that of the innate. 
However, it is equally incorrect to suggest that he is a thorough anti-nativist. Note that the 
scope of anti-innatism is carefully restricted to representations. Kant does not unwisely extend his 
anti-innatism to its extreme. Rather, he happily acknowledges that our faculties of receptivity and 
spontaneity are innate. Kant makes it explicit that there must be grounds in the subject that makes 
the representations to arise in a determinate manner. Kant identifies the receptivity and spontaneity 
peculiar to our mind as these grounds of the acquired representation, and he suggests that these 
grounds themselves are not acquired but innate. Thus, Kant commits himself to constitutional innatism, 
which should be distinguished from his representational anti-innatism. Kant probably holds that the 
view that we have faculties endowed to us at our birth is uncontroversially as well as uninterestingly 
true. 
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4.3.2 Objections to the C-Criterion 
4.3.2.1 The Inadequacy Objection to the C-Criterion 
Even if the assumption of co-extensionality is acceptable and the inference goes through, the 
C-criterion itself is still vulnerable to several objections, which I will spell out in the following. First, 
Kant vehemently attacks the correctness of the C-criterion of truth. The first set of Kant’s 
objections to the C-criterion is presented in the Inquiry: 
 
But it is not possible to invest some propositions with the status of supreme material principles unless 
they are obvious to every human understanding. It is my conviction, however, that a number of the 
principles adduced by Crusius are open to doubt, and, indeed, to serious doubt. (AA 2:295) 
 
In the first place, Kant casts doubts on the truth of the supreme principle by the argument 
from universal assent. Unlike Locke, Kant does not appeal to the case of children and idiots. In my 
view, this is because Kant does not want to argue about the status of the metaphysical formal 
principle that is grounded on the principle of contradiction, to which Kant wholeheartedly 
subscribes himself. Rather, Kant intends to challenge the much more controversial material 
principles in Crusian metaphysics. Kant puts forward the following scheme to examine the 
supremacy of a principle that some proposition P is the supreme material principle in metaphysics 
only if P is beyond doubt for every human understanding.133 
It turns out that many propositions which pass the test of the C-criterion of truth leave open 
to doubt, at least for Kant. In effect, it amounts to saying that the criterion is arbitrary and indefinite. 
On the one hand, it is too liberal, and it allows the illicit principles to slip in; on the other hand, it 
is too tyrannical, for it prevents the licit ones from being admitted in. 
Its force notwithstanding, the above objection is an empirical one. It could be conceived that 
the metaphysical principles otherwise formulated by Crusius happen to be evident to every human 
understanding, including Kant himself. If no empirical objection is available, does it mean that the 
C-criterion is tenable? Or put it simply: does universal assent guarantee the sufficiency of the C-
criterion? 
This objection is not conclusive. Crusius is still left with room to argue that the C-criterion is 
correct, yet it is not well practiced. At first, it appears that this rejoinder should be dismissed as the 
                                                     
133 Kant could be regarded as locating himself in the tradition of defining knowledge in terms of doubt. 
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insignificant. However, it does have a preeminent precedent in history; Descartes formulates his 
rule of clear and distinct perception as the criterion of truth, and we can call it D-criterion: 
 
For any p, p is true if and only if p can be perceived clearly and distinctly. 
 
However, the formulation of the D-criterion does not automatically enable people to perceive 
clearly and distinctly. Descartes holds that his Meditations on First Philosophy is precisely meant to 
teach people how to perceive clearly and distinctly. In a letter written to Mersenne, Descartes 
explicitly claims that “we have to form distinct ideas of the things we want to judge about, and this 
is what most people fail to do and what I have mainly tried to teach by my Meditations”134. It leaves 
open that some people might still remain incapable of clear and distinct perception after reading 
the Meditations. 
If one cannot demonstrate the truth of a criterion, then he might make an appeal to the 
phenomenology of certainty to tell the true from the false. Kant raises the objection that the 
phenomenal character of subjective conviction is inadequate for establishing truth. In his doctrine 
of belief and knowledge (Wissen)135, Kant defines apodictic certainty as follows: 
 
For any proposition p, p is apodicticly certain if and only if it is conscious of the impossibility of 
the contrary of p. 
 
Kant notes that certainty is only a mark of knowledge. That is, apodictic certainty is at best a 
necessary condition, rather than a sufficient condition, of knowledge. Every instance of knowledge 
must be certain, but not every instance of certain belief is knowledge. Certainty by itself is only 
subjectively valid. One should not rest the objective validity of a proposition on its subjective 
validity. 
Kant’s criticisms of Crusius are much deeper than this. Kant does not only argue that the C-
criterion is not correct, or not adequate, but he further argues that it is not even a criterion. After the last 
quotation from the Inquiry Kant continues to write: 
                                                     
134 Descartes 1991, 165. 
135 For a study of Kant’s theory of belief and knowledge see Chignell 2005. 
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This celebrated man proposes setting up a supreme rule to govern all cognition and therefore 
metaphysical cognition as well. The supreme rule is this: what cannot be thought as other than true is true, etc. 
However, it can easily be seen that this proposition can never be a ground of the truth of any cognition. 
For, if one concedes that there is no other ground of truth which can be given, apart from the 
impossibility of thinking it other than true, then one is in effect saying that it is impossible to give any 
further ground of truth, and that this cognition is indemonstrable. Now, of course, there are many 
indemonstrable cognitions. But the feeling of conviction which we have with respect to these 
cognitions is merely an avowal, not an argument establishing that they are true. (AA 2:295) 
 
Here Kant’s point is that the C-criterion of truth is unacceptable not because the criterion is 
false, but because it is not a criterion at all. Underlying the criticism Kant imposes normative 
constraints on the conception of criterion. For Kant, the demonstration is essential for establishing 
the correctness of a criterion of truth. An indemonstrable criterion of truth amounts to no criterion 
of truth at all. 
Kant pushes his objection to its logical conclusion by claiming that the C-criterion is not even 
a criterion. This radicalized objection is methodological in character, and it claims that Crusius 
opens the door of dephilosophization, for he downplays the role of demonstration or proof as a method in 
philosophy. As Kant writes in the Logik Philippi, “Crusius has an anti-philosophical method which 
undermines all philosophy. He advances things as subjective laws which are often only the effects 
of the understanding and not laws. He has sheer phantoms of the brain. He casts aside all means 
of proof.” (AA 24:335) As the passage shows, Kant generalizes the role of proof in philosophy. 
Proof is not only essential to any attempt to establish a criterion of truth, but it lies at the heart of 
the methodology characteristic of philosophy. To undermine the role of proof is precisely to 
undermine philosophy.  
Even at the moment when his esteem of Crusius is at its climax, Kant betrays his reservation 
with Crusius’ general methodological approach. This is made most evident in Kant’s critical 
engagement with Wolff and Crusius in regard to the question of the principle of sufficient ground. 
In the 1755 A New Elucidation of the First Principles of Metaphysical Cognition136, Kant provides a proof 
for the principle of sufficient ground in the hope of saving it from Crusius’ powerful criticisms on 
those offered by Wolffians. Kant admits that the previous attempts of demonstration for the 
principle of sufficient ground are unsuccessful and that he is sympathetic to the motivation of 
Crusius’ criticisms. 
                                                     
136 Abbreviated as New Elucidation thereafter. 
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However, Kant is not convinced that any argument for the principle of sufficient reason is 
impossible. Instead, Kant formulates his own version of argument by resting it upon the principle 
of complete determination. Kant deplores that Crusius is too soon to be driven by the previously 
unsuccessful attempts to the conclusion that the principle of sufficient ground is indemonstrable. On 
the contrary, what we should do is not to give in; rather, Kant maintains that we can discover a far 
better demonstration for the principle of sufficient reason. Not only should we trust that the 
principle of sufficient ground must be true, but also we should insist that it can be demonstrated at 
all.137 
While Kant turns the fire against rationalism in general, including his dogmatic past, Kant’s 
insistence of the demonstrability of the principle of sufficient ground is retained well into his 
mature critical period. In the Second Analogy, Kant rejects the dogmatic proof (proof by analysis of 
concept) of any kind as impossible by underlining the radical difference between analytic and 
synthetic propositions. (A209/B255) Instead, Kant provides a transcendental proof of the principle of 
sufficient ground, which receives ever-lasting acclaim. In a nutshell, Kant disagrees that all proofs 
must be dogmatic, but he agrees that there must be proof. 
For the present purpose, what is at issue is not whether Kant provides an unprecedentedly 
successful demonstration for the principle of determining ground by “having overcome every 
difficulty” (AA 1:398); neither does it concern whether the principle should be demonstrated 
dogmatically or transcendentally; what is at issue is Kant’s meta-philosophical outlook that 
philosophy should encourage analysis and argument: philosophical intuition should be susceptible to 
analysis and philosophical claim should be supported by demonstration. 
Kant’s conviction that philosophical principles could and should be discursively proved, 
rather than immediately intuited, does not come by accident. Rather, it is deeply rooted in the 
Leibnizian tradition in Germany. In the following I will explore a little bit the traditions lay behind 
them. The Leibnizian methodology has been deeply entrenched into the philosophical practice in 
Germany. The Leibnizian tradition grows in its opposition to Cartesian tradition and developed by 
Christian Wolff and his followers. The Cartesian methodology aims at teaching people how to 
perceive clearly and distinctly. Leibniz dismisses the Cartesian criterion of clear and distinct 
perception as obscure, and we should instead replace it with a more articulated criterion. In a 
nutshell, the Cartesian epistemology attaches great importance to the intuitive grasp of truth, while the 
Leibnizian epistemology rests the work upon conceptual analysis. 
                                                     
137 In New Elucidation Kant’s reservation about Crusian approach to philosophy is moderate and even implicit. 
However, his scruple is gradually developed into avowed criticisms. 
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In his Third Meditation Descartes writes that “whatever I perceive very clearly and distinctly 
is true” 138, and thereby he formulates the criterion of truth in terms of clear and distinct perception. 
We can call it D-criterion (named after Descartes): for any p, p is true if and only if p can be 
perceived clearly and distinctly. Echoing Gassendi, Leibniz raises his objection to Descartes’ 
criterion of truth by suggesting that it is obscure.139 If a criterion of truth is obscure, it means that 
the criterion requires another criterion which is more articulately formulated so as to clarify the 
previous criterion. In other words, the obscurity of the criterion of truth immediately generates a 
regress if not an infinite one. Given the systematicity of the Cartesian Epistemology, further 
questions are raised as to what is the relationship between cogito and the new principle. Leibniz’s 
positive proposal is to replace this criterion of clear and distinct perception with other criterion of 
more logical import.140 
Crusius’ denial of the demonstrability of metaphysical principles and his affirmation of the 
phenomenology of certainty are the two sides of the same coin. His definition of truth in terms of 
subjective unthinkability is nothing but an appeal to rational insight to certainty. In effect, Crusius’ 
invocation to rational insight is a return from the German rationalist tradition of Leibniz and Wolff 
to Descartes and Malebranche. The crucial move made by Crusius is to subordinate the Leibnizian 
dichotomy between truth of reason and truth of fact under the single supreme principle of the 
nature of understanding. 
Kant is the heir of Leibnizian rather than Cartesian school. The Leibnizian tradition is 
formative to the intellectual development of Kant. For Kant as well as for many others, that is how 
philosophy should be conceived and practiced. While Kant is inclined to align himself with Crusius 
against the Wolffian orthodoxy on many substantive questions, with regard to cognitive machinery 
Kant is clearly aware of the superiority of Wolff and his followers to Crusius. Although Kant is 
probably not aware that in effect Crusius is reviving the Cartesian Epistemology which Leibniz has 
harshly criticized, he knows well about Plato and Malebranche and what goes wrong in their 
philosophy. Crusius’ criterion of truth is more dangerous than Plato. 
Kant’s criticism against the Crusius is much stronger than that of Leibniz against Descartes. 
For Leibniz Descartes is a rival; Cartesian epistemology of clear and distinct perception should be 
                                                     
138 Descartes 1984, 24. 
139 Gassendi levels fierce criticisms on the Cartesian conception of clear and distinct perception in his famous Fifth 
Set of Objections. See Descartes 1984, 179-240. 
140 Leibniz’s obscurity objection appeared first in his Meditations on Ideas, Truth, and Knowledge (1989, 23-27) and then 
again in his New Essays (1996). 
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replaced by a more logically and mechanically oriented standard. For Kant Crusius is not even a 
heterodoxy; the Crusian epistemology of truth claims “the death of philosophy” (AA 24:82). 
 
4.3.2.2 The C-Criterion as Occult Quality 
While the above set of objections is directed to the C-criterion in particular, the following set 
of Kant’s objections is concentrated on innate representation in general. Since the C-criterion of 
truth is an instance of the innate principle, this set of objections also applies to it. However, it does 
not only direct itself to a nativist account of a particular criterion of truth; rather it directs itself to 
any nativist theory of representation in general.  
Kant’s standard objection to the representational innatism of the C-criterion is that it makes 
an appeal to qualitates occultas. The qualitates occultas objection is interesting. As I have noted, Kant 
offers a classification of the philosophical spectrum with regard to the different paths of 
metaphysics. According to the spectrum, the occult quality is a distinctive system for explaining 
the grounding relation of representation to object, which is mainly applied to the common sense 
theorists such as Reid. The system of occult quality is characterized by explaining things trivially by 
appealing to the paradigmatic schema that x is F simply because x is F. Given the methodological 
considerations, Kant is inclined to dismiss the system of qualitates occultas without detailed discussion. 
To be sure, the entire system of Crusius occupies a distinctive position in Kant’s spectrum that 
should not be conflated with qualitates occultas. However, it does not prevent any level of the system 
from resorting qualitates occultas as the principle of understanding. In the discussion of Crusius, we 
are given the opportunity to show what Kant means by qualitates occultas, and why Kant thinks that 
insofar as the C-criterion is concerned, Crusisus is resorting to qualitates occultas. I will not spend a separate 
chapter to discuss the common-sense theories. 
In the Dynamics chapter of Metaphysical Foundations, Kant contrasts his own explanation of 
impenetrability in terms of repulsive forces with the explanation by qualitates occultas as follows: 
 
Absolute impenetrability is in fact nothing more nor less than qualitas occulta. For one asks what the 
cause is for the inability of matters to penetrate one another in their motion, and one receives the 
answer: because they are impenetrable. The appeal to repulsive force is not subject to this reproach. 
For, although this force cannot be further explicated in regard to its possibility, and therefore must 
count as a fundamental force, it does yield a concept of an acting cause, together with its laws, whereby 
the action, namely, the resistance in the filled space, can be estimated in regard to its degrees. (AA 
4:502) 
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The reproach of qualitates occultas is applied to the explanation of the ground of some kind of 
object’s being F. As Kant points out, the answer to the question why the matters are impenetrable is that 
they are impenetrable. Therefore, the scheme of occult quality in Kant could be summarized as follows:  
 
Def. occult quality F= for any object x, x is F if and only if (i) x has the quality of F-ness and (ii) 
x’s being F-ness is unexplainable in other terms. 
 
If the phenomena that x is F is explained in terms other than F, say, G, this mode of 
explanation does not fall under the category of qualitas occulta. Kant further clarifies that it is true 
even if the explanation that x is G cannot be further explained. Otherwise, the recursivity of the 
scheme entails the infinite regress of explanation, which is traditionally taken as implausible. The 
point is not that how long the chain of explanation extends, but the phenomena in question must 
be given a genuine explanation. 
Kant sometimes formulates the objection to qualitas occulta in a different manner. According 
to the Blomberg Logic, Kant equates qualitas occulta with the fallacy of circular reasoning: 
 
In the writings of the ancient philosophers we quite frequently find such qualitates occultas, and in the 
writings of Crusius they are as frequent as they ever could have been among the ancients. He says, e.g.: 
something is true because no one regards it as, or can hold it to be, other than true. The one says just 
as much as the other, thus it is a qualitas occulta. (AA 24:82) 
 
Here Kant is saying that the mode of explanation by appeal to qualitas occulta commits the 
logical fallacy of idem per idem, namely, the same by the same. For Kant, Crusius suffers from the 
charge of qualitas occulta, because he holds “something is true because no one regards it as, or can 
hold it to be, other than true” (AA 24:82). Crusius embraces the following scheme: for any 
proposition p, p is true if p is universally and inevitably thought to be true. 
Initially, this criticism does not do justice to Crusius. Facing the question of the ground of 
truth, Crusius does not fall into the category that “[t]he one says just as much as the other”, which 
Kant construes as the mark of a circular reasoning. Rather, he says that the objective notion of 
truth must be determined with reference to a universally and necessarily valid criterion for all 
subjects. Crusius correctly identifies a subjective notion of objective validity. At this point, Crusius 
makes a move similar to Kant in that both of them are convinced that truth cannot be determined 
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by transcending the limit of human thought to look at whether the representation is in agreement 
with its object. In fact, to gain objectivity from subjectivity is what leads one to conflate Kant’s 
position with that of Crusius. 
In order for this criticism to take its effect, Kant seems to have to commit to the assumption 
that it is trivially true that truth implies the intersubjective validity. This commitment is consistent with 
Kant’s insufficiency objection to Crusius. Subjective certainty is a necessary yet not sufficient 
condition for truth. Even so, Crusius still does not fit the reproach of qualitas occulta, for what he 
says is insufficient and thereby false, rather than uninformative and trivially true. Moreover, the C-
criterion is not unexplainable. Crusius explicitly identifies God as the ground of truth. Whether 
that the appeal of God can count a genuine explanation will be discussed in the following. 
 
4.4 Against the Pre-established Harmony  
4.4.1 The Intellectual Pre-established Harmony 
The C-criterion in general and the inborn concepts and principles in particular are 
unexplainable only insofar as we do not invoke God to explain innateness. As a common practice, 
however, the claim that some concepts or principles are innate implies the claim that they are 
implanted by God. That is to say, the synthetic a priori propositions are inborn principles implanted 
by God.141 
In his 1772 letter to Herz, Kant writes that “Crusius believed in certain implanted rules for 
the purpose of forming judgments and ready-made concepts that God implanted in the human 
soul just as they had to be in order to harmonize with things” (AA 10:131). Kant then dubs the 
label “Pre-established Intellectual Harmony Theory” (AA 10:131) to refer to Crusius’ theory that 
God implants the inborn concepts and principles into human understanding. In somewhere else, 
Kant views Crusius as “a pre-stabilist of reason” (AA 18:21). Consequently, Kant identifies it as 
one form of the infamous doctrine of pre-established harmony in general. 
In order to appreciate Crusius’ intellectual version of pre-established harmony, it is better for 
us to start with Kant’s interpretation of the Leibnizian pre-established harmony. In one explicit 
discussion of pre-established harmony in the Amphiboly Kant writes: 
 
                                                     
141 The appeal to a divine grounding is only an unavoidable move for Crusius but also a target for Kant’s attack. 
Kant’s objection is directed not so much to the validity of the inference from being innate to being implanted than to the 
nature of the appeal to divine grounding. 
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For this very reason, however, his [Leibniz’s] principle of the possible community of substances 
among themselves also had to be predetermined harmony and could not be a physical influence. For 
since everything is only internal, i.e., occupied with its own representations, the state of the 
representations of one substance could not stand in any efficacious connection at all with that of another, 
but some third cause influencing all of them had to make their states correspond to one another, not, 
to be sure, through occasional assistance specially brought about in each case (systema assistentiae), but 
rather through the unity of the idea of one cause valid for all, from which, in accordance with general laws, 
they must all together acquire their existence and persistence, thus also their reciprocal correspondence 
with each other. (A274-275/B330-331) 
 
In this passage, pre-established or predetermined harmony is applied to the community 
relation between substances. In fact, the system of pre-established harmony is a theory that is designed 
to account for causation in general, and it is applied to a variety of phenomena, such as mind-body 
problem, the problem of perception, etc. 142  It must be pointed out that the system of pre-
established harmony is only applied to natural causation in general, and not to divine causation.143 In the 
latter case, Leibniz obviously believes that God really causes the world. 
It is not difficult to articulate the system of pre-established harmony in the following ways: 
for anything x and y in the world, x and y stands in the relation of pre-established harmony if and 
only if (i) x and y are systematically co-varied, (ii) the ways of co-variation of x and y draw only on 
the intrinsic or non-relational properties of x and those of y, and (iii) the intrinsic properties and 
the individual history therefrom of x and those of y are programmed by God in advance. 
By (i) the systematic co-variation pre-established harmony satisfies the requirement of 
empirical adequacy. By (ii) the non-relationality it makes the commitment to causal idealism, namely, 
the causal relation is not real but ideal. And meanwhile, it is distinguished from the system of 
assistance or occasionalism proposed by Malebranche. By (iii) it makes the commitment to the 
divine grounding. It offers an account of the source of the constant conjunction by appeal to the 
pre-determined program of God. To sum up, pre-established harmony claims that the causation 
between x and y is derived neither from the efficacy of x nor from that of y, but from a third thing 
z, and this third thing z is infinite. By appeal to the third thing, the pre-established harmony is 
committed to causal idealism. By appeal to the infinite thing, it is committed to epistemic theism. 
Then, what does Kant mean by the “Pre-established Intellectual Harmony Theory”? For 
Leibniz, perceptual and intellectual knowledge is species of the genus of constant and regular 
relation. Due to the general applicability of the system of pre-established harmony, it comes as no 
                                                     
142 For the ramifications of the system of pre-established harmony see Watkins 2005. 
143 In Christian philosophy, divine causation is called primary causation, while natural causation is called secondary 
causation. 
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surprise that it could be applied to epistemology. As Leibniz writes in the letter to Arnauld on 
October 9th in 1687: 
 
One thing expresses another (in my terminology) when there exists a constant and fixed relationship 
between what can be said of one and of the other. This is the way that a perspectival projection 
expresses its ground-plane. Expression is common to all forms, and it is a genus of which natural 
perception, animal sensation, and intellectual knowledge are species. (1967, 144) 
 
Perception and intellectual knowledge are two species of which representation or expression 
is a genus. Therefore, the intellectual pre-established harmony means pre-established harmony with 
regard to intellectual knowledge. Since what is at issue is innate concepts and principles, in Crusius’ 
philosophy intellectual knowledge concerns nothing but the relationship between innate concepts 
or principles and objects.  
This pre-established harmony verdict is ironical for Crusius, however. Crusius is one of the 
most adamant opponents to pre-established harmony as well as one of the most fervent supporters 
of the physical influx, another distinct system designed to explain grounding or causation relation. 
Crusius not only precludes pre-established harmony from the mind-body problem, but also claims that 
the relations between corporeal substances are real, and it is these real relations that combine separate 
substances into one whole world. 
Here it is useful to distinguish two different ways of endorsing pre-established harmony. For 
Leibniz himself, pre-established harmony is a universal doctrine applied to all phenomena of natural 
causation in general. He develops a multiplicity of general arguments for the impossibilities of its main 
alternatives of physical influx and occasionalism. Leibniz’s followers, by contrast, do not have to 
adopt Leibniz’s general arguments against other systems of explaining causation even if they 
endorse pre-established harmony for one reason or another. Rather, the system of pre-established 
harmony is radically localized by them for one reason or another. For them, both physical influx and 
pre-established harmony are systems to explain the phenomena of natural causation. It is perfectly 
compatible if one resorts to physical influx to explain causation in one subject matter and to pre-
established harmony in another. 
On Kant’s view, Crusius is such a local theorist of pre-established harmony. To be sure, 
Crusius does more than anyone else before Kant to mount criticisms on pre-established harmony 
and to champion the reality of causal relations and causal powers. Nonetheless, his physical influx 
metaphysics does not commit him to a physical influx epistemology. In the field of intellectual 
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knowledge, Crusius rejects the reality of the relationship between representation and object. Rather, he 
attributes the ground of the agreement between representation and object to God, a move that in 
Kant’s view resurrects pre-established harmony. 
In my view, Kant’s judgment is fair; with regard to intellectual knowledge or a priori 
knowledge, Crusius does commit himself to pre-established harmony. The C-criterion claims that 
there exists a systematic correspondence between thoughts and things outside of thoughts, thereby 
it satisfies the condition (i) of pre-established harmony. The correspondence between the series of 
thoughts and the series of things are not derived from the efficacy of either party, but due to the 
inner nature of each party, thereby it satisfies the condition (ii). God guarantees the systematic 
correspondence between thoughts and things outside of thoughts, and therefore it satisfies the 
condition (iii). 
Given the possibility of the permission of pre-established harmony to be an element of this 
philosophy, one unmistakable difference between Crusius and Kant with respect to pre-established 
harmony emerges. For Crusius pre-established harmony is false not by itself. Rather, it is false for 
different specific reasons: it could be objectionable due to its insufficiency to explain certain 
phenomena of causation; it could also be objectionable due to its incompatibility with other 
philosophical claims. For Kant, by contrast, pre-established harmony is false by itself in addition to 
specific reasons. Kant’s criticisms on pre-established harmony are as general as Leibniz’s defenses. 
Due to his general hostility, Kant is alert and ready to see whether any system would collapse into 
pre-established harmony. Any attempt to invoke pre-established harmony results in falling prey to 
the general objection to the pre-established harmony system. This objection is nothing but what 
Kant says in his Herz letter: “the deus ex machina is the greatest absurdity one could hit upon in the 
determination of the origin and validity of our cognitions” (AA 10:131). Before tackling this general 
objection, let’s first examine Kant’s particular objections. 
 
4.4.2 Objections to the “Middle Way”  
(a)The Insufficiency Objection 
Kant repeatedly characterizes the intellectual pre-established harmony system as a “middle 
way”. This characterization vividly captures the position of Crusius’ system in Kant’s metaphysical 
spectrum. The intellectual pre-established harmony steers a middle way precisely because it does 
not commit to the model of “the object makes the representation possible”, nor to the model of 
“the representation makes the object possible”. Kant’s discussion of the “middle way” marks an 
important improvement of Kant’s argument. Essentially, this move takes a previously neglected 
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alternative into account and thereby closes the logical gap in A-Deduction. Therefore, not only 
could it be viewed as an important, and even indispensable, complementary argument to the A-
Deduction, it also changes the landscape of Transcendental Deduction by committing to an entirely 
new model of grounding that underlies the system of the intellectual pre-established harmony. 
In a footnote to §36 of the Prologomena Kant considers the possibility of “a middle way” 
represented by Crusius for the first time, and he argues as follows: 
 
Crusius alone knew of a middle way: namely that a spirit who can neither err nor deceive originally 
implanted these natural laws in us. But, since false principles are often mixed in as well – of which this 
man’s system itself provides not a few examples – then, with the lack of sure criteria for distinguishing 
an authentic origin from a spurious one, the use of such a principle looks very precarious, since one 
can never know for sure what the spirit of truth or the father of lies may have put into us. (AA 4:320f) 
 
Kant’s talk about “the father of lies” is reminiscent of the Cartesian evil demon, and it 
suggests that Kant intends to introduce something that could play a role in the radical skeptical 
scenario. On my reading, however, by “the father of lies” Kant does not have in mind anything 
like that. According to the Cartesian radical skepticism, even our belief in obviously true principles 
might be a result of the deception by the evil demon. This Cartesian radical skeptical scenario is 
inescapable for Kant.  
Kant’s point is rather that even if all the inborn principles are believed to be true, it leaves 
undetermined whether it is the father of lies who deceives us. Kant’s argument rests on his previous 
objection to the arbitrariness of the C-criterion. If all the principles implanted in the human mind 
are true, it follows that it is the spirit of truth who implants them. If there are some false principles, 
it follows that we cannot tell whether it is the father of lies or the spirit of truth who implants them. 
Given the fact that the C-criterion recruits false principles, it can be inferred from that “false 
principles are often mixed” that there is a father of lies. 
Therefore, it implies that the general role of the implanter of all true principles cannot be 
individuated into the spirit of truth; and the spirit of truth in turn cannot be individuated into God. 
The previous quotation from the Prologomena suggests that it should have taken Kant an additional 
argument against that only God can play the role of the spirit of truth that implants the rules into 
human mind by excluding anything else (angle for instance) who can play the role. In the 1787 
Critique, however, Kant explicitly identifies “subjective predispositions for thinking” as “implanted 
in us along with our existence by our author” (B167). So in the following, I will leave aside the second 
worry of individuation and focus on other objections. 
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(b) The Subjectivity Objection and Causal Realism 
A passage on Crusius similar to the above one in the Prologomena appears in the Critique: 
 
(besides the fact that on such a hypothesis no end can be seen to how far one might drive the 
presupposition of predetermined predispositions for future judgments) this would be decisive against 
the supposed middle way: that in such a case the categories would lack the necessity that is essential 
to their concept. For, e.g., the concept of cause, which asserts the necessity of a consequent under a 
presupposed condition, would be false if it rested only on a subjective necessity, arbitrarily implanted in 
us, of combining certain empirical representations according to such a rule of relation. I would not be 
able to say that the effect is combined with the cause in the object (i.e., necessarily), but only that I am 
so constituted that I cannot think of this representation otherwise than as so connected; which is 
precisely what the skeptic wishes most, for then all of our insight through the supposed objective 
validity of our judgments is nothing but sheer illusion, and there would be no shortage of people who 
would not concede this subjective necessity (which must be felt) on their own; at least one would not 
be able to quarrel with anyone about that which merely depends on the way in which his subject is 
organized. (B167-168) 
 
Many texts in the 1787 Critique could find precedents in Prologomena, and in most cases the 
former is merely a repetition of the latter. However, this passage is an exception. While this passage 
serves also as a criticism against Crusius, it develops an entirely new argument, and Kant even calls 
it the “most decisive”. This most decisive objection appears to be that “the categories would lack 
the necessity that is essential to their concept”. Kant’s following explication reads: “I would not 
be able to say that the effect is combined with the cause in the object (i.e., necessarily), but only that 
I am so constituted that I cannot think of this representation otherwise than as so connected” (B168). 
In effect, Kant draws a distinction between two kinds of necessity: objective necessity and 
subjective necessity. At first, Kant’s reproach of subjective necessity is perplexing; we have been 
accustomed to the view that Kant’s objectivity is nothing but the necessity initiated by subject. If 
there is another kind of subjective necessity, the difference between Kant and Crusius seems too 
nuanced to be detected. As Kant makes it clear, however, the distinction between subject necessity 
and objective necessity is clear-cut: the former concerns the constitution, or the predisposition, of 
the human mind, while the latter is the combination in the object. 
Kant’s objection is that if we adopt the Crusian preformation system, then we would not 
have objective representation at all. Since what is taken under consideration are innate concepts which 
are a priori, it amounts to saying that we would not have objective a priori concepts. This is not the only 
way to understand Kant’s point in his objection. Kant’s objection could make sense without 
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committing to the premise (2). According to this interpretation, Kant’s objection is that the 
conception of the innate objective representation is simply conceptually incoherent. 
According to the traditional conception of objectivity, a representation r is objective iff r is 
correspondent to the object o outside r. According to this conception of objectivity, it is 
unobjectionable that the Crusian innate concepts and principles are objective. However, Kant 
rejects such a traditional conception of objectivity in favor of a new and stronger conception of 
objectivity: an a priori representation r is objective if and only if (i) it is instantiated in experience, 
and (ii) its instantiation is really grounded on the a priori representation in question. 
It becomes apparent that the parallelism or isomorphism in the agreement is too weak to be 
adequate for objectivity, so Kant introduces new conditions to modify the old conception of the 
objectivity of representation. The new condition (ii) is a requirement of Kant’s assumption of 
explanatory rationalism, which is intended to forestall the occult quality objection, which is the 
innate version of the Crusian system. For Kant, a purely contingent agreement cannot yield objectivity 
at all. 
The condition (ii) not only says that there should be a ground but also says that the ground 
should be real. Therefore, it betrays that in addition to the explanatory rationalism, the causal realism 
is also brought in play in his conception of objectivity. According to causal realism, a ground g is 
real if and only if g is non-ideal, that is, non-reductive.144 For instance, in a series of causal events, 
a causes b, and b causes c, then a is an ideal cause of c. In the example, a does not really cause c, for 
it could be reduced into two causal events that a causes b and that b causes c.145 Likewise, the 
common cause model falls short of constituting real grounding between the two parallel series. The 
consequence of Kant’s causal realism is profound. It does not only preclude the purely contingent 
agreement between two things. It also excludes a kind of hypothetically necessary agreement. 
Therefore, both the innateness version and implantation version of the Crusian system are rejected. 
Kant observes that the Crusian preformation system converges with skepticism. This remark 
is surprising. As is well known, skepticism is Kant’s standard label on Hume. As a classical 
rationalist, Crusius insists that a priori concepts are innate and implanted by God. As a classical 
empiricist, by contrast, Hume believes that all concepts are derived from experience. The difference 
between a classical rationalist and a classical empiricist is even huger than their difference from 
Kant. How should we make sense of Kant’s charge of skepticism? Here Kant explains the 
derivation of a priori concepts from experience in terms of “from a subjective necessity arisen from 
                                                     
144 For Leibniz’s notion of ideality as reductivity see Langton 1998. 
145 Leibniz discusses the conception of ideal influence in his The Monadology. See Leibniz 1989, 219. 
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frequent association in experience, which is subsequently falsely held to be objective, i.e., custom” 
(B127). While for nativist the subjective necessity is endowed by God, for empiricist subjective 
necessity is acquired by frequent association.146 It is clear that for Kant what Hume and Crusius 
have in common is the fact that both of them could only reach subjective necessity. Subjective 
necessity is simply a matter of how mind behaves without reference to how the objects are and 
how they could be related to the mental representations. What is at play in Kant’s criticism is still 
Kant’s characteristic conception of objectivity. 
 
4.4.3 The Crusian Circularity and its Reply 
In the 1772 Herz letter, Kant’s mention “the vicious circularity (dem betrüglichen Zirkel)” 
(AA 10:131) seems to encourage us to suppose that Kant explicitly raises an epistemic circularity 
objection to Crusius, which is reminiscent of the famous Cartesian circularity. The circular 
reasoning in Crusius can be summarized as follows: 
 
(1) I know that (P) the C-criterion is true only if I know that (Q) God exists. 
(2) I know that (Q) God exists only if I know that (P) the C-criterion is true. 
 
Since we can know neither the truth of (P) nor that of Q, this circularity seems to be nothing 
but the very kind of the famous Cartesian circularity. If one wants to get rid of the alleged circularity, 
he would reject either (1) or (2). On my view, Crusius could discard (1) in favor of (2). In other 
words, there is a way for Crusius to justify (2) without invoking (1). The primary difficulty in 
justifying (2) is that the C-criterion functions as the supreme principle valid of all truths such that 
the vindication of the C-criterion is almost impossible. In the following, I will outline a strategy to 
get rid of the epistemic circularity. On my proposal, Crusius would have not squarely committed 
to the epistemic circularity had he (i) restricted the scope of the C-criterion into material principles 
in metaphysics and (ii) admitted the logical validity of the ontological argument of God. The basic 
idea is that Crusius could analytically prove that God implants the C-criterion into us.  
Before I delve into the suggested line of response, I would like to remind the readers of the 
following two facts. First, Crusius has a less humble goal and more resources to deal with the 
                                                     
146 The acquired subjective necessity might be inferior to the implanted subjective necessity since the former as a 
naturally evolved and acquired mechanism can err, while the latter cannot. However, this point is not what is at issue 
right now. 
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epistemic circularity than Descartes does, and thereby he does not have to confine himself to the 
Cartesian framework and to take the standard routes suggested by scholars in response to the 
epistemic circularity. Unlike Descartes, Crusius is not preoccupied with the radical skeptical 
scenario. The assumption of this strategy is that analytic knowledge is epistemically reliable, and 
the principle of contradiction is not cast into doubt. Therefore, I will develop one response to the 
circularity by drawing resources available to Crusius. Second, that Crusius is able to discharge the 
possible circularity objection does not imply that he is willing to do so. Unfortunately, it turns out 
that not all available resources are valued by Crusius. As we shall see, both of the steps (i) and (ii) 
are explicitly rejected by Crusius. In other words, Crusius cannot get rid of the trap unless he 
changes his attitudes on certain crucial points. Nonetheless, I believe that it is of interest to know 
whether Crusius could avoid the circularity charge. 
For (i): The most important reason for Crusius to be involved in epistemic circularity lies in 
that he is reviving a Cartesian-style epistemological monism of the criterion of truth. Descartes 
does not have knowledge about the Leibnizian distinction between the truth of reason and the 
truth of fact, or the Kantian distinction between analytic and synthetic judgment. Descartes’ move 
is to bring all necessary truths, no matter whether they are analytic or synthetic, categorical or 
hypothetical, under the category of the eternal truth created by God. Descartes believes that the 
eternal truths can be clearly and distinctly perceived by us, though they do not exhaust all that is 
clearly and distinctly perceived by us. According to Crusius, the C-criterion as the highest principle 
is valid to both formal principles and material ones, viz. to both analytic and synthetic a priori ones. 
In placing the C-criterion as the supreme principle of metaphysics, Crusius is subordinating the 
Leibnizian dichotomy between the truth of reason and the truth of fact to the Cartesian monist criterion 
of truth. 
With the Leibnizian dichotomy at his disposal, Crusius takes over the distinction between the 
truth of fact and the truth of reason and couches it in terms of material and formal principles as 
fundamental to his metaphysics. Meanwhile, Crusius does not have to abandon the crucial 
distinction between material and formal principles in metaphysics in favor of Wolffian monism as 
he does in fact. Rather, he could retain his central insight to the requirement of the criterion of 
truth as well as the formal-material distinction while restricting the scope of the C-criterion merely 
into the material principle unexplainable with reference to the principle of contradiction. In so 
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doing Crusius is left adequate room to prove the existence of neither erring nor deceiving God 
without the help of the C-criterion.147  
For (ii): The restriction of the C-criterion only leaves the necessary room for Crusius to avoid 
the Cartesian circularity, yet it is far from a sufficient condition for it. In addition, Crusius must be 
willing and able to give an a priori ontological argument for the existence of God. The proof of the 
existence of God is either a priori or a posteriori. From Leibniz onwards, the notion of a priori 
becomes co-extensive with the analytic when it is applied to proof. In other words, the proof of 
God can be analytic or non-analytic. According to the Cartesian tradition of ontological proof, the 
argument for the existence of God is nothing other than an analysis of the concept of God defined 
as the most perfect being. 
According to the standard ontological argument, the existence of God is logically entailed by 
the existence of God: if God exists, then his existence is necessary. From the claim of the necessary 
existence of God, it follows that the omnipotence and omnibenevolence of God are not merely in 
thought, but in reality. The omnipotence of God implies that God cannot err, and the 
omnibenevolence of God implies that God cannot deceive. Therefore, a successful ontological 
God logically entails a non-erring and non-deceiving God, which is precisely required for response 
to the circularity charge. 
Unfortunately, Crusius is no less an opponent to the a priori argument for the existence of 
God than Kant. Crusius thinks that “the actuality of God can be cognized in no way other than 
from his works”, and thus he discards the a priori argument in favor of the a posteriori ones for the 
existence of God. Crusius explicitly charges that the ontological argument is not formally valid: 
 
This inference can be deceptive because the first premise is an axiom, while the second is a definition. 
However, its form is not correct, as it is a syllogism with four terms. For the term of having existence 
means something different in the conclusion from what it means in the premise. For it means 
existence in the understanding in the premise, since, namely, a concept in the understanding 
contains existence in itself in such fashion that when it is thought or posited, existence must also be 
thought or posited as a part of it. But in the conclusion it means real existence outside of thought.148 
 
According to Crusius, the ontological argument commits the logical fallacy of four terms. 
The equivocation of the middle terms is as follows: in the premise the concept of existence means 
                                                     
147 Again, it reflects the distinction between Descartes and Leibniz in regard to the status of logic. This distinction in 
turn comes down to their difference in understanding the status of God.  
148 Watkins 2009, 168. 
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the ideal existence in thought, whereas in the conclusion it means the real existence outside of 
thought. If ontological argument is invalid, Crusius can only turn to the a posteriori arguments for 
help. However, it is not clear that any successful a posteriori arguments will imply the omnipotence 
and omnibenevolence of God. In this case, a vicious circularity reemerges. Thus, Kant’s verdict is 
fair: we cannot know for sure that God exists and He neither deceives nor errs. 
Kant’s argument against the necessary existence of God by logical entailment from its 
concept has received wide acclaim. Recently Nick Stang has argued that an adequately sophisticated 
rationalist (Baumgarten for instance) is able to provide an ontological argument that immunes from 
Kant’s allegedly successful refutation.149 Whether there is a successful ontological argument is not 
my present concern here. For the sake of argument, let’s suppose that there is such an argument 
and that Crusius is convinced by it. By restricting the C-criterion and adopting such an argument, 
Crusius could establish the existence of the non-erring and non-deceiving God without being 
bogged in vicious circularity. Since we know that God exists independently of the C-criterion, then 
(1) is falsified, and thereby the circularity disappears. 
 
4.4.4 The Deus ex Machina Objection and Epistemic Atheism 
In the original context, Kant mounts his objection against both hyperphysical influx and pre-
established harmony. In the last chapter I have analyzed why the system of intellectual intuition is 
hopeless, now I will turn to the Deus ex machina objection to pre-established harmony. As I have 
noted, Kant’s Deus ex machina objection is more directed at pre-established harmony in general than 
to Crusius’ preformation-system in particular. In other words, it is not that preformation system 
per se is false. Rather, pre-established harmony is false, and preformation system as one species of 
pre-established harmony is thereby false.  
Kant’s Deus ex machina objection to Crusius’ system of pre-established harmony between 
representation and object is not a new invention. It echoes the same famous objection made by 
Leibniz against Malebranche’s occasionalism of natural causation, according to which God is 
invoked to intervene the world from moment to moment for each state of the world. In his first 
published essay New System of Nature composed in 1695, Leibniz introduces his Deus ex machina 
charge as follows: 
 
                                                     
149 See Stang 2015. 
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It is quite true that, speaking with metaphysical rigor, there is no real influence of one created substance 
on another, and that all things, with all their reality, are continually produced by the power [vertu] of 
God. But in solving problems it is not sufficient to make use of the general cause and to invoke what 
is called a Deus ex machina. For when one does that without giving any other explanation derived from 
the order of secondary causes, it is, properly speaking, having recourse to miracle. (1989, 143) 
 
As the passage indicates, Leibniz’s mention of miracle might allude to his perpetual miracle 
argument, one of Leibniz’s most famous objections to occasionalism. According to this argument, 
the occasionalist account of natural causation by appeal to a supernatural cause amounts to saying 
that God exercises a perpetual miracle on the world, for all the natural events are miraculous in the 
sense that all events exceed their own causal powers. Thereby it implies there is no genuine 
distinction that can be drawn between laws of nature and miracle.150 
In this very passage, however, it is not the specific consequence of perpetual miracle, but a 
general mode of explanation of Deus ex machina, that constitutes the chief target under Leibniz’s 
attack. Here Leibniz employs Deus ex machina to highlight a particular pattern of inference that 
underlies the system of occasionalism. According to Leibniz, an explanation invokes God as Deus 
ex machina if the explanation invokes God by making use of God as the general cause without giving 
an explanation from other secondary cause. On the one hand, Leibniz is convinced that God 
should play a role in the explanation of natural phenomena to display his divine wisdom and 
benevolence. On the other hand, he believes that we cannot simply invoke God as the immediate 
cause and thereby ignores the complex mechanism in nature as the secondary cause. It is by 
specifying which causal role God plays that Leibniz distinguishes the illegitimate invocations to 
God as Deus ex machina from the legitimate ones. Different from the perpetual argument, what 
Leibniz does here is to make a normative claim on epistemic legitimacy: what kind of explanation 
is legitimate if it invokes to God. 
The charge of invoking Deus ex machina seems applicable to Leibniz’s own system, too. It does 
appear puzzling to his contemporaries that Leibniz feels his own theory of pre-established harmony 
free from this charge, since it also makes an appeal to God. In his letter to Leibniz on March 4th in 
1687, Arnauld expresses his worry that Leibniz’s system of pre-established harmony seems “saying 
the same thing in other words that those claim that my will is the occasional cause of the movement 
of my arm and that God is the real cause of it”.151  
                                                     
150 For Leibniz on perpetual miracle see Adams 1994, 90-99.  
151 Leibniz 1967, 105. 
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Anticipated by Arnauld’s scruple, it is not surprising to hear that Kant charges Crusius’ 
intellectual pre-established harmony with invoking God as Deus ex machina.  
However, the intellectual pre-established harmony does not fall prey to the Deus ex machina 
objection only if the notion of Deus ex machina is captured precisely as Leibniz explains. With the 
well-defined notion of Deus ex machina in hand, however, Leibniz could easily distance his pre-
established harmony from occasionalism and dismiss the latter as explanatorily illegitimate by 
taking God as the general cause.152 
As we have seen, the distinction between God’s role as ultimate cause and his role as 
immediate cause matters so much for Leibniz. In spite of that, the distinction is not that significant 
for Kant. Kant’s entire Deus ex machina objections rests upon his dismissal of the distinction. For 
Kant Malebranche’s system of assistance and Leibniz’s system of pre-determined harmony are 
close neighbors. Indeed, Kant calls them respectively as individually established harmony and 
generally established harmony in his Inaugural Dissertation. (AA 2:409) Since Kant radicalizes the 
notion of Deus ex machina, to decide whether some explanation is susceptible to the Deus ex machina 
objection is not a matter to see whether God plays the explanatory role as immediate cause or as 
remote cause, but a matter to see whether God plays any explanatory role regardless of what role 
it is. To invoke God as Deus ex machina is simply to accord it some role in the explanation of natural 
phenomena. Consequently, any mode of the explanation of a priori knowledge by appeal to God invites 
this kind of objection. In this sense, Leibniz’s system of pre-determined harmony is no better off 
than Malebranche’s system of assistance. 
Kant’s reconceptualization of Deus ex machina should not obscure its continuity with Leibniz’s 
original conception; their difference is a matter of degree. Both of them employ this objection as a 
charge to the legitimacy of the mode of explanation, and both of them impose demands on 
theoretical norms. In fact, Leibniz and Kant can be regarded as working in the same direction. 
Leibniz takes the step to deprive God of the immediate or secondary cause of the explanation of 
natural phenomena. Kant takes a further step to deprive God of any role in the explanation of 
knowledge.153 
                                                     
152 For Leibniz’s motivation and effort to distance his own pre-established harmony from perpetual miracle see 
Rutherford 1993, 135-159. For a different account see Jolley 1998. 
153 It is not obvious whether this objection can be extended to the explanation of any phenomena. Again, it might be 
illuminated to see whether Kant has ever resorted to God in his philosophy. It is noteworthy that pre-critical Kant 
does resort to God in their explanation of the origin of the real connections between isolated substances. One 
natural question is whether a complete theory of physical influx also invites the Deus ex machina objection. Then, the 
only two alternatives we have are either to bite the bullet to say that pre-critical Kant leaves himself open this 
objection, or to draw a line of the legitimate appeal to God such that Kant’s objection is not to be applied to himself. 
One simple answer is that the appeal to God is merely a dogmatic residue of the pre-critical Kant, which is discarded 
in his critical philosophy. Therefore, there is no inconsistency in Kant’s epistemic atheism. 
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As I have noted, the Deus ex machina objection is directed to a wide range of positions. In 
particular, Kant claims explicitly that the Deus ex machina objection is also applied to intellectual 
intuition. The move to invoke intellectual intuition is also one that makes an appeal to God. In this 
case, God does not play the role of the guarantor of the parallelism between thoughts and objects 
outside thoughts. God instead plays the role of the creator and giver of the objects of a priori 
knowledge. The C-criterion of truth is reliable because it is guaranteed by God. The object of a 
priori knowledge is available because it is provided by God.  
The explanatory schema of Deus ex machina can be formulated as follows: something x is F 
for God wills or makes it. It is reminiscent of Kant’s objection to the appeal to occult qualities in 
explanation: something x is F for x has an occult quality of F-ness. The system of occult quality does 
not constitute a genuine explanation, since it does not explain its explanandum in other terms. While 
pre-established harmony seems to explain its explanandum in other terms, it makes an appeal to 
an infinite cause that could explain everything. Both systems of explanation could explain 
everything in an effortless way by appealing to the omnipotent scheme. It is no wonder that both 
invite intellectual laziness. 
With this schema one simply cannot tell a good explanation from a bad one since everything 
could be explained in such a way. It is less an argument than an implicit assertion of what counts 
as the legitimate mode of explanation. The recourse to God makes philosophy as human intellectual 
endeavor less rewarding. In effect, the Deus ex machina objection is an objection to triviality. In sum, 
the problem of the inference to the explanation by God is that the scheme is too general to be 
explanatorily informative and it is too cheap to be explanatorily profitable.  
Initially, it appears not to be a fatal objection. The objection seems to be normative in character. 
It excludes the mode of inference to explanation by God neither due to its falsity, nor due to its 
incoherence, but due to its triviality, which is obviously not a theoretical virtue. The system of pre-
established harmony could be a true story; we cannot preclude the possibility that it is the case that 
the relation of representation to object is subject to a system of pre-established intellectual harmony. 
Underlying the objection is one of Kant’s most fundamental assumptions, epistemic atheism. 
Epistemic atheism claims that God does not play any role in explaining the possibility of knowledge. 
It is noteworthy that epistemic atheism should be distinguished from other kinds of theism, which 
are more famous in philosophical literature. Metaphysical theism is the view that God exists, a view 
most philosophers and scientists assume.154 Moral theism is the view that God plays some role in 
                                                     
154 The stronger versions of metaphysical theism hold that God creates the world or lays down laws of nature to the 
world. 
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explaining the possibility of morality, a view Kant himself defends in his ethics. One should be 
wary of the complex relationship between various kinds of theism atheism. Both epistemic theism 
and moral theism presuppose metaphysical theism. However, epistemic atheism is independent of 
other kinds of atheism. It does not imply metaphysical theism; neither does it imply moral atheism. 
Meanwhile, epistemic atheism is compatible with metaphysical theism and moral theism; Kant 
himself is an example of embracing these three positions. 
It is fair to say that epistemic theism is the dominant view in early modern philosophy. The 
spectrum of epistemic theism ranges widely, and it includes Christianized Platonism, divine illumination, 
divine reliabilism, and divine perspectivism. On Kant’s interpretation, Plato and Malebranche embrace 
the Christianized Platonism that God creates objects for our a priori knowledge, accompanied by the 
commitment to the realism of abstract objects. Augustine and his followers endorse the doctrine of 
divine illumination, according to which all of our ideas are located in God.155 Descartes embraces 
the doctrine of divine reliabilism, according to which God guarantees our epistemic apparatus such 
that we could perceive clearly and distinctly.156 Even Spinoza’s pantheism is no exception. On this 
issue, Spinozism could be dubbed as divine perspectivism, according to which we human beings 
could represent adequate ideas from a God’s point of view. 
The only exceptions to this dominant tradition before Kant are British empiricists Locke and 
Hume.157 Obviously, Kant aligns himself with this tradition.158 Epistemic atheism delineates the 
boundary of explanatory legitimacy. In Chapter 5 we will see that empiricist philosophy still occupies 
one horn of the new dilemma of relation problem. It is not only because that the borrowing model 
of the knowledge of empirical path can yield the same scope of knowledge independently of the 
metaphysical status of physical objects; it is also because the explanatory legitimacy implied by 
epistemic atheism makes empiricism the most viable position in the philosophical spectrum. 
The rivalry between the empirical path, the mystical fanatical path, and the logical fanatical 
path under discussion results from the two seemingly mutually conflicting desiderata: explanatory 
legitimacy and explanatory adequacy. However, none of the three paths could satisfy both desiderata at 
the same time. The empirical path satisfies the former; it is explanatorily legitimate yet not 
explanatorily adequate. On the contrary, the two fanatical paths satisfy the latter; they are 
                                                     
155 The Christianized Platonism should not be conflated with the divine illumination since the former merely adds 
the origin of abstract entities. 
156 See Jolley 1998. 
157 Hobbes could be classified as an epistemic atheist. Hobbes is rather skeptical of the Christian theist outlook, 
though he recognizes the existence of God. However, Hobbes certainly does not exert great influence on Kant’s 
theoretical philosophy. 
158 In addition to Kant, one philosophical school that is devoted to developing this aspect of Locke’s philosophy is 
French materialism. 
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explanatorily adequate yet not explanatorily legitimate. One central motivation of Kant’s 
transcendental path is to develop a theory possessing the theoretical virtues of both explanatory 
legitimacy and explanatory adequacy. 
 
 
  
119 
 
Chapter 5  Toward the Transcendental Path 
5.1 Introduction 
For many readers, Kant creates the impression in the Critique that for vindicating the 
transcendental path, everything is done as soon as he rejects the empirical path. However, it is 
desperately incomplete. In the above chapters, it takes us a long journey to examine the empirical 
path, the mystical fanatical path, and the logical fanatical path by taking into account what each 
system says and how Kant argues against them. In spite of their systematic importance, Kant does 
not incorporate the entire journey into his magnum opus, Critique of Pure Reason.  
In the Herz letter, we have seen how unsolvable Kant finds the puzzle is. In the Critique, the 
difficulty that plagues Kant suddenly disappears. Then, one might reasonably conclude that by 
1781 Kant had found a solution to the previous system. As we have noted, it seems all possible 
paths based on different grounding models have been exhausted, and no further possible room is 
left to Kant. Then, what is Kant’s solution to his puzzle? 
In section 5.2, I will argue that the previously considered paths do not exhaust all the possible 
paths, and Kant finds that there are two sub-models within the model of “the representation makes 
the object possible”. Kant’s discussions of abstract, mathematical, and moral objects assume that 
to make possible is to make actual. However, Kant shows that to make determinate is the other way 
to make possible. I will continue to argue that to say some objects are determined a priori is to say 
that some objects instantiate necessary properties.  
In section 5.3, I will offer an analysis of the consequences of Kant’s notion of “determining 
a priori” and his Copernican model of grounding, and I will argue that the idealization of objects, 
the schematization of categories and the radicalization of imaginative synthesis constitute the 
separately necessary yet jointly sufficient conditions of the model of “making determinate”. And 
then I will briefly discuss what costs Kant as well as what benefits him for taking the transcendental 
path. 
In section 5.4, I will examine two kinds of arguments for idealism without any reference to 
the notion of sensibility. The first argument from the objective reality of categories could be viewed 
as an argument for supplying the necessary condition of idealism for the Copernican model of 
grounding. The second argument from laws of nature is a line of argument for idealism that is 
entirely different from any argument offered in the Aesthetic. The underlying basic idea of the 
ontological degeneration in a metaphysical hierarchy marks a radicalization of the idea that we 
resemble God to the distinctive Kantian idea that we replace God. 
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In section 5.5, I will propose that schemata are the instances of the categories in experience, 
and therefore they are the necessary properties of the empirical objects. I will also suggest that the 
schemata are introduced because the nature of the objects is changed so that the nature of their 
properties is changed. On a final analysis, I will suggest that there is a tension between Kant’s two 
specifications of schemata, and it can be resolved only when we note the systematic ambiguity in 
Kant’s notion of relation or application. 
In section 5.6, I will argue that the a priori determination requires a determining ground and I 
will identify the ground with the transcendental synthesis of imagination. And then I proceed to 
analyze the various requirements imposed by the determining ground and to show how 
transcendental imagination fills the role in virtue of its productivity, transcendentality, and 
blindness. Finally, I propose that by insisting on the priority of synthesis, Kant’s picture of mind 
decisively departs from those analysis-centered conceptions of mind embraced by his rationalist 
predecessors and contemporaries. 
 
5.2 The Transcendental Path and A Priori Determination 
5.2.1 the Disappearance of the Difficulty 
Remember that in the 1772 letter to Herz Kant wrote that “our understanding, through its 
representations, is neither the cause of the object (save in the case of moral ends), nor is the object 
the cause of our intellectual representations in the real sense (in sensu reali)” (AA 10:131). This is 
precisely the difficulty on which Kant gets stuck in the Herz letter. In Critique, however, the 
difficulty suddenly and curiously disappears. Kant no longer finds there is anything problematic 
with the way of the reference of a priori concepts of understanding to objects. In the introductory 
section “Transition to the transcendental deduction of the categories” claims that synthetic 
representation can make object possible in virtue of a priori determination: 
 
There are only two possible cases in which synthetic representation and its objects can come together, 
necessarily relate to each other, and, as it were, meet each other: Either if the object alone makes the 
representation possible, or if the representation alone makes the object possible. If it is the first, then 
this relation is only empirical, and the representation is never possible a priori. And this is the case with 
appearance in respect of that in it which belongs to sensation. But if it is the second, then[…] the 
representation is still determinant of the object a priori[…]. (A92/B124-125) 
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It is noteworthy that it is What stands in contrast with the empirical path and stands for the 
model of “the representation makes the object possible”. In concluding §27 “the Result of this 
deduction” of 1787 Critique Kant puts the new dilemma in a very specific and explicit way: 
 
there are only two ways in which a necessary agreement of experience with the concepts of its objects 
can be thought: either the experience makes these concepts possible or these concepts make the 
experience possible. The first is not the case with the categories (nor with pure sensible intuition); for 
they are a priori concepts, hence independent of experience (the assertion of an empirical origin would 
be a sort of generatio aequivoca). Consequently only the second way remains (as it were a system of the 
epigenesis of pure reason): namely that the categories contain the grounds of the possibility of all 
experience in general from the side of the understanding. (B166-167) 
 
The new dilemma is formulated as “either the experience makes these concepts possible or 
these concepts make the experience possible”. On the one hand, Kant talks about “categories” or 
“a priori concepts” in particular without talking about representation in general. On the other hand, 
Kant explicitly identifies the object as “experience” and he informs the general claim that the a 
priori representation determines the object with a more specific articulation that “the categories 
contain the grounds of the possibility of all experience in general”. 
What is stunning in this new formulation of the grounding dilemma is that Kant claims that 
the a priori concepts of understanding fall under the horn that “the representation makes the object 
possible”, which should have been successfully rejected by Kant as the mystical fanatical path. In 
fact, this is precisely what the principle of transcendental deduction says: “they must be recognized 
as a priori conditions of the possibility of experiences (whether of the intuition that is encountered 
in them, or of the thinking)” (A94/B126). 
 
5.2.2 The Generality of “Representation Makes Object Possible” 
The secret of the disappearance of the difficulty lies precisely in that Kant becomes aware that 
creation or invention is by no means the only way in which the representation makes the object 
possible. It might be a little surprising that for Kant the mode of “the representation makes the 
object possible” ranges widely. Kant holds that there are three cases in which the representation 
makes the object possible. Representations can make possible (a) abstract objects, (b) mathematical 
objects, and (c) moral objects. All of them are included in the Herz letter: 
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if that in us which we call “representation” were active with regard to the object, that is, if the object 
itself were created by the representation (as when divine cognitions are conceived as the archetypes of 
things), the conformity of these representations to their objects could also be understood. (AA 10:130) 
 
our understanding, through its representations, is neither the cause of the object (save in the case of 
moral ends)[.] (AA 10:130) 
 
In mathematics this is possible, because the objects before us are quantities and can be represented as 
quantities only because it is possible for us to produce their mathematical representations (by taking 
numerical units a given number of times). (AA 10:131) 
 
The above three cases pertain to two distinct kinds of mind. The Platonic abstract objects can 
be made possible by the divine mind, whereas only mathematical objects and moral objects can be 
made possible by the representation of the human mind. Despite the insurmountable gap between 
divine and the human mind, underlying the three different kinds of objects exists only one model for 
representation to make object possible: the representation makes the object possible insofar as the 
existence of the object is concerned. 
In the Herz letter, Kant seems to think that the moral object is a species of Platonic objects. 
After Kant writes that “Plato assumed a previous intuition of divinity as the primary source of the 
pure concepts of the understanding and of first principles” (AA 10:131), he continues that 
“[v]arious moralists have accepted precisely this view with respect to basic moral laws” (AA 10:131). 
That is to say, moral laws as moral objects are created as archetypes are. 
That mathematical objects are invented or constructed is one of Kant’s most persistent views. 
In Critique Kant writes that “in synthetic judgments we cognize a priori… about the shapes that the 
productive imagination draws in [space in general]” (A157/B196). In discussing the distinction 
between mathematical principles and dynamical principles, Kant writes: “[t]hings must be entirely 
different with those principles that are to bring the existence of appearances under rules a priori. 
For, since this existence cannot be constructed, these principles can concern only the relation of 
existence.”(B 222) It implies that the existence concerned by mathematical principles can be 
constructed. 
 
5.2.3 Making-Possible as Determining A Priori 
Then, what is the other way that the representation makes the object possible? In Critique, As 
Kant writes in Transition: 
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There are only two possible cases in which synthetic representation and its objects can come together, 
necessarily relate to each other, and, as it were, meet each other: Either if the object alone makes the 
representation possible, or if the representation alone makes the object possible. If it is the first, then 
this relation is only empirical, and the representation is never possible a priori. And this is the case with 
appearance in respect of that in it which belongs to sensation. But if it is the second, then since 
representation in itself (for we are not here talking about its causality by means of the will) does not 
produce its object as far as its existence is concerned, the representation is still determinant of the 
object a priori if it is possible through it alone to cognize something as an object. (A93/B124-125) 
 
This quotation seems to contain an implicit contrast between two kinds of “representation 
makes object possible”. The locution “causality by means of will” alludes to the way in which moral 
objects are made possible by a priori representation. In the Preface to the 1787 Critique, by contrast, 
Kant explicitly contrasts the two fundamentally different ways of making possible: 
 
Insofar as there is to be reason in these sciences, something in them must be cognized a priori, and this 
cognition can relate to its object in either of two ways, either merely determining the object and its 
concept (which must be given from elsewhere), or else also making the object actual. The former is 
theoretical, the latter practical cognition of reason. In both the pure part, the part in which reason 
determines is object wholly a priori, must be expounded all by itself, however much or little it may 
contain, and that part that comes from other sources must not be mixed up with it. (Biv-Bv) 
 
Nowhere else Kant makes the two modes of making-possible clearer. In the case of a priori 
reference159 of representation to its object, two ways of relating representation to its object are 
available. One is that representation makes actual the object, while the other is representation 
determines the object. The former case pertains practical reason, whereas the latter case to 
theoretical reason. 
Therefore, the previous philosophical spectrum depicted in Chapter 1 is complete. It fails to 
take into account the case that making-actual is not the only way for a representation to make an 
object possible. The consideration is not as easy as it might initially appear. To make this move 
means a fundamental break with the intuitive realistic metaphysics, which is deeply embedded in 
our world-view. Even those idealists are still committed to a metaphysical realism in a more covert 
way. This is precisely why Kant dismisses the empirical idealists as transcendental realists: a simple 
mind-dependence account of existence is cheap, but an a priori determining theory of causation is 
difficult. The Picture 1 presented in Chapter 1 could be replaced by the following Picture 2: 
                                                     
159 A priori reference means that the ground of relation is a priori. 
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Picture 2 
 
5.2.4 Formulation of A Priori Determination 
(a) To Determine an Object 
In the following, I will clarify what it means by “determine an object” in general and what it 
means by “determine an object a priori” in particular. And then we will see how this move is necessary. 
As for the first question, I propose that to determine an object is to add new determinations to it, and that 
to add new determinations to an object is to make it instantiate certain properties. The notion of “determine” 
is a technical term in metaphysics, and its meaning should be understood in German metaphysical 
tradition. In §34 of his Metaphysics, Baumgarten writes: 
 
Something is determinate if it is posited that it is A or that it is not A, but if it is posited only that it 
is either A or not A, it is indeterminate. Or, if nothing with respect to contradictory predicates is 
(1) If the relation of 
representation to object exists, 
then the relation is either 
contingent or necessary.
(1.1) If the relation of 
representation to object is 
contingent, there is no ground for 
this relation.
The system of occult quality
(1.2) If the relation of 
representation to object is 
necessary, there is some ground for 
this relation.
(1.2.1)If the relation of 
representation to object is 
necessary and ideal, then there is
common ground for the relation.
The logical fanatical path
(1.2.2) If the relation of 
representation to object is 
necessary and real, then there is real 
ground for the relation.
(1.2.2.1)If the relation of 
representation to object is 
necessary and real, then it could be 
that the object grounds the 
representation.
The empirical path
(1.2.2.2) If the relation of 
representation to object is 
necessary and real, then it could be 
that the representation grounds 
the object.
(1.2.2.2.1) If the representation 
grounds the object, then it could 
be that the representation makes 
the object actual.
The mystical fanatical path
(1.2.2.2.2) If the representation 
grounds the object, then it could 
be that the representation makes 
the object determinate.
The transcendental path
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posited in the subject except that one or the other is attributed to it, that subject is indeterminate in 
respect of those predicates. However, it is determinate, if one of them is posited in the subject. 
Whatever can be determined is determinable. Therefore, concerning this it can be posited that 
something is A or that something is not A, [hence] that something is determinable.160 
 
In Baumgarten’s formulation, the notion of determination is relational. We can formulate 
determination in this way: for anything x, x is determined with respect to F if and only if x 
instantiate the predicate A or its contradictory predicate not-A, where F is a higher-order predicate 
of A. For example, when we say something a is scarlet, then we are saying that a is determined with 
respect to red, and we can also say that a is determined with respect to color.  
In my view, this how Kant himself understands “determinate” and “indeterminate”. In 
Transcendental Dialectic, Kant writes: 
 
Every concept, in regard to what is not contained in it, is indeterminate, and stands under the principle 
of determinability: that of every two contradictorily opposed predicates only one can apply to it, 
which rests on the principle of contradiction C and hence is a merely logical principle, which abstracts 
from every content of cognition, and has in view nothing but the logical form of cognition. 
(A571/B579) 
 
To be sure, it appears that what Kant speaks of is about the determination of concept, rather 
than about the determination of thing. Remember Kant’s modal principle that the logical possibility 
does not imply the real possibility, while the real possibility implies the logical possibility, where 
the logical possibility is understood as the possibility of a concept, and the real possibility as the 
possibility of a thing. From the fact that the logical possibility entails the principle of determinability, 
it follows that the real possibility entails the principle of determinability, in spite of its logical nature. 
In fact, Kant is clear about the inference because this is what Kant actually says in the 
immediately following paragraph: “Every thing, however, as to its possibility, further stands under 
the principle of thoroughgoing determination” (A571/B579). As a result, the possibility of s 
thing must stand under both the principle of determinability and the principle of thoroughgoing 
determination. 
To make an object actual and to determine an object are entirely different. To make an object 
actual is to bring the object into existence. To make an object determinate is to confer property to 
                                                     
160Watkins 2009, 93-94. For determining ground and external determination see respectively §34 (Watkins 2009, 94) 
and §36(Watkins 2009, 94). Baumgarten writes: “[t]hose things that are posited in something in determining [it] 
(marks and predicates) are determinations” (Watkins 2009, 94). 
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an existent object. The former is a claim about existence, while the latter is a claim about property. 
The intuition of the difference between a claim on existence and a claim on property is made even 
sharper by Kant’s famous motto “existence is not a real predicate”. For the rationalist such as 
Baumgarten, existence is complete determination. For Kant, by contrast, existence cannot be 
analyzed in terms of determination. No matter how determinate an object is made, it can never be 
made actual in virtue of being made determinate. Put in contemporary locution, for Kant existence 
is a second-order property, which should not be lumped together with the normal first-order 
property.161 
 
(b) Determine A Priori 
In the following exploration of the meaning of the claim “pure concepts determine objects a 
priori”, I propose that to determine a priori is to instantiate necessary property. For illustrative purpose, the 
meaning of a priori determination could be elucidated by an analogy to Kant’s relevant account of 
pure intuitions, i.e. space and time. This move requires little justification. In fact, in the quotation 
from B-Preface Kant is speaking of the generic term “cognition”, rather than the specific term 
‘concept’ or ‘intuition’. It suggests that an analogous reading of the a priori determination of 
intuition could shed light on the reading of the a priori determination of concept. Kant’s analogy 
between concept and intuition invites the suggestion that there should be an unequivocal meaning 
of a priori determination. 
In Aesthetic Kant makes two a priori claims on space and time respectively: 
 
If I can say a priori: (T1)all outer appearances are in space and determined a priori according to the relations of space, 
so from the principle of inner sense I can say entirely generally: (T2)all appearances in general, i.e., all objects 
of the senses, are in time, and necessarily stand in relations of time. (A34/B51) 
 
While this passage contains an analogy of space to illustrate time, what is said of time can 
certainly clarify the nature of space. Therefore, we can sharpen our understanding of a priori 
determination with the help of the mutual reference between space and time. First of all, we can 
easily infer that a priori determined means necessarily determined. This is consistent with the meaning of 
                                                     
161 Another vocabulary employed by Kant is the notion of positing. For a discussion on the absolute and relative 
positing in Kant see Stang 2016. 
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a priori. What Kant makes here is a de re claim that outer appearances necessarily stand in the relation 
of space. In other words, the spatial relation is the necessary property of outer appearances. 
Second, the a priori determination is valid of all objects in a certain domain. Since for Kant 
necessity and universality are coextensive, the claim that any object x in the domain D is a priori 
determined with respect to some property F means that F is universally valid of the domain of any 
object x in question.162 
Third, the a priori determination of a domain of objects is the highest-order property. It is worth 
noting that the determination in general implies excluding the opposite. However, this scheme is 
not immediately applied to the case of a priori determination. What is determined a priori is not any 
specific object in a domain, but all objects in that domain. Correspondingly, the a priori 
determination of a domain of objects is not any low-order property, but the highest-order property. The a 
priori determination of the positions between two bodies is not the property of, say, ‘being five 
miles from’, but the most indeterminate spatial property ‘being next to’. Excluding the 
indeterminate general relation does not determine any positive property or relation. Rather, it 
cancels all the possibilities of meaningfully attributing any spatial property to bodies. If it were the 
case, to attribute any specific spatial property to the objects in question is to commit the categorical 
mistake. 
Finally, the a priori determinations are relational properties. As the passage indicates, appearances 
are determined with regard to relations. Outer appearances are determined with regard to the 
relations of space, whereas appearances in general are determined with regard to the relations of 
time. Only relations can be universally and necessarily valid of a domain of objects.163 
Therefore, the new determinations or content added to the objects is the general relational 
determination. The way the categories determine the epistemically significant objects is to 
determine a priori, that is, universally and necessarily. These new determinations do not belong 
uniquely to any object, or any kind of object. It indifferently subsumes all objects in the framework 
of space and time and in the reach of possible consciousness. The initial formulation of a priori 
determination could be articulated as follows: for any object x in a certain domain D and for 
relational concept C, x is determined a priori with regard to C=Def. x necessarily instantiates C. 
 
                                                     
162 The price it pays for meeting the universality requirement is that it is not valid of things in themselves. 
163 Kant’s emphasis on the priority of relation to relata is striking. As for certain relation, Kant could be seen as a 
follower of Aristotelianism. On the one hand, relation does not depend on any particular relata for its existence; On 
the other hand, relation depends on some relata for its existence. 
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5.3 The Implications of the Transcendental Path 
In the previous section, I have clarified what it means for representation to determine object a 
priori and why it is the only alternative for make-actual model if it is committed to the horn 
representation that makes object possible. However, it is possible that the notion of a priori 
determination is empty. In this section, I will address the question as to in how it is possible for the 
representation to determine the object a priori. 
From the fact that concepts determine objects a priori, it trivially follows that the model must 
satisfy the three requirements: (i) the objects must be in a way such that they are susceptible to be 
determined by a priori concepts; (ii) the a priori concepts must be in a way such that they are 
susceptible to determine the objects; (iii) there must be a way such that it can make such 
determination realized. From the three requirements arise the following three how-questions: 
 
(Q1) How the objects can be susceptible to be determined by a priori concepts. 
(Q2) How the a priori concepts can be susceptible to determine the objects. 
(Q3) How other conditions can be satisfied. 
 
The answers Kant gives are as follows: 
 
(A1) The objects must be idealized such that it can be legislated by the human mind. 
(A2) The categories must be singularized such that it can be displayed in concreto. 
(A3) The mind must be equipped with some faculty such that it can bring about the laws of nature. 
 
The three answers commit Kant to his controversial idealism, obscure schematism, and notorious 
psychologism, which constitute the unmistakable trademarks of transcendental philosophy. Before I 
respectively expound these three implications of Kant’s Copernican move, I would like to have a 
brief survey of the negative consequences of this transcendental path in the hope of clarifying why 
it is difficult to propose a formulation of a priori determination, and why it is even more difficult to 
accept its consequences. 
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This question of how it is possible for representation to determine object a priori is elusive, if 
not entirely unintelligible. As Kant shows, one cannot make sense of the conditions of a priori 
determination in a straightforward way. 164  Rather, both the representation and the object in 
question must be radically reconceptualized. By the reconceptualization I do not mean Kant’s 
following moves: on the one hand, representations are identified not as intellectual concepts of the 
real use of understanding, but as a priori concepts of understanding, and, on the other hand, objects 
are identified not as things in themselves, but as things that appear to us. While the first change is 
merely terminological, the second change is more substantial for it is motivated by the Givenness 
Thesis of cognition that objects must be given to us if they are to be cognized at all. Rather, Kant 
reconceptualizes the two relata in a far more radical way: a priori concepts of understanding are 
replaced by the schemata, i.e. transcendental time-determination, and things appear to us are reduced to 
representations, i.e. mind-dependent entities. 
The consequences of the Copernican Revolution are profound and far-reaching. In the first 
place, the Copernican turn makes things unbelievable. Idealism is a position characteristic of reducing 
physical objects into representations. It is justified, but it is unbelievable. Even idealistic precedents do 
not alleviate the intellectual shock. It is difficult for us to lend credence to the theory without 
believing in a realistic metaphysics. 
In spite of the idealistic inspirations, Kant does not immediately see how far he is led, and what 
repercussion will be caused in the future path. The transcendental idealism results in a further 
repercussion: the object is lost. The repercussion is paradoxical: in order for categories to be applied 
to objects, one must concede to the truth of idealism. The concession to idealism results in that 
the newly introduced representations lose their objects (and that the temporal sequence loses 
objective time-determination). If Kant could not make a response to the problem, the promise of 
Copernican move would be bleak. 
In the second place, the Copernican turn makes things irrelevant. We expect that Kant offers an 
answer to the question of how a priori concepts are related to objects. It turns out that it is schemata, 
rather than categories per se, that are related to objects. Kant’s answer appears to simply miss the 
point. Although Crusius illegitimately introduces God as the common cause between thoughts and 
things outside thoughts, his pre-established harmony intellectual system has at least one merit: it is 
concepts rather than anything else that represent objects. Kant is still obliged to provide justification for 
this move. Even if Kant can finally prove that the objective reality of schemata implies that of 
                                                     
164 Suppose that Transcendental Deduction does not presuppose the results of Transcendental Aesthetic that space 
and time are forms of sensibility and that appearances are representations. 
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categories, one might object that the objective reality of categories can be proved without resorting 
to schemata. 
In the third place, the Copernican turn makes things complicated. In transcendental philosophy 
Kant gives an extraordinarily sophisticated theory of synthesis to account for the relationship 
between mind and the modal facts in the world. Consider Descartes’ theory of perception of 
intellect. Even if it is deplorably false, it is unparalleled elegant. The natural light can elevate us to 
penetrate the eternal truth created and laid down by God without appeal to further mental 
machinery. In developing his doctrine of synthesis Kant is committed to a theory of mind burdened 
with heavy metaphysical presupposition. For instance, Kant seems to postulate the mathematical 
synthesis and dynamical synthesis to be two numerically distinct kinds of activity which are 
responsible for different kinds of modal truths. 
The above considerations suggest that to take a transcendental path means to accept following 
challenges which seldom people dare take: (i) one must have the insight into what conditions the 
Copernican model must satisfy in order for it to be intelligible at all; (ii) one must have the courage 
to accept all the consequences that flows from Copernican model, no matter how counter-intuitive 
they are when taken in themselves; (iii) one must have the skill to cope with the repercussions 
caused by the consequences of Copernican model upon other parts of the system. 
On the above analysis, Kant’s transcendental philosophy is, on the one hand, counter-intuitive, 
and it is on the other hand, of high theoretical cost. Then, the natural question is why we have to accept 
it. In my view, the answer is quite simple: transcendental philosophy brings us huge theoretical benefits. 
It can help us to explain the synthetic a priori propositions, the laws of nature, personal identity, 
and the antinomy between freedom and determinism. 
This does not suggest that Kant’s characteristic transcendental path is favored because it 
involves theory choice, and it is an inference to the best explanation. Theoretical benefits of the 
transcendental system such as explanatory power do count as a theoretical virtue, but theoretical virtue 
is not the reason why Kant embraces it. For Kant, the move to the transcendental path is not a matter 
of taste, but a matter of truth. Kant’s transcendental philosophy is true not because some 
phenomena can be explained by it, but because those phenomena must be explained and they can 
only be explained by it against the background of a set of assumptions.  
Again, we are brought back to Kant’s commitment to scientific actualism. For Kant sciences 
are actual and therefore correct, and sciences are synthetic a priori. These two basic facts are non-
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negotiated. As I have noted, the explanation of synthetic a priori proposition is the most important 
criterion to measure the success of a theory. 
That is why Kant’s quickest argument often collapses into such a simple linear version: because 
scientific actualism is true, therefore metaphysical realism is false. This is the most fundamental 
conflict underlying the surface argument in the Critique. In fact, the official argument is a little bit 
complicated. In the Critique empiricism is taken into account as the standard epistemological match 
of realist metaphysics. The argument goes like this: If metaphysical realism is true, there would be 
no synthetic a priori propositions. Why? It is so precisely because metaphysical realism is only 
compatible with an empiricist epistemology characteristic of a reception model of knowledge. We 
know that not even this critique story is the whole story. Things are much more complicated. That is how 
we find in his Reflections and why we reconstruct the spectrum of philosophical systems, and 
examine why all of them doomed to fail. 
 
5.4 The Idealism Implication 
5.4.1 The Argument from Objective Reality 
Idealism lies at the heart of the Copernican Revolution. Kant repeatedly stresses the key to 
escaping from the predicament is to see appearances as representations. Furthermore, it helps 
foster the other two consequences: the reconceptualization of schemata and the introduction of 
transcendental synthesis. 
While Kant formulates a variety of arguments for idealism, it is usually thought that idealism 
depends on the results of Transcendental Aesthetic. Indeed, Kant’s official direct arguments do 
find themselves in Transcendental Aesthetic. However, in Transcendental Deduction there is one 
independent argument for idealism directly bearing upon the relation of a priori concepts to objects. 
This most explicit connection between the Copernican model of mind and world with idealism 
appears in the very last section of A-Deduction, which is titled with “Summary representation of 
the correctness and unique possibility of this deduction”.  The argument shows how to proceed from 
the Copernican model to its implication, and how idealism is a consequence of the Copernican model 
of mind and world: 
 
If the objects with which our cognition has to do were things in themselves, then we would not be 
able to have any a priori concepts of them at all. For whence should we obtain them? If we take them 
from the object (without even investigating here how the latter could become known to us), then our 
concepts would be merely empirical and not a priori concepts. If we take them from ourselves, then 
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that which is merely in us cannot determine the constitution of an object distinct from our 
representations, i.e., be a ground why there should be a thing that corresponds to something we have 
in our thoughts, and why all this representation should not instead be empty. But if, on the contrary, 
we have to do everywhere only with appearances, then it is not only possible but also necessary that 
certain a priori concepts precede the empirical cognition of objects. For as appearances they constitute 
an object that is merely in us, since a mere modification of our sensibility is not to be encountered 
outside us at all. (A128-A129) 
 
This characteristic Kantian argument can be reconstructed as follows: 
 
(1) The objects of cognition are either things in themselves or representations. 
(2) If the objects of cognition are things in themselves, then either object makes the concept 
possible, or the concept makes object possible. 
(3) If it is the case that the objects make the concepts possible, then concepts are empirical, which 
contradicts with the apriority of the concepts in question. 
(4) If it is the case that concepts make objects possible, then the concepts are empty, which 
contradicts with the reality of the concepts in question. 
(5) The objects of cognition are not things in themselves. 
(6) The objects of cognition are representations. (from (1) and (5)) 
 
For (1) and (2): Premise (1) is a conceptual truth. Everything can be either mind-independent 
or mind-dependent. If something is former, it is the thing in itself; if it is latter, it is representation. 
Premise (2) formulates a grounding dilemma with which we have engaged ourselves. 
For (3) and (4): The reducio assumptions in (3) and (4) are that there are concepts that are both 
a priori and objectively real. By assuming that a priori concepts are related to objects, this argument 
begs the very question of transcendental deduction. It does not argue for the truth of the Copernican 
model, but assumes it without justification. What the argument intends to show is what follows if we 
assume that the Copernican model that a priori concepts determine objects. Or more precisely, it 
intends to show what demand the Copernican model makes upon the metaphysical nature of the 
objects in question. It poses the urging question on what kinds of metaphysics of objects we should 
accept. Since we are concerned with idealism as a consequence of Copernican model of 
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representation and object, this argument is precisely the one we need to call for right now, and it 
is very suitable to place it here. 
As is made clear by (2), (3), and (4), as long as we cling to a realistic metaphysics, pure concepts 
cannot be possibly related to objects. If the two horns of the dilemma must be rejected, it does not 
imply the falsity of the reductio assumption and thereby cancel the question that poses this dilemma. 
It instead reveals that the problem lies in some implicit assumption that underlies the way in which 
the dilemma is formulated. This implicit assumption is nothing but the metaphysical reality of 
physical objects that serve as the objects of cognition. With the help of the reductio assumption, the 
rejection of the two horns of the dilemma constitutes a fatal attack on the presupposed realistic 
metaphysics of physical objects. 
What is particularly noteworthy is the claim in (4) that if the objects of cognition are things in 
themselves, then the a priori concepts would be empty. The rejection of the second horn of the 
dilemma in a realistic framework shows that even if we have a priori concepts, provided a successful 
derivation of a priori concepts is available, the pure concepts could not be applied to objects at all 
and remain to be merely “subjective conditions of thinking” (A89/B122). If objects were utterly 
independent of the subject, then the gap between mind and world is too huge to be closed. The world 
has nothing a priori to do with mind, and mind can do nothing a priori to the world. It is wildly impossible 
to suppose that the human mind can make a broadly causal difference on a mind-independent 
world.165 Only divine mind can make actual the object by merely intuitively representing it. In any 
case, the human mind cannot elevate their spontaneity up to the divine level. Therefore, the moral 
is that the world must exist in such a way that it can be compromised by the mind. 
When the realistic metaphysical assumption is replaced by the idealistic one, the dilemma 
posed by Kant’s puzzle does not disappear but reemerges anew. In the new dilemma in an anti-
realistic framework, there likewise exist two parallel alternatives: either the object makes the 
concept possible, or the concept makes the object possible. In the first case, it suffers from the 
very same objection to the first horn of the realistic dilemma, for what is in play is still the 
borrowing model of knowledge. 
It is intriguing that the empiricist epistemology is independent of the kind of the metaphysics 
of objects that is adopted. Even if the objects of cognition are merely representations, the 
borrowing model of knowledge still merely copies the content of these representations and 
                                                     
165 Behind the limitation of making causal difference is the idea of ontological hierarchy. The conception of 
ontological hierarchy is also evident in Kant’s argument from laws of nature that will be discussed later, and the 
similar point is also made in Chapter 8. 
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therefore it cannot say anything more than what these representations teach it. However, the 
realism and idealism of physical objects differ only in metaphysical status, rather than in content. 
The empiricist epistemology is liberated from its underlying metaphysics. 
This striking feature has profound implications. For one thing, empiricist epistemology, if 
properly qualified, is a deeply plausible epistemology. The independence of the empiricist 
epistemology from metaphysics implies that it is compatible with any kind of metaphysics. A properly 
qualified empiricist epistemology extends its theoretical viability and utility as far as it could be 
matched with metaphysics. 
For another, empiricist epistemology is theoretically neutralized. Although a realistic 
metaphysics could be matched only with empiricist epistemology with regard to empirical 
knowledge, it does not imply that the reverse also holds. Indeed, an empiricist epistemology 
intended to match realistic metaphysics provides a convincing account of a scope of knowledge. 
But it does not add any theoretical virtue when compared with its rival theories. As we have seen, 
both Plato’s rationalist epistemology and Kant’s own epistemology can incorporate and 
appropriate a qualified empiricist epistemology without any compromise to the coherence of their 
own position. 
The aftermath of the Copernican move is not exhausted by this argument for idealism. The 
idealist claim that objects of cognitions are indeed appearances does not by itself suffice for the 
solution to the problem with respect to how representations can a priori determine objects. What it 
claims is merely to make the room which cannot be left by metaphysical realism for the Copernican move. 
The other two necessary conditions will be expounded in the following two sections. 
 
5.4.2 The Argument from Laws of Nature 
(a) The Analysis of Argument 
In the above argument, the Copernican model of mind and world is presupposed. Therefore, 
it can be seen as establishing a conditional claim that if a priori concepts determine objects, then 
objects are representations. It fails to establish the truth of idealism independently from the reality 
of a priori concepts. 
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Nevertheless, in Transcendental Deduction Kant proposes an independent argument from 
laws of nature for idealism that does not presuppose the conclusion from his idealistic view of 
space and time.166 At the very end of the Second Section of Deduction in 1781 Critique Kant writes: 
 
That nature should direct itself according to our subjective ground of apperception, indeed in regard 
to its lawfulness even depend on this, may well sound quite contradictory and strange. But if one 
considers that this nature is nothing in itself but a sum of appearances, hence not a thing in itself but 
merely a multitude of representations of the mind, then one will not be astonished to see that unity on 
account of which alone it can be called object of all possible experience, i.e., nature, solely in the radical 
faculty of all our cognition, namely, transcendental apperception; and for that very reason we can 
cognize this unity a priori, hence also as necessary, which we would certainly have to abandon if it were 
given in itself independently of the primary sources of our thinking. For then I would not know 
whence we should obtain the synthetic propositions of such a universal unity of nature, since in this 
case one would have to borrow them from the objects of nature itself. But since this could happen 
only empirically, from that nothing but merely contingent unity could be drawn, which would fall far 
short of the necessary connection that one has in mind when one speaks of nature. (A114) 
 
The argument could be reconstructed as follows: 
 
(1) Nature consists either of things in themselves or of representations. 
(2) If nature consists of things in themselves, then we would have no a priori knowledge of the laws 
of nature. 
(3) We have synthetic a priori knowledge of the laws of nature. 
(4) Nature does not consist of things in themselves. 
(5) Nature consists of representations. 
 
Assuming some modal truth, the argument starts from an exclusive disjunction on the 
metaphysical status of nature and then proceeds to idealism in virtue of the incompatibility of the 
modal truth with metaphysical realism. 
Despite its independence, the basic structure of the argument from laws of nature is not 
something new. In fact, this argument is nothing but a dynamic parallel to the argument from 
geometry. Like geometrical truths, laws of nature are also expressed in synthetic a priori proposition. 
                                                     
166 Guyer acutely notes it. See Guyer 1987, 379-382. 
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Like other epistemic arguments for idealism, Kant’s argument rests on the crucial epistemic 
assumption of our knowledge of laws of nature. It might raise the doubt whether Kant is virtually 
making such an outright assumption or not. This doubt can be dispelled by Kant’s note in his own 
copy of Critique: “the laws of nature really have their origin in the understanding, and are just as 
little to be encountered outside it as space and time are, is already proved by the in any case already 
acknowledged assertion that we cognize them a priori and as necessary[.]”167 Here Kant does not only 
underline the parallel between space/time and laws of nature, but he makes explicit the a priori 
claims are well-established. 
 
(b) Human Legislation and Ontological Degeneration 
The argument from laws of nature differs from the argument from geometry in its emphasis 
on the idea of legislation and its presupposition of the agency. Kant discusses the idea of legislation 
in many places: 
 
Now we can characterize it as the faculty of rules. This designation is more fruitful, and comes closer 
to its essence. Sensibility gives us forms (of intuition), but the understanding gives us rules. (A126) 
 
…Rules, so far as they are objective (and thus necessarily pertain to the cognition of objects) are called 
laws. (A126) 
 
… The understanding is [thus not merely a faculty for making rules through the comparison of the 
appearances; it is itself] the legislation for nature, i.e., without understanding there would not be any nature 
at all[.](A126) 
 
The idea “understanding as legislation for nature” marks one significant difference from both 
the old space arguments and the epistemic argument from geometry. Kant’s idealism is distinctive. 
Firstly, metaphysical idealism rests on space idealism. Physical objects are representations in virtue of 
space as the form of sensibility. Second, the premise of Kant’s argument starts from our possession 
of a body of knowledge, rather than from the nature of sensibility. In Transcendental Aesthetic, 
Kant’s identification of space as the form of sensibility obscures the very distinctive character of 
Kant’s idealism. It is in the argument from legislation that the distinctiveness of Kant’s idealism 
achieves its peak. On the one hand, the argument from laws of nature does not start with the nature 
                                                     
167 In Kant’s works the notion of laws of nature is closely connected with that of experience. 
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of sense-perception, as the four old space-arguments do. On the other hand, it does not result in any 
theory of sensibility, as the argument from geometry does. 
The step to idealism is decisive. Kant concedes to the elusiveness of the idea of legislation by 
human understanding168, and he claims that it is “[in]comprehensible” (A113), “contradictory and 
strange” (A114), “exaggerated and contradictory” (A127). However, why does Kant soon claim 
“[o]n my principles it is easily comprehensible” (A113) and “one will not be astonished” (A114)? 
Why can the extraordinary idea of human legislation of nature be saved by idealism? 
In my view, the key to the solution to this puzzle is the idea of an ontological degeneration that 
both of the above arguments presuppose. Traditionally, the ontological hierarchy has different 
levels: on the top, it is the infinite divine entity; in the middle, it is finite concrete entities; and on the 
bottom it is mental entities. The view is that the ontological status of physical objects degenerates to 
the mental entities, namely, from the middle to the bottom of the ontological hierarchy. 
Leibniz notes that there is an analogy between God and human beings. In his Discourse on 
Metaphysics in 1686 Leibniz writes that “created substances depend upon God, who preserves them 
and who even produces them continually by a kind of emanation, just as we produce our thoughts”169. 
In his later Principles of Nature and of Grace in 1714 Leibniz elaborates this idea in more detail: 
 
It is not only a mirror of the universe of created things, but also an image of the divinity. The mind 
not only has a perception of God’s works, but it is even capable of producing something that resembles them, 
although on a small scale. For to say nothing of the wonders of dreams, in which we effortlessly (but 
also involuntarily) invent things which we would have to ponder long to come upon when awake, our 
soul is also like an architect in its voluntary actions; and in discovering the sciences according to which 
God has regulated things (by weight, measure, number, etc.), it imitates in its realm and in the small world 
in which it is allowed to work, what God does in the large world. (1989, 46) 
 
As Leibniz observes, there exists a striking analogy between God and human beings despite 
their essential difference: God is the producer of the physical objects in the universe; likewise, we 
human beings are the producers of thoughts in our mind. In the dream we can invent things 
effortlessly, and the effortless invention puts us in a position akin to God, where God creates 
physical things effortlessly. Therefore, the way we have the dominance over our mental world is 
analogous to the way God has dominance over the physical world.170 
                                                     
168 The talk of the laws of nature and the talk of a priori determination are essentially expressing the same thing. 
169 See Leibniz 1989, 211-212. 
170 The above ontological hierarchy is about God, physical entities and mental entities. In another direction, the 
ontological hierarchy could be developed making use of the ambiguity of the term “idea”, which has nothing to do 
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Leibniz calls into attention the analogy between God and human beings in order to 
demonstrate the thesis that the human mind is qualitatively similar to, yet quantitatively inferior to, 
God. This is the famous doctrine that man is made in God’s image. The world is created by God. 
It is our resemblance to God that explains the intelligibility of the world to us.171 
Different from Leibniz, Kant’s focus is not on the creator role of God, but on the legislator role 
of God. This move is understandable, since even sensible representations are not created by our 
human beings. For those who admit the existence of laws of nature is not sui generis. Rather, the 
notion of legislation implies the existence of a legislator. Traditionally, it is God who lays the laws 
for nature. The theological dependence of laws of nature on a law-maker is compatible with their mind-
independence. According to this view, laws of nature are things in themselves. In an important way, 
human beings have their dominance over the mental not in the sense of producing representations, 
but in the sense of ordering representations. 
Taken in itself, the epistemic or mental atheism that God does not have dominance over any 
mental state is not harmful to many philosophers. Even Leibniz is adherent to some weak version 
of it. However, when combined with the Kantian idealism of nature, epistemic atheism entails 
natural atheism that God plays no role in nature. Kant’s philosophical radicalism precisely lies in the idea 
of legislation of nature by understanding: for Kant, we do not resemble God; rather, we replace God.  
In my view, the legislation of nature by understanding has a twofold significance. According 
to the traditional interpretation, the attribution of the legislative role to human understanding 
marks the culmination of the Copernican Revolution. As far as the relation of representation to 
object is concerned, Kant’s Copernican Revolution suggests that we should think the other way 
around. I contend that we could consider the issue from a different point of view. As far as the 
relation of the human to the divine is concerned, the legislation of human understanding marks 
the ascending of the human and the retreating of the divine. 
 
(c) The Structure of Argument: Kantian Disjunctive Syllogism 
                                                     
with the order and law. The notion idea is ambiguous in early modern philosophy. Leibniz has already noted the 
problematic ambiguity of the notion of idea. One the one hand, it refers to the mental entities, and, one the other 
hand, it refers to the abstract entities. The two conceptions of ideas are developed respectively by Locke and 
Malebranche, the two most preeminent successors to Descartes’ theory of ideas are. The abstract Platonic Ideas are 
God’s Idea, while the Lockean ideas are human ideas. The ambiguity of ‘idea’ also constitutes an analogy between 
God and human beings. 
171 For the doctrine that man is made in God’s image in modern philosophy see Craig 1996. 
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In the following, I will say something about the general structure of Kant’s argument for 
mind-dependence. What characteristic of Kant’s arguments for idealism is the argumentative 
strategy one might call “Kantian disjunctive syllogism”. 
Influenced by Leibniz, German metaphysical tradition attaches great importance to 
conceptual analysis and deductive proof. The syllogism is universally regarded as the paradigmatic 
of deductive reasoning of logical validity. In fact, the syllogism is one of the most frequent 
techniques employed by German rationalist philosophers in building baroque metaphysical system. 
Since many systems of metaphysics start with a conceptual distinction, and the conceptual 
distinction is apt to function as the major premise of a disjunctive syllogism, it is no wonder why 
disjunctive syllogism is pervasive in rationalist metaphysics. The disjunctive syllogism of the form 
is as follows: 
 
(1) Major premise: Either P or Q. 
(2) Minor Premise: Not P 
(3) Conclusion: Q 
 
What is distinctive of Kantian Disjunctive Syllogism is the Minor premise. The truth of the 
Minor premise is often deduced by modus tollens.  
 
(1) If R, then S. 
(2) Not S. 
(3) Not R. 
 
The sub-argument by modus tollens consists of a conditional claim and a negation claim. The 
conditional claim is often a plausible theoretical truth. The negative claim is normally a modal truth. 
Again here we encounter a negative claim “Not S”. The most characteristic feature of a Kantian 
disjunctive claim is that “Not S” is a modal truth. This modal truth is often assumed without 
justification.  When Kant is charged with begging the question of his opponents, it is this modal truth 
that is called into question. 
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The Kantian disjunctive syllogism instantiates the following scheme: 
 
(1) Either P or Q. 
(2) If P, then R. 
(3) Not R. 
(4) Not P 
(5) Q 
 
The paradigmatic Kantian disjunctive syllogism is the famous argument from science to 
idealism. The argument from laws of nature under discussion is also paradigmatic, though it is less 
known. The argument from the Copernican model to idealism is one complicated version of 
Kantian disjunctive syllogism. 
 
(1) Either P or Q. 
(2) If P, then either R or S. 
(3) Not R. 
(4) Not S. 
(5) Not P. (from (2), (3), and (4) by modus tollens) 
(6) Q 
 
The distinctive feature of this argument is that the rejection of the disjunct P is made in virtue 
of a new dilemma, not in virtue of an incompatibility. 
 
5.4.3 The Object Lost 
Every theory has its costs as well as its benefits. Transcendental idealism is no exception. In 
spite of its theoretical utility, transcendental idealism brings forth a number of theoretical 
repercussions. To accept transcendental idealism implies to mitigate the repercussion. Indeed, 
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transcendental idealism comes at a much higher price, one that renders Kant’s general program 
obsolete. This threat is to deprive our immediate representations of their objects.  
In the context of transcendental deduction, a seemingly paradoxical implication emerges: the 
objects of categories are gained yet the objects of representations are lost. In order to show that categories 
are related to objects, we must resort to idealism and thereby reduce physical objects into 
representations. According to Kant’s other views, however, these representations do not have 
objects.  
It is important for us to distinguish two questions on distinct levels by distinguishing two 
different kinds of objects in the context of relating categories to object and assigning objects to representations. 
When we say that the categories are related to objects, we are saying that they are related to 
appearances. When we say that objects are supposed to be assigned to representations, we are 
referring to objects other than appearances. 
Despite its importance, the threat of losing object is not adequately thematized by Kant, and 
even downplayed when mentioned.  Around the corner of the end of “threefold synthesis”, Kant 
writes: 
 
All representations, as representations, have their object, and can themselves be objects of other 
representations in turn. Appearances are the only objects that can be given to us immediately, and that 
in them which is immediately related to the object is called intuition. However, these appearances are 
not things in themselves, but themselves only representations, which in turn have their object, which 
therefore cannot be further intuited by us, and that may therefore be called the non-empirical, i.e., 
transcendental object = X. (A108-A109) 
 
In this dense passage, an inconsistency is revealed, though Kant does not develop it in detail 
and resolve it too quickly. The transcendental idealism claims that all appearances are 
representations. If transcendental idealism is correct, it follows that all appearances are 
representations. Furthermore, it is trivially true that representations are representations of objects. 
This universality of the claim of representation to object is built into the definition of 
representation; a representation without an object is not representation. Therefore, appearances as 
a set of representations have objects. Based on these observations, an argument can be 
reconstructed as follows: 
 
(Premise 1) All Appearances are representations. (By Transcendental Idealism) 
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(Premise 2) All representations have objects. (By Definition of Representation) 
(Conclusion 3) Appearances as representations have objects. (By Syllogism from 1 and 2.) 
 
However, this characterization of appearances as representations in the light of transcendental 
idealism stands in conflict with another more trivial characterization of appearances by its 
definition. This latter characterization is connected with a more subtle line of reasoning focusing 
on the immediacy of intuition.  
In Kant’s view, representations must represent objects Os, and if the objects of 
representations are also representations, then as representations these objects of representations 
must also have further objects O*s. To terminate this regress, the ultimate objects of 
representations must be non-representational objects. Without this non-representational object, the notion 
of representation without object would be incoherent. A first-order representation is one that immediately 
represents the non-representational object and does not include or presuppose further lower-order 
representation. No matter how high the order of a representation is, it must presuppose a first-
order representation of an object, to which other higher-order representations can anchor. 
According to Kant, intuitions are immediate representations of objects. The objects of intuitions or 
the only objects of intuitions are appearances, despite that these objects are undetermined for 
intuitions. It follows that appearances are immediately related to intuitions. 
Along this line of thought, what Kant needs is not the immediate representation of objects, i.e. 
intuitions, but the representations of immediate objects, i.e. first-order representation. Although the latter 
notion of the representations of immediate objects is quite clear, it is left undecided what this 
notion refers to. In this situation, Kant makes move to identify the former with the latter, thus 
identifying first-order representations with intuitions. 
Therefore, the immediacy requirement for intuition does not merely mean non-discursivity, i.e., 
not in virtue of marks; rather, it also means first-orderedness, i.e., not presupposing lower-order 
representation. Objects of intuition are not merely those objects that can be given to subjects not 
in virtue of marks, but those that cannot represent another set of representations and cannot find 
any objects for themselves. With this second construal of immediacy at hand, a second argument 
can be reconstructed from the quoted passage as follows: 
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(Premise 4) Objects of intuitions do not in turn have objects. (by the Second Definition of 
Immediacy) 
(Premise 5) Appearances are objects of intuitions. (by Definition of Appearance) 
(Conclusion 6) Appearances as objects of intuition do not have objects. (by Syllogism from 4 and 
5.) 
 
It is obvious that Conclusion 3 that appearances have objects and Conclusion 6 that 
appearances do not have objects are inconsistent. It is equally obvious that both arguments are 
logically valid. Then, which argument is unsound? Confronted with this difficulty, it seems that at 
least one of the premises of both arguments must be false. However, Premise 2, 4, and 5 are true by 
definition. The only nontrivial premise left open to objection is Premise 1, that is, transcendental 
idealism. It is tempting to suggest that the second line of argument undermines the first line of 
argument, and therefore it poses a serious challenge to idealism. 
By contrast, as its rival theory, transcendental realism is immune from the challenge. If 
transcendental realism is true, then appearances are things in themselves. In this case things in 
themselves cannot possibly be representations. Instead, they are fundamentally real and 
independent, and thereby they are the perfect example of non-representational objects, namely, 
objects of first-order representations. It seems that transcendental realists do not to be worried by 
the danger of losing objects. 
However, transcendental idealism is the last philosophical theory that Kant would forgo. For 
the initial success of vindicating the body of knowledge in mathematics seems to show an attractive 
picture of his general program of Copernican Revolution. Furthermore, transcendental idealism 
seems not merely the sufficient condition but also the necessary one for grounding synthetic 
proposition a priori in pure mathematics. If Kant is unable to offer a satisfactory solution to this 
problem, the plausibility and the promise of transcendental idealism are desperately undermined, 
since a theory that opens the door of explaining the first half of the phenomena yet closes it before 
engaging the second half is by no means a successful one. But to reject transcendental idealism is 
no more than to give up the only hope to accomplish Kant’s grand program of vindicating science 
at the very beginning. In my view, this inconsistency is the most dangerous enemy to the tenability 
of transcendental idealism, because it contradicts a number of conceptual truths by definition. Now, 
the burden of proof is on Kant’s side, and he must find some way to resolve this inconsistency. 
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In order to dissolve this problem, Kant makes a move by reinterpreting and restricting the domain 
of objects of intuitions. From the second argument, it is inferred that it is true that objects of 
intuition, whatever it might be, are not required to have further represented objects, but the 
represented objects referred to here can be interpreted as merely empirical objects, rather than objects 
in its broadest sense. What the Premise 4 exactly says is that the appearances as objects of intuition do 
not have empirical objects. 
A second move followed would be that, in addition to empirical objects, there is another set 
of non-empirical objects that play the role of not being the objects of intuition, yet being the objects 
of representation. That is exactly what Kant does: he introduces the transcendental objects in addition 
to empirical objects. In effect, Kant says that objects of intuitions as representations cannot have 
empirical objects, yet they have transcendental objects to meet the claim of any representation to 
the object. Therefore, the postulation of transcendental objects is a consequence of Kant’s idealism, 
and it could also be viewed as a price paid for the transcendental path.172  
 
5.5 The Schematism Implication  
5.5.1 What Schemata Are 
What are these necessarily instantiated determinations or properties that are attached to 
objects? Kant’s suggestion is that these determinations are transcendental time-determinations, which 
are nothing but schemata. Consider the following passage: 
 
The schema is [in itself always only a product of the imagination; but since the synthesis of the latter 
has as its aim no individual intuition but rather] only the unity in the determination of sensibility[.] 
(A140/B179) 
 
From the above passage it is clear that the schematism of the understanding through the transcendental 
synthesis of imagination comes down to nothing other than the unity of all the manifold of intuition 
in inner sense, and thus indirectly to the unity of apperception, as the function that corresponds to 
inner sense (to a receptivity). (A145/B185) 
 
Now in the original apperception all of this manifold, so far as its temporal relations are concerned, is 
to be unified… This synthetic unity in the temporal relation of all perceptions, which is determined 
a priori, is thus the law that all empirical time-determinations must stand under rules of general time-
determination[.] (A177/B220) 
                                                     
172 In some sense, the burden of proof is not relieved, but transferred to the notion of transcendental object. Kant is 
obliged to give a convincing account of the nature and function of transcendental object. 
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Then, what is transcendental time-determination? As Kant later explains: 
 
Now in the original apperception all of this manifold, so far as its temporal relations are concerned, is 
to be unified… This synthetic unity in the temporal relation of all perceptions, which is determined 
a priori, is thus the law that all empirical time-determinations must stand under rules of general time-
determination[.] (A177/B220) 
 
Accordingly, transcendental time-determination is “the unity in the determination of 
sensibility” or “the unity of all the manifold of intuition in inner sense”. First, the unity is not 
analytic and thus logical, but synthetic and temporal. For example, the schema of causality is “the 
succession of the manifold insofar as it is subject to a rule” (A144/B183). Second, it is 
transcendental since it is determined a priori. Along with time, the unity in the time-determinations 
constitutes the general condition of sensibility. Therefore, these time-determinations are necessarily 
instantiated. In other words, Objects necessarily instantiate the synthetic unity of temporal relations. 
The schematization of categories appears to suggest that categories are reduced to schemata, 
and therefore they are identical with schemata. However, it is not the case. Here emerges a 
difference between the idealism implication and the schematism implication. As for schematism, 
schemata are numerically distinct from categories. Schemata are neither identical with nor a species of 
categories. Schemata are transcendental time determinations, while categories are general concepts 
of understanding. As Kant says explicitly, “it is clear that there must be a third thing, which must 
stand in homogeneity with the category on the one hand and the appearance on the other, and 
makes possible the application of the former to the latter” (A138/B177). If the schema is 
introduced as “the third thing”, it trivially implies that it is numerically distinct from the category, 
which plays the role of “the first thing”. Moreover, Kant offers no account that schemata can be 
reducible to categories.173 
As for idealism, by contrast, physical objects or appearances are reducible to representations, 
but the former is still identical with the latter. We just have an interpretation of the metaphysical 
status of physical objects. By analogy, given our knowledge of physics, we could say that when we 
                                                     
173 Longuenesse seems to identify the rule conception of the concept with the schema. For instance, Longuenesse 
writes: “The concept is a rule insofar as it is the consciousness of the unity of an act of sensible synthesis or the 
consciousness of the procedure for generating a sensible intuition. This first sense of rule anticipates what Kant, in 
the Schematism of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding, calls a schema” (1998, 50). On many occasions, Kant 
seems to identify the schema as a role played by the category without carefully distinguishing the schema from the 
category. Strictly speaking, they are not numerically identical. 
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touch table, we touch the motion of electrons. But the introduction of the motion of electrons 
does not make the table a different thing. 
As I understand, one of the deepest problem in the schematism implication in particular and 
in the Transcendental Deduction in general is found in the following two claims: on the one hand, 
the official task of transcendental deduction is to prove that categories are related to appearances. 
On the other hand, however, the Copernican Revolution requires that “the appearances must not 
be subsumed under the categories per se, but only under their schemata” (A181/B223). 
Now the crucial question is what the relation of the schema to categories is, and why the 
schema is the eligible agent for categories to represent objects, or to put more explicitly, why 
schemata can represent appearances in such a way that even if appearances are immediately 
subsumed under schemata, we are still justified to say they are also obliquely subsumed under 
categories per se. In order to answer this question, we must examine the motivation of Kant’s 
schematization of categories. 
 
5.5.2 The Motivation of Introducing Schemata 
Categories are schematized in order to accommodate the idealization of empirical objects. 
Two interpretations of the motivation of the schematization of categories could be brought under 
consideration. On the first semantic interpretation, schemata are introduced because in addition to 
things in themselves idealism creates a new set of objects, of which categories cannot be truly 
predicated. On the second metaphysical interpretation, schemata are introduced because the nature 
of the objects is changed so that the nature of their properties are changed.  
In introducing schemata, Kant’s official line of reasoning seems to be as follows: (i) categories 
are only of empirical use, and therefore (ii) categories must be schematized. I will turn to them one by 
one. The use of categories is a question about which domain of objects categories is related. In his 1781 
Critique Kant develops his argument for the empirical use of categories for the first time in 
Schematism-Chapter, where Kant writes: 
 
concepts are entirely impossible, and cannot have any significance, where an object is not given either 
for them themselves or at least for the elements of which they consist, consequently they cannot 
pertain to things in themselves (without regard to how and whether they may be given to us) at all; 
that, further, the modification of our sensibility is the only way in which objects are given to us; and, 
finally, that pure concepts a priori, in addition to the function of the understanding in the category, 
must also contain a priori formal conditions of sensibility (namely of the inner sense) that contain the 
general condition under which alone the category can be applied to any object. We will call this formal 
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and pure condition of the sensibility, to which the use of the concept of the understanding is restricted, 
the schema of this concept of the understanding[.] (A139/B178) 
 
Thus the schemata of the concepts of pure understanding are the true and sole conditions for 
providing them with a relation to objects thus with significance, and hence the categories are in the 
end of none but a possible empirical use, since they merely serve to subject appearances to general 
rules of synthesis through grounds of an a priori necessary unity[.] (A145-146/B185) 
 
Kant’s argument runs like this: 
 
(1) Concepts have significance (relation to objects) only if their objects can be given to us. 
(2) Sensibility is the only way in which objects are given to us. 
(3) Concepts can have significance only if their objects are given in sensibility. 
(4) A priori concepts of understanding can have significance only if their objects are given in 
sensibility. 
(5) Therefore, categories are only of empirical use, not of transcendental use.  
 
This argument neither presupposes nor entails idealism. Initially, this argument rests on the 
crucial premise (1), the Givenness Thesis of cognition, which Strawson calls “the principle of 
significance”174. The Givenness Thesis should be distinguished from idealism. The Givenness 
Thesis by itself does not imply idealism. It merely asserts that the object’s being given in intuition 
is a necessary condition for the cognition of the object. 
Even in conjunction with (2), it still does not commit Kant to idealism. Since an object is 
given to our sensibility by means of affection, the conjunction constitutes what Langton calls the 
Receptivity Thesis.175 Receptivity Thesis is a very plausible view which is meant to acknowledge the 
causal nature of empirical knowledge. As the conclusion (4) shows, even the objects for categories 
must be given in sensibility. 
Kant’s formulation often seems to suggest that it is the empirical use of categories that 
motivates the schematization of categories. As the following quotation from Analogies makes 
explicit, “these analogies have their sole significance and validity not as principles of the 
                                                     
174 See Strawson 1966, 3-5. 
175 See Langton, 1998, 23. 
148 
 
transcendental use of the understanding but merely as principles of its empirical use, hence they 
can be proven only as such; consequently the appearances must not be subsumed under the categories 
per se, but only under their schemata.” (A180-181/B223) Taken literally, Kant claims that the 
schematization of categories is a consequence of his view that categories are of empirical use. In a 
similar passage Kant writes: 
 
the categories in their pure significance, without any conditions of sensibility, should hold for things 
in general, as they are, instead of their schemata merely representing them how they appear, and 
they would therefore have a significance independent of all schemata and extending far beyond them. 
(A147/B186) 
 
This passage seems to suggest that Kant simply asserts a kind-correspondence between 
representation and object without argument. On the one hand, categories by definitions are concepts 
of things in general, and they are supposed to be related to things in themselves or things in general, 
even though we still cannot make it intelligible how categories refer to things in themselves provided 
things in themselves are given to us. Only if categories have the transcendental use can we say that 
categories per se are related to objects. On the other hand, schemata are supposed to be related to 
appearances. If categories are related to appearances and conditioned by sensibility, then it is 
schemata that are related to appearances.  
On the semantic interpretation, categories are schematized because categories cannot be truly 
predicated of empirical objects. For instance, the concept of fish is not truly predicated of whales, 
because the whale is not a species of the fish. Likewise, categories per se could not generate true 
predication of the empirical objects, for categories per se are true of things in themselves, not of 
appearances. By contrast, schemata could be truly predicated of appearances. To predicate 
categories of appearances or representations is simply to commit a categorical mistake.  
The distinction between things in themselves and appearances is a consequence of Kant’s 
commitment to idealism. It seems that the distinction between categories per se and schemata is in 
turn a consequence of the distinction between things in themselves and appearances. The line of 
reasoning might be as follows:  
 
(1) If categories are truly predicated of something, then they are truly predicated of things in 
themselves. (Uniqueness Claim) 
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(2) According to idealism, things in themselves are not only distinct from appearances, they also 
do not overlap with them. (Idealism) 
(3) Categories are not truly predicated of appearances as the objects of intuition. 
(4) In fact, there are concepts that are true predications of appearances as the objects of intuition. 
(5) The concepts must be numerically distinct from categories. 
(6) These representations that are truly predicated of appearances are nothing but schemata. 
 
This argument outlines a story of how schemata are introduced to save the true predication of 
empirical objects before our sense. These true predications are nothing but the synthetic a priori 
propositions in pure physics, as Kant acknowledges in the Introduction to 1787 Critique. 
One might think that the premise (2) is crucial for the introduction of schemata. If (2) were 
changed from idealism to realism, then we would have the following argument: (1) If categories 
are truly predicated of something, then they are truly predicated of things in themselves. 
(Uniqueness Claim) (2*) If transcendental realism is true, then things in themselves are identical 
with appearances. (3*) As a result, for transcendental realism categories are applied to appearances 
as well as to things in themselves. 
On my view, however, this line of reasoning is misguided. As for (2), it is important to bear 
in mind that idealism does not make appearances a different set of things. Therefore, the 
correspondent introduction of schemata is dubious. As has been shown in the previous section 5.3, 
idealism is merely committed to a reductive metaphysics of appearances. This implies that in 
extensional context one sentence could be paraphrased into another sentence in virtue of reductive 
analysis without changing the truth value of the original sentence. Take the following example for 
illustration: if the sentence that I touch the table is true, then the sentence that I touch the motion 
of electrons is also true. Therefore, we could nonetheless perfectly say that categories per se are truly 
predicated of appearances, even if idealism holds. As a result, the introduction of schemata is 
independently from whether idealism is true or realism is true. Nevertheless, it remains 
undetermined whether it is categories or schemata that are truly predicated of appearances to 
generate the acknowledged synthetic a priori propositions. Therefore, it cannot explain the 
motivation of the introduction of schemata.176 
                                                     
176 One could pose a further question on the premise (1): why categories are designed for being applicable of things 
in themselves. To say that it is so by definition does not solve the problem. 
150 
 
 
5.5.3 A New Justification: Schemata as Determinations 
According to the metaphysical interpretation, schemata are introduced as the instantiation of 
categories, since categories per se cannot be the instances of categories in empirical objects. As we will 
see, on the second interpretation, the Copernican move and the accompanied ontological 
degeneration do motivate the schematization of categories, but in a quite different way.  
Initially, this new interpretation appears to be puzzling. One might object that true predication 
is equivalent to instantiation: when we say that F is truly predicated of x, we are saying that F is 
instantiated in x. However, in this formula the instantiated F is left out. Schemata are introduced to 
play the role of the necessary property of objects.  
The simple point Kant makes is that categories themselves and the instances of categories are 
numerically distinct. It brings another consequence of generality: the distinction is also 
independently from whether idealism or realism is true. Even appearances are identified with things 
in themselves, categories per se are still numerically distinct from their instantiation. 
However, this does not suggest again that idealism does not play any role in motivating the 
introduction of schemata. The way in which categories are instantiated does depend on whether 
idealism is true or false. Schematization is precisely the particular mode of the instantiation of 
categories when idealism is true. Consider the following account. As we have seen, to say that 
something a priori determines objects is to say that something adds new determinations or 
properties to the otherwise undetermined empirical objects and that these determinations or 
properties must be necessarily instantiated. As Kant makes clear, “in accordance with [the principles], 
everything (that can even come before us as an object) necessarily stands under rules” (A159/B198). 
Now the question is how it is possible for the determinations to be necessarily instantiated. 
The answer is nothing but Kant’s idea of ontological degeneration. Empirical objects do not suffice 
for necessary instantiation, for empirical objects can still be things in themselves, the robust reality 
of which leaves no room for a priori determination. It is at this point where idealism steps in. 
According to Kant’s idealism, physical objects are reduced to representations. What is more 
important is that for Kant physical objects are representations in virtue of being in space and time which 
are ideal forms of sensibility. In this light, spatial and temporal properties are necessarily 
instantiated by physical objects. Without space and time, physical objects are not only deprived of 
spatial and temporal properties; they are also deprived of all the necessary properties that they can have. 
Therefore, to say that empirical objects are subsumed under schemata is to say that empirical 
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objects are subsumed under space and time, rather than to say that empirical objects are subsumed under 
empirical concepts. The theoretical benefit of this interpretation is that it could explain away the worry 
that the introduction of schemata undermines the project of Transcendental Deduction by making 
categories irrelevant to the empirical objects. 
 
5.5.4 The Response to Incoherence Objection  
According to my interpretation, the schemata are the instantiation of the categories on the 
one hand, and the necessary properties of the empirical objects on the other hand. However, my 
interpretation seems to run counter to the dominant interpretation that the schemata serve as the 
rules of the synthesis of imagination.177 One theoretical benefit of my interpretation is that it could 
provide a solution to the inherent problem of the inconsistency of Kant’s doctrine of schemata. 
Kant has two different characterizations of the schema. On the one hand, Kant characterizes 
schemata as the product of the synthesis of transcendental imagination, and, on the other hand, he 
characterizes schemata as the condition of the application of categories to appearances by means of the 
synthesis of transcendental imagination. Consider the following passages for the product 
characterization: 
 
The schema is in itself always only a product of the imagination[.] (A140/B179) 
 
The schema of a pure concept of the understanding… is a transcendental product of the imagination, 
which concerns the determination of the inner sense ingeneral[.] (A142/B181) 
 
Equally, there are passages for the condition characterization: 
 
Hence an application of the category to appearances becomes possible by means of the transcendental time-
determination which, as the schema of the concept of the understanding, mediates the subsumption of 
the latter under the former. (A139/B178) 
 
Thus the schemata of the concepts of pure understanding are the true and sole conditions for providing 
them with a relation to objects, thus with significance[.] (A145-146/B185) 
                                                     
177 For instance, Longuenesse holds that the schemata is the rule of synthesis. However, on the other hand, she 
points out that the schema is the instance of the category, as if there is no tension between the two specifications. 
(19998) It is not clear why the rule of the synthesizing activity could be the rule of the synthesized objects. 
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The two characterizations are not immediately incompatible, but they would elicit serious 
logical difficulty. Even Kant himself recognizes the difficulty in introducing schemata. Kant writes 
in his note R6359 (between 1796 and 1798): 
 
The difficulty seems to arise because the transcendental time-determination itself is already a product of 
apperception in relation to the form of intuition and thus itself raises the question how the application 
of the categories to the form of intuition is possible, since the categories and the form of intuition are 
heterogeneous. In general, the schematism is one of the most difficult points. – Even Herr Beck cannot 
find his way about in it. – I hold this chapter to be one of the most important. (AA 18:686) 
 
As Kant explicitly concedes, the question of transcendental schemata is “one of the most 
difficult” as well as “one of the most important”. Fortunately, Kant also points out where the 
difficulty lies. Obviously, in “the question how the application of the categories to the form of 
intuition is possible” the schema ends up with two unacceptable consequences: either with an 
infinite regress or with vicious circularity. However, it is far from clear what specific formulation of the 
difficulty Kant keeps in mind. When it leads to infinite regress, the argument runs like this: 
 
(1) The schema as transcendental time-determination is a product of the application of categories. 
(By the product characterization) 
(2) Every application of categories requires a mediator between two heterogeneous elements. (By 
the condition characterization) 
(3) The schema itself as the mediator requires another mediator between two heterogeneous 
elements. 
 
When it leads to vicious circularity, the argument could be formulated as follows: 
 
(1) The application of category to appearances is conditioned by the schema. (By the condition 
characterization) 
(2) The schema functions as the condition of application only if it is brought out by transcendental 
imagination. (By the product characterization) 
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(3) The synthesis of transcendental imagination is conditioned by the category. (By Transcendental 
Deduction)178 
 
Moreover, this note ends by merely pointing out the difficulty without giving any hint to the 
solution of the problem. We are not informed what the solution Kant has in mind, nor even 
whether he has a solution at all. While I think that there is no easy way to overcome the difficulty 
in either formulation, in what follows I will attempt to provide a solution to the difficulty in the 
light of my previous proposal of Kant’s motivation of introducing schemata.  
According to condition characterization, schemata are the conditions of application of 
categories to appearances. The term “application” is desperately ambiguous.179 When it is read in 
the metaphysical sense, then the notion of application of categories to appearances means 
categories ground appearances and make experience possible. It is the Transcendental Deduction 
that precisely addresses this question. 
When it is read in the semantic sense, then the notion of application of categories to 
appearances means that categories as concepts refer to the empirical objects that are already 
determined by categories. It is not difficult to find that the semantic reading of application 
presupposes the metaphysical reading of application.  
When it is read in the pragmatic sense, then the notion of application of categories to 
appearances means how we ought to apply categories to appearances. The most salient feature is the 
normativity involved in it, which is absent in the previous two senses. In fact, this is what the 
official task of the faculty of the power of judgment, which is supposed to “show generally how 
one ought to subsume under these rules, i.e., distinguish whether something stands under them or 
not”. 180  Whether it is determining or distinguishing, it is a matter of a person, though the 
Schematism chapter goes astray in the direction of the metaphysical sense. One can understand the 
                                                     
178 For instance, Kant writes that “[c]onsequently all synthesis, through which even perception itself becomes 
possible, stands under the categories”. (B161) 
179 Longuenesse acutely notes the ambiguity of the notion of the application of categories to appearances, and she 
uses “synthesis” and “subsumption” to designate the two different senses. (1998, 244) however, I think that whether 
the notion of subsumption is used in the metaphysical sense or in the semantic sense is undetermined. This objection 
is directed not to Longuenesse’s verbal use of a label, but to her substantial claim that schemata play the mediating 
role in “the subsumption of sensible objects under the pure concept of the understanding is made possible” (1998, 
245). 
180 There are a variety of understanding of the task of the power of judgment. In addition to my reading, it could be 
understood as the epistemic identification of the particular under general, as indicated in the following passage: “If 
the understanding in general is explained as the faculty of rules, then the power of judgment is the faculty of 
subsuming under rules, i.e., of determining whether something stands under a given rule (casus datae legis) or not.” 
(A132/B171) 
154 
 
difference between the semantic sense and pragmatic sense of application by an analogy to the 
distinction between semantic meaning and speaker’s meaning of a term. 
My proposal is that if the notion of application is understood in the metaphysical sense, the 
infinite regress or vicious circularity is unavoidable. However, if it is understood in the semantic 
sense or even in the pragmatic sense, then there is no such problem. The product characterization 
of schemata claims that the schema as the instantiation of the categories is a consequence of the 
metaphysical ground of transcendental imagination. And the condition characterization of 
schemata claims that the predication of categories of appearances presupposes the instantiation of 
the schemata. Therefore, both characterizations are consistent. The story roughly goes like this: 
categories per se refer to objects in virtue of their schemata, and pragmatically when we find the 
schema in experience, we are then in a position to use categories in our judgments either implicitly 
or implicitly to subsume them under concepts. 
Another interpretative bonus is that this distinction helps us in understanding why Kant holds 
that appearances cannot immediately be subsumed under categories unless there is a mediator. 
When Kant speaks of subsumption, he is not speaking of the logical subordination of an individual 
under a concept, or of a lower concept under a higher one. Rather, Kant is speaking of the 
impossibility of the metaphysical grounding of the individuals in discursive concepts, or of the 
illegitimacy of the subordination of an individual under a concept without the metaphysical 
grounding. For an overview of the semantic and metaphysical level see the following table:  
 
                         Semantic                           Metaphysical 
Categories designate properties (schemata) Categories ground properties (schemata) 
--------------------------------------------------------- Properties (schemata) ground objects 
Categories refer to objects Categories ground objects 
 
5.6 The Psychologism Implication 
5.6.1 The Demand for Determining Ground 
As I have suggested, to say that concepts make objects possible in the sense of a priori 
determination is to say that concepts add a priori determinations to representations. In order for 
objects to necessarily instantiate properties, objects must be idealized, and concepts must be 
schematized. Intuitively, there must be something that functions as a difference-maker. If some object 
is determinate in some respect, this determination cannot be sui generis. Rather, determination 
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implies being determined, which in turn requires a determining ground of which the determination is a 
consequence. 
According to traditional rationalist metaphysics in Germany, all determinations require 
determining grounds, something that makes the determinations possible. In his early metaphysics 
in the pre-critical period, Kant is enthusiastic about the principle of determining ground. In spite 
of his rejection of rationalist metaphysics in the critical period, Kant takes over and retains the 
basic idea that the necessarily instantiated determinations must be grounded. Actually, the causal 
realism is one of the most fundamental assumptions to which Kant adheres in his entire career. 
To be sure, Kant does not explicitly use the term ‘determining ground’. But the use of 
“determine” and its derivative words “determined” (B151), “determining” (B152) and 
“determinable” (B152) are by no means rare, and even the nominalized phrase “[t]hat which 
determines” (B153) could also be found. For Kant, “that which determines” and “that which is 
determined” obviously correspond to ground and consequence. Kant’s use of ground is even more 
common. Faculties are standardly characterized as “subjective grounds”, which is interchangeable 
with “subjective condition” or “source”. When Kant speaks of “the affinity of all appearances (near 
or remote) is a necessary consequence” (A123), the idea of affinity as consequence implies a 
grounding or consequence relation between ground and consequence. 
Now the question is what the determining ground is. Kant’s answer is that the determining 
ground is the synthesis of transcendental imagination. This answer is not surprising for any reader 
of Kant. However, the strategy of introducing the transcendental function of imagination is striking. 
Kant’s strategy is first to specify the role of determining ground satisfying certain requirements, and 
then abduce the entity that can play the role. Although Kant never makes an official exposition of his 
strategy, he does in this way introduce the required determining ground in many versions of 
arguments in transcendental deduction, most notably, in the argument from above, the argument 
from below, and the argument from perception in B-Deduction. 
Although both Hume and Kant are committed to faculty psychology, Kant’s approach is 
fundamentally different from, and even opposed to, that taken by Hume. This is most evident in 
Kant’s theory of a priori imagination. For Hume, human faculties are uncontroversial and well-
established, if something can be explained neither by sense nor by imagination, then it comes to 
nothing. For Kant, by contrast, if something is a fact and it cannot be explained by our known 
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faculties, then we should instead introduce new cognitive faculties to explain it. A faculty is determined 
in terms of its results which are irreducible to the known faculty.181 
 
5.6.2 Transcendental Imagination 
Due to various reasons, Kant concludes that the required faculty as the determining ground 
of a priori determination is (a) imagination, (b) productive, (c) transcendental, (d) successive, and (e) 
blind. In the following, I will examine how Kant is motivated to determine the nature of the faculty 
one by one. 
(a) The Imagination 
According to Kant’s idealism, physical objects are reduced into representations. Obviously, 
these representations are not general, but particular. The reduction of physical objects into ideas 
enables human beings to exercise action upon the sensible particulars, which is consistent with the 
assumption of mental atheism. 
Human cognitive faculties are divided into sensibility, which is defined as a receptive faculty, 
and understanding, which is defined as a spontaneous faculty. The distinction between sensibility 
and understanding is drawn in terms of whether its function is free from affection. It is quite natural 
to suppose that the determining ground of the a priori determination should be attributed to 
understanding. Therefore, the basic constraints imposed on the required faculty is that, on the one 
hand, its action must be spontaneous, and, on the other hand, its objects must be intuitive. The 
required ground must be a faculty that is both spontaneous and intuitive.  
Traditionally, the paradigmatic faculty that meets the requirements is intellectual intuition. In fact, 
the name of intellectual intuition itself indicates the satisfaction of both spontaneity and 
intuitiveness requirements. However, the faculty in question must be human. As we have shown in 
Chapter 3, we human beings fall short of intellectual intuition; rather, we are capable only of 
sensible intuition. And we human beings cannot create anything real; we can instead only determine 
the real. Kant holds that both requirements are also satisfied by imagination, which is defined as “the 
faculty for representing an object even without its presence in intuition” (B151). As Kant explains 
in the following passage: 
 
                                                     
181 For an excellent account of Hume’s reductive project see Owen 1999. 
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Now since all of our intuition is sensible, the imagination, on account of the subjective condition under 
which alone it can give a corresponding intuition to the concepts of understanding, belongs to 
sensibility; but insofar as its synthesis is still an exercise of spontaneity, which is determining and not, 
like sense, merely determinable, and can thus determine the form of sense a priori in accordance with 
the unity of apperception, the imagination is to this extent a faculty for determining the sensibility a 
priori[.] (B151-B152)182 
 
In this passage, Kant explains how imagination satisfies both criteria. One the one hand, 
imagination provides intuition, therefore it is sensible. And, on the other hand, it is an action of 
spontaneity, therefore it is intellectual. As a result, imagination is viewed as a mediating faculty 
between the two extremes of sensibility and understanding.  
In spite of the above line of justification, Kant’s specification of imagination is dubious. It 
seems that the imagination that produces intuition and the imagination that determines a priori is 
not the same one. The former is constructive imagination, which aims at producing geometrical 
figures. By contrast, the latter is transcendental or legislative imagination, which performs the 
function of making the real ordered. Kant’s mistake is rooted in the ambiguity of the intuitiveness 
criterion. What this criterion says is not that the faculty must produce sensible intuition from itself, but 
that the faculty must take sensible intuition as an object.183 
 
(b) The Productive 
There are various kinds of imagination. Kant is still left with the task to determine what kind 
of imagination or synthesis of imagination can do the job as well as what requirements must the 
imagination under discussion satisfy. When he first introduces the required faculty in the argument 
from above, Kant writes: 
 
Thus the transcendental unity of apperception is related to the pure synthesis of the imagination, as an 
a priori condition of the possibility of all composition of the manifold in a cognition. But only the 
productive synthesis of the imagination can take place a priori; for the reproductive synthesis rests 
on conditions of experience. The principle of the necessary unity of the pure (productive) synthesis of 
                                                     
182Synthesis is attributed to imagination in 1781 Critique, and then to understanding in 1787 Critique: “Yet the 
combination (conjunctio) of a manifold in general can never come to us through the senses, and therefore cannot 
already be contained in the pure form of sensible intuition” (B129-B130). 
183 In his recent article, Rosefeldt attributes to a twofold epistemic role to imagination. On the one hand, imagination 
gives understanding the access to real possibility; for instance, the construction of geometrical figures pose further 
constraints to the metaphysical possibility of a figure in addition to the constraint of logical coherence of the 
concept. And on the other hand, imagination brings object of sensibility to consciousness. For more details see 
Rosefeldt forthcoming.  
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the imagination prior to apperception is thus the ground of the possibility of all cognition, especially 
that of experience. (A118) 
 
What Kant takes to be a known fact is that our imagination brings a priori determination to 
sensible representation. From the fact that the synthesis of imagination is a priori Kant infers that 
the imagination at issue is productive. The line of reasoning is not casual. In the argument from below, 
Kant employs precisely the same strategy when he writes “[t]he imagination is therefore also a 
faculty of a synthesis a priori, on account of which we give it the name of productive imagination” 
(A123). The line of the thought of identifying the imagination as productive goes as follows: 
 
(1) All imaginations are either productive or reproductive. 
(2) All reproductive imaginations are empirical. 
(3) Only productive imagination can be a priori. 
(4) The imagination in question is a priori. 
(5) The imagination in question is productive. 
 
What kind of imagination is in play presupposes Kant’s complex doctrine of imagination. In 
§28 of his Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View184 Kant offers a more detailed portrayal of 
imagination: 
 
The power of imagination (facuitas imaginandi), as a faculty of intuition without the presence of the 
object, is either productive, that is, a faculty of the original presentation of the object (exhibitio originaria), 
which thus precedes experience; or reproductive, a faculty of the derivative presentation of the object 
(exhibitio derivativa), which brings back to the mind an empirical intuition that it had previously. (AA 
7:167) 
 
The power of imagination (in other words), is either inventive (productive) or merely recollective 
(reproductive). But the productive power of imagination is nevertheless not exactly creative, for it is not 
capable of producing a sense representation that was never given to our faculty of sense; one can always 
furnish evidence of the material of its ideas. (AA 7:167-168) 
 
                                                     
184 Abbreviated as Anthropology thereafter. 
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The power of imagination (in other words), is either inventive (productive) or merely recollective 
(reproductive). But the productive power of imagination is nevertheless not exactly creative, for it is 
not capable of producing a sense representation that was never given to our faculty of sense; one 
can always furnish evidence of the material of its ideas. (AA 7:167-168) 
 
According to Anthropology, imagination is divided into productive and reproductive one in 
terms of the temporal relation of its presentation of the object to experience. The object presented 
by productive imagination is before experience, whereas that of reproductive imagination is after 
experience. The inference goes through only if this distinction is mutually exclusive and jointly 
exhaustive and both empirical and a priori imaginations are instantiated. 
I would like to remind one point: the distinction between productive and reproductive 
imagination and the distinction between a priori and empirical imagination are not co-extensive. To 
be sure, some passages tempt people to hold that Kant equates a priori imagination with productive 
imagination. A careful reading shows that we should not attribute this view to Kant. What Kant 
claims is that all a priori imaginations are productive, but he never claims that all productive 
imaginations are a priori. Moreover, he suggests that some productive imagination is empirical. For 
instance, from Kant’s claim that “the image is a product of the empirical faculty of productive 
imagination” (A141/B181) it is not difficult to infer that this empirical productive imagination is 
nothing but apprehensive imagination. 185  In his private notes Kant explicitly says that “[t]he 
productive imagination is either pure or empirical” (AA 23:18). Nevertheless, this further division 
in productive imagination does not affect the validity of the argument. 
The most substantial premise in the argument is (4), which is a trivial consequence of the 
claim that a priori determination is determined a priori by its determining ground. The a priori 
determinations are valid indifferently for all objects. Thus, it cannot be affected by any contingent 
condition initiated by the specific content of experience. In fact, a priori determination is nothing 
but a specification of the essential character of the transcendental path. As the determining ground, 
the synthesis of imagination is the condition of experience, rather than conditioned by experience, 
which is characteristic of empirical transcendental imagination. Therefore, the apriority of 
imagination is implied trivially. 
                                                     
185 For the most detailed discussion of Kant’s doctrine of imagination see Kant’s notes (AA 23:18). The empirical 
productive imagination is the synthesis of apprehension which makes perception possible. Reproductive synthesis 
and apprehensive synthesis of imagination are empirical, whereas the constructive and transcendental synthesis of 
imagination take place a priori. 
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(c) The Transcendental 
By employing the same strategy, Kant continues to write in the argument from above that 
“we call the synthesis of the manifold in imagination transcendental if, without distinction of the 
intuitions, it concerns nothing but the connection of the manifold a priori” (A118). The same idea 
is repeated in the argument from below: “insofar as its aim in regard to all the manifold of 
appearance is nothing further than the necessary unity in their synthesis, this can be called the 
transcendental function of the imagination” (A123). 
Kant is giving the definition of what it is for a synthesis of imagination to be transcendental. 
Initially, Kant appears to merely state the sufficient condition for the imagination to be 
transcendental: the synthesis of the manifold in imagination is transcendental if it concerns 
necessary unity or the connection of the manifold a priori. I believe that the use of the asymmetrical 
logical connective “if” is not so much a reflection of the fact that transcendental synthesis is 
introduced as a new term as the intention of giving merely the sufficient condition of a term. What Kant has in 
mind is a definition of transcendental synthesis: the synthesis of the manifold in imagination is 
transcendental if and only if it concerns necessary unity or the connection of the manifold a priori. 
In fact, Kant does more than giving a definition of what transcendental synthesis of 
imagination is. Kant further shows that transcendental synthesis is a numerically distinct faculty 
which is irreducible to any other kind of pure synthesis of a priori imagination. After he introduces 
transcendental synthesis in the argument from below, Kant states the peculiarity of transcendental 
imagination as follows: 
 
It is this apperception that must be added to the pure imagination in order to make its function 
intellectual. For in itself the synthesis of the imagination, although exercised a priori, is nevertheless 
always sensible, for it combines the manifold only as it appears in intuition, e.g., the shape of a triangle. 
Through the relation of the manifold to the unity of apperception, however, concepts that belong to 
the understanding can come about, but only by means of the imagination in relation to the sensible 
intuition. (A124) 
 
Although the relation of apperception to the synthesis can be found in many texts, here Kant 
explicitly claims that apperception makes the pure imagination intellectual such it is differentiated 
from pure imagination without apperception. Here Kant’s example of the triangle is illuminating. 
It indicates that by the merely pure synthesis of imagination what Kant has in mind is the 
constructing imagination, which determines the mathematical object by constructing it in pure and 
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empirical intuition. In his pre-critical works, Kant has already found the indispensability of pure 
synthesis of imagination for pure geometry.186 The postulation of transcendental synthesis only 
appears in the critical period and is officially proclaimed in Critique. Since the transcendental 
imagination determines something, rather than constructs a shape in space without making a causal 
difference, transcendental synthesis cannot be identified with the pure synthesis of constructing 
imagination, and we should admit it as numerically distinct faculty. 
Here the situation is different from the one where Kant determines the productivity of 
imagination. In determining the productivity, we know that all imaginations are either productive 
or reproductive, and we know that both of them are instantiated. In determining the transcendental 
character, by contrast, the line is not that first we know in advance that all a priori imagination are 
either sensible or intellectual, and then we find that the imagination in question falls under the latter 
category. Rather, after postulating the synthesis of imagination in question, we find that it has a 
special concern, which is distinct from and irreducible to any other kind known pure synthesis of 
imagination, and then we give a name to it so as to individuate an independent faculty. In short, in 
the former situation we determine the imagination in question, while in the latter situation we 
individuate it. 
 
(d) The Blind 
When Kant first introduces synthesis in general in 1781 Critique, he makes the following 
interesting remark: 
 
Synthesis in general is, as we shall subsequently see, the mere effect of the imagination, of a blind 
though indispensable function of the soul, without which we would have no cognition at all, but of 
which we are seldom even conscious. (A78/B103) 
 
As the passage indicates, synthesis in general is “blind though indispensable”. The 
indispensability of synthesis indicates its explanatory role, from which one can lay claim to its 
existence, and thereby it becomes a metaphysical characterization. By contrast, the blindness of 
synthesis indicates its phenomenal character that (1) synthesis is seldom conscious. However, this flatly 
contradicts with Kant’s claim that (2) synthesis is necessarily conscious consistently in A-Deduction and 
in B-Deduction: 
                                                     
186 See the first section of Inquiry (AA 2:276-278). 
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the mind could not possibly think of the identity of itself in the manifoldness of its representations, 
and indeed think this a priori, if it did not have before its eyes the identity of its action, which subjects 
all synthesis of apprehension (which is empirical) to a transcendental unity[.] (A108) 
 
Namely, this thoroughgoing identity of the apperception of a manifold given in intuition… is possible 
only through the consciousness of this synthesis. (B133) 
 
On my interpretation, the inconsistency could be explained away by taking note of the 
ambiguity of the meaning of consciousness. In claim (1), the consciousness is the non-inferential 
reflexive consciousness, which simply indicates an epistemic access to some representation. In 
claim (2), the consciousness is transcendental consciousness, which is ubiquitous in all actions of 
synthesis and virtually in all my representations.187 
I believe that this epistemic characterization of synthesis as blindness holds for the 
transcendental synthesis of imagination. One central phenomenal character of the transcendental 
synthesis of imagination is that we are not reflexively conscious of them, that is, we have no 
phenomenal knowledge of it. It is not only quite consistent with my suggestion that we inferentially 
know transcendental synthesis of imagination, but it also accords with our ordinary intuition that 
our mental life is not always reflexive. In most cases we are not conscious of synthesis, since not 
all representations are clear or even distinct. In order to have the conscious experience of it, one 
must take great efforts and even make long practice.188 
Another challenge posed on the interpretation is Kant’s qualification of the frequency that we 
are “seldom”, rather than never, conscious of the synthesis. The qualification seems to suggest that at 
least in some cases we have non-inferential knowledge of synthesis. One might wonder in what sense 
this qualification of frequency should be understood. According to my understanding, it is in simple 
cases such as drawing a line of describing a circle that we could become reflexively conscious of 
the synthesis. 
The objection resurfaces that the suggestion that we have immediate reflexive knowledge of 
transcendental synthesis is quite implausible. If we know empirically the existence and the nature 
                                                     
187 Consider the following text: “This consciousness may often only be weak, so that we connect it with the 
generation of the representation only in the effect, but not in the act itself, i.e., immediately”(A103-A104); 
“they did not all together belong to a self-consciousness; i.e., as my representations (even if I am not conscious of 
them as such) (B132). Therefore, the transcendental self-consciousness is not reflexive, i.e., the transcendental 
consciousness of something x does not entail the knowledge of the knowledge of x. 
188 For the need of practice see B1-2. 
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of transcendental imagination, then why the transcendental synthesis of imagination is postulated 
only by Kant? Is Kant mentally more acute than anyone such that only Kant has a phenomenal 
experience of what transcendental synthesis is like? The affirmative answer would be intolerably 
absurd. One reply is that we could have reflexive knowledge of what is misidentified as something 
other than the transcendental synthesis of imagination. It is one thing to know what it is like to 
experience the action, but it is quite another thing to know the nature of the action. 
 
5.6.3 A New Picture of Mind 
As a result of the introducing of transcendental imagination, Kant offers a novel picture of 
human understanding or mind. As Kant writes in a bold manner: “[t]he unity of apperception in 
relation to the synthesis of the imagination is the understanding, and this very same unity, in 
relation to the transcendental synthesis of the imagination, is the pure understanding.” (A119) 
By reducing understanding to imagination, Kant informs a new conception to the traditional image of 
mind. 
In pre-Kantian German philosophy, understanding or reason is viewed primarily as a faculty 
of analysis. Accordingly, all metaphysical truths are essentially logical or conceptual truths by 
definition and principle and identity, and thus they are analytic and a priori. Kant does not deny the 
role of analysis; he instead admits that a large portion of truths is analytic. Rather, Kant is claiming 
that the primary function of understanding is not analysis but synthesis. According to the priority 
thesis of synthesis to analysis, one cannot analyze unless we synthesize first. In his systematic 
discussion of synthesis in B-Deduction, Kant elaborates it in detail: 
 
One can here easily see that this action must originally be unitary and equally valid for all 
combination, and that the dissolution (analysis) that seems to be its opposite, in fact always 
presupposes it; for where the understanding has not previously combined anything, neither 
can it dissolve anything, for only through it can something have been given to the power of 
representation as combined. (B130) 
 
To be sure, the priority thesis is applied to synthesis in general. The primary concern at issue 
is the synthesis of the manifold of sensible representation into one intuition, rather than of the synthesis of 
different simple concepts into a complex one or into a judgment. Kant repeats this idea in many 
places: 
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The first pure cognition of the understanding, therefore, on which the whole of the rest of its use is grounded, 
and that is at the same time also entirely independent from all conditions of sensible intuition, is the 
principle of the original synthetic unity of apperception. (B137) 
 
Understanding belongs to all experience and its possibility, and the first thing that it does for this is not to 
make the representation of the objects distinct, but rather to make the representation of an object 
possible at all. (A199/B244-245) 
 
The formation of a complex concept does not determine an object. An object can only be 
determined by a concept if the concept is complete. Even for Leibniz complete concept is peculiar 
to divinity. Kant also excludes complete concept from the human sphere. One the one hand, we 
do not originally have a complete concept, and, on the other hand, we cannot make complete 
concept either by logical means or by intuitive means. Given the generality of partial concept, no 
matter how many concepts we combine, we cannot use the combination of partial concepts to 
form a complete concept.  
With the change of the conception of mind, the preoccupation of metaphysics is also changed. 
According to the rationalists, the major if not the exclusive task of metaphysics is to make the concept 
distinct, and it is conducted in virtue of analyzing concept, namely, clarifying the content of the 
concept. Now the primary job of metaphysics it to make the object possible in virtue of the synthesis 
of the manifold into one intuition, and then to make concepts distinct in virtue of the analysis of 
the concept. Only if the reference of a concept to object is fixed could the analysis of the concept 
be possible. Consequently, the intuition of a determinate object is not a brute fact, but an 
intellectual achievement. 
  
165 
 
Chapter 6  The Argument from Cognition 
6.1 Introduction 
The first line of argument I will examine is the one which I call the argument from cognition. 
Since the argument from cognition is nothing other than “the argument from below” in the A-
Deduction, the line of argument is not difficult to be separated from other lines. The argument 
from cognition runs from A119 to A125, and it could be reconstructed as follows:  
 
(AC1) We have the cognition that is the composite and connected representation. 
(AC2) Cognition requires the composition of perception.  
(AC3) Cognition requires the connection of perceptions. 
(AC4) Cognition requires the affinity. 
(AC5) Affinity as consequence implies the transcendental synthesis of the imagination. 
(AC6) The transcendental imagination is grounded in categories. 
(AC7) The appearances as the objects of cognition are grounded in categories.189 
 
The argument from cognition consists of four sub-arguments for faculties: the argument for 
apprehension, the argument for reproduction, the argument for association, the argument for 
affinity, and then it finally arrives at the conclusion that categories are related to objects. The most 
fascinating as well as mysterious affinity argument lies in the heart of the four sub-arguments. 
Furthermore, the argument from below adopts the form of indirect proof, i.e. reductio ad absurdum, 
to achieve its desired conclusion. All of the four sub-argument follow the very suit, and thereby 
they can be regarded as a series of reductio ad absurdum. The basic idea of each sub-argument is that 
the sole passive faculty is inadequate for explaining some characteristic essential to the notion of 
cognition, and therefore some additional active faculty is required to be introduced for the 
collaboration with sense to yield cognition. 
In spite of its tediousness, the argument from cognition gives us many theoretical profits. 
First of all, among all arguments it is in the argument from cognition that Kant charts the geography 
                                                     
189 For the proof-structure in A-Deduction and the dependence of the argument from below on the argument from 
above see Barker 2001. 
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of mind in greatest detail. Here we have a story that is told in a different way from the famous 
threefold synthesis. They are not mutually conflicting, but inter-complementary. With the 
proceeding of argument, a sophisticated model of mind emerges as the psychological background. 
Second, after his more general criticisms against the empirical path, Kant is continuing his anti-
empirical campaign in the argument from cognition by challenging the simple-minded empiricist 
theory of perception and the arguably empirically adequate association model of mind. Third, Kant 
shows that his model of mind is formulated not by observation, but by inference, which constitutes 
a sharp contrast with Hume. And it also shows in what sense his theory is revisable. The last but not 
the least, the world-picture characteristic of the dual modality finds its clearest expression in the 
argument from cognition. In any other argument centered on synthetic unity Kant never makes it 
so explicit and powerful. Rather, Kant must make use of the ambiguity of synthetic unity to meet 
the objective of the Transcendental Deduction. 
In section 6.2, in spite of the appearance of the premise of perception, I will propose that the 
argument from below is an argument from a thick notion of cognition, rather than from perception, 
and that it is unlikely to be an anti-skeptical argument. On my view, the cognition at issue refers 
not to judgment, but to intuition. In section 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5, by analyzing the arguments for 
apprehension, reproduction and association, I will reveal how these arguments that are expected 
to follow the same logic differ from each other in important respects, and I will give an account of 
the apparent change of the role of association in both editions of the Critique. In section 6.6, I will 
examine the argument for affinity, which is the heart of Kant’s argument from cognition. Through 
a careful analysis of the modality, I will argue that Kant does not commit any modal fallacy, and 
that he is committed to the view that necessary connection can only be explained by the necessary 
instantiation of the connection. In section 6.7, I will further show in what sense the explanatory 
argument from cognition is an argument from consequence to ground by investigating into Kant’s 
inference to transcendental synthesis and to categories. 
 
6.2 Kant’s Notion of Cognition 
There are two ways to understand the meaning of the metaphor “below”. Understood in the 
metaphysical sense, the argument from below is the argument from consequence. If so, then all 
arguments are “from below” in this sense, and “the argument from above” does not make sense 
anymore. Obviously, this is not the sense in which the argument from cognition is called the 
argument from below. 
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In the second sense, the argument from below is the argument from lower faculty. In the 
argument from below, Kant starts his argument by explicitly reminding us that “[n]ow we will set 
the necessary connection of the understanding with the appearances by means of the categories 
before our eyes by beginning from beneath, namely with what is empirical”.(A119) Kant continues: “[t]he 
first thing that is given to us is appearance” (A119-A120). 
The argument from below forms a contrast to the argument from above that precedes it in 
A-Deduction. Kant starts his argument by saying: “Now if we wish to follow the inner ground of 
this connection of representations up to that point (bis auf denjenigen Punkt) in which they must 
all come together in order first to obtain unity of cognition for a possible experience, then we must 
begin with pure apperception.” (A116) As Kant later makes clear, the two “extremes” of “below” and 
“above” are sensibility and understanding, which refer back respectively to “the manifold of 
intuition” and to “the necessary unity of intuition” (A124), which are nothing other than the points 
of the departure of the two lines of arguments. The hierarchy is also confirmed by Kant’s general 
theory of faculties. As Kant observes in his Jäsche Logic190, sensibility is the lower faculty, whereas 
understanding is the higher faculty. Therefore, the distinction of the argument from above and the 
argument from below is drawn in terms of the hierarchy of faculties. The argument from above 
starts with the pure and intellectual, while the argument from below sets out with the empirical and 
the sensible. (AA 9:36) 
In fact, the label of argument from below is inaccurate. To be sure, the argument from below 
appears to be an argument from perception. For one thing, its first sub-argument starts with the 
premise that “[t]he first thing that is given to us is appearance, which, if it is combined with 
consciousness, is called perception” (A119-120). For another, it is evidenced by the occasional 
formulation of the conclusion in B-Deduction that self-consciousness is indispensable for 
perception. (B161) 
Strictly speaking, however, Kant merely starts with, rather than argues from, the appearance or 
the empirical consciousness of it. With the unfolding of the argument, it turns out that it is not the 
weaker conception of perception, but the stronger conception of cognition, on which the entire 
course of argument is premised. 191  The correction of the initial impression stems from the 
following facts. First, the argument from below consists of a series of reductio ad absurdum. The 
explicit point of departure does not exhaust all premises that are employed in the argument. In the 
course of his introduction of reductio assumptions, Kant in effect adds new premises to his argument, 
                                                     
190 Abbreviated as Logic thereafter. 
191 The virtual argument from perception is contained in the second half of B-Deduction. It will be discussed in 
Chapter 9, which bears striking resemblance with, or even possibly originates from, this argument from below. 
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and betrays his commitment to our possession of cognition. Second, the A-Deduction might differ 
from B-Deduction, so does the conclusion in the B-Deduction. 
Since the entire argument is premised on the notion of cognition, we have to examine what 
cognition is for Kant. Kant has various definitions or specifications of cognition, which could 
roughly be divided into two groups. In §1 of the Logic, Kant writes “[a]ll cognitions, that is, all 
representations related with consciousness to an object, are either intuitions or concepts”.(AA 9:91) 
In effect, Kant offers one intensional definition that cognition is the conscious representation of 
an object and one extensional definition that cognition is either an intuition or a concept. 
These two definitions of cognition could also be found in the Critique. In his Stufenleiter in 
Dialectic, Kant offers a systematic exposition of cognition in the taxonomy of representations: 
 
The genus is representation in general (repraesentatio). Under it stands the representation with 
consciousness (perceptio). A perception that refers to the subject as a modification of its state is a 
sensation (sensatio); an objective perception is a cognition (cognitio). The latter is either an intuition 
or a concept (intuitus vel conceptus). The former is immediately related to the object and is singular; the 
latter is mediate, by means of a mark, which can be common to several things. (A320/B376-377) 
 
Extensionally, cognition is a genus of intuition and concept; intensionally, cognition is an objective 
perception. As Kant indicates, “objective” means “related to object”, and “perception” refers to 
“conscious representation”. Therefore, the objective perception is the conscious representation of 
object, which is consistent with that given in the Logic.192 
The other characterization of cognition is focused on the notion of connection and rule. In 
§5 of the Anthropology, Kant introduces the notion of cognition in the context of the distinction 
between distinctness and confusion. (AA 7:138) 193  Kant writes that “an aggregate of 
representations becomes knowledge, in which order is thought in this manifold, because every 
conscious combination presupposes unity of consciousness, and consequently a rule for the 
combination.” Then, Kant continues: “In every complex representation (perceptio complexa), and thus 
in every cognition (since intuition and concept are always required for it)”. 
Kant obviously identifies cognition as complex representation or complex perception. From what 
follows we can see that complex representation is composed of (a) the aggregate of the part-
                                                     
192 In the following I will use cognition and objective representation interchangeably. 
193 In this context, Kant’s view is starling in that he proposes an ontic rather than an epistemic reading of clarity and 
distinctness of representation. I think that overwhelming textual evidence indicates that epistemic reading is Kant’s 
more usual view, and we should also understand along this route. 
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representations, (b) the combination of the part-representations, (c) the rule of combination, or 
“the order according to which the partial representations are combined. The order is either a logical 
division or real one” (AA 7:138). 
This portrayal could also find itself in the Critique. In the second section of A-Deduction, 
Kant offers a definition of cognition as “a whole of compared and connected representations” 
(A97). Since this definition makes an appearance in the preliminary to the argument in A-
Deduction, it seems to be the conceptual preparation that is supposed to play a role in the 
subsequent argument. The comparison and connection are correspondent respectively to the 
logical division and the real division in the account of cognition in the Anthropology. 
The striking feature of this definition is that Kant defines cognition with reference to 
representational mereology. Cognition is a whole-representation, and naturally it is composed of 
part-representations, which stand in the relation of comparison and connection. In a nutshell, 
cognition is essentially composite and structured. As we will see in the course of analysis, the facts (such 
as composition, combination, and rule) that unfold themselves are precisely contained in the 
conception of cognition. 
A crucial question is what cognition refers to when Kant talks about it. Since the notion of 
cognition is generic, it seems that there are many candidates. I propose that the cognition in the 
context of the argument from below should be identified with intuition, or the unity conception of 
intuition. Kant discusses this after his introduction of synthesis in §10. Two initial objections to 
this proposal soon appear. A first objection is that intuition is an ingredient of cognition, rather 
than cognition itself. A second objection is that, according to Stufenleiter, cognition is broader than 
intuition, so all intuitions are cognitions, but not all cognitions are intuitions. The first objection is 
disarmed by the second objection. Kant explicitly says that intuition is a species of cognition. 
According to Kant’s Stufenleiter, cognition is objective perception, and the genus cognition has two 
species: intuition and concept. Here, intuition is identified with cognition. As for the second 
objection, one might reply by saying that the primary sense of cognition is intuition. Although in 
A-Deduction Kant does not explicitly say that cognition is the intuition with unity, I think that 
there is a compelling reason for this identification. Kant’s account of the generation of a cognition 
and that of the building of one intuition bear striking similarity. As Kant indicates in the last 
paragraph, “manifold”, “synthesis” and “unity” are the three conditions that are separately 
necessary and conjointly sufficient for the cognition of the object. It is even confirmed by Kant’s 
discussion of synthesis in general at the beginning of §10: “[b]y synthesis in the most general sense, 
however, I understand the action to put different representations together with each other and to 
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comprehend(begreifen) their manifoldness in a cognition.” (A77/B103) The intuition is likewise 
characterized. In §10 Kant gives the specific sense in which intuition could be identified with 
cognition. The built intuition consists of “different representations”, “synthesis”, and “unity”. One 
intuition is the unity of the synthesis of the manifold of representations.194 
This identification runs counter with the general impression that Kant equates cognition with 
judgment, which is confirmed by numerous texts written in both pre-critical and critical periods. 
Based on the collaboration thesis, a long-standing mistake is to attribute to Kant the view that the 
combination of a concept and an intuition is always a judgment.195 We do not know what Kant’s 
ultimate position is with regard to the issue of whether cognition must take the form of judgment. 
I think that it is more profitable to adopt a liberate view on the form the cognition takes. The 
judgment is one species of the objective representation whose peculiarity lies in its claim to truth. 
Therefore, I think that this argument from cognition is numerically distinct from the argument 
from judgment, and discuss them in two distinct chapters. 
The notion of cognition appears much thicker than that of perception. It is quite natural to 
worry that Kant’s argument from cognition might beg the skeptics’ question. 196 This kind of 
objection that the argument from cognition tacitly assumes that the primary, if not exclusive, 
concern of Transcendental Deduction is to refute skepticism. However, why should we accept this 
assumption? If one abandons the idea that Kant’s argument in Transcendental Deduction should 
be evaluated in terms of the prospect of anti-skepticism, few would embrace the view that the 
argument from cognition is anti-skeptical. As long as we do not adopt the anti-skeptical reading, 
the objection of begging the question immediately disappears. 
To be sure, this does spare one the effort to reply to the worry whether it is anti-skeptical. It 
does not imply, however, that this argument is not controversial. Rather, a new substitutive worry 
is that the argument from cognition has no polemical force. Soundness does not exhaust all the 
virtues one argument could have. Even if this argument is valid and even sound, this argument still 
could be pointless. Then, what is the point of Transcendental Deduction? As I have suggested, my 
alternative is that the Transcendental Deduction is explanatory in nature. What misleads people is 
that its metaphysical character is dwarfed by its pervasive and extravagant representational language. 
                                                     
194 For more details about the notion of unity see Chapter 8. 
195 Hanna attributes to Kant the view that the product of the threefold synthesis is an explicit judgment. See Hanna 
2001, 45-53. I think that this move runs counter to Kant’s remark concerning the first product of human cognition 
and distorts the entire picture of Critique. 
196 This point is repeatedly made by Guyer, especially in his 1987. 
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The argument from cognition aims to give a metaphysical explanation of the objective 
representation, which should be seen not as a brute fact, but as our intellectual achievement. 
Even if it is conceded that the Transcendental Deduction in general and the argument from 
cognition in particular is not anti-skeptical, it does not license the cognition to figure in the premise 
of the argument. It could be the case that the peculiar conception of cognition is invented by Kant 
for the sake of meeting the requirement of argument. Besides Kant and his argument, neither will 
the notion of cognition be acknowledged by other philosophers, nor will it be of any use. 
As I understand it, Kant uses the thick conception of cognition in a manner that it never 
occurs to him that it could be controversial. This is evidenced by the fact that cognition does not 
only appear in the revolutionary Critique, it also appears in his much less controversial Anthropology 
and Logic. It suggests that the notion of cognition is presupposed by the transcendental philosophy 
and accepted by the philosophical community. Indeed, the idea of representational mereology is 
alien to us, but it is not unfamiliar to Kant and his contemporaries. It could be found in Leibniz 
that every perception consists in a unity of manifold. 197 It is not surprising why it is taken for 
granted by Kant. 
 
6.3 The Argument for Apprehension 
The Apprehension Argument could be reformulated as follows: 
 
(AC1.1) Assume for reductio that appearance is given to us without reference to any active faculty 
and its action. 
(AC1.2) Every appearance contains a manifold. 
(AC1.3) Perception is appearance combined with empirical consciousness. (Definition of 
Perception) 
(AC1.4) from (AC 1.2) and (AC 1.3) that every perception contains a manifold and thus is dispersed 
and separate. 
(AC1.5) (AC 1.4) is false. 
                                                     
197 For a discussion of the unity of perception see Puryear 2006. In fact, this is nothing but the precursor of Kant’s 
famous notion of synthetic unity, which will be discussed in detail in next chapter. 
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(AC1.6) from (AC 1.5) (AC 1.1) is false. A combination of perceptions is necessary. (Assumption 
Discharged) 
(AC1.7) from (AC 1.5) and (AC 1.6) there is a combination of these perceptions. 
(AC1.8) from (AC 1.7) there is an active faculty of the imagination and thereby an action of the 
apprehension is essential to perception. 
 
This first sub-argument adopts the strategy of reductio ad absurdum. The success of the reductio 
ad absurdum relies heavily on whether the assumption can entail a contradiction with some accepted 
truth. The apprehension argument can be divided into two halves according to whether the 
introduced assumption for reductio is discharged or not. The first half runs from (AC1.1) to (AC1.6), 
which is intended to show that appearances cannot be simply given to us without being combined. 
And its second half runs from (AC1.7) to (AC1.9), which is intended to show that the required 
function of combination should be assigned to the faculty of the imagination. The apprehension 
assumes that composition is essential to the notion of cognition. In the following I will examine 
and evaluate the two parts of apprehension argument. 
Let’s begin with the redutio assumption. The assumption for reductio says that appearance is 
given to us without reference to any active faculty and its action. The assumption for reductio 
introduced often can be construed as implicitly targeted at some polemical position. It might be 
proposed that Kant intends to argue against radical sensationalism and thus the monism of epistemic source 
that only sense could give us representations. One might wonder, however, whether there is anyone 
who has ever endorsed such a radical position. Classical empiricists, most notably Locke, are also 
adherent to the dualism of epistemic source. According to Locke, all ideas are either those of sensation or 
those of reflection, though reflection is identified with inner sense.198 
It is more reasonable to suppose that Kant does not argue that only sense can give us 
perception, but that sense can provide perception independently from the spontaneous faculty. 
This thought naturally leads to the proposal that Kant intends to argue against the non-conceptualism 
of perception, where perception is understood in the Kantian sense. This reading is also problematic. 
Even if Kant is committed to some version of conceptualism, it is not immediately clear that what 
is presented in the Apprehension Argument by itself is adequate to establish this view. It is equally 
                                                     
198 In Kant literature, the evaluation of the two-faculty theory of mind or of the two-source theory of cognition does 
not reach consensus. For the novelty of distinction see Henrich 2008, sensation and cognition can be reduced to 
each other. For the banality of the distinction see Falkenstein 2004. 
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not clear that the involvement of any mental activity in the supposedly passive reception of 
impressions is equivalent to any version of conceptualism of perception, either the state-
conceptualism or content-conceptualism. 
A middle way drawn between the two previous proposals is to suggest that Kant intends to 
discard the traditional model of perception that perception is literally sense-perception in favor of the view 
that the generation of perception must be with reference to the imagination. In fact, this proposal 
is confirmed by the famous note in A120: “No psychologist has yet thought that the imagination 
is a necessary ingredient of perception itself.” (A120f) The third proposal seems to be stronger 
than the first yet weaker than the second, for it does not only affirm that human beings have the 
imagination as a faculty distinct from sense, but also asserts that the imagination is necessarily 
involved in perception. Therefore, Kant does not argue for the existence of a distinct active faculty, 
namely, the imagination, but for the involvement of the imagination in perception. This amounts to 
assigning a new function to the imagination. 
The line of the first half of the apprehension argument roughly runs as follows: perception is 
the empirical consciousness of appearance. Now since every appearance contains a manifold, it 
follows that perception contains a manifold. Without any involvement of synthesis, perceptions 
would be dispersed and separate. Then, Kant concludes that “a combination of them, which they 
cannot have in sense itself, is therefore necessary” (A120).  
The problem of this argument is that it is not clear why dispersed and separate perceptions 
cannot be accepted, and on what account Kant makes the inference from (AC1.4) to (AC1.5). It is 
tempting to attribute to Kant the fallacy of non-sequitur. Of course, this would be an uncharitable 
reading of Kant. One way to circumvent this objection is to maintain that Kant makes a valid 
argument, yet he merely fails to make explicit some premise. In order for the argument to go 
through, the hidden premise must be uncovered. At the end of this sub-argument, Kant betrays 
his implicit commitment when he writes that “the imagination is to bring the manifold of intuition 
into an image” (A120), and that “it must therefore antecedently take up the impression into its 
activity”. It suggests that we have the image of an object which contains a combination of 
perceptions. Only if the fact that perception is essentially composite is granted, the implication that 
perceptions are dispersed and separate is contradicted. Consequently, the assumption for reductio is 
successfully discharged. Note that Kant does not make use of the notion of cognition; rather, what 
he draws on is the peculiar notion of image.199 While we are not previously informed of what the 
                                                     
199 If one does not cling closely to the text in the first sub-argument, he could suggest that a combinatory notion of 
cognition has already been introduced before the argument starts off when Kant writes in the preliminary part: “If 
every individual representation were entirely foreign to the other, as it were isolated and separated from it, then there 
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notion of image means, we inferentially know that image must be something that implies the 
composition and connection of representations, and perhaps something else. 
The inference (AC1.4) to (AC1.5) could be spelled out as follows: 
 
(1) (AC1.1) implies (AC1.4) 
(2) We have the image of an object which is combined. 
(3) (AC1.4) contradicts with (2). 
(4) (AC1.1) is false. 
 
Now let us come to the second half of the argument. When Kant remarks that a combination 
is necessary for the “dispersed and separate” (A120) perceptions, it immediately leads to the 
conclusion that there is a distinct active faculty of the imagination in general and the action of 
apprehension in particular. If the line of reasoning is taken literally, Kant is again guilty of the 
fallacy of non sequitur in his inference from (AC1.7) to (AC1.8). We must refrain ourselves from 
attributing a non sequitur objection to Kant and attempt to uncover some hidden premises beneath 
the argument. While the required premises are not made explicitly in the main text, they are hinted 
in his famous footnote: 
 
No psychologist has yet thought that the imagination is a necessary ingredient of perception itself. This 
is so partly because this faculty has been limited to reproduction, and partly because it has been 
believed that the senses do not merely afford us impressions but also put them together, and produce 
images of objects, for which without doubt something more than the receptivity of impressions is 
required, namely a function of the synthesis of them. (A120f) 
 
This footnote helps us to formulate a negative argument by elimination to close the inferential 
gap between (AC1.7) and (AC1.8): 
 
                                                     
would never arise anything like cognition, which is a whole of compared and connected representations.” (A97) This 
hasty route of justification is obviously not desirable and not adopted by me, though it turns out that cognition is in 
effect premised. 
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(N1) A combination is necessary for objective representation and it requires perceptions not to be 
dispersed and separate. 
(N2) The combination is attributed either to sense or to the imagination. 
(N3) Sense does not provide any combination. 
(N4) The combination is attributed to the imagination. 
(N5) The reproductive imagination cannot do this job. 
(N6) It must be some action in the imagination other than reproduction that exercised immediately 
on perception. 
(N7) Apprehension can be designated to this distinct action of the imagination. 
 
The basic idea of the negative argument is that Kant argues against the two alternative views 
on faculty attribution. Kant points out that there are different conceptions of sense that are relevant to 
the validity of the argument. For instance, some contend that sense itself has “a function of 
synthesis” (A105). Kant firmly rejects this conception of sense. It seems that Kant’s notion of sense 
is conceptually delineated from any activity and synthesis. Accordingly, Kant seems to be tacitly 
committed to an empiricist conception of sense, which is characterized by pure passivity. With this 
particular conception of sense at hand, Kant infers that the function of the combination of sensible 
representations can only be attributed to the faculty of the imagination, as a species of the genus of 
sensibility, rather than to sense, as the other one. 
Even if the combination is attributed to the imagination rather than to sense, at most it shows 
that the first half of the conclusion (AC1.8) follows that there is an active faculty of the imagination, 
and the latter half does not thereby follow that there is an action of apprehension. In order for the 
latter half to follow, an additional argument for apprehension must be provided. Kant maintains 
that the imagination “has been limited to reproduction” (A120f). It implies that it has been well-known 
what it means by reproduction and it is widely recognized that reproduction is attributed to the 
imagination. On the one hand, reproduction is concerned with recalling the past representations, 
and reproduction is exercised between perception, rather than within perception. On the other hand, 
the required action is characteristic of being “exercised immediately upon perceptions” (A120). As a 
result, Kant concludes that the required action is numerically different from reproduction. The order of 
inference is critically important. Only if reproduction has been definitely delineated and correctly 
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understood can it be concluded that reproduction does not do the required work of taking 
impression into perception. 
As Kant observes, the reason why no psychologist has ever made this discovery lies in that 
either they deflate the imagination with reproduction due to the prejudice toward the imagination, 
or they conflate sense with the imagination due to the misconception of sense. In other words, the 
apprehension of the imagination, on the one hand, must not be assimilated into the reproduction 
of the imagination, and, on the other hand, it must be distinguished from sense. The conclusion is 
that the synthesis of apprehension is neither conflating sense nor deflating the imagination. 
This line of argument is of vital methodological importance. It displays exactly how some 
mental faculty is introduced to close the explanatory gap for objective representation.200  The 
general pattern of this methodology is first to identify some observational and conceptual 
requirement, and then to postulate the relevant faculty to satisfy these requirements.201 It also 
displays that for the previously postulated and widely accepted faculty this kind of argument is able 
to determine the role of the faculty in question and clarify its relation to objective representation. 
 
6.4 The Argument for Reproduction 
The second sub-argument is the most compact yet the least similar to the general pattern of 
the argument ad absurdum. The second sub-argument starts with the seemingly concluding sentence 
that “this apprehension of the manifold alone would bring forth no image” (A121). Nevertheless, 
the widespread use of the subjunctive mood and their negations indicate that it is plausible to 
reconstruct this argument by adapting it to the general model of reductio ad absurdum as follows: 
 
(AC2.1) Assume for reductio that apprehension of the manifold is the only subjective ground for 
cognition. 
(AC2.2) No connection of representations can arise. 
(AC2.3) (AC2.2) contradicts with a fact.  
(AC2.4) (AC2.1) is false. (Assumption Discharged) 
                                                     
200 The entire chain of inference shows precisely how apprehension as a theoretical entity is introduced and 
individuated in the course of argument. 
201 For more details see 5.7. 
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(AC2.5) there is some subjective ground other than apprehension, i.e. the empirical faculty for 
reproduction. 
 
        The basic idea of the reproduction argument is that merely the apprehension of the 
imagination is inadequate for objective representations and something else must be introduced. 
Exactly like the first one, the second sub-argument does not explicitly separate the premise either, 
with which the assumption for reductio contradicts. Since Kant claims that “this apprehension of 
the manifold alone would bring forth no image”, the missing premise is again that we have the 
image of object. In order to make the reductio strategy work, the missing premises that are abduced 
from the peculiar notion of image is “connection of the impressions” (A121). In order to explain 
the connection of impressions, we must believe that the faculty of reproduction is involved in 
generating the image of an object. 
In the apprehension argument, it has been shown that the faculty of the imagination is liable 
to be deflated with the function of reproduction, and it has also been revealed that only if the 
notion of reproduction is clearly delineated can apprehension be individuated. Since the main 
purpose there is to highlight the distinctive role of apprehension, it suffices to say what 
reproduction is not. Now in the argument for reproduction it is time to say what it is here. 
As a matter of fact, the mind must transit from one state to another state. The faculty of 
reproduction does nothing other than call back a representation to the succeeding one to make this 
transition possible. The reproductive imagination is characterized as subjective ground and empirical 
faculty. It is safe to suppose that this characterization is also true of apprehension, though Kant 
does not make it explicit. Whereas both apprehension and reproduction are the subjective grounds 
for the generation of an image of object and they are “inseparably combined” with each other, 
Kant maintains that they perform distinct functions: apprehension makes perception itself possible 
while reproduction makes the “series of perception” (A121) possible, and that the former is 
presupposed by the latter. 
Unlike the apprehension in the first sub-argument, in the second sub-argument the introduced 
reproductive imagination needs not to be individuated. Kant takes it to be an uncontroversial view 
that reproduction is essential to the function of the imagination. Kant does not make any effort to 
identify that the reproduction of past representations should be attributed to the imagination, as 
he does for the apprehension of the imagination. What Kant does is merely to clarify that it is the 
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faculty of the reproductive imagination to perform the function of exhibiting the entire series of 
perceptions and forging connections between them. 
Moreover, Kant makes a different point in the reproduction argument. If we take seriously 
what the footnote says of reproduction, the point of this argument is not to introduce reproduction, 
for both the function of reproduction and its attribution to the imagination have already been taken as widely 
recognized. It is not the fact of the transition of mind from one perception to another that makes 
reproduction a useful theoretical postulate. Rather, the point of the argument is to establish that 
the transition of mind and thus the connection of perceptions is indeed required by the image of an 
object, or by objective representation. As long as this link is established, the involvement of 
reproduction naturally follows. 
Again, we are confronted with the embarrassment: Kant does not give an articulated 
definition or any informative illustration of what an image is. What we are doing is just to read the 
missing premise back into the notion of image, with the conviction that the arguments should and 
must be valid. In spite of this, it cannot be mistaken that a thick premise concerning image or 
objective representation is assumed, rather than argued for, by Kant. Any anti-skeptic reading flatly 
contradicts with what the text exactly says. What is faulty is not the modest goal of the argument, 
but the ambitious interpretation of it. The bonus of the argument is that the notions occurring in 
premises and in conclusion and their relationship are clarified. We come to know why some 
theoretical entities are introduced, what roles they play, and how certain facts are correlated. 
 
6.5 The Argument for Association 
The association argument could be formulated as follows: 
 
(AC3.1) Assume for reductio that representations reproduce one another arbitrarily. 
(AC3.2) There would be no determinate connection, and therefore no cognition would arise. 
(AC3.3) However, cognition does arise. 
(AC3.4) (3.1) is false. (Assumption Discharged) 
(AC3.5) Representations reproduce another in accordance with a rule. 
(AC3.6) The subjective and empirical ground of reproduction with a rule is association. 
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6.5.1 The Consistency and the Strength of the Premise 
The basic idea of the sub-argument is nothing new, and the argument identifies another 
element for the generation of cognition. However, there are two differences between this sub-
argument and the previous two arguments. First, Kant’s presentation of the argument for 
association explicitly exhibits the design of an argument ad reductio that spares us the effort of 
reconstruction. Second, it is in the third sub-argument for association that the notion of cognition or 
objective representation makes its first appearance and functions as the premise that discharges the 
assumption for reductio. In the third sub-argument, Kant explicit claims that the unacceptable 
consequence is that “no cognition at all would arise” (A121). In the first two sub-arguments the 
discharger of the assumption for reductio is image. Kant remarks respectively that “the imagination 
is to bring the manifold of intuition into an image” (A120), and that “this apprehension of the 
manifold alone would bring forth no image” (A121).  
It is not clear whether the notion of image is synonymous with, or at least, co-extensive with 
that of cognition or objective representation. The issue is difficult to settle down. While image (Bild) 
as the cognate of the imagination (Einbildungskraft) seems to suggest that the imagination is 
supposed to be the source or ground of image, we are not informed whether the imagination is 
taken in itself or with reference to apperception. In other words, we do not know whether the 
imagination as the source of image includes the transcendental imagination or not. If it is, then 
image is co-extensive with objective representation. If not, then being image is necessary but not 
sufficient for being objective representation. In either case, being image includes a subset of the 
necessary conditions of being cognition or objective representation.  
If being image is not equivalent with cognition, it implies that the image-centered premise in 
the argument for apprehension and that for reproduction does not play any part in the third 
argument for association. Accordingly, the premise for discharging the assumption for reductio is 
inconsistent throughout these sub-arguments. In order to make the three sub-arguments unified into 
one story with one uniform premise, it is well-motivated, though not required, to assume that image is 
equivalent with cognition, and all of the sub-arguments are arguments from cognition. Even if we 
concede that cognition does not play any role in the first two sub-arguments, it does nothing but 
defer the introduction of objective representation to a point where it cannot be delayed anymore. 
This point is precisely the following argument for affinity. Fairly speaking, it is just a matter of time 
to introduce objective representation as the premise of the argument. 
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Previously, the obscure notion of image leaves room for suggesting that skepticism might 
accept it as unproblematic, and that this argument has the potential to be anti-skeptical. With the 
introduction of cognition, no doubt could be cast on the view that the argument from cognition 
assumes, rather than argues for, our possession of cognition. 
One might wonder whether cognition implies determinate connection. According to Kant, 
connection is a necessary condition for cognition. The question is what Kant means by determinate 
connection. The determined or determinate connection means that a representation is connected 
“with one representation rather than with any others” (A121). The claim that the representation 
that follows the antecedent one is determined amounts to saying that there is a necessary connection 
between representations. If a representation is followed by its succeeding representation arbitrarily, 
the succession would not even be constant, not to mention necessary. 
If this interpretation of determinate connection as necessary were correct, then a surprising 
conclusion would follow: if Kant’s argument is meant to provide an alternative to Humean Mosaic, 
up to this point the sheer association without further condition is adequately strong to yield the 
conclusion that there exists necessary connection. Even in this case, Kant could not level genuine 
refutation of Hume, since both of them do not share a common premise. 
Kant has already shown how he differs from Hume with respect to the necessary connection. 
Then, one might wonder what the point of the following fourth sub-argument for affinity is. If 
Kant does have a point in his following sub-argument, it could be expected that his view on 
necessary connection is far more radical than Hume could imagine.  
 
6.5.2 The Faculty of Association Identified 
In the conclusion of the third argument, Kant identifies the subjective and empirical ground 
as association. Like reproduction, Kant takes association as uncontroversial, and he does not bother 
himself to make the justification for it. In what follows I would like to clarify the nature of 
association, which is of considerable importance to understand Kant’s theory of mind in general. 
In the argument from cognition, the sub-argument for association is technically separated as one 
paragraph, and it seems to imply that association is an independent faculty that is irreducible to any 
other faculty. In some place, Kant’s explicit juxtaposition of association with other faculties 
strengthens the impression; for instance, Kant writes: 
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On them is grounded, therefore, all formal unity in the synthesis of the imagination, and by means of 
the latter also all of its empirical use (in recognition, reproduction, association, and apprehension) 
down to the appearances, since the latter belong to our consciousness at all and hence to ourselves 
only by means of these elements of cognition. (A125) 
 
In other places, however, it seems not to be the case. Since the third sub-argument association 
is defined as “reproduction in accordance with rules”, it seems to suggest that association is a species 
of reproduction. If it is correct, then in this third sub-argument does not introduce a new kind of the 
action of the imagination of association and assert that it is essentially involved in generating 
objective representation. Rather, Kant further specifies and determines the previously introduced 
reproduction, and what he introduces is precisely the notion of rules as the differentia of the genera 
of reproduction. Kant’s use of association often makes reference to rules or laws. For instance, 
Kant writes that the synthesis of “the reproductive imagination is subject solely to empirical laws, 
namely those of association[.]” (B152) When Kant is talking about association here, he is talking about 
reproduction with rules. 
This proposal is supported by the following observation. When Kant introduces reproduction, 
Kant says that without reproduction apprehension “would not bring forth image”. Only in 
collaboration of reproduction is it possible for apprehension to yield image or cognition. Kant does 
not say that reproduction is a ground of apprehension. In the famous threefold synthesis section, 
Kant does not identify reproduction as the ground of apprehension, either. When Kant claims that 
“[t]he synthesis of apprehension is therefore inseparably combined with the synthesis of 
reproduction” (A102), what he is suggesting seems to be merely that both apprehension and 
reproduction are necessary for the generation of cognition. When it comes to association, Kant 
explicitly identifies association as the ground of the reproduction, though the latter is not a priori. 
This is further evidenced by the striking fact that in Kant’s argument from cognition 
association is the only one among these four elements constituting the objective representation 
that cannot find any counterpart in threefold synthesis in A-Deduction. In the threefold synthesis, 
Kant introduces association precisely in his discussion of reproduction, rather than distinctly 
separates it. Probably it confirms the above proposal that association is not an entirely new kind of 
function of imagination, but the previously familiar notion of reproduction with reference to rules. 
 
6.5.3 An Argument without Reproduction and Association? 
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In A-Deduction, apprehension, reproduction, association and apperception are necessary for 
cognition.202 The above analysis has shown how reproduction and association are incorporated into 
the account of cognition. However, Kant seems to hold a radically different view of what role 
reproduction and the laws of association play in B-Deduction. In B-Deduction, reproduction and 
association do not play any positive role in any version of Kant’s argument. Indeed, their sudden 
disappearance is one of the most mysterious things in entire B-Deduction. For instance, his 
argument from perception in § 26 is inspired by the argument from cognition in A-Deduction. 
However, in this argument both reproduction and laws of association do not make an appearance. 
Kant instead argues directly from apprehension to apperception.  
In B-Deduction the reproductive imagination and laws of association play a new, and negative, 
role in Kant’s argument: they are introduced to form a contrast with Kant’s positive apparatus in his 
arguments. In Kant’s argument centering on judgment, the reproductive imagination and the laws 
of association are introduced to form a contrast with the objective judgment. In § 19, for instance, 
Kant writes that “a judgment, i.e., a relation that is objectively valid, and that is sufficiently 
distinguished from the relation of these same representations in which there would be only 
subjective validity, e.g., in accordance with laws of association” (B142). 
In addition, Kant contrasts the reproductive imagination also with the transcendental 
imagination in many places in his argument from perception. For instance, in § 24 reproduction is 
mentioned in order for us to be in a better position to appreciate the productiveness of the 
transcendental imagination: 
 
the reproductive imagination, whose synthesis is subject solely to empirical laws, namely those of 
association, and that therefore contributes nothing to the explanation of the possibility of cognition a 
priori, and on that account belongs not in transcendental philosophy but in psychology. (B152) 
 
Here Kant suggests that the reproductive imagination has nothing to do with transcendental 
philosophy. If we take this claim seriously, it means that reproduction and association are no longer 
essential to Kant’s explanation of cognition. Note that this conclusion is not mundane. Since that 
both apprehension and reproduction/association are empirical in character, it is obvious that they 
do not make any contribution to pure cognition. I believe that that here a priori cognition could be 
harmlessly understood as the a priori aspect of empirical cognition, namely, the form of cognition.  
                                                     
202 Even in A-Deduction the reproduction does not always make an appearance. 
183 
 
Therefore, it seems that Kant assigns radically different roles to reproduction and association 
in both editions of the Critique. In A-Deduction, reproduction and association are indispensable 
ingredients for making possible the empirical cognition of objects. In B-Deduction Kant seems to 
change his mind. Reproduction and association are introduced not as the necessary condition for 
cognition, but for providing a sharp contrast with the necessary condition of cognition.  
It can hardly be denied that there is a change in Kant’s presentation throughout A- and B-
Deduction. The question is how we should evaluate such a change. It could be argued that Kant’s 
theory of synthesis for objective representation is inconsistent between A- and B-Deduction. In 
1787 Critique Kant does think that reproduction and association are not involved in the generation 
of cognition. On this issue, B-Deduction marks a great improvement of the A-Deduction. This 
reading is uncharitable to the coherence of Kant’s theory. A more charitable response is to argue 
that Kant’s theory of synthesis for objective representation is consistent. One could suggest that 
what Kant claims in B-Deduction is not that reproduction literally is not involved in the explanation 
of objective representation, but that it does not contribute to the explanation of the a priori aspect 
of objective representation. Therefore, in A-Deduction reproduction and association falling under 
the psychological category are included in a complete explanation, since they do play a role in 
generating cognition. In B-Deduction, by contrast, they are excluded from a proper philosophical 
explanation, since it has nothing to do with transcendental philosophy, Kant inhibits himself from 
talking reproduction and its associative rules. 
Therefore, Kant does not change the content of the doctrine of cognition. One might propose 
that in B-Deduction Kant has a better comprehension about, or a more precise formulation of, the 
nature of the enterprise he undertakes. Hence, Kant delineates a clear-cut line between philosophy 
and psychology and relegates reproduction and association into psychology.  
It is often believed that Kant finds the A-Deduction too psychological, and therefore he 
rewrites it in the 1787 Critique. The psychologism charge is famous, but it is also little appreciated. 
The psychologism charge is not targeted at Kant’s broadly mentalist approach characterized by the 
pervasive appeal to mental representations and faculties. As I have argued in Chapter 5, once the 
Copernican revolution is launched, Kant has to be committed to idealism, schematism and 
psychologism. To circumvent psychologism charge is not simply to reduce the appeal to 
representations and faculties in number or in frequency. Otherwise, B-Deduction is still plagued 
with psychologism, though merely to a lesser degree. Rather, to avoid psychologism charge means 
something specific and strong: it is to eliminate the appeal to psychological explanation. This move has 
twofold meanings. On the one hand, reproduction and laws of association are regarded as 
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belonging to psychology rather than to philosophy. Therefore, reproduction and laws of 
association are eliminated from the inventory of explanatory resources. On the other hand, the 
psychological fact of perception could nonetheless be employed as the empirical premise for the 
argument, for they are not the explanans, but the explanandum. 
One could argue for Kant’s consistency from a different angle. What preoccupies Kant is the 
proof of the objective reality of categories, not the theory of mind itself. While Kant has to make use 
of different theoretical resources for the demonstration of the reality of categories, this does not 
oblige him to elaborate the background theories which he takes as a tool. To provide a complete 
description of all the elements is not Kant’s primary concern. What concerns Kant most is instead 
the entailment of the conjunction of the objective representation and the manifold of sensibility. 
Suppose that the change in B-Deduction is a simplification, verbally or substantially, of the 
theory of synthesis in A-Deduction. It is theoretically profitable to make such a simplification. The 
more informative a theory is, the more risks it takes. Kant would make a more general and less risky 
conclusion that there must be some activity to synthesize all the manifold into a unity and it does so 
in accordance with some rules. The revision of the theory of synthesis indicates the theoretical nature 
of the Kant’s conception of synthesis. It is open to empirical and philosophical considerations and 
is susceptible to theoretical modification and even transformation. 
 
6.6 The Argument for Affinity 
In the argument for association it is concluded that representations instantiate determinate 
connection, i.e., representations are necessarily connected. If Transcendental Deduction intends to 
prove that there exists a necessary connection in the world, then the association argument should 
have achieved its aim and Deduction should be completed here. However, Kant shows that it is 
not the end of the Deduction, and he puts forward the argument for affinity, which turns out to 
be the heart of the argument from cognition.  
In order to keep neutral, I will first use Kant’s own language and design to reiterate the 
argument, then abbreviate the argument in my own language. Kant’s argument for affinity runs as 
follows: 
 
(AC4.1) Assuming that association does not have objective ground. 
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(AC4.2*) Appearances can only be apprehended by the imagination under the condition of a 
possible synthetic unity of this apprehension.203 
(AC4.3*) Therefore, it would also be entirely contingent whether appearances fit into a connection 
of human cognitions. 
(AC4.4) It would still remain in itself entirely undetermined and contingent whether the perceptions were 
also associable. 
(AC4.5) Therefore, it would be possible that empirical consciousness does not belong to one 
consciousness. 
(AC4.6) However, it is necessary that all empirical consciousness is encompassed in one self-
consciousness. 
(AC4.7) (AC4.5) is false. (From AC4.6) 
(AC4.8) Therefore, association has the objective ground of association, namely affinity. 
(Assumption Discharged) 
 
6.6.1 Terminological Clarification 
The basic idea of the argument for affinity is quite clear. Kant suggests that determinate 
connection of representations is inadequate, and it still lacks something else. However, Kant’s 
formulation of the argument requires further clarification. Perhaps the most striking feature of the 
argument for affinity is the repeated and complex modal expression. (AC4.2) and (AC4.3) are 
Kant’s two formulations of reductio claims with the explicit reference to modal terms: 
 
if this unity of association did not also have an objective ground […] it would also be entirely contingent 
whether appearances fit into a connection of human cognitions. (A121) 
 
For even though we had the faculty for associating perceptions, it would still remain in itself entirely 
undetermined and contingent whether they were also associable[.] (A121-122) 
 
                                                     
203 Kant’s line of argument in the Argument for Affinity is not as clear as the previous four. Therefore, I have to 
discard some texts in favor of other ones. This claim is rewritten on the basis of the following text: “it would be 
impossible for appearances to be apprehended by the imagination otherwise than under the condition of a possible 
synthetic unity of this apprehension” (A121). 
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The second reductio claim is loaded with two modal expressions: (a) “associable” and (b) 
“undetermined and contingent”. Unfortunately, both of them are problematic. I would like first to dispel 
some terminological obscurity and inconsistency in this argument in order for the reader to have a 
better sense of Kant’s point in this argument. The expression “associable” in “whether they [the 
perceptions] were associable” is liable to invite misunderstanding. Normally, “associable” simply 
means being able to be associated, thus it indicates the possibility of association. In this case, being 
associated entails being associable; that is, the actuality of association entails its possibility. If this 
is right, Kant could trivially infer the possibility of association from the actuality of association that 
has already been proved in association argument. Then, it is curious why Kant says that whether 
the perceptions are associable is not determined. 
On my view, this normal reading is incorrect. By “whether they were also associable” what 
Kant precisely asks is not whether association is possible, but whether the association is necessary, or 
equivalently, he is asking how association is possible. As a common practice, Kant’s how-possible 
question of x is a question of the ground of x. Kant is pursuing what the ground of their being 
associated is.204 In fact, this strong reading also coheres well with other text where Kant raises the 
question about association. In A144 Kant has a more precise articulation of the question: “on what, 
I ask, does this, as a law of nature, rest, and how is this association even possible?” (A144) 
Therefore, I propose that we should abandon the normal and weak reading in favor of an 
unusual and strong reading of “associable”. In other words, it is more plausible to read “associable” 
as the necessity of association, the one of stronger modal strength, instead of the mere possibility of 
association. Construed in this way, what concerns Kant is not a trivial inference from the actuality 
of association to its possibility, but a substantial one from the actuality of association to its necessity. 
Of course, this inference cannot go through by itself, and some additional premise must be 
introduced.205 
Kant’s modal expression “undetermined and contingent” is not only obscure but also incoherent. 
Since “contingent” is a modal term, “undetermined” should be read as modally undetermined.  Then, 
what does modal indeterminacy mean? On my proposal, if some proposition P is modally 
undetermined, then the modal status of P cannot be decided in view of the evidence one has. For 
instance, actuality is a typical kind of modality, but it is modally coarse-grained. It can be further 
determined whether it is necessarily or contingently so. The necessity and contingency are modally 
                                                     
204 The necessity in question of the hypothetical necessity, rather than absolute necessity. According to Kant, if x is a 
ground of possibility of y, then y is hypothetically necessary. In fact, almost all necessities in Kant are hypothetical 
except those related to God. 
205 Apparently, Kant is inquiring into the mode in which representations enter connections. 
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fined-grained. The modal determinacy is deeply relative. Relative to actuality, necessity is modally 
determinate. Relative to some other more fine-grained modality, say, the necessity of necessity, 
necessity is modally indeterminate. 
It is strange that Kant should use the contingency in juxtaposition with modal indeterminacy. 
In Kant’s formulation that “undetermined and contingent”, the notion of modal indeterminacy 
and the notion of contingency are obviously not coextensive. It can entice two quite different readings 
on the precise modal nature of the question. Furthermore, “undetermined and contingent” are 
even not compatible. If a truth T is contingent, it follows that it is modally determined relative to 
actuality, rather than modally undetermined. The modal status of contingency excludes the 
possibility of necessity and it is modally determined. To claim that T is undetermined and 
contingent amounts to claiming that T is both modally undetermined and determined, which is 
obviously self-contradictory. 
In the confrontation with the incompatibility between contingency and modal indeterminacy, 
we must decide which modal status Kant has in mind. Note that the first reductio claim “it would 
also be entirely contingent whether appearances fit into a connection of human cognitions”. It is 
tempted to draw the conclusion that the modal status of second reductio claim in question is 
contingent, rather than modally indeterminate, by being consistent with Kant’s first modal 
formulation. However, one cannot make such inference. The reason lies in that while both reductio 
claims are conditional, their antecedents of are different. In Kant’s first reductio claim, the antecedent 
of the conditional is that there is association and there is no objective ground. In Kant’s second 
reductio claim, however, the antecedent of the conditional is that there is association without 
negating the objective ground. One uniqueness claim is included in the antecedent of the first 
reductio claim which is excluded from the second. Consequently, the different antecedents of the 
conditional in two conditional reductio claims correspondingly require the different modal restriction 
in consequents. 
Suppose that P represents that there exists a subjective ground of reproduction in accordance 
with a rule, Q represents that there exists an objective ground reproduction in accordance with a 
rule, and R represents that representations are associated. The conditional in the first reductio 
formulation goes as follows: 
 
(MC1) if P & not Q, then R is contingent. 
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In contrast, the conditional of the second reductio goes in a different way: 
 
(MC2) if P, then R is modally undetermined. 
 
According to my reading, what Kant has in mind by the second reductio is modal indeterminacy, 
rather than contingency. The contingency reading is incorrect precisely because from neither (MC1) 
nor (MC2) does it follow: 
 
(MC2*) if P, then R is contingent. 
 
What Kant is pursuing is that, even if association is granted, it still remains modally undetermined 
whether this association is necessary. Kant’s assumption is that if the reproduction with rules has an 
objective ground, then it is necessary that representations are associated. Therefore, 
 
(MC3) if P & Q, then R is necessary. 
 
On the other hand, the reductio claim further suggests that if the antecedent is satisfied, 
appearances will enter cognition in a necessary way: 
 
(MC3) If P & Q, then R is necessary. 
(Premise*) P & Q. 
(Conclusion) R is necessary. 
 
Therefore, the modal status of association is condition-relative; and the modal status of 
association is different with respect to the different antecedent. This conclusion is critically 
important, for it enables us to be in a position to clarify the modal status of association. In the 
argument for affinity, Kant’s positive view is that association is necessary since it is grounded in affinity. 
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In some other place, however, Kant charges that association is contingent. Kant’s contingency charge 
of association is not surprising. In fact, this is one of most standard criticisms Kant levels to the 
role of association in cognition in general. One typical statement on association is contained in §18 
in B-Deduction: 
 
Whether I can become empirically conscious of the manifold as simultaneous or successive depends 
on the circumstances, or empirical conditions. Hence the empirical unity of consciousness, through 
association of the representations, itself concerns an appearance, and is entirely contingent. (B139-
B140)    
 
Therefore, Kant’s commitment to the contingency of association in B-Deduction is 
inconsistent with Kant’s commitment to the necessity of association in A-Deduction. One 
response is that Kant might change or improve his view in the 1787 Critique. I think that a 
developmental reading of the difference does not do justice to Kant. Rather, I believe that Kant’s 
theory of mind is substantially consistent and that there is no genuine difference between A-
Deduction and B-Deduction concerning the modal status of association.  
In light of the several distinctions I have made above, the alleged inconsistency disappears. 
Kant’s necessity claim on association in the affinity argument in the A-Deduction amounts to 
claiming (MC3) that if there are both a subjective and an objective ground, then association is 
necessary. Kant’s contingency claim on association in B-Deduction in effect claims (MC1) that if 
there is no objective ground, association is contingent. If Kant’s argument for affinity is successful, 
then association is in fact necessary. Consequently, Kant maintains that association by itself is not 
only contingent but also unactual. In other words, the contingency of association is merely a 
hypothetical scenario. What Kant claims in §18 is that if association were not to make reference to 
the unity of transcendental self-consciousness, then association would be entirely contingent.  
Another objection to the scope of association could be found in Guyer. In response to Kant’s 
contrast between subjective unity and objective unity, Guyer powerfully argues as follows: 
 
if we were to accept Kant’s present move without qualification, we would have a dilemma on our 
hands: either some of our experience is merely subjective, and does not involve the categories, which 
means that the categories do not after all have objective validity, that is, apply to all our experience; or 
else all of our apperception is objective and the categories do apply to all our experience, but only 
because we do not have any merely subjective experience at all. Neither horn of this dilemma seems 
attractive. (2006, 90-91) 
 
190 
 
Guyer is acutely aware of the fact that the putative contingency of association implies that 
some objects of sensible intuition are merely associated without being subject to categories, which 
is inconsistent with Kant’s alleged conclusion that all the objects of sensible intuitions are subject 
to categories. Guyer’s objection is quite reasonable. As far as Kant’s intention is concerned, I 
believe that Kant is caught on the second horn of the dilemma, namely, categories apply to all of 
our experience. 206  As I have explained above, Kant’s contention that association by itself is 
contingent is a theoretical conditional truth that is never actualized in our world. For Kant, there 
is no contingent association in the world just as there is no colorless shape in the world. 
 
6.6.2 Kant’s Dual Necessity  
Remember that in the association argument Kant has shown that association necessitates 
representations. The necessity of association appears to render superfluous the association 
argument that representations are necessarily connected. The key to explaining away the 
superfluousness is to shed light on the difference between the modal characterizations in the two 
sub-arguments, which could be formulated in this way: the association argument is intended to 
establish that every representation is necessarily connected with another. The affinity argument, by 
contrast, is intended to establish that every representation necessarily instantiates the connection with 
another. Kant attempts to contend that the necessary connection is necessarily instantiated. Broadly 
speaking, the necessity in the two arguments are operative on different levels. The first kind of 
necessary relationship holds between objects, i.e., between appearances, while the second kind of 
necessary relationship holds between object and subject, i.e., between appearances and 
understanding. The conflation of one with the other will distort the entire picture of the 
Transcendental Deduction. 
In fact, this characteristic modal structure is not peculiar to the argument for affinity; rather, 
it is formulated in different guises in different texts. Corresponding to the two different notions of 
necessity, two kinds of texts should be carefully distinguished. On the one hand, Kant talks about 
the necessary connection between appearances: 
 
All appearances therefore stand in a thoroughgoing connection according to necessary laws[.] (A113-
114)207 
                                                     
206 It does not mean that categories are valid of literally everything in space and time without qualification. As Kant 
adds in 1787 Critique, categories are only valid of objects of outer intuition.  
207 For Kant, the necessary connection is equivalent to the lawlike (gesetzlich) connection. 
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I will not mention that, e.g., the concept of a cause brings the trait of necessity with it, which no experience at 
all can yield, for experience teaches us that one appearance customarily follows another, but not that 
it must necessarily follow that, nor that an inference from a condition to its consequence can be made a 
priori and entirely universally. (A112) 
 
        Since perception is the empirical consciousness of appearances, the metaphysically neutral 
language of appearances could be formulated by the representational talk of perceptions. 208 As 
Kant writes: 
 
There is only one experience, in which all perceptions are represented as in thoroughgoing and lawlike 
connection[.] (A110) 
 
        On the other hand, Kant talks about the necessary instantiation of the connection, which is 
reflected by “the necessary connection of the understanding with the appearances” (A119):  
 
Now since this relation of appearances to possible experience is likewise necessary (since without it we 
could not obtain any cognition at all through them, and they would thus not concern us at all), it 
follows that the pure understanding, by means of the categories, is a formal and synthetic principle of 
all experiences, and that appearances have a necessary relation to the understanding. (A119) 
 
        Given that appearances are given to sensibility and apperception is sometimes identified with 
understanding, sometimes Kant would say that the necessary relation holds between sensibility and 
apperception: 
 
However, the possibility, indeed even the necessity of these categories rests on the relation that the 
entire sensibility, and with it also all possible appearances, have to the original apperception, in which 
everything is necessarily in agreement with the conditions of the thoroughgoing unity of self-
consciousness, i.e., must stand under universal functions of synthesis, namely of the synthesis in 
accordance with concepts, as that in which alone apperception can demonstrate a priori its 
thoroughgoing and necessary identity. (A111-A112) 
 
                                                     
208 I take Kant’s notion of appearances to metaphysically neutral because appearances are neither things in 
themselves nor representations unless appearances are interpreted by realism or idealism. 
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        In another place, Kant simply reduces the necessary relationship between appearances and 
apperception into that between two faculties, namely, of sensibility and understanding:  
 
By its means we bring into combination the manifold of intuition on the one side and the condition 
of the necessary unity of apperception on the other. Both extremes, namely sensibility and 
understanding, must necessarily be connected by means of this transcendental function of the 
imagination[.] (A124)209 
 
This dual necessity is characteristic of Kant’s transcendental path. Kant’s systematic and consistent 
distinction between the two kinds of necessity makes it difficult to believe that Kant conflates the 
de dicto necessity with the de re necessity. According to one misleading interpretation, Kant has a 
short argument from (N1) to (N2) and therefore he is committed to the view that the necessary 
connection entails the necessary instantiation: 
 
(N1) Objects are necessarily connected. (Anti-skeptical particularism) 
(N1*) Objects necessarily instantiate the connection. 
 
Of course, it is logically fallacious. But if the argument is understood not as deductive but as 
abductive, then it is a convincing argument: (N1*) is obviously the sufficient condition for (N1). 
There is a deeper point. Kant could complement the explanatory argument with one additional 
argument for the necessity of necessary instantiation, where the necessity is one of the consequence. 
Then the argument becomes valid: 
 
(N1) Objects are necessarily connected. (Anti-skeptical particularism) 
(N2) The necessary connection is made possible by the necessary instantiation of the 
connection. 
(N3) The necessary connection is not made possible in any other way. 
                                                     
209 The difference is best evidenced in the necessary relation of appearances to experience. To say appearances must 
be necessarily connected into the experience is not to say that appearances must be necessarily connected with each 
other. 
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(N4) The necessary connection implies the necessary instantiation of connection. 
(N1*) Objects necessarily instantiate the connection. 
 
The necessary instantiation is equivalent to the grounding model that “the representation 
makes the object possible”. As we have shown in previous chapters, the necessary connection is 
not made possible by all other rival grounding models. Therefore, Kant draws the conclusion with 
twofold necessity: one is the necessity of the consequence, which is derived from the disjunctive 
syllogism, and the other is the necessity of the consequent, which is derived from the inner structure 
of the grounding model. This broad argument is the very core of the Copernican Revolution. I 
think that it suffices to make the argument from cognition a convincing and independent argument. 
However, Kant’s actual argument from cognition runs in a different direction by appealing to the 
identity of self-consciousness. 
 
6.6.3 The Strength of the Premise 
In the previous sub-arguments, from the rich conception of cognition flow the various 
dischargers of reductio assumptions. One might propose that this strategy of conceptual analysis is also 
true of the argument for affinity.  To recall Kant’s various conceptions of cognition: in the 
Stufenleiter, cognition is the conscious representation of an object; in the second section of A-
Deduction, cognition is “a whole of compared and connected representations” (A97). It is not 
difficult to see that while composition and connection are implied by this definition, no claim to 
the necessity of combination is explicitly contained in these definitions of cognition. Therefore, it is not 
clear why appearances cannot “fit into a connection of human cognitions in a contingent way” (A121). 
Even if Kant were committed to a conception of cognition involving such an implicit modal 
constraint, this conception of cognition would be too strong to be intuitive. The modal requirement 
seems to be motivated by an ad hoc prescription of the notion of cognition. In fact, in the affinity 
argument it is the second time when “human cognition” makes an explicit appearance in the 
argument from cognition. Ironically, in this very occasion Kant makes a demand that the cognition 
by itself cannot afford. 
On another proposal, Kant’s target is directed against the empirical adequacy of the 
association model of mind, namely, the scope of association. In effect, this proposal makes a reductive 
analysis of the necessity in question without taking the modal characterization at face value. This 
proposal has the additional bonus to avoid the problem that Kant’s modal characterization in the 
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argument for affinity seems excessively strong. As far as one representation is associated with 
another, the connection is necessary. It does not mean, however, that all representations must enter 
the connection necessarily and be associated with other representation determinately. It is likely 
that at least some representations could escape from the association. 
The reason why the association model of mind is inadequate lies in that not all representations 
are associated into necessary connection, there must be further ground such that all representations 
are associated into necessary connection. What the previous association argument establishes only 
applies to some representations where there exists relevant habit for a certain kind of representation. 
If so, Kant’s point in the affinity argument is that there must be something else that makes all 
representations associated into determinate connections. 
One might further ask why association cannot guarantee that all representations are 
necessarily connected. The answer is that the explanatory inadequacy of association is deeply rooted 
in the empirical nature of association. Consider the following two reasons for this view. I will call 
them respectively as the reason of the gap in time and the reason of the gap for erring. 
In order for association to take its effect, we should acquire a relevant habit or custom as the 
mechanism to associate a particular kind of event. The formation of the mechanism of habit or 
custom relies on repeated observation, and this in turn requires a certain amount of time. Suppose 
that one forms the relevant and required habit or custom for the association of a particular kind of 
event E at the time t. Before t, however, it leaves a time gap with regard to lawfulness, and therefore 
there is no association to determinately connect one representation with another. Obviously, this 
time-gap objection could be mounted against any particular type of event. 
Or we can understand the limitation of the association in a different light. Given a particular 
type of event E, association constantly connects one representation that falls under E with another 
representation F. However, it cannot be guaranteed that the mechanism of habit or custom can 
always do so. It might be the case that our mind does not always associate one representation that 
falls under E determinately to another representation. It is likely to happen because our habit or 
custom of association is empirically acquired in the short run and historically evolved in the long run. The 
relevant mechanism of habit or custom can err. The mechanism of association as adapter often 
works such that it suffices to enhance the chance of our survival, but it does not do this job with 
metaphysical necessity. 
In spite of their plausibility, I think that the above criticisms against the empirical inadequacy 
of association model of mind are not Kant’s point. In what follows I will explain why we cannot 
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and should not attribute this reading to Kant. For one thing, Kant does not hold this view. For Kant 
there is no problem in the scope of association. As Kant himself makes explicitly, “laws of a 
thoroughgoing connection in reproduction” are “universal” (A122). For another, Kant should not 
hold this view. For the sake of argument, it is not an interesting strategy for Kant to argue against 
the empirical limitation of association model of mind, even if there is indeed some deficiency in the 
association model of mind. In order to sharpen his argument, Kant should instead argue against 
the association model of mind in its strongest form, for which the rule of association unexceptionally applies 
to every representation, and therefore the association of mind is empirically adequate for explaining 
the necessary connection in the world. 
For the polemical reason the philosophical significance of empirical adequacy is particularly 
important. If the model of association were not to perform the function to live up to the standard 
of empirical adequacy, empiricism would be left with room to rejoinder to the Kant’s argument. 
Empiricists could claim either that association model of mind is misunderstood, or that its potential 
is not exhausted. In either case, Kant does not do justice to association model of mind. For instance, 
empiricists can reply that as far as has been observed to date, the association is quite good to explain 
a variety of phenomena. It is very plausible to postulate the empirical adequacy of association as a 
contingent truth. 
Now that Kant has neither conceptual nor empirical reason to introduce a new dimension of 
necessary instantiation, one might wonder on what ground Kant is justified in arguing that the 
world is necessarily connected in virtue of necessary instantiation. It seems that the dual necessity 
seems not only excessively but also unnecessarily strong. The empiricists are justified to ask: since the 
association model is empirically adequate, why don’t we satisfy with the contingency of the claim? 
Or more generally, why should the modal status be relevant to our concern? A more radical charge 
is that why we should make the claim to necessity, namely, to an objective ground at all. What the 
affinity argument intends to say is that not only all representations are necessarily connected, but 
also they necessarily instantiate the connection.  
Kant’s answer is that even if the association model of mind is empirically adequate, it is not 
consistent with our modal truth. Consequently, it is incompatible with the modal structure of reality. 
This is Kant’s moment in philosophy. Kant changes his premise from the definition of cognition 
to some modal truth. As Kant makes clear that it is the modal truth concerning self-consciousness, rather 
than the modal truth concerning mathematics or physics, that plays the role of the touchstone for examining 
a model of human mind. Kant makes this move out of the consideration of the consistency of his 
system, or better, his body of fundamental philosophical convictions. This constitutes a reply to 
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the objection that Kant’s position of necessary instantiation of necessary connection is excessively 
strong. 
 
6.6.4 The Argument Reformulated 
In the following, I would like to propose that the affinity argument is concerned with the 
modality of the connection between representations. More specifically, I will argue that the affinity 
argument intends to determine the modal status of some claim with reference to some modal truth and 
to explicate what the precise modal formulations are. 
Now the argument for affinity considered above can be reconstructed as a characteristic 
Kantian Disjunctive Syllogism: 
 
(AC4.1*) That representations instantiate the determinate connection is either contingent or 
necessary. (Logical Truth: the modal indeterminacy of Connection Thesis) 
(AC4.2*) The contingency of the instantiation of determinate connection of representations is 
inconsistent with the necessity of the ascription of all my representations to self-consciousness. 
(AC4.3*) The ascription of all my representations to self-consciousness is true. (Self-Ascription 
Thesis) 
(AC4.4*) The contingency of the instantiation of the determinate connection of representations is 
false. 
(AC4.5*) That representations instantiate the determinate connection is necessary. 
 
The reconstructed argument (AB4*) precisely instantiates the scheme of Kantian Disjunctive Syllogism. 
The minor premise of the syllogism is a negation of a disjunct, which is determined by its 
incompatibility with some modal truth by modus tollens: 
 
(AB4.1*) Either P is contingent or P is necessary. (Major Premise) 
 (AB4.2*) Q is necessary. (Modal truth) 
(AB4.3*) The contingency of P is inconsistent with the necessity of Q. (Inconsistency) 
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 (AB4.4*) P is not contingent. (Minor Premise) 
(AB4.5*) P is necessary. (Conclusion) 
 
As the scheme shows, the overall argument is obviously valid. The following task is only to 
examine its premises to see whether it is sound. Like other Kantian disjunctive syllogisms, whether 
the argument stands or falls depends on the truth-values of the major premise (AB4.1*) and the 
minor premise (AB4.4*) of the disjunctive syllogism. Since (AB4.1*) is taken as a theoretical truth 
on certain assumptions, the soundness of the argument draws on (AC4.4*), the negation of one 
disjunct. The truth of the minor premise in turn draws on the Inconsistency Premise (AC4.2*) and 
the Modal Truth Premise (AC4.3*). In this chapter I will assume the truth of Self-Ascription Thesis 
(AC4.3*) and leave Kant’s argument for it aside to the next chapter. Therefore, I will only 
concentrate on examining whether the Inconsistency Premise (AC4.2*) holds, and what additional 
premise is required in order for this argument to go through, provided that it does not hold. 
In (AC4.2*) the contingency of the Necessary Connection Thesis is refuted if any of its logical 
consequences contradicts the Self-Ascription Thesis. Let’s look at what the contingency of 
Necessary Connection Thesis implies. Kant writes: 
 
in case they were not [associable], a multitude of perceptions and an entire sensibility would be possible 
in which much empirical consciousness would be encountered in my mind, but separated, and without 
belonging to one consciousness of myself, which, however, is impossible. (A122) 
 
As has been explicated before, “associable” means the necessity of association. To claim that 
perceptions were not associable is equivalent to claim that the association of perceptions does not 
have objective ground and thus it is not hypothetically necessary. The consequence of this 
counterfactual scenario is that it is possible that “much empirical consciousness” would not belong 
to one self-consciousness. Note that Kant does not make the claim that it is actual that “much 
empirical consciousness” would not belong to one self-consciousness. This confirms my view that 
Kant does not argue against the empirical adequacy of association.  
Obviously, it is unproblematic that the consequence of multiple selves is immediately 
incompatible with the identity of self-consciousness, which I have assumed without offering any 
proof. Now the question is whether and how this consequence is implied by the contingency of 
the Necessary Connection Thesis in the counterfactual scenario of the contingent association. 
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Given that Kant does not make explicit what the connection between the contingency of 
association and the negation of Self-Ascription Premise is, in the following I will try to reconstruct 
one possible line of Kant’s thought: 
 
(1) It is contingent/groundless that all perceptions are associated into necessary connections. 
 
By negating (1), we have the claim that 
 
(2) It is possible that not all perceptions are associated into necessary connections.  
 
From (2) the consequence Kant intends to draws is: 
 
(3) It is possible that not all perceptions are ascribed to one self-consciousness. 
 
In order for the inference from (2) to (3) to go through, Kant is committed to the assumption that  
 
(A*) For any representation x, if x is ascribable to one self-consciousness, then it is associable into 
connection. 
 
According to the association model of mind, all perceptions stand in determinate connection, 
though whether perceptions enter into the connection is contingent and depends on the 
circumstances. In Kant’s words, the association does produce “unity” among perceptions. While 
Kant does not say it explicitly, the unity of association is obviously synthetic. It is noteworthy the 
unity of self-consciousness plays no part in the association account of necessary connection.  
The friends of the association model of mind can argue that this subjective unity by 
association is all that we have, and by means of the subjective unity all our perceptions are not 
separated. Then, they can further ask, very justified, why we need a redundant unity of self-
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consciousness at all, and, even if we do have, why the connection by association should have 
bearing upon the ascription of empirical consciousness to one single self-consciousness. 
Even if this line of reasoning is accepted as well-motivated, the friends of association model 
of mind still have other ways to escape from it. For instance, they can acknowledge that we have a 
thin conception of the identity of self-consciousness, namely in the sense of logical identity of self-
consciousness, and meanwhile they equally claim that the connection of empirical consciousness 
needs not to refer to self-consciousness. Therefore, the self-consciousness has nothing to do with 
the connection between empirical consciousness at all. 
The friends of the association model of mind believe that the burden of proof is loaded on 
Kant’s side. The unity of self-consciousness is at best one sufficient condition, but not a necessary 
condition for connection between different empirical consciousness. What is at issue is not to show 
that why association is not sufficient, but to show why self-consciousness is necessary.  
Unfortunately, this is the weak point in Kant’s formulation of the argument from cognition. 
Yet, it does not damage the substance of Kant’s line of thought. Kant’s basic idea is as follows: if 
there is no ground of association, then there is no affinity; if there is affinity, there is no a priori 
synthetic unity; if there is no synthetic unity of the manifold, then there is no identity of self-
consciousness; if there is no identity of self-consciousness, there is dispersed empirical 
consciousness. In order for the argument to go through, Kant must commit himself to the view of 
“no identity without affinity”, which lacks adequate justification here. 
In any event, however, this is not an incurable deficiency in Transcendental Deduction. As 
has been indicated, the different versions of arguments have different strength and weakness. This 
relation between association and identity of self-consciousness will be remedied by Kant’s 
introduction of the analytic unity and the synthetic unity of the self-consciousness in his argument 
from self-consciousness in Chapter 7. 
 
6.7 Metaphysical Grounding: Affinity, Imagination and Categories 
6.7.1 The Imagination as Ground 
The association argument claims that representations have a subjective and empirical ground, 
and it proceeds to identify the subjective ground as association. Likewise, in the affinity argument 
claims that representations must have an objective ground, and it further suggests that the 
“objective ground of all association of appearances” (A122) is affinity. Then, what is affinity? In 
Critique, Kant defines affinity as follows: “[t]he ground of the possibility of the association of the 
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manifold, insofar as it lies in the object is called the affinity of the manifold” (A113). In the 
Anthropology Kant’s definition is slightly different from the above one: “[b]y affinity I understand the 
unification (Vereinigung) of the manifold in virtue of its derivation from one ground.” (AA 7:176-
177) 
The definition in the Anthropology contains two key pieces of information. First, affinity is a 
“unification of the manifold”. Although Kant does not say it explicitly, affinity should be 
understood as synthetic unity. As I have indicated, Kant takes apprehension and association to have 
synthetic unity. In the argument from above Kant also identifies “the transcendental principle 
of the unity of all the manifold of our representations (thus also in intuition)” as “synthetic” 
(A116). Therefore, I think that it is reasonable to suggest that the unity of affinity is also a kind of 
synthetic unity. If Kant has synthetic unity at his disposal, it seems natural for him to infer to the 
synthesis and categories. The definition enables such an immediate inference by including the 
metaphysical notion of grounding in it. Furthermore, affinity does not only mean the synthetic unity 
of manifold, but indicates that the synthetic unity is not sui generis and that it is grounded as a 
consequence. In other words, it is hypothetically necessary that the manifold representation is such 
connected. By combining the two remarks, we can conclude that affinity is defined in terms of the 
explanatory role it plays. On the one hand, affinity is introduced as the objective ground of association, 
and the latter is grounded by the former. On the other hand, affinity as consequence is in turn 
grounded on the a priori synthesis of imagination, as Kant writes that “the affinity of all appearances 
(near or remote) is a necessary consequence of a synthesis in the imagination that is grounded a 
priori on rules” (A123). Therefore, Kant’s picture of cognition is underwritten by the metaphysical 
relation of ground and consequence. 
The metaphysical chain of grounding extends further than the affinity. Defining affinity in 
this way, Kant sheds new light on the nature of imagination as well as the role it plays in constituting 
objective representation. As mentioned before, the received view is that the faculty of the 
imagination “has been limited to reproduction” (A120f). In the apprehension argument Kant 
postulates that the faculty of the imagination must have the function of the synthesis of 
apprehension that plays a role in perception, and thus broadens the understanding of what 
imagination is. In the affinity argument Kant is doing exactly the same thing. In addition to the 
reproductive function, as Kant suggests, the imagination also has the productive function. The 
productive imagination is “a faculty of the original presentation of the object, which precedes 
experience” (AA 7:167).210 It is noteworthy that Kant is not saying that the productive imagination 
                                                     
210 For more detail see Anthropology §28 (AA 7:167-169). 
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must be a priori; rather, he is saying that the a priori synthesis of imagination must be productive. 
Therefore, Kant suggests that it is the productive imagination that is at play for the affinity of the 
manifold. For Kant, the imagination emerges also as a faculty of synthesis a priori. The a priori 
synthesis is the transcendental function of imagination that is essentially distinguished from other 
empirical functions such as apprehension and reproduction. The discovery or postulation of a 
transcendental dimension of mind is the most revolutionary and controversial part in Kant’s theory 
of mind. In Chapter 5 I have discussed how Kant introduces and delineates the precise nature of 
the imagination, therefore I will spare myself another discussion on it here.211 
 
6.7.2 Categories as Ground 
After the introduction of the transcendental synthesis of the imagination, Kant makes the 
inference to categories. Again, he relies on the metaphysical relation of ground and consequence 
and extends it to categories, which are characterized as the grounds of the unity of synthesis: “[on 
those categories] is grounded, therefore, all formal unity in the synthesis of the imagination, and by 
means of the latter also all of its empirical use (in recognition, reproduction, association, and 
apprehension) down to the appearances, since the latter belong to our consciousness at all and 
hence to ourselves only by means of these elements of cognition.” (A125) 
To be sure, Kant identifies categories as the grounds of “all formal unity in the synthesis of the 
imagination”. On my reading, nevertheless, what Kant intends to say is not that categories are 
numerically distinct from the formal unity of synthesis, but that they are identical with it. 
Kant’s introduction of categories is very brief, and it looks like an assertion, rather than an 
argument. Guyer complains that Kant’s reasoning is too abstract.212 I think that Guyer’s objection 
is quite fair. The ill-argued link between synthesis and categories does not only make trouble for 
the argument from cognition, but also plagues every version of Kant’s argument. This difficulty 
can only be relieved, if not resolved, in Chapter 8, where a study of the meaning and origin of 
categories will shed light on the inference from synthesis to categories. 
From the introduction of transcendental affinity, Kant identifies a series of metaphysical 
relation of consequence to ground: affinity is grounded in the transcendental synthesis of the 
imagination, and the transcendental synthesis of imagination is in turn grounded in categories. This 
                                                     
211 See 5.6. 
212 For more details see Guyer 2006, 87-88. 
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chain of inference is clearer than any other place in lending support to my metaphysical 
interpretation of the nature of argument in Transcendental Deduction. 
The argument from cognition is lengthy, and sometimes it seems even unnecessarily tedious. 
It is doubtful whether, for the sake of argument, it is necessary to take such a long journey to find 
the entrance of Deduction, namely, the synthetic unity, in the thick notion of affinity. In fact, this 
deficiency will be remedied by the one argument from the identity of self-consciousness. Relying 
on some other modal truth, Kant will soon find the entrance to the synthetic unity necessary for 
the success of Transcendental Deduction. 
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Chapter 7  The Argument from Self-Consciousness 
7.1 Introduction 
Kant’s most celebrated argument in the Transcendental Deduction is the one centered on the 
notion of self-consciousness, or equivalently, transcendental apperception, or I (think)213. This line 
of argument is referred to, or acclaimed as, the master argument in the Transcendental Deduction. 
To many people the argument from self-consciousness is the transcendental deduction of 
categories itself.214 
In fact, Kant wrote this line of argument twice. The first version is the so-called “argument 
from above” in the A-Deduction, which runs from A116 to A119. And the second version of the 
argument is located in §16 in the B-Deduction.215 The ramifications of the argument from self-
consciousness go beyond that: as we have seen in the last chapter, the notion of self-consciousness 
is indispensable even for Kant’s official argument from cognition in A-Deduction. In addition, a 
detailed elaboration of the notion of self-consciousness is included in the threefold synthesis.216 
On my reading, the broad structure of the argument from self-consciousness could be 
constructed on the textual basis of the Transcendental Deduction in the 1781 Critique as follows: 
 
(AS1) Necessarily, all my representations in an intuition contain the I think. In other words, all my 
representations stand in analytic unity. (Self-Ascription) 
(AS2) Analytic unity implies synthetic unity. (Assumption) 
(AS3) Necessarily, all my representations stand in synthetic unity. (from AS1 and AS2) 
(AS4) The synthetic unity of representations in one intuition implies the transcendental synthesis. 
(AS5) The transcendental synthesis of imagination implies categories. 
(AS6) Necessarily, all my representations imply categories. 
                                                     
213 I take apperception, self-consciousness, the I (think), and the I (am) as synonymous and use them 
interchangeably. The self-consciousness is of German root, while the apperception is of Latin root. I do not think 
that Kant plays the trick of making use of the words of different roots to express different concepts; rather, it is a 
systematic feature in Kant’s philosophy to use the terms of different roots to express the same concept. 
214 Just to name a few examples: Strawson 1966, Dickerson 2003, and Wunderlich 2011. 
215 Strictly speaking, the second version of argument is not complete, since it finally drives into a new direction. 
However, it is not difficult for us to add what is missing and to reconstruct the argument in its entirety on the basis 
of the A-Deduction. As we will see later, what matters to me happens to be the part in §16. 
216 See the section “On the synthesis of recognition in the concept” in the 1781 Critique (A103-110). 
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(AS7) Necessarily, categories are applied to appearances.217 
 
This argument from self-consciousness is composed of two parts: the steps from (AS1) to 
(AS3) are characteristic of the argument from self-consciousness, and constitute the entrance to 
the transcendental path, and the steps from (AS4) to (AS7) are the routine route of the 
transcendental path shared by all versions of deduction.  
On the bottom level, my conviction is that the basic idea of the argument from self-
consciousness is quite simple. Kant need not bother himself to make the relevant discussion 
unnecessarily lengthy. Once the basic idea is figured out and articulated, the argument from self-
consciousness will suddenly come to light. It turns out that the argument from self-consciousness 
constitutes the most straightforward and quickest argument in the Transcendental Deduction. 
There are many reasons for the fact that the commentators overlook such a possibility of 
simplistic reading. Perhaps the most important reason is that Kant does not make his line of 
reasoning explicit in every twist and turn. Moreover, Kant’s argument is complicated by his 
ambiguous terminology. It is not to say that Kant is playing the trick of ambiguity, but that Kant 
himself is not always clear. For instance, Kant is trading on the ambiguity of analytic unity and 
synthetic unity as well as the ambiguity of result and act. Finally, even Kant’s formulation is 
sometimes inaccurate. For instance, Kant misleadingly claims that analytic unity presupposes synthetic 
unity. 
In this chapter I will concentrate on the argumentative part for the synthetic unity from self-
consciousness that runs from (AS1) to (AS3), and spare the effort of giving another redundant 
analysis of the second part of the argument from (AS4) to (AS7), since the metaphysical 
background has been discussed in the transcendental path in Chapter 5, and the most powerful 
defense of this common part is made in the argument from cognition in Chapter 6. All of the 
important steps from (AS1) to (AS3) are contained in the short and dense §16. 
In section 7.2, I will argue that even the argument form self-consciousness is not primarily 
anti-skeptical. The way of reading it as one argument against the Humean skepticism on the basis 
of the Cartesian evidence is unfounded. I hold that it is the fact concerning self-consciousness, 
rather than self-consciousness itself that is to be explained, which is consistent with Kant’s claim 
that self-consciousness is considered the supreme faculty. The fact of the ascription of all my 
                                                     
217 On a phenomenalist reading of Kant’s idealism, appearances are representations. 
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representations to an identical self does not enjoy any epistemic privilege to other facts that Kant 
takes for granted. 
In section 7.3 I will center my discussion on (AS1), namely, Kant’s idea of self-ascription and 
its various facets. To interpret Kant’s self-ascription thesis, I would like to take the approach of 
semantic analysis by invoking Kant’s own theoretical resources of marks and containment. The key 
to interpreting the self-ascription thesis in a semantic way is to focus not on the activity or some 
other aspects, but on the content of self-consciousness, which is linguistically designated by the “I 
think”.218 Therefore, I read the “I think” as a mark, and I argue later that it is an intuitive mark, 
rather than a discursive mark.219 On this mark reading, I argue that the self-ascription thesis is 
essentially analytic. The self-ascription thesis (AS1) is claiming that (AS1*) the “I think” as a mark 
that is semantically contained in every “my representation” as a whole-representation. More specifically, 
the self-ascription thesis states that (1) my representation is mine for it’s being accompanied by self-
consciousness, that (2) representations are ascribed to one identical self, (3) that the self-ascription thesis 
is an a priori analytic truth in virtue of the containment of marks and theoretical assumptions, (4) that 
it lays claim to the possible self-consciousness rather than to the actual self-consciousness, and (5) 
that it is local thesis rather than a global thesis. 
In section 7.5 and section 7.6, I will center my discussion on (AS2) and (AS3), namely, Kant’s 
idea of unity and its relation to manifoldness or multiplicity. One distinctive feature of the B-
Deduction is that Kant introduces the conceptual distinction between analytic unity and synthetic 
unity in the hope of clarifying the obscurity of linking identity with the connection in the A-
Deduction. I believe that previous interpretations fail to exploit the conceptual resources Kant 
offers largely due to the fact they overlook the systematic ambiguities in both notions. I will 
carefully differentiate the various senses of them, and examine different arguments based on them. 
In line with my previous mark reading, I propose that it is most promising to read the analytic unity 
and the synthetic unity of self-consciousness as co-extensive. In this light, Kant’s inference from 
the analytic unity to the synthetic unity of self-consciousness is conceived as addressing the 
question as to how the intuitive mark of I is brought into every manifold of my intuition. 
 
7.2 The Self-Consciousness and Anti-skepticism 
                                                     
218 For a survey of the different questions and answers in interpreting the “I think” see Klass 2003. 
219 Longuenesse holds that “the proposition ‘I think’ is thus characteristic of a merely discursive, not an intuitive 
understanding” (1998, 68). On my reading, the I think as an intuitive mark is neither discursive nor propositional. 
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As a common practice, the interpretation of Kant’s Transcendental Deduction is often 
preceded by a detailed study of self-consciousness. The analysis of Kant’s notion of self-
consciousness is so preeminent that it as it were reduces transcendental deduction to a study of 
self-consciousness. Since the nature of Kant’s self-consciousness itself requires book-length 
study, 220  and my present concern is merely the argumentative role of some aspects of self-
consciousness in Transcendental Deduction, I will spare myself from the daunting task of offering 
a systematic study of what self-consciousness is, and concentrate on Kant’s own definition, rather 
than the various specifications. 
While Kant’s discussion of self-consciousness is abundant, his most explicit and rigid 
definition seems to only make an appearance in his famous Refutation of Idealism. Kant writes 
that “[t]he consciousness of myself in the representation I is no intuition at all, but a merely 
intellectual representation of the self-activity of a thinking subject.” (B278)221 Kant believes that 
his own distinctive conception of self-consciousness encapsulates a genuine insight and contains a 
criticism of a mistaken view embraced by his predecessors, contemporaries and his uncritical past. 
Kant insists that the pure or transcendental self-consciousness is the consciousness of the activity 
of understanding, and that it should be distinguished from empirical self-consciousness as inner 
sense.222 
The fact that self-consciousness is appealing to philosophers and commentators is 
understandable. One important exegetical reason is that the notion of self-consciousness serves as 
the very point of departure of the entire argument in the B-Deduction as well as in the so-called 
argument from above in the A-Deduction. Therefore, it is very natural to view the notion of self-
consciousness as the cornerstone of the entire project of transcendental deduction, and to suppose 
that the prospect of the entire argument depends on it. 
However, I believe that the absolutely central status of self-consciousness in Transcendental 
Deduction is overrated. As it has been indicated, I adopt a generous and loose reading of the lines 
of arguments in the Transcendental Deduction, and I find that there exist other lines of argument 
independently from the argument from the identity of self-consciousness. Therefore, self-
consciousness is not necessary for Transcendental Deduction. Even if we cling strictly to Kant’s 
                                                     
220 See Ameriks 2000, Rosefeldt 2000, and Tester 2014. 
221 See §7 of the Anthropology for a similar definition of self-consciousness: “the higher, of spontaneity of 
apperception, that is, of pure consciousness of the activity that constitutes thinking”. (AA 7:141) 
222 In §24 of the Anthropology, Kant makes contrast between two kinds of self-consciousness as follows: “Inner sense 
is not pure apperception, a consciousness of what the human being does, since this belongs to the faculty of thinking. 
Rather, it is a consciousness of what he undergoes, in so far as he is affected by the play of his own thoughts. ” (AA 
7:161) 
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own presentation, the appeal to self-consciousness is by no means indispensable. The role of self-
consciousness is entirely absent in Kant’s argument in Prologomena in 1783 and his suggestion in 
Metaphysical Foundation in 1786, and it also does not find itself in his famous Analogies, either. 
The conception of self-consciousness is of great theoretical potential.223 Indeed, according to 
the traditional interpretation, the argument from self-consciousness starts with a self-evident 
Cartesian premise concerning the I think to derive a deeply anti-Humean result. To be sure, 
Cartesian and Humean skepticisms are of entirely different concerns. It nonetheless seems 
promising to read Transcendental Deduction as refuting Humean skepticism with the Cartesian 
inspiration. For the defenders of such an interpretation, the fact that Kant does not reiterate 
Descartes’ cogito argument is not a vice, but a virtue: Kant not only should but also does contribute 
something original in his version of the argument from self-consciousness. 
Kant’s notion of self-consciousness roots itself deeply in the early modern Cartesian tradition. 
For Descartes, the cogito is the Archimedean point in his foundationalist project of epistemology. 
The certainty of the proposition “I think” is the first piece of knowledge evident and beyond 
doubt, from which other knowledge could be deduced when combined with certain principles. 
Moreover, the certainty of the knowledge of the existence of mind is also immune from even the 
most radical kind of skepticism.224 
Kant’s notion of self-consciousness is linguistically designated by “I think”, which is 
reminiscent of Descartes’ famous cogito argument that “I think therefore I am”. Since Kant’s notion 
of self-consciousness also serves as the very point of departure of the argument, one might quite 
reasonably suppose that self-consciousness is the Archimedean point in Kant’s system of 
philosophy. It is expectable that the connection of Kant with Descartes is profitable. For instance, 
Henrich dubs the term “Cartesian evidence” to refer to our certainty of the identity of ourselves.225 
In addition, the anti-skeptic prospect of the argument makes the notion of self-consciousness 
exciting. The anti-skepticism reading of the nature and task of the Transcendental Deduction is 
prevalent. Compared to the argument from cognition, it is much more plausible to have an anti-
skeptical reading of the argument from self-consciousness. The possession of the cognition as the 
                                                     
223 Commentators vary on the evaluation of the place of Kant’s theory of self-consciousness in the history of 
philosophy. Henrich and many others are convinced that Kant’s conception of self-consciousness is revolutionary. 
See Henrich 1989b. By contrast, recently Wunderlich attaches critical importance to the continuity of Kant’s account 
of self-consciousness with his rationalist predecessors’ theories of self-consciousness in Germany. For German 
idealist such as Fichte the self-consciousness is self-positing. See Wunderlich 2005. For a useful survey of the history 
of self-consciousness in early modern philosophy see Thiel 2001. 
224 For an excellent reconstruction of Cartesian foundationalist epistemology see Bonjour 2009, 9-23. 
225 See Henrich 1989b and Henrich 1994. For a study of Descartes and Kant see Longuenesse 2017. 
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synthetic unity of representations seems too strong to win the favor of the opponents. The identity 
of self-consciousness, by contrast, seems to be a much thinner and much more defensible premise. 
Hence, the argument from self-consciousness gives precisely what the commentators want. 
In spite of its initial plausibility, I think that this line of interpretation is misleading. First of 
all, the premise of Kant’s argument from self-consciousness is not Cartesian. One important reason 
for it’s not being Cartesian lies not in that the Cartesian notion of self is a substance (activity), but 
in that both the key facts of self-ascription and personal identity are completely absent in Descartes’ cogito 
argument. Descartes does discuss the relationship between consciousness and representation in 
other places, but he never argues explicitly that the self-ascription is defined in terms of being 
conscious, nor does he give any analysis of the semantic relation of ‘my representation’ to ‘the I’, 
not to mention incorporates this idea in his cogito argument. 
While Descartes also discusses personal identity, the derivability of personal identity makes it 
entirely irrelevant to the cogito argument. The personal identity is not only metaphysically derivative 
of the substantiality of the mind, but it is also epistemologically derivative: the mind is known in 
the first place, and known to be substance, and then it is inferred that it is also identical in virtue 
of its substantiality. Although Kant’s notion of the identity of self-consciousness is metaphysically 
grounded in the synthesis of transcendental imagination, it is epistemologically known in the first 
place: we analytically know that the identity is contained as a mark in the representation I think 
with regard to the manifold representations.226 
Essentially, Kant’s argument is not justificatory, but explanatory, in character. After the 
introduction of the identity of self-consciousness, Kant steers his argument into his own direction. 
What Kant does is not to establish some general epistemic criterion to justify other pieces of beliefs, 
neither does he deduce the logical consequences from it. Rather, Kant is engaged with how to explain 
the metaphysical ground of the modal truth concerning the identity or the analytic unity of self-
consciousness. 
The identity of self-consciousness seems not to enjoy any epistemic privilege. For Descartes, 
the ascending from mind to God is almost the only path available to him.227 For Kant, by contrast, 
the identity of self-consciousness is merely one member of a set of acknowledged modal facts Kant 
takes to be well-established and acceptable for a sensible mind. These facts include sciences 
(mathematics and physics), the laws of nature, the freedom of will, etc. Kant could argue from any 
of the premises concerning these facts. Therefore, the notion of self-consciousness is merely one 
                                                     
226 Rosefeldt 2000 emphasizes the logical import of the minor premises of the rationalist paralogisms. 
227 For an account for the ascending from mind to God see Menn 2002. 
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entrance to the transcendental deduction, though it is arguably the most important one. The 
identity of self-consciousness is set as the point of departure of Kant’s official argument not for its 
indispensability, but for its feasibility. The identity of self-consciousness does not only lay a positive 
claim to the necessity that is required by the transcendental deduction, but it constitutes the 
quickest and the most straightforward route to the synthetic unity. The choice of explanandum could 
be made not only of epistemic reason, but also out of pragmatic reason. 
In line with my previous verdict, it seems that the argument from self-consciousness is not 
able to refute the Humean skepticism as well. Even if Kant makes an appeal to an apparently thin 
conception of self-consciousness, it does not imply that it could be accepted by the skeptics as well. 
It is doubtful whether the identity of self-consciousness stands beyond any possible doubt that 
could be raised by a Humean skeptic. After all, Hume’s denial of personal identity so famous that 
it induces us to suspect that the identity of self-consciousness simply begs the question of Hume. 
One might reasonably object that this explanatory reading does not fit with Kant’s claim that 
self-consciousness, or pure apperception, is the highest faculty in cognition.228 As the highest 
faculty, the pure apperception should be the ultimate explanatory ground for objective 
representation, for which no further explanatory grounds could be given. According to the 
explanatory reading, every line of argument is the inference from consequence to ground; even the 
argument from self-consciousness is no exception. Accordingly, the argument from self-
consciousness turns out to be an argument from the ultimate ground. Then, how could we possibly 
find further ground for an ultimate ground? Therefore, the explanatory reading fails at least in the 
case of the argument from self-consciousness. 
I believe that this worry is misguided. The hierarchy of the grounding relation of facts should 
not be conflated with the hierarchy of the relation of faculties. To be sure, the imagination is a lower 
faculty relative to apperception. The explanatory reading does not challenge this. Rather, what it 
claims is that the transcendental synthesis of imagination is the ground of the necessary unity of 
apperception. Even if the pure apperception is the highest faculty, certain facts concerning 
apperception (facts like the self-ascription and the identity of self-consciousness) still could be 
given further explanation.229 Consider the following analogy: while God is absolutely foundational 
in a theological picture, not all facts concerning God are unexplainable.  
                                                     
228 Kant has various descriptions of the supremacy of apperception. See A125 and B134f. 
229 Kant’s claim that “the synthetic unity of apperception is the highest point to which one must affix all use of the 
understanding” (B134f) does not qualify as an objection. Although synthetic unity is a fact concerning apperception, 
what Kant intends to say here is that the metaphysical and synthetic use of understanding is prior to its logical and 
analytic use, and he leaves it untouched whether the synthetic unity of apperception needs further explanation. In 
other words, the supremacy of synthetic unity of apperception is relative to the use for cognition, rather than per se. 
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7.3 Self-Ascription and Consciousness 
(a) The Criteria of Self-Ascription 
As I have mentioned, I will not delve into the nature of self-consciousness; rather, I will 
merely address some aspects of self-consciousness that bear argumentative relevance. According 
to my interpretation, what is distinctive in Kant’s approach to self-consciousness is his focus on 
the phenomena of self-ascription, which is couched in terms of the relation of consciousness to 
representation. The notion of self-ascription is not something new. Strawson helps in popularizing 
this term into Kant literature.230 It is widely used to describe a feature of self-consciousness. Yet, 
few have laid it at the central place of interpretation. On my proposal, the self-ascription of 
representation is a fact concerning self-consciousness, and it is a fact with which Kant starts his 
argument.  
Let’s first begin with the idea of self-ascription. The idea of self-ascription is preeminent in 
§16. The possessive form “my” or “mine” is restlessly repeated and stressed with the explicit 
technical device by Kant. The notion of the self-ascription of representations is understood in the 
sense of ownership. If something x is ascribed to someone s, then x is owned by s. Self-ascription 
is a species of ascription: if something x is ascribable to myself, then x is mine, or I can call x mine. 
The Kantian self-ascription is concerned with mental representations, rather than physical 
objects.231 The above characterization merely captures the general idea of self-ascription, yet the 
specific criterion of self-ascription thesis leaves unexplored. The most natural proposal for the 
criterion of self-ascription seems to be as follows: 
 
(Self-Ascription C1): A representation r is mine if and only if r exists in my sensibility. 
 
The notion of sensibility is elusive, but it is apt to be reformulated in physicalist terms: 
 
                                                     
230 In his Individuals (1959), Strawson argues that self-ascription is essential to a theory of mental states. And then 
Strawson applies this idea into Kant’s theory of consciousness. See Strawson 1966, 54-67. 
231 The notion of self-ascription has a particular use in literature on Kant’s self-consciousness. The self-ascription 
should not be confused with the propositional attitude ascription, which is linguistically expressed by a sentence. On 
my reading, I think is not a propositional attitude. Rather, it is related to the possessive form of the first person 
pronoun ‘I’. 
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(Self-Ascription C1*): A representation r is mine if and only if r supervenes upon a physical state 
of my body. 
  
However, Kant does not pursue this route. Rather, he turns to a more controversial 
interpretation of self-ascription. The basic idea is that a representation is mine not for its being 
something “in me”, but for its being something “for me”. To decide whether a representation is in 
me seems to be an objective matter, while to decide whether a representation for me seems to be 
a subjective matter. Kant offers a consciousness-centered account of the criterion of self-ascription. 
Its formulation stands as follows: 
 
(Self-Ascription 2) A representation r is mine only if r is able to be accompanied by 
consciousness.232 
 
Kant himself offers two interpretations of the self-ascription claim. In the A-Deduction 
Kant’s first less well-known criterion of self-ascription is introduced in his argument from above. 
In a passage that bears striking resemblance with the famous beginning sentence in §16 in the B-
Deduction, Kant writes: 
 
All intuitions are nothing for us and do not in the least concern us if they cannot be taken up into 
consciousness, whether they influence it directly or indirectly, and through this alone is cognition 
possible. (A116)  
 
In the footnote Kant makes an important clarification of what the consciousness refers to. 
Kant writes: “[a]ll representations have a necessary relation to a possible empirical consciousness: 
for if they did not have this, and if it were entirely impossible to become conscious of them, that 
would be as much as to say that they did not exist at all.” (A117) As Kant makes it explicit in the 
footnote, the consciousness in question is empirical consciousness and that all representation is 
accompanied by a possible empirical consciousness. Then we have the empirical consciousness 
criterion of self-ascription as follows: 
                                                     
232 In this formulation I choose a more general term ‘consciousness’ rather than Kant’s original term ‘I think’ for 
making room for the following analysis of two rival notions of empirical consciousness and transcendental self-
consciousness. 
212 
 
 
(Self-Ascription 2.2) For a representation r, r is mine if it is accompanied by a possible empirical 
consciousness. 
 
It is noteworthy that the account centered on empirical consciousness is empirically adequate 
to explain the phenomena of self-ascription. One important reason is that it could satisfy the 
universality requirement of the self-ascription of representations. As long as each and every 
representation can be accompanied by empirical consciousness, I am justified to call all the 
representations to mine, though I am not in a position to ascribe representations to an identical I. 
At this very point, empirical consciousness and transcendental self-consciousness are empirically 
equivalent for explaining self-ascription. 
Kant’s more famous claim on the self-ascription thesis is located in the famous beginning 
sentence in §16 of the B-Deduction where Kant starts his argument with the discussion of the 
relation of transcendental original self-consciousness (the I think) to representations. The 
beginning sentence of §16 reads: “[t]he I think must be able to accompany all my representations”. 
Another formulation of self-ascription is as follows: 
 
(Self-Ascription) For a representation r, r is mine if it is able to be accompanied by transcendental 
self-consciousness (the I think). 
 
(b) Elimination by Identity 
Now Kant seems to give two rival criteria of the self-ascription of equal empirical adequacy, 
but it is far from his final answer. In spite of its empirical adequacy, Kant vehemently attacks the 
criterion of self-ascription centered on empirical consciousness. Although self-ascription is not a 
concern of empiricism, the account centered on empirical consciousness would be happily 
welcomed by empiricists, since it is consistent with the logical consequence of empiricism. In effect, 
this view is committed to the Humean bundle theory of self, according to which my self is nothing 
but a bundle of perceptions. Consequently, all my representation is accompanied by numerically 
different Is, which are the instances of the empirical concept ‘I’. Therefore, Kant’s rejection of the 
criterion self-ascription centered on empirical consciousness is an implicit criticism of the 
empiricist bundle theory of self. 
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Kant explicitly rejects the criterion of self-ascription twice in the B-Deduction. Consider the 
following passage: “For the empirical consciousness that accompanies different representations is 
by itself dispersed and without relation to the identity of the subject.” (B133) After a few sentences 
comes a more explicit objection to this view, where Kant claims that empirical consciousness 
cannot suffice, “for otherwise I would have as multicolored, diverse a self as I have representations 
of which I am conscious.”(B134)  
In spite of the terminological difference, the point of Kant’s objection is quite clear: the 
empiricist theory of self fails to attribute all my representations to one and the same self.233 Both 
quotations suggest that Kant is committed to the identity of self-consciousness, that is, in some sense 
there is only one and the same I. When the empiricist theory of self is rejected, Kant postulates 
that there is one and same representation “I (think)” that accompanies all my representations. In 
fact, Kant uses the explicit technical device to make explicit the numerical identity of self-
consciousness by underlining “I” or “mine”. Like empirical consciousness, this representation can 
satisfy the universality requirement of the self-ascription thesis that all representation must be 
ascribed to myself. Unlike empirical consciousness, it also could satisfy the identity requirement of 
the self-ascription thesis that my representations must be ascribed to one identical self. 
 
(c) The Objection to the Anti-skepticism Reading 
It is doubtless that Kant rejects the view of multiple selves in favor of the identity of self. 
Now the question is that whether Kant is justified in doing so. Puzzlingly, Kant does not formulate 
any specific argument against the bundle theory of self. Instead, Kant simply asserts the identity of 
self-consciousness without argument. This compels one to think that the acknowledgment of the 
identity of self is one of Kant’s unjustified assumptions, which Kant takes for granted. 
A popular view is that Kant’s argument should be understood as a project against Humean 
skepticism. If Kant cannot give any convincing argument against empiricist bundle theory of self, 
one might wonder how Kant’s argument from self-consciousness could be anti-skeptical at all, 
since Kant assumes precisely what skeptics cast into question. The anti-skepticism reading naturally 
                                                     
233 Kant often use subject, (my)self, and self-consciousness in the way as if they are the same thing. (B131-135) For 
the sake of brevity, here I also take Kant’s loose talks of subject, self, and self-consciousness as referring to the same 
thing. It does not mean that one cannot draw any subtle distinction between them. I suspect, however, that the 
distinction is not so much of the distinction between these different notions as that of the inner diversity of each 
notion. 
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results in the question-begging objection to Kant’s argument. In fact, Kant has the least intention 
to throw himself into the radical skeptical scenario. 
The dispute between Hume and Kant could not be settled down in terms of skepticism; their 
difference is instead rooted in profound assumptions and approaches. For Hume personal identity 
is a problem, whereas for Kant it is a premise.234 Hume regards his bundle theory of self as an 
achievement. Armed by his empiricist copy principle, Hume is convinced that if we do not have any 
idea of substance, then we do not have any idea of identity. By contrast, Kant views the bundle 
theory of self as a deficiency that needs to be remedied. Indeed, Kant rejects the rationalist view of 
personal identity in virtue of the substantiality of mind. Yet, Kant never hesitates in claiming that 
personal identity still holds in a significant sense, and that first person discourse makes perfect 
sense. Kant is convinced that there must be some theoretically satisfactory way to talk about the 
identity of the subject, some way that is immune from the charge of empiricism. As Kant argued 
the third Paralogism, personal identity should be understood as “[t]he identity of the consciousness 
of Myself” is “the logical identity of the I”, which should be distinguished from “the numerical 
identity of my subject” (A369).235 
On my reading, Kant’s assumption of the identity of the subject is guided by his philosophical 
intuition. Kant rests his objection on the intuition that the discourse of different Is is simply 
incomprehensible. Kant would say that the ordinary discourse involving self-reference presupposes 
the identity of oneself, that the commitment to a multiplicity of Is contradicts with the ordinary 
way of talk and renders the singular first-person language unintelligible, and that the talk of empirical 
consciousness without reference to the identity of subject commits one to absurdity. 
 
(d) An Argument without Empirical Consciousness? 
Before leaving this section, I would like to dispel the worry that Kant might give different 
accounts of the relationship between empirical consciousness and transcendental self-
consciousness. This is by no means the only case that reflects the difference between 1781 and 
1787 Critique; as we have seen in the last chapter, there also seems to be a difference in Kant’s views 
on reproduction and association in both editions of the Critique. 
In the important footnote to A117, Kant writes: 
                                                     
234 As Henrich notes, the identity of self is not a problem for him, but a premise for him. See Henrich 2008. 
235 For a logical reading of Kant’s personal identity see Rosefeldt 2000; for a metaphysical reading see Tester 2013. 
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All representations have a necessary relation to a possible empirical consciousness […]. All empirical 
consciousness, however, has a necessary relation to a transcendental consciousness (preceding all 
particular experience), namely the consciousness of myself, as original apperception. (A117f) 
 
In the A-Deduction transcendental self-consciousness is related to representations via 
empirical consciousness. Kant first links representation with empirical consciousness, and then he 
in turn links empirical consciousness with transcendental consciousness, and finally he draws the 
conclusion that empirical consciousness presupposes transcendental self-consciousness. In other 
words, no empirical consciousness is possible with respect to representation unless it has a 
necessary relation to transcendental self-consciousness. 
In the B-Deduction transcendental self-consciousness is related to representation without 
reference to empirical consciousness. In §16 Kant starts his argument with the discussion on the 
original transcendental self-consciousness (the I think) as if transcendental self-consciousness is 
the only candidate to play the role of making representations genuinely mine. To be sure, Kant 
levels criticisms on empirical consciousness in his later discussion (B133, B134) in §16. As my 
previous formulations of self-ascription indicate, in this context Kant regards empirical 
consciousness as a rival to transcendental self-consciousness, and he mentions empirical 
consciousness in the service for the exposition of the indispensability of transcendental self-
consciousness. 
This discrepancy between the two editions in the account of the relation between empirical 
consciousness and transcendental self-consciousness might lead one to think that perhaps Kant 
changes his mind on the issue of the relationship between empirical consciousness and 
transcendental self-consciousness in explaining self-ascription. In my view, however, this 
difference is not substantial, but methodological. Kant’s new presentation in the B-Deduction does not 
mean that Kant holds that empirical consciousness can operate independently of transcendental 
self-consciousness. In the B-Deduction Kant still insists that empirical consciousness is 
conditioned by transcendental self-consciousness. In the concluding section § 21, for instance, 
Kant writes that “the empirical consciousness of a given manifold of one intuition stands under a 
pure a priori self-consciousness, just as empirical intuitions stand under pure sensible one, which 
likewise holds a priori”(B144). What Kant does in §16 is to take the shortcut to circumvent the 
relevant account of empirical consciousness and turns himself directly to the indispensable role 
that transcendental self-consciousness plays in explaining the phenomena of self-ascription. 
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Again, I think it is necessary to distinguish an argument from an account. For the sake of 
argument, Kant is not obliged to offer an account that involves the relationship between empirical 
consciousness and transcendental self-consciousness. What Kant is required to do is to pick out 
from the theoretical resources the piece that is indispensable in inference. It is not Kant’s job to show 
how the entire machinery of mind works. As I have indicated in the last chapter, the argument 
from below is more informative than the argument from above in telling us how the mind works.236 
 
7.4 Aspects of the Self-Ascription Thesis 
7.4.1 The Analyticity of the Self-Ascription Thesis 
After clarifying Kant’s conception of self-ascription, I will argue that the self-ascription thesis 
is analytic. For the argumentative purpose, I suggest that we should abstract other aspects of self-
consciousness and attend to its content. In this light, Kant uses the “I think” to designate the content 
of self-consciousness. Therefore, the “I think” should be read as a mark, and, according to the 
self-ascription thesis, it is contained in all my representations. 
The basic idea of the self-ascription thesis is that all my representations are mine. In this simplified 
formulation, the semantic and epistemic properties of the self-ascription thesis are appealing. On 
the one hand, it seems that the self-ascription thesis is universally and unexceptionally true; it is 
true not only of past representations, but also of future representations. On the other hand, it 
seems that we have a priori knowledge of the self-ascription of representations; we know a priori 
that all representations are my representations without knowing what they are and which they are. 
Kant’s precise formulation of the self-ascription thesis is more complex and more 
controversial than that all my representations are mine. Nonetheless, I believe that it is illuminating 
to read Kant’s precise formulation of the self-ascription thesis to be analytic. Consider Kant’s chief 
claims on the self-ascription thesis: 
 
(T1) The I think must be able to accompany all my representations; (T2) for otherwise something 
that could not be thought at all would be represented in me, (T3) which is as much as to say that the 
representation would either be impossible or else at least would be nothing for me.) (B132) 
                                                     
236 Henrich argues that Kant employs the strategy of theory avoidance such that there he does not develop a theory 
of self-consciousness or subject and he does not allow a derivation of knowledge from the principle of self-
consciousness. See Henrich 1992. However, I think Henrich’s reading is loaded with too many post-Kantian 
receptions of Kant’s self-consciousness. On my view, at least the identity of self-consciousness is a fact that is to be 
explained by a more fundamental fact, and therefore it is not a grounding principle. 
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Interestingly, this passage includes various characterizations of analytic truth. First, (T1) 
indicates that the self-ascription thesis is analytic in virtue of the containment of marks. As I have 
indicated, it is critically important to construe the “I think” as a mark, and it functions here as the 
predicate concept. The subject concept “my representations” is composed of two marks: 
“representations” and “my”. Therefore, the subject concept ‘my representations’ as a whole-
representation conceptually contains the predicate concept ‘I (think)’ as a part-representation.  
Furthermore, (T2) indicates that the self-ascription thesis is analytic in virtue of its relationship 
with the principle of contradiction. The logical feature of an analytic proposition is that the denial 
of it will entail a contradiction, and that is precisely what Kant indicates in the (T2) and (T3). (T2) 
is a negation of (T1) and (T3) as a complementary clarification of the consequence of (T2). Kant’s 
formulation of (T2) and (T3) seems to suggest that the self-ascription thesis is analytic. In addition 
to the logical feature, the modal formulation of necessity also seems to encourage an analytic 
reading. The “must” signifies the necessity of the thesis. Necessity implies apriority. Although 
apriority does not imply analyticity, it indicates analyticity. 
For (T1): The previous reading concerns only with the intensional relation of containment. In the 
following I will give a more detailed account of why the self-ascription thesis is analytic with respect 
to the intension and extension of the subject and predicate concept. In order to make it more liable 
for further analysis, (T1) could be simplified and reformulated as: 
 
(1) Necessarily, all my representations are thought by me. 
 
In the course of simplification, I attend to the necessity or the strict universality of the self-
ascription thesis by abstracting from the following two things. Firstly, I replace “accompanied by 
the I think” with ‘thought by me’, for the representation that is thought by me is equivalent to the 
representation that is accompanied by the I think. In the following 7.4 I will discuss Kant’s own 
view and the motivation behind it. Secondly, I abstract from the modal modifier “be able to”, so 
that the remarkable dual modal modification is simplified to one. I will delay my discussion on the 
problem of the modal modifier into the following 7.5. 
The proposition is analytic only if the predicate concept ‘thought by me’ as a mark is contained 
in the subject concept ‘my representations’ as a whole. What is thorny here is that the subject 
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concept ‘my representations’ is ambiguous. When the subject-concept ‘all my representations’ is 
interpreted as ‘all representations that are thought by me’, then we have the claim:  
 
(1.1) Necessarily, all representations thought by me are thought by me. 
 
        This claim is overtly analytically and tautologically true. However, this trivial reading is not 
what Kant has in mind. As Kant immediately shows in the next sentence (2), “something that could 
not be thought at all would be represented in me”. Obviously, Kant is concerned with the 
relationship between something “represented in me” and something that could be thought. Then, 
the subject concept ‘my representations’ is interpreted not as ‘representations that are thought by 
me’, but as ‘representations that exist in me’, then we have the claim: 
 
(1.2) Necessarily, all representations existing in me are thought by me. 
 
For (T2): The negation of (1.2) reads as 
 
(2) Possibly, not all representations in me are not thought by me. 
 
Equivalently, 
 
(2*) Possibly, some representation in me is not thought by me.  
 
        Obviously, (2*) is precisely what (T2) says. Since the predicate concept is not (at least overtly) 
contained in the subject concept, this claim appears not to be immediately analytic. Kant has even 
no slightest intention to claim that the notion of representations in me and that of representations 
for me are co-extensive. There exists an obvious gap between representations in me and 
representations for me. Then, how can the self-ascription thesis be analytic?  
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For (T3): The clarification in (3) seems to be a response to this non-analyticity objection. In 
(T3) Kant is clarifying what it implies if there are representations that are not thought yet exist in 
sensibility. Kant holds that the negation of the self-ascription thesis has two distinct consequences: 
(i) the representation would be “impossible”, and (ii) the representation would be “nothing for 
me”. 
In the light of these two distinct consequences, Kant commits himself to the view that (2) as 
the negation of the self-ascription thesis includes two logically possible cases by dividing 
representations in me into two species: (a) the representations that are thought by me and (b) the 
representations that are not thought by me. Kant’s analysis in (T3) is clarified as well as complicated 
by (3). In the former case, 
 
(1a) Necessarily, all representations in me that are thought by me are thought by me. 
 
Again, this claim is an overtly analytic truth. The negation of (1.1) entails a contradiction that the 
representations in me would be thought by me and not thought by me at the same time. Therefore, 
the consequence of (3a) is that the representations would be logically impossible. In the latter case, by 
the negation of (2.2) we have 
 
(1*b) Some representation that is in me yet not thought by me is thought by me. 
 
The above claim is stunning, for it appears to suggest that the self-ascription claim is not an 
analytic truth. Therefore, the non-analyticity objection resurfaces that there is a gap between the 
representations merely in me and the representations thought by me. Obviously, it is conceptually 
possible that there are representations in me without being thought by me. The notion of 
unconscious representation is conceptually coherent. At least, the denial of it does not prima facie 
entail a contradiction.  
Kant does not deny the possibility; rather, he even affirms the existence of unconscious 
representations. Unconscious representations are not only conceptually coherent, but also actually 
existent. They are nothing but one species of obscure representations, namely, the objectively 
obscure representations. Kant admits that there are a vast number of obscure representations in 
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our mind. For instance, Kant writes in §5 of the Anthropology: “[t]he field of sensuous intuitions and 
sensations of which we are not conscious, even though we can undoubtedly conclude that we have 
them; that is, obscure representations in the human being (and thus also in animals), is immense.” 
(AA 7:135) The existence of unconscious representations means that it contradicts with Kant’s 
theory of conscious representations. In other words, the proposition is not only not analytic, but 
also not true at all. 
If this charge is fair, then the self-ascription thesis turns out not to be analytic truth. Kant 
does not overlook this possibility; his reply is that the representations existing in me yet not thought 
by me are simply “nothing for us and do not at least concern us” (A116). In a nutshell, Kant 
disqualifies those representations in me as representations for me. Since the representations that exist in 
me yet are not thought by me do not contribute to cognition, they are not qualified as my 
representation. 
Underlying this move is Kant’s distinctive conception of the self-ascription of representation, 
which has been mentioned in last section. Kant makes the assumption that the criterion for some 
representation to be mine is not to be a representation in me, but to be a representation for me, namely, 
to be thought by me. The normative criterion of meaningfulness substitutes the descriptive criterion 
of existence. It is a normative claim concerning what should be classified as my representation in light 
of the stipulated definition. On this interpretation, for a representation the property of being mine 
is defined not in terms of its existence, but in terms of its availability. Strictly speaking, it is not a 
conceptual truth, but a conceptual truth against a theoretical background. 
The claim (3b) that the representation would be nothing for me amounts to saying that (2b) 
it is cognitively meaningless for me that something that could not be thought would be represented in 
me at all. By the conjunction of the two cases, we have 
 
(3) It is conceptually impossible or cognitively meaningless for us that something that could not be thought 
would be represented in me at all. 
 
Or, 
 
(3*) It is necessary or cognitively meaningful for us that everything represented in me could be 
thought. 
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7.4.2 The Modality of the Self-Ascription Thesis 
In order to concentrate on the analytic nature of the self-ascription thesis, I do not take into 
account the complex modalities involved in it. In the following I will analyze the modal 
qualifications of the self-ascription thesis on the textual basis of the opening sentence of §16: 
 
The I think must be able to accompany all my representations; for otherwise something would be 
represented in me that could not be thought at all, which is as much as to say that the representation 
would either be impossible or else at least would be nothing for me. (B131-132) 
 
The complexity lies in that the modality in question is dual: it does not only contain necessity 
and possibility, but it is also expressed in the form of “the necessity of possibility”. The necessity 
of the possibility of the accompanying of consciousness is unmistakably continuous in both the A-
Deduction as well as the B-Deduction. Kant writes respectively that “[t]he I think must be able to 
accompany all my representations” in the B-Deduction, and that “[a]ll representations have a 
necessary relation to a possible empirical consciousness” in te A-Deduction. For the present 
purpose I will concentrate on examining the meaning of the dual modal qualifications of necessity 
and possibility, and the motivations behind them.237 
 
(a) Necessity 
In the last section, we have tackled the question of the necessity of the self-ascription thesis 
in the context of the examination of its analyticity. Here I will briefly outline the necessity 
qualification of the self-ascription thesis and concentrate on the possibility qualification. I propose 
that the necessity (“must”) in question has a twofold meaning: the necessity of consequence, and the 
necessity derived from analyticity. In the first reading of the necessity indicated by “must”, the 
necessity indicates that the claim the “[t]he I think must be able to accompany all my 
representations” logically follows from the claim that “something that could not be thought at all would 
be represented in me”. In the second reading of the necessity in question, the claim that “[t]he I 
think must be able to accompany all my representations” is itself necessary, and its necessity is 
derived from the necessity the claim something would be represented in me that could not be thought 
at all, in the same way the truth of the former claim is derived from that of the latter one. These 
                                                     
237 See 6.5 for discussion of the similar modal complexities. 
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two readings are not incompatible, and the necessity can mean both at the same time. The second 
one is more indispensable, since the first one can be indicated by another expression such as 
“otherwise”. 
 
(b) Possibility 
Kant does not claim that the representations of which I am conscious are mine; rather, Kant 
claims that the representations of which I can be conscious are mine. At any rate Kant is not careless. 
His seriousness is evidenced in the recurrence of the modal restriction of possibility in his 
formulations concerning self-ascription. The question of possibility stands independently of the 
question of necessity, for the former has a quite different motivation from the latter. In fact, the 
difficulty of understanding the modal restriction of the self-ascription thesis lies mainly in the 
awkward possibility. On the one hand, the possibility requirement makes the self-ascription thesis 
too strong. Whether a possible mental state is mine seems to be entirely irrelevant, and even 
counterintuitive, to the idea of self-ascription. In a physicalist formulation of the self-ascription thesis, 
this problem is even more outstanding. For physicalists the mental states that count as mine are 
only those that supervene on my actual physical states. Our intuitive idea is that if there is no such 
actual mental state, there will be no actual physical states. In short, those mental states supervening 
on possible physical states are not mine.238 The possibility restriction runs counter to this intuitive 
idea. It is possible for me, for example, to be a winner of a gold medal in the Olympic Games and 
to have a mental state of experiencing the bliss. But why should this merely possible mental states 
of the bliss of being a winner of a gold medal in the Olympic Games be mine? They are the mental 
states of the actual winners of a gold medal in the Olympic Games. On the other hand, the 
possibility requirement makes the argument too tricky; it seems to suggest what is at issue is an 
unnecessarily all-encompassing self-consciousness. Henrich’s objection to the semantic analysis of 
self-ascription grows out of the worry that that would make the argument too easy.239 Then, what 
does Kant mean when he insists that the possibility of the consciousness in question is 
indispensable and integral to the self-ascription? What are the representations that are possible to 
be accompanied by consciousness? What are the theoretical motivations behind this move of 
adding this counter-intuitive modal modifier? 
                                                     
238 While the supervenience account of physicalism involves the modal restriction of possibility, yet that is irrelevant 
here. 
239 See Henrich 1969. 
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In my view, it is difficult to offer a reductive analysis of the possibility of consciousness. The 
possible conscious representation is a representation that can become conscious without 
determining whether it is actually conscious. By this move, Kant extends the reach of consciousness 
from actually conscious representations to possibly conscious representations and thereby to 
broaden the range of representations that could become conscious. 
In order to theorize Kant’s idea, one natural move is to make an appeal to the Wolffian 
distinction between clear and obscure representation, which has been taken over by Kant for some 
time.240 In line with Leibniz, the Wolffian school interprets the clarity of representation in terms of 
its relation to consciousness; a representation is clear if it is conscious, and a representation is 
obscure if it is unconscious. According to this scheme, the representation that is actually 
accompanied by consciousness is a clear representation, whereas the representation that is not 
accompanied by consciousness is an obscure representation. The distinction between obscure and 
clear representation is not rigid; obscure representations can become clear. Hence, a representation 
that can be yet not has been accompanied by self-consciousness still belongs to obscure 
representation. The possibility of the transformation of a representation from obscurity to clarity 
seems to refer to nothing other than the possibility of becoming conscious of any representation.  
This line of interpretation is generally plausible. However, we should be cautious about what 
the clear and obscure representation mean when we make an appeal to this distinction, because 
Kant’s theory of clarity and obscurity is both historically and systematically complex. 
The move to appeal to the distinction between clear and obscure representation in the above 
proposal suffers from an exegetical objection: even if in his early philosophy Kant takes over the 
Wolffian conception of clarity and obscurity, it does not follow that Kant still embraces this view 
on clarity and obscurity in the Critique. This objection is confirmed by the footnote in A117, where 
Kant writes that “it does not matter here whether this representation ([consciousness]) be clear 
(empirical consciousness) or obscure, even whether it be actual” (A117f). As it is indicated, the fact 
that Kant juxtaposes the distinction between obscure and clear consciousness and that between 
possible and actual one implies that these two distinctions are neither co-intensive nor co-extensive. The 
issue of whether the consciousness is actual is quite distinct from and more radical than the issue 
whether it is clear. The distinction between actual and possible consciousness must be operated in 
another dimension. 
                                                     
240 This view is defended by Grüne 2009, 36-40. This kind of textual evidence is often found in Kant’s early writings. 
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In fact, Kant greatly modifies the Wolffian scheme, and develops his own more sophisticated 
version of clarity and obscurity in his mature philosophy. In §5 of the Anthropology first published 
in 1798 Kant writes: 
 
A contradiction appears to lie in the claim to have representations and still not be conscious of them; for how 
could we know that we have them if we are not conscious of them? Locke already raised this objection, 
and this is why he also rejected the existence of representations of this nature. However, we can still 
be indirectly conscious of having a representation, even if we are not directly conscious of it. - Such 
representations are then called obscure; the others are clear[.] (AA 7:135) 
 
Note that the concept of clear representation remains intact, while the concept of obscure 
representation undergoes considerable change. Kant’s modification of the Wolffian definition of 
obscure representation seems to be motivated by taking into consideration Locke’s famous 
objection that unconscious representation is conceptually incoherent.241 While Kant seems to be 
convinced by Locke’s argument that all representations must be essentially conscious, he is not 
thereby forced to discard the idea of obscure representation. The response Kant makes to this 
objection is to reformulate the distinction between clear and obscure representation within the 
domain conscious representation. Clear representations are those of which we are directly 
conscious, whereas obscure representations are not unconscious representations, but those of 
which we are indirect conscious. Indirect consciousness is perfectly compatible with actual 
consciousness. This indirectness of consciousness does not entail that the non-actuality of 
consciousness; rather, it entails the actuality of consciousness. The indirect consciousness means 
not unconsciousness, but consciousness in a particular manner. Therefore, the indirectness 
concerns not the existence of consciousness, but the mode of consciousness. 
While this new conception is elaborated in the Anthropology, I believe that it has been operative 
in the 1781 Critique. When Kant says in the A-Deduction that “if they [representations] cannot be 
taken up into consciousness, whether they flow into it[consciousness] directly or indirectly” (A116), 
Kant holds that there are two ways in which representations are taken into consciousness: to flow 
into consciousness directly and to flow into it indirectly. By “taken into consciousness” Kant 
obviously means “actually accompanied by consciousness”. Combined with Kant’s explicit 
mention of clear and obscure representation in the footnote, it is reasonable to suppose that these 
                                                     
241 On Kant’s understanding, by detecting the apparent conceptual incoherence of unconscious representation, 
Locke obviously links consciousness to the notion of self-ascription in the sense of ownership. It is very plausible to 
suppose that Locke’s awareness of and interest in the issue of the relationship between consciousness and 
representation is aroused by Descartes’ original discussion. However, this idea of self-ascription never assumes a 
central place in the all-too important Cartesian cogito argument. 
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two ways of taking representations into consciousness are nothing but clear and obscure 
representations as defined in the Anthropology.242 
Then, what is indirect consciousness, and how could we know that it exists? In the following 
passage Kant illustrates this point: 
 
When I am conscious of seeing a human being far from me in a meadow, even though I am not 
conscious of seeing his eyes, nose, mouth, and so on, I properly conclude only that this thing is a 
human being. For if I wanted to maintain that I do not at all have the representation of him in my 
intuition because I am not conscious of perceiving these parts of his head (and so also the remaining 
parts of this human being), then I would also not be able to say that I see a human being, since the 
representation of the whole (of the head or of the human being) is composed of these partial ideas. 
(AA 7:135)243 
 
As it reveals, Kant’s idea of indirect consciousness is motivated by the pressure of his 
mereology and epistemology of intuition. In holding that if one does not have a conscious 
representation of any part, then it is incoherent for him to become conscious of the whole, Kant 
is committed to the assumption that if I am conscious of a whole-representation, then I am 
conscious of any part of the whole-representation. As far as mereology is concerned, some 
properties are transitive, that is, some properties instantiated by the whole are also instantiated by 
the part. For instance, if a surface is red, it follows that every part of the surface is red; if a land is 
mine, it follows that every part of the land is mine. However, not all properties are transitive; if a 
body is heavy, it does not follow that every part of the body is not heavy. For Kant, consciousness 
is a relational property akin to that of mineness since it is a mereologically transitive property. If 
the whole representation is conscious, it follows that every part-representation is conscious.244 
This example bears directly upon the relationship between clear representation and distinct 
representation. It becomes apparent that what Kant has in mind is the clear yet confused representation 
when he introduces the idea of indirect consciousness. In a clear yet confused representation, I am 
directly conscious of the whole representation and distinguish it from another whole representation, 
but I am not conscious of the part of the whole representation in the same way as I am of the whole. 
                                                     
242 In the 1787 Critique, Kant also explicitly affirms that even some obscure representations are conscious. (B144f-
B145f) 
243 For an illuminating similar text see the Logic: “We glimpse a country house in the distance. If we are conscious 
that the intuited object is a house, then we must necessarily have a representation of the various parts of this house, 
the windows, doors, etc. For if we did not see the parts, we would not see the house itself either. But we are not 
conscious of this representation of the manifold of its parts, and our representation of the object indicated is thus 
itself an indistinct representation.” (AA 9:34) 
244 As Kant indicates, clarity is not transitive. If a representation is clear, it does not follow that every part of the 
representation is clear. That is why a further distinction between distinctness and confusion is introduced. 
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In another sense, however, I am still indirectly conscious of and inferentially know the existence 
of other indistinguishable parts of the whole. 
The manner of having the direct consciousness of representation radically differs from that 
of indirect consciousness. In the latter case, it is inferred that we are conscious of representation. 
According to the factivity of knowledge, it means that obscure representations exist. However, we 
are not in a position to know what it is like to have an obscure representation. The inferential 
conception of consciousness is counterintuitive; for what our ordinary intuition of consciousness 
captures is to the immediate epistemic access to some representation. By this move Kant broadens 
the ordinary notion of consciousness. 
Despite some defects in the previous proposals, I think that we have already brought 
ourselves on the right track when we attempt to settle this issue by appealing to the Kantian notion 
of clarity and obscurity. As I have indicated, Kant has a highly sophisticated theory of obscure and 
consciousness, in which the notion of obscurity is strikingly multi-layered. The fact that indirectly 
conscious representation does not fit for the purpose does not imply that any species of obscure 
representation fails to meet the requirement.  
I think that we could make intelligible Kant’s motivation for imposing this modal qualification 
with reference to other modifiers possibility. The modal qualification of possibility does not merely 
occur in the context of possible consciousness or possible representation, and it also appears in a 
variety of contexts: the possible combination, the possible synthesis and, most famously, the 
possible experience. It is quite plausible to conjecture that these characterizations of the possibility 
make up a chain, and they are driven by the same motivation. 
Kant’s idea of possible containment could shed light on this problem. In the illuminating 
Reflection 1692 on logic, Kant writes: “[t]he distinctness is the clarity of the manifold in the 
representation of a thing, either that which is in the representations actually contained, or can be 
contained”.245 Here Kant makes a distinction between the actual containment and the possible 
containment of the manifold in the representation of a thing. The representation of an individual 
thing is a singular representation, namely, intuition. Furthermore, the representation of a thing is a 
whole representation of which both intuitive marks are its parts. However, it is not yet a complete 
representation of a thing. A complete representation is a representation whose content is so rich that 
                                                     
245 The translation is mine. The German text reads as follows: “Die Deutlichkeit ist die Klarheit des Mannigfaltigen 
in der Vorstellung eines Dinges, entweder desjenigen, was in der Vorstellung wirklich enthalten ist, oder enthalten 
seyn kan.” (AA 16:85) 
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it could only determine one thing in the world. While the singular representation is not a part-
representation, it is a part of the complete representation. 
In this light, I think that the purpose of adding the modal restriction of possibility is meant to 
open the possibility of attributing the unconscious representation to the actually consciously 
represented thing. The not contained yet containable representation is co-extensive with the not 
combined (in one intuition) yet combinable representation. In addition to clear representation, they 
are also the representations over which the categories quantify. The pressure of the being able to 
be conscious stems from the pressure of being containable, which in turn stems from its necessarily 
being part of a possible complete experience. 
Now the question is why we have to stick to the idea of a complete representation or complete 
experience. For Kant human beings do not have a complete representation of a thing.246 On the 
one hand, we human beings are representational animals, but representation is essentially intensional. 
We cannot represent an object without the mediation of marks; we instead must represent the 
object in virtue of the marks or properties of a thing. On the other hand, a finite individual thing 
is composed of intrinsic or non-relational properties on one hand, and extrinsic or relational 
properties on the other hand.247 One cannot completely describe the history of one individual 
without any reference to other individuals since each individual stands in various relations. 
Therefore, the fate of the completeness of representation depends on the metaphysics of relations.  
In Leibniz’s system it is metaphysically possible for human being to be capable of a complete 
representation of a thing. For Leibniz, the relations among objects are not real but ideal. 
Consequently, all relational propositions could be in principle reduced into non-relational 
propositions. On the bottom level, the real world is consisting of monads, on which the 
phenomenal world ontologically depends. Everything in the world is synchronized clocks: 
agreement without interaction. 
In Crusius and Kant, things are entirely different.248 All of them embrace the reality of the 
relational property and relations instantiated by individual things. The world consists of 
interconnected finite individual things. The interconnectedness is not merely spatial relations, but 
real dynamical relations. For instance, a house and another house are interconnected rather than 
isolated from each other. Although a house stands not in the inherence relation to another house, 
                                                     
246 Due to our historical finitude, we human beings can never have complete representation of a thing. But this is not 
the point Kant intends to make here. 
247 Here I take intrinsic and non-relational to be equivalent, though a nuance is further detected and a subtle 
distinction is drawn by some philosophers. 
248 For a useful study of German rationalist metaphysics see Watkins 2005. 
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but in the community relation with it. For relational realists, to have a complete representation of one 
thing is to have a complete experience of everything in the world. 
While we human beings do not have actual complete representation, we do have the singular 
representation that aims at a possible complete representation. True synthetic propositions could 
always be attributed to the thing that is represented. These synthetic truths are based on the 
available clear part-representations of the thing. In addition to these truths, in both counterfactual 
and future contexts I could alternatively enumerate some other synthetic truths, which are based 
on the possibly yet not actually clear representations. And these new synthetic truths both should 
and could be attributed to the same subject(s). Therefore, Kant’s addition of the modal modifier 
of possibility is motivated by the consideration that every unconscious representation can be 
attributed as a part to the synthetic unity of manifold in intuition as a whole.  
 
7.4.3 A Global or Local Thesis? 
Despite that self-ascription holds for all my representations, the room is still left for deciding 
whether Kant intends to make a global thesis or a local one. A global thesis of self-ascription is 
that Kant is focusing on all representations in the whole of experience. A local thesis of self-
ascription is that Kant has in mind representation in any arbitrarily selected domain of the whole of 
the life experience. It should be clear that the local thesis and global thesis are equivalent. Either 
of them does not affect the previous contentions concerning self-ascription at all. What is at issue 
here is only the focus of Kant’s formulation of the self-ascription thesis. 
I propose that Kant intends to formulate a local thesis of self-ascription. To be sure, Kant 
opens §16 with “[t]he I think must be able to accompany all my representations”. It encourages 
us to read the self-ascription thesis to be a global one for all my representations without further 
qualification. In the following, however, Kant clarifies his position: “[T]hat representation that can 
be given prior to all thinking is called intuition. Thus all manifold of intuition has a necessary relation 
to the I think in the same subject in which this manifold is to be encountered.”(B132)  
In fact, Kant has done the very same thing in the argument from above in the A-Deduction, 
which starts with: “[a]ll intuitions are nothing for us and do not in the least concern us if they cannot 
be taken up into consciousness” (A116). Kant narrows the domain of the self-ascription thesis by 
further identifying the representation in question as the representation given in intuition, and other 
representations such as concepts, judgments and inferences are excluded for the purpose of the 
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present concern.249 Here intuition does not refer to the conscious representation of an object. At 
the beginning of Transcendental Deduction, the thesis of the unity of intuition has not yet been 
established before the introduction of the unity of self-consciousness. Rather, the intuition refers 
to the indeterminate intuition, i.e. intuitions that have not been determined by categories. More 
precisely, an indeterminate intuition is merely a spatial or temporal mereological sum of manifold 
representations contained therein. In other words, they are is blind intuitions: confused and without 
order.250 
The repeated reference to intuition is by no means an accident. It instead can be systematically 
found in Kant’s texts. Almost each of them is formulated with great carefulness and precision. In 
fact, Kant has done the very same thing in the argument from above in A-Deduction, which starts 
with: “[a]ll intuitions are nothing for us and do not in the least concern us if they cannot be taken 
up into consciousness” (A116). In what follows §16 Kant writes: “[f]or the manifold 
representations that are given in a certain intuition would not all together be my representations” (B132) 
and “[n]ow this principle of the necessary unity of apperception… declares as necessary a synthesis 
of the manifold given in an intuition” (B135). 
This kind of formulation extends far beyond § 16. In the concluding § 20 Kant opens with 
“[t]he manifold that is given in a sensible intuition necessarily belongs under the original synthetic unity 
of apperception” (B143). In the transitional §21 it is started with “[a] manifold that is contained in 
an intuition that I call mine is represented as belonging to the necessary unity of self-consciousness” 
(B144).  
From the above overwhelming textual evidence it can be safely concluded that in the B-
Deduction the self-ascription thesis is meant to be a local one, which focuses on the manifold 
representations given in some unspecified intuition, rather than on the entire mental life. If it is the 
local thesis that is at issue, and if this argument is successful, then the conclusion of this argument 
is only temporary: it will be that categories must be applied to all the manifold representations given 
in certain intuition. In order for categories to be valid of all objects of experience, Kant must make a 
further trivial inference on the premise that the sum of the representations in my conscious life 
experience is nothing but the conjunction of every intuition.  
                                                     
249 These kinds of representations are nevertheless mine in proper sense. 
250 It seems that both metaphysical reading and epistemic reading of blindness are available. According to the 
epistemic reading, blind intuitions are conceptually unspecified intuitions. According to Allais, “intuitions are blind in 
the sense that they do not present objects as classified or as subject to the normative requirements of inferential 
judgments”. (2015, 152-153). I subscribe to the metaphysical reading, according to which blind intuitions are 
uncategorized intuitions. 
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In addition to the identification of the local formulation, the explanation of the motivation of 
the local thesis is still in order. To elucidate this issue is crucial to understand the next step of 
Kant’s argument, namely, how the analytic unity self-consciousness is grounded in its synthetic 
unity. As Kant repeatedly emphasizes, representations are essentially composite, and every intuition 
has a manifold. Due to their composite nature, every representation except the simple 
representation I, has a manifold in itself, no matter it is empirical or pure, sensible or intellectual. 
The move from intuition to the manifold in intuition seems to be no surprise.251 As we will confirm 
in the following section, the unity of intuition is Kant’s immediate concern. What Kant does is to 
make sharp the problem of the one and many in his own manner. Therefore, it comes as no surprise 
that the ancient philosophical question “the one and many” reemerges in the B-Deduction in a 
representational cloak.252  
 
7.5 The Analytic and Synthetic Unity of Self-Consciousness 
7.5.1 Analytic and Synthetic Unity: The Various Meanings 
There are various kinds of the relations of unity to manifoldness. One distinctive feature of 
Transcendental Deduction in the 1787 Critique is that Kant introduces the conceptual tool of the 
analytic unity and the synthetic unity of self-consciousness. Kant highlights this distinction between 
two kinds of unity in the hope of clarifying the obscurities in the A-Deduction; specifically, they 
are introduced to bridge the inference from the identity of self-consciousness to synthesis.  
This pair of terms are coined by Kant himself, but the ideas are not utterly new. As I 
understand, analytic unity is akin to the problem “the one and many” in ancient philosophy, and 
the idea of synthetic unity could be found in early modern philosophy and particularly in Leibniz.253 
Dickerson suggests that the problem of the synthetic unity of apperception in Kant is the 
representational parallel of that of the unity of proposition in early analytic philosophy. This is an 
interesting proposal, but I believe it is mistaken. It is mistaken not in that the unity of proposition 
is anachronistic, but in that it is unproblematic for Kant. The unity of judgment as the representational 
analogue of proposition is not a problem to be solved, but a premise to start with. The analogy to 
the unity of proposition is also inappropriate. Not all complex entities are propositionally 
structured, and therefore not all the unity of complex entities stem from the unity of proposition. 
                                                     
251 One might wonder whether categories are composite. My view is that at least some categories are composite. As 
Kant illustrates, the concept of causation include both the mark of necessity and the mark of positing rule. 
252 For Guyer’s objection to the inconsistency of the domain see Guyer 2006 and Guyer 2010. 
253 See Puryear, 2006. 
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The category of magnitude and its instance house will serve as a powerful counterexample to the 
propositional reading.254 
On my reading, the structure of intuition and the structure of judgment are quite different, 
though they are correspondent. In the course of the argument, one of Kant’s aims is to explain 
how the unity of intuition is generated. If we are asked to find some analogue to the Kantian 
intuition, I believe it would be the Leibnizian notion of the complete concept. 
Remember that the outline of the argument runs as follows: 
 
(1) Necessarily, all my representations have analytic unity. (Self-Ascription)  
(2) Analytic unity implies synthetic unity. (Assumption) 
(3) Necessarily, all my representations stand in the synthetic unity of intuition.  
 
In the above section I have offered a detailed analysis of the claim (1) that it is analytically and 
necessarily true that all my representations in an intuition contain the possible I think. As we will 
see later, (1) is equivalent to say that (1*) necessarily, all my representations have analytic unity. In 
the following I will further analyze (2) the principle of the priority of synthetic unity to analytic 
unity. In the course I will first clarify the meaning of analytic unity and synthetic unity, and then 
examine the different lines of the arguments for this principle. 
First of all, I would like to propose that Kant’s notion of analytic unity and that of synthetic 
unity are systematically ambiguous. Kant’s terminological ambiguity does not imply that Kant is 
playing the trick of equivocation. Rather, it reveals that Kant himself is not always clear and careful. 
On some occasion Kant is misled by the complex ambiguity of analytic unity and synthetic unity.  
In addition, I suggest that at least four lines of justifications for the priority principle of 
synthetic unity to analytic unity could be singled out. These lines of arguments are developed by 
drawing on the different senses of analytic unity and synthetic unity, and each of them can find its 
own textual support. However, I believe that the readings suggested by some most frequently 
quoted texts are misleading. The most promising line of thought that makes best of Kant’s 
                                                     
254 See Dickerson 2003, 109-13. For a critical review see Rosefeldt 2007. For more details about my positive view see 
Chapter 8. 
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intentions is the most neglected, since it runs counter with some of Kant’s most famous remarks. 
In fact, this line of argument displays the explanatory nature of Kant’s arguments. 
On the first reading, analytic unity is one in many, and synthetic unity is many in one. The 
former presupposes the latter. This is particularly supported by Kant’s footnote in B133f-B134f. 
In spite of Kant’s clarification, the presupposition is bogged into vicious circularity. On the second 
reading, analytic unity is the unity generated by analysis, and synthetic unity is the unity generated 
by synthesis. The former presupposes the latter. However, there is no such relation of 
presupposition could be found. 
After the rejection of some rival readings, I propose one most promising reading which 
suggests that analytic unity and synthetic unity of self-consciousness are intensionally distinct but 
extensionally identical. This proposal is counterintuitive in that Kant’s explicit statement that 
analytic unity presupposes synthetic unity implies that the two kinds of unity are numerically distinct, 
and therefore that they cannot be numerically identical. In spite of this exegetical problem, I believe 
that this is the only way to do justice to the entire line of the argument from self-consciousness in 
§16. 
 
7.5.2 The Original Meaning of Analytic Unity and Synthetic Unity 
What are analytic unity and synthetic unity? The quickest answer is contained in the apt slogan 
in Metaphysik Mrongovius: analytic unity is one in many (Eins in Vielem), synthetic unity is many in 
one (Vieles in Einem). (AA 29:889) In fact, like many terms, Kant’s use of this pair of terms is far 
from consistent; for instance, occasionally he applies this distinction to the category of quality and 
that of quantity. Kant officially introduces the analytic unity and the synthetic unity of self-
consciousness in the main text in §16: 
 
Therefore it is only because I can combine a manifold of given representations in one consciousness 
that it is possible for me to represent the identity of the consciousness in these representations 
itself, i.e., the analytical unity of apperception is only possible under the presupposition of some 
synthetic one. (B133-B134)  
 
According to this passage, the synthetic unity of self-consciousness refers to “a manifold of 
given representations in one consciousness”, and the analytic unity of self-consciousness refers 
to “the identity of the self-consciousness in these representations itself”, namely, “a manifold 
of given representations”. In Metaphysik Mrongovius, Kant identifies analytic unity is one in many and 
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synthetic unity is many in one. Initially, they are correspondent to the “many in one” and “one in 
many” characterizations. 
It is remarkable that both synthetic unity and analytic unity are understood with reference to 
the relation of one to many. The verbal affinity between both slogans should not obscure the substantial 
complexities hidden behind them; the one is not a simple reversal of the other. For one thing, the 
one and the many in each phrase refer to quite different things in their own context. For another, 
the relationship between one and many differ in quality; it turns out that analytic unity is not “one 
in many”, but “one over many”, and that synthetic unity seems to be apt for both many in one and 
one in many. 
As this footnote indicates, the synthetic unity and analytic unity are not merely abstractly 
understood as one in many and many in one. Rather, Kant gives the specific context to which this 
distinction could be applied, namely, the two species of cognition, intuition and concept. 
Consequently, the construal of them cannot be isolated from this motivational context. In order 
to appreciate the precise meaning of analytic unity and synthetic unity, we need first to make 
reference to the context where they are introduced. Kant’s most explicit discussion about this issue 
in Critique is located in the footnote of §17: 
 
Space and time and all their parts are intuitions, thus individual representations along with the 
manifold that they contain in themselves (see the Transcendental Aesthetic), thus they are not mere 
concepts by means of which the same consciousness is contained in many representations, but rather 
are many representations that are contained in one and in the consciousness of it; they are thus found 
to be composite, and consequently the unity of consciousness, as synthetic and yet as original, is to 
be found in them. (B136f) 
 
In his discussion of the nature of space and time, Kant offers a general criterion to 
differentiate intuition from concept. As Kant makes clear, in the case of an intuition many 
representations are contained in one consciousness, whereas in the case of a concept one same 
consciousness is contained in many representations. Many representations that are contained in 
one consciousness is the synthetic unity of self-consciousness, and one same consciousness in 
different representations is the analytic unity of consciousness. Accordingly, in the case intuition, 
many representations are not only contained in the same self-consciousness, but also contained in 
the intuition itself. In the case concept, many representations contain not only the same 
consciousness, but also the concept itself. Therefore, concept itself is an analytic unity, and an 
intuition itself is a synthetic unity. 
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In order to appreciate the meaning of analytic unity and synthetic unity, we must have a 
picture of Kant’s representational mereology. One basic distinction Kant draws is the one between 
a thing and a mark (Merkmal). A thing is a whole-representation. Every whole-representation has its 
part-representations. Kant’s technical term for part-representation is ‘mark’. A mark is a part-
representation of a whole-representation. 
Now it becomes apparent that while in the original context both “many” are regarded as many 
representations, they mean quite different things. In the case of analytic unity, many in one means 
many marks in one thing, or many part-representations in one whole-representation. In the case of 
synthetic unity, one in many means one mark in many things, or one part-representations in many 
whole-representations. 
In the above clarification the meaning of thing in two formulations is univocal. A thing is an 
object of intuition. However, Kant is often trading on the intuition itself and the object of intuition, 
or the intuited and the intuiting. Hence, a thing is simply identified as an intuition when this 
intuition is taken as the intuited. However, things are complicated by the fact that the meaning of 
mark itself is systematically ambiguous. A mark can mean the discursive mark, i.e., a concept of a 
thing. For instance, a concept ‘red’ is a discursive mark of a red apple, and it is a mark common to a 
red apple, and to a red table. A mark can also mean, in a more significant yet less conspicuous 
sense, intuitive mark, i.e., a proper part-representation of a thing, or a part of the representational content 
of the whole-representation.255 For instance, a nose is an intuitive mark of a head. To a further 
specification, analytic unity means one discursive mark in many things, while synthetic unity means many 
intuitive marks in one thing. 
In the case of synthetic unity, the intuitive mark as a part-representation is relative to a thing 
as whole-representation. For example, while a nose is an intuitive mark of a head, a head is an 
intuitive mark of the body. In other words, every intuitive mark is essentially a thing. In the case of 
analytic unity, by contrast, the discursive mark as a part-representation has a twofold relationship 
                                                     
255 Here I use representational content (Inhalt) in a characteristic Kantian sense, which should be distinguished from 
mental content or representational/intentional content in the contemporary philosophy of mind. The Kantian 
content is contrasted with scope (Umfang). Originally, Kant introduces this pair of terms in his discussion on the 
concept. And the notion of content is indispensable for drawing the distinction between analytic and synthetic 
judgments. I believe that it could also be applied to intuition. Content is the intensional content of a representation 
in virtue of which the scope of the representation could be determined. In fact, sometimes Inhalt and Umfang are 
translated as intension and extension. In a nutshell, the Kantian contents are mental entities. By contrast, the mental 
content in philosophy of mind is the object or state of affairs represented by the mental states, and these correlates 
of mental states are a set of accuracy conditions of mental states, which are usually taken as abstract entities. The 
Kantian notion of scope is not synonymous with the mental content either, since the scope of a representation is 
primarily the spatiotemporal object. In order to terminologically keep them apart, I will call the former representational 
content or content complemented with the German word in bracket (Inhalt), and reserve mental content or 
intentional content for the latter. 
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to a thing or a concept as a whole-representation. Like the intuitive mark, the discursive mark is 
also a part-representation relative to a thing as a whole-representation. In a more proper sense, it 
is relative to a complex concept as a whole-representation, for a discursive mark is essentially a 
concept. 
Obviously, one intuitive mark is correspondent to a discursive mark, but the former is not 
identical with the latter. Otherwise, it amounts to a conflation of a thing with a concept. 
Unfortunately, Kant sometimes seems to make them numerically identical by sliding from one 
sense of mark to another. For instance, Kant writes in this footnote in §16: “I thereby represent to 
myself a feature that (as a mark) can be encountered in anything, or combined with other 
representations” (Bf133-134). 256  According to my previous interpretation, the meaning of 
represented “mark” in the quotation is ambiguous. A mark that can be encountered in anything is 
a discursive one, whereas a mark that can be combined with other representations is an intuitive 
one. The word token “that” is striking, for it suggests that the mark that can be encountered and 
the mark that can be combined are assumed to be identical. Since the mark refers to the discursive 
mark, the mark that is combined should also refer to the discursive mark. This line of reading is 
enhanced by the following asymmetrical fact: an intuitive mark could not be encountered in others, 
since an intuitive mark can never serve as the common mark, while a discursive mark could be 
combined with others regardless of whether it is a common mark.  
In spite of its plausibility, I believe that it is misguided to read the second mark as a discursive 
mark that can be combined with other concepts. It is true that a discursive mark as a concept can 
of course be combined with other discursive marks to constitute a complex concept, no matter 
whether its object can be instantiated or not. Nonetheless, the combination of discursive marks is 
trivial; it is derived from the case where an intuitive mark is combined with other intuitive ones. 
Obviously, when Kant talks about analytic unity, he is preoccupied with the relationship between 
concept and thing, rather than that between concept and concept. (B133f-134f) 
A further point implicitly made by Kant is that despite the correspondence between the discursive 
mark and the intuitive mark the former arises not directly from the former, but from the whole-
representation of which the latter is merely a part. For example, the concept ‘red’ does not arise 
from the intuition of redness; for there is simply no such common thing as the redness repeated in 
many red things. Rather, it arises from the particulars such as a red apple, a red table, etc. in virtue 
                                                     
256 Note that the translation of Cambridge edition adds a “that”. The original German text reads as “die (als 
Merkmal) irgendworan angetroffen, oder mit anderen Vorstellungen verbunden sein kann.”  
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of the comparison, reflection and abstraction. This point is particularly important for the following 
argument. 
 
7.5.3 The Relationship between One and Many 
In spite of the directional difference, the same “in” in “many in one” and “one in many” 
invites people to take them to be synonymous. Again, I propose that the way different 
representations are contained in one intuition is qualitatively different from the way one concept is 
contained in different representations: in the case of synthetic unity different intuitive marks are 
really contained in the intuition, whereas in the case of analytic unity the concept is logically or ideally 
contained in different things. Or rather, the analytic unity is one over many. 
  The relationship between many and one in synthetic unity is defined in strict mereological 
terms of part and whole, whereas the relationship between many and one in analytic unity is defined 
in metaphysical terms of particular and universal. In the case of synthetic unity many different 
individual representations are literally contained in the intuition as different parts of a whole. For 
instance, eyes, nose, and mouth are literally contained in the intuition of a head. In the case of 
analytic unity, however, different representations are not literally contained in the common concept; 
rather, they are merely different instances of a universal. For instance, a red apple, a red table, and a 
red flag are contained in the discursive mark of red not as its parts; rather, they are instances of the 
universal of red. 
Not only is a discursive mark not literally contained in many things, but it is also not otherwise 
metaphorically contained in them. The above strict mereological sense of parthood is not the only 
way to say that some part is contained in a whole. In a loose sense, a property could be viewed as 
metaphysically contained in a substance. In Aristotle, an accidental property is in a substance, 
whereas an essential property is said of a substance.257  However, this kind of statement makes sense 
only if the underlying metaphysical theory of universal is realism. With regard to the problem of 
universal, the mainstream modern tradition is precisely anti-realism. Following Leibniz Kant is a 
committed conceptualist.258 Conceptualism draws a middle way between realism and nominalism. 
Conceptualism consists of the following claims: (1) universals exist; (2) universals are concepts, 
                                                     
257 For instance, Duns Scotus holds that in spite of its numerical singularity, universal is divisible, otherwise it would 
collapse into a particular. Consequently, Scotus concludes that a universal has parts in the particulars that instantiate 
it. 
258 For an excellent discussion on Leibniz’s conceptualism or nominalism see Mates 1989. Perhaps Kant becomes 
more or less controversial when it comes to the issue of the concepts of understanding, but it is clear that when it 
comes to empirical concepts Kant is not an exception to the mainstream nominalist modern tradition. 
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which are mental entities; consequently, (3) universal does not exist independently of us, not to 
mention its repeatability in particular instances. Therefore, for Kant concept is neither literally nor 
metaphorically contained in many instances. 
In another place, Kant uses different, and less confusing, terminology to explicate the 
difference in the “contained in” relation respectively in the analytic unity and the synthetic unity of 
representation. In the fourth argument for space (and time) in Transcendental Aesthetic in the 
1787 Critique Kant writes: 
 
Now one must, to be sure, think of every concept as a representation that is contained in an infinite 
set of different possible representations (as their common mark), which thus contains these under 
itself; but no concept, as such, can be thought as if it contained an infinite set of representations 
within itself. (B39-B40) 
 
The distinction between “contained under” and “contained in” relation is introduced to serve 
as the criteria to distinguish whether a representation is an intuition or a concept. Kant embraces 
the following scheme: for any representation x, if different representations are contained under the 
representation x, then x is a concept; if different representations are contained in x, then x is an 
intuition.259 Accordingly, it is not difficult to see that the within-containment is characteristic of the 
analytic unity of concept, whereas the under-containment is characteristic of the synthetic unity of 
intuition. To say that many representations are contained under one concept is to say that one 
concept is over many representations. The precise formulation of analytic unity is not the slogan of 
“one in many”, but “one over many”. 
 
7.5.4 The Analytic Unity and the Synthetic Unity Extended  
In spite of the original context of analytic unity and synthetic unity, Kant seems to use the 
analytic unity and synthetic unity in other senses. Remember how Kant introduces the analytic 
unity and the synthetic unity of self-consciousness in the main context in §16: 
 
Therefore, it is only because I can combine a manifold of given representations in one consciousness 
that it is possible for me to represent the identity of the consciousness in these 
                                                     
259 It is on the basis of this distinction that Kant infers that space and time are not concepts but intuitions, since they 
fall under the latter category. For the present purpose I will delay this to Chapter 9. 
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representations 260 itself, i.e., the analytical unity of apperception is only possible under the 
presupposition of some synthetic one. (B133-B134)  
 
In the previous attempt I understand analytic unity and synthetic unity merely in the light of 
their original meaning. In this specific context, Kant conveys something more than that; he seems 
to be trading on two senses of synthetic unity. Synthetic unity does not only mean “a manifold of 
given representations in one consciousness”, and it could also mean “combine a manifold of given 
representations in one consciousness”. Since combination is the German synonym of the Latin 
synthesis, synthetic unity is the unity by synthesis. The second generative conception of synthetic unity 
is not incompatible with the original conception of synthetic unity. Rather, the former is a further 
specification of the ground of the latter. That is, the synthetic unity of the manifold is produced by or 
grounded in the combination of the manifold representations in one self-consciousness. Accordingly, 
the synthetic unity in generative sense entails the synthetic unity in a mereological sense. 
Analogously, the generative conception could be extended to analytic unity. Analytic unity is the 
unity generated by analysis. Kant has a broad conception of analysis which includes concept acquisition. 
Kant explicitly says that concepts “arise analytically” (A77/B103) with respect to their form. Here 
analysis refers to nothing but the three steps of Kant’s account of the logical origin of concept in 
his logic textbook: abstraction, comparison and reflection. The analytic unity is the unity of 
reflection. 
In this quotation Kant identifies the identity of self-consciousness as analytic unity. It seems 
that Kant has two conceptions of analytic unity. The identity of self-consciousness is not the 
analytic unity of consciousness wherein a concept consists; nor is it the unity by analysis. Rather, 
analytic unity is used in a third different sense: it is the unity by conceptual analysis. 
It is noteworthy that the original conception of analytic unity and its generative conception 
are closely connected; the semantic fact of analytic unity is metaphysically grounded by the 
generative conception of analytic unity.261 However, it seems that the epistemic conception of 
analytic unity differs radically from the other two conceptions. Now the question is how the identity 
of self-consciousness can be understood as “one in many”, if it is not “one in many” itself or the 
ground of “one in many”. 
                                                     
260 Here “these representations” is the anaphor of the previous “a manifold of given representations”, namely, 
intuitive marks. Interestingly, Kant is sliding from discursive marks to intuitive marks, which is the opposite case to 
the sliding to discursive marks.  
261 It is not controversial that synthesis makes the synthetic unity possible. 
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On my view, while the analytic unity is not used in the original sense, the logical unity of 
empirical concept can be extended to the general meaning of “one in many”. In an analytic 
judgment, the predicate concept as a mark is contained in the subject concept, and it is identical in 
its being contained in the subject concept. It is identical to be instantiated in many instances of the 
subject concept. In the analytic judgment that ‘all red bodies are red’, for instance, the 
representation ‘red’ is identical and it is contained in all red things. It is “one in many” in the sense 
that it is one concept instantiated in many things. In fact, this conception of analytic unity is 
parasitic on the original conception of analytic unity. 
Now we have three pairs of the conceptions of analytic unity and synthetic unity that could 
be presented in the following table: 
 
 original sense epistemic sense generative sense 
analytic unity one in many 
unity known by semantic analysis 
unity generated by analysis 
synthetic unity many in one unity generated by synthesis 
  unity not known by semantic analysis 
 
 
7.6 The Argument via Analytic Unity and Synthetic Unity of Consciousness 
7.6.1 Rival Readings 
(a) Reading 1 
After the clarification of the various meanings of analytic unity and synthetic unity, we are in 
a position to accomplish the principal task to justify (P2) the principle that the analytic unity of 
consciousness presupposes the synthetic unity of self-consciousness. In the above I have shown 
that the distinction between analytic unity and synthetic unity are introduced with a view to 
distinguishing concept and intuition. Along with this line of thought, the first justification of the 
general principle can be reconstructed as follows: 
 
(1) Every concept presupposes the analytic unity of consciousness. 
(2) Every intuition presupposes the synthetic unity of apperception. 
(3) Every concept depends for its signification on some intuition. (Principle of Signification) 
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(4) Therefore, the analytic unity of consciousness presupposes the synthetic unity of self-
consciousness. 
 
For (1): According to the account of the logical origin of concepts in his Logic, “1. comparison 
of representations among one another in relation to the unity of consciousness; 2. reflection as to 
how various representations can be conceived in one consciousness” (AA 9:94-95). It is 
noteworthy that both comparison and reflection are conducted with reference to “the unity of 
consciousness”. I believe that this unity of consciousness in the account of the logical origin of 
concept should be identified as the analytic unity of consciousness. As Kant further makes clear, 
“[t]his logical origin of concepts – the origin as to their mere form - consists in reflection, whereby 
a representation common to several objects (conceptus communis) arises”. Since the form of a concept 
is its universality, the analytic unity of consciousness is presupposed by the concept for its existence 
in the sense that without analytic unity there is no universality in concept which is the way a 
representation is related to object. 
For (2): The difficulty of this argument is located in the understanding of the nature of 
intuition. Here intuition is the representation which has reference to an object, that is, the 
immediate and singular representation of an object, or the representation in which an object is 
given. It is not the intuition without unity in the manifold. The synthetic unity of self-consciousness 
is the very thing that produces the object for intuition and makes determinate intuition possible. 
Therefore, the synthetic unity of self-consciousness is presupposed by intuition for its existence in 
the sense that without synthetic unity there is no object-reference or relation to object in intuition. 
For (3): For a same represented object, an intuition differs from its corresponding concept 
merely in its form not in its matter, i.e., only in its universality not in its object. In the process from 
singular to general representations, only the form of cognitions is changed from singularity to 
universality, yet their matter remains to be the same and one object. Consequently, concepts take 
over their power of reference to objects from the corresponding intuitions. As long as those 
intuitions do refer to objects, their corresponding concepts refer derivatively to objects, too. Since 
the relation to object in all kinds of representations are derived from the immediate relation in 
intuition, without synthetic unity in intuition there is no object-reference or relation to an object in 
concepts, judgments or inferences. 
For (4): What the conclusion says is not that analytic unity of consciousness depends for its 
existence on the synthetic unity of self-consciousness. Rather, it says that in order for analytic unity 
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to function, it must presuppose that the synthetic unity of self-consciousness has already been in 
play. It amounts to saying that the way of being related to object by discursive mark presupposes 
the relation to object. This point has been made clear in the previous discussion, namely what 
concept presupposes is not any intuitive mark but the synthetic unity of intuition where the intuitive 
mark is only a part. 
Take in itself, this argument goes without objection. One merit of this line of argument is that 
it can do justice to the original meaning of analytic unity and synthetic unity by taking the mereological 
relation between intuition and concept into account. When this sub-argument is taken into a bigger 
picture, however, serious problems arise. Note that this sub-argument by appealing to intuition and 
concept is employed to justify the priority of the synthetic unity of self-consciousness to the analytic 
unity of consciousness and thereby to draw the conclusion (C3) that the manifold representations 
stand under the synthetic unity of self-consciousness. Along the above line of the justification for 
(P2), however, the priority of synthetic unity to analytic unity holds only if the assumption is granted 
that the manifold representations in intuition stand under the synthetic unity of apperception. This 
assumption turns out to be the very thing that Kant attempts to prove in the argument from self-
consciousness, not that from which Kant proceeds to argue. 
If the argument for (C3) and the argument for (P2) are taken together, the argument involves 
a circular reasoning where the conclusion implicitly appears in a set of premises. To make the 
logical circularity more explicit, let us see the following three claims:  
 
(P2) Intuition presupposes synthetic unity of self-consciousness. 
 
(1) holds only if: 
 
(C3) Analytic unity of consciousness presupposes the synthetic unity of self-consciousness.  
 
and (2) hold in turn only if: 
 
(1) Intuition presupposes the synthetic unity of self-consciousness. 
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Kant endorses both that (1) implies (2) and that (2) implies (1). In confrontation with this 
circularity, there could be two responses: one could deny either the inference from (1) to (2) or the 
inference from (2) to (1). Since Kant’s official line of reasoning is from the priority of synthetic 
unity to the synthesis of the representations in one self-consciousness, it is very natural to retain 
the inference from (1) to (2) and to deny the inference from (2) to (1), and thereby to deny the 
entire line of thought by appealing to the semantic priority of intuition to concept to justify the 
priority of synthetic unity. 
Even if there is no circularity of the justification of the priority of synthetic unity to analytic 
unity, another objection to this line of argument is that Kant equivocates on the meaning of analytic 
unity, and thus commits to the fallacy of middle term. 
 
(P1) The manifold representations given in intuition stand under the analytic unity of consciousness. 
(P2) The analytic unity of self-consciousness presupposes the synthetic unity of self-consciousness. 
(C3) Therefore, the manifold representations given in intuition stand under the synthetic unity of 
self-consciousness. 
 
In this argument, the analytic unity of self-consciousness is the middle term of this syllogism. 
According to the various senses I have differentiated above, the analytic unity of self-consciousness 
in (P2) is understood in the generative sense, and it means the consciousness that makes the 
common concept possible. In (P1), however, the analytic unity of self-consciousness is understood 
in the epistemic sense, and it means the identity of self-consciousness in the manifold of 
representations. 
Although the two occurences of analytic unity in the two premises are not synonymous, it 
does not preclude the possibility that they are co-referential. The equivocation makes the argument 
invalid, but it does not immediately make the argument unsound. We need to prove that the 
generative conception of analytic unity and the epistemic conception of analytic unity are 
numerically distinct. Now it becomes apparent that this fallacy of equivocation in middle term is 
another reason to force us to discard the line of the justification of the priority of synthetic unity 
to analytic unity with reference to their motivational context of intuition and concept. 
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(b) Reading 2 
I would like to dispel one easy way of justifying the priority of synthetic unity to the analytic 
unity of self-consciousness. According to this reading, it seems that the claim that the analytic unity 
of apperception presupposes the synthetic unity of apperception is a specific application of Kant’s 
cherished principle in §15 that analysis presupposes synthesis, for which he explicitly clarifies that 
“where the understanding has not previously combined anything, neither can it dissolve anything” 
(B130). This line of thought does not resolve the problem, and it merely relocates the task of 
justification to the principle of the priority of synthesis to analysis. Again, a line of the justification 
of the principle of synthesis to analysis is to make an appeal to the priority of intuition to concept, 
which we have invoked in the previous reading. Along with this line we are adopting the generative 
conception of analytic unity and synthetic unity, according to which analytic unity has a 
straightforward relation to analysis as synthetic unity does to synthesis: synthetic unity is the unity 
produced by synthesis, whereas analytic unity is the unity produced by analysis. This move does 
nothing but to collapse the argument into the previous one, and consequently suffers from the 
previous problem of circularity. 
 
(c) Reading 3 
According to this second reading, the premise that the analytic unity of apperception 
presupposes the synthetic unity of apperception lacks adequate justification, and the inference from 
analytic unity to synthetic unity cannot be drawn as Kant suggests. Kant does not say how the 
inference from analytic unity to synthetic unity in the main text runs; rather he clarifies the 
relationship between these two kinds of unity in the footnote of §16, where the clearest hint is the 
following passage: 
 
A representation that is to be thought of as common to several must be regarded as belonging to 
those that in addition to it also have something different in themselves; consequently they must 
antecedently be conceived in synthetic unity with other (even if only possible representations) 
before I can think of the analytical unity of consciousness in it that makes it into a conceptus 
communis.(B133f-134f) 
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In this passage “A representation that is to be thought of as common to several” refers to 
the analytic unity, and “those that in addition to it also have something different in themselves” 
refer to the synthetic unity. We can see from the text where the problem of the inference lies. It is 
doubtless that the simple representation of the I think and the manifold representations stand in 
the relation of analytic unity of apperception since the I can be encountered in each of my possible 
representation. If we accept the way that the analytic unity of consciousness presupposes the 
synthetic unity of apperception as Kant indicates, then at best Kant proves that a synthetic unity 
exists between the one representation of the I think and the manifold representations. But it does not follow 
that in addition to the I think all the representations themselves stand under a synthetic unity. What 
Kant gives is that if x is an analytic unity of consciousness then x stands in synthetic unity with all 
other different representations, say, a and b. What we need is rather that if x is an analytic unity 
then other different representations a and b, stand in synthetic unity. To make this inference valid, 
an additional premise should be invoked. 
 
7.6.2 The Identity Reading Recommended 
All the previous readings assume that the analytic unity of consciousness and the synthetic 
unity of self-consciousness are extensionally distinct. In the last reading, however, I will argue that 
the analytic unity and the synthetic unity of self-consciousness that are at play in the argument form 
self-consciousness are intensionally distinct but extensionally identical. We have a quick argument 
from the identity of self-consciousness to the indispensability of synthesis. 
It has been shown that the synthetic unity of self-consciousness should be understood as 
many in one in the context of intuition. To be sure, the distinction between synthetic unity as 
“many in one” and analytic unity as “one in many” appears to be clear-cut. It turns out that the 
synthetic unity of self-consciousness could also be understood as “one in many”, and thereby it is 
liable to collapse into a form of analytic unity. 
The analytic unity of self-consciousness is derived from the analyticity of self-ascription thesis 
which has been elaborated in detail in the last section. Remember the following line of reasoning 
concerning the concept ‘I’, the conceptual expression of self-consciousness. The proposition that 
all my representations are mine is analytic and known a priori, where the subject-concept ‘all my 
representations’ refers to many different representations, while the predicate-concept ‘mine’ refers 
to the same representation I, too. Every time when I encounter my representation I could analyze 
one I as its mark or part of its representational content. For instance, in my representation of the thing 
‘a head’, I can always encounter a representation ‘I’. In every part-representation of the head, say, 
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a nose, I could encounter a representation ‘I’ as well. The representation I is contained in each of 
my representations, and in fact it is contained in all my representation. Consequently, the 
representation I can be regarded as “common to several”, which is a criterion of being analytic 
unity. Therefore, when analytic unity is understood in this epistemic sense, we can make intelligible 
why the identity of self-consciousness is a kind of analytic unity. This sign of identification turns 
out to be decisive for Kant’s following argument. 
The most serious consequence seems to be that the difference between “many in one” and 
“one in many” is blurred. While it requires something more to claim that the epistemic conception 
of the analytic unity of self-consciousness implies the original conception of synthetic unity, the 
epistemic conception of the analytic unity of self-consciousness is not incompatible with the original 
conception of synthetic unity. 
Fortunately, it turns out that the distinction between the synthetic unity and the epistemic 
conception of the analytic unity of self-consciousness could be retained. We have the following 
two arguments for the two criteria of synthetic unity. The first argument draws on the apriority of 
the unity of self-consciousness: 
 
(a1) If some unity is analytic in the epistemic sense, it could be either analytic unity as one over 
many, or synthetic unity as many in one. 
(a2) The unity is either of absolute universality or of comparative universality. 
(a3) If the unity is of absolute universality for the many, it is synthetic unity, and if the unity is of 
comparative universality for the many, it is analytic unity. 
 
The enormous difference between the concept ‘I’ and normal concepts should not be 
overlooked. The empirical concept ‘red’ is instantiated in many red bodies. In fact, the instantiation 
of the concept ‘red’ is grounded in the logical procedure of comparison, reflection and abstraction 
of many different red objects. As analytic unity of concept, the empirical concept ‘red’ refers to a 
multiplicity of red things, and the multiplicity of red things all falls under and is unified in the 
concept ‘red’. Things are different in the concept ‘I’. While the concept ‘I’ is likewise instantiated 
in each of my representations, the identity of the I (self-consciousness) implies the uniqueness 
claim that there is only one such I (the self-consciousness). The numerical identity of self-
consciousness contradicts with the numerical multiplicity of the referents of the empirical concept 
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‘I’. ‘I’ as the pure concept refers to the unique individual the I. The pure concept ‘I’ does not refer 
to the different empirical referents Is. At best it refers to the different occurrences of the identical referent the I. 
Therefore, we have a second distinguishing criterion in terms of the numerical identity of self-
consciousness:  
 
(b1) If some unity is analytic in the epistemic sense, it could be either analytic unity as one over 
many, or synthetic unity as many in one. 
(b2) The unity of self-consciousness is either identical or not. 
(b3) If the unity is identical, it is synthetic unity; and if not, it is analytic unity. 
 
With the aid of the identification of the epistemic conception of analytic unity with the original 
conception of synthetic unity, the argument from self-consciousness could be reformulated as: 
 
(1) All my representations have analytic unity. 
(2) The analytic unity of self-consciousness turns out to be a synthetic unity of self-consciousness. 
(3) All my representations have synthetic unity. 
(4) All my representations presuppose a transcendental synthesis of imagination. 
 
In fact, we will see that Kant does not argue for the claim that the epistemic conception of 
analytic unity implies the original conception of synthetic unity and then further makes the 
inference that the original conception of synthetic unity implies the generative conception of 
synthetic unity. Rather, Kant takes a shortcut to directly argue that the epistemic conception of 
analytic unity implies the generative conception of synthetic unity. This line of reasoning has its 
peculiar difficulty: while it is easy to show the latter implies the former, it is not easy to show how 
the former implies the latter. 
The ambiguity of the synthetic unity is not a coincidence in Kant’s argument. In fact, it is 
paralleled by another ambiguity. It is with the help of this ambiguity that Kant’s argument 
accomplishes his objective. The key text on this ambiguity is quoted as follows: 
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(T) The latter relation therefore does not yet come about by my accompanying each representation 
with consciousness, but rather by my adding one representation to the other and being conscious of 
their synthesis. (B133) 
 
“The latter relation” refers to the relation to “the identity of subject”, or, more exactly, the 
relation of representation or empirical consciousness to the identity of self-consciousness. What 
precisely is the relation to the identity of self-consciousness? In my view, the relation to the identity 
of self-consciousness should be understood with reference to the opening sentence of §16 “the I 
think must be able to accompany all my representation”. Accordingly, the relation in question is one 
of the accompanying of all my representations with the I think (self-consciousness), which is the 
same with the analytic unity of self-consciousness in the epistemic sense. 
Combined with this understanding of the “latter relation”, the sentence in the quotation can 
be paraphrased as: the relation of the accompanying of all my representations with the I think or 
the analytic unity of self-consciousness in all manifold representations “does not yet come about 
by my accompanying each representation with consciousness, but rather by my adding one 
representation to the other and being conscious of their synthesis”. Put it more concisely, a 
somehow paradoxical yet illuminating claim emerges: 
 
(T*) The accompanying relation of all my representations with the I think does not come about by 
my accompanying each representation with consciousness. 
 
It is paradoxical in that it sounds like there is a marriage relationship without marrying one to 
another. It is illuminating in that it reveals Kant’s most fundamental motivation to argue for the 
indispensability of synthesis. In order to make sense of this claim, it is natural to attribute an 
ambiguity to the notion of accompanying. The first accompanying is the fact of accompanying, whereas 
the second accompanying is the act of accompanying. As the term “come about” makes clear, the 
relation to the identity of self-consciousness is not given, but produced. The crux is that the product 
of the accompanying relation of the I to the manifold representations is not brought about by the 
act of the accompanying by consciousness. 
It must be clear that we do not know how every representation is related to the I think as to 
consciousness. Rather, we just find the result of accompanying relation in virtue of the semantic analysis 
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of self-ascription. From this result, however, one cannot infer that it is the act of accompanying by the 
consciousness that is at play. The act of accompanying by consciousness is not a necessary 
condition for the loose notion of the self-ascription of any representation in me without the need to 
make reference to the identity of the I. As we shall see, it turns out that according to the strict sense 
of self-ascription to the identical I it is not even a sufficient condition. 
This act-result ambiguity could be illustrated by a more ordinary example. For instance, in a 
running race one player A is running after another player B. On the basis of empirical observation 
(rather than conceptual analysis) we can say that A follows B in running. But the interesting thing 
is that from the following relation of A to B it cannot be inferred that A follows B in virtue of A’s 
following B. Although it is a fact that A follows B, it does not imply A intends to follow B. A is striving 
for champion as well as B. The fact is that A and B has different running speed; and A follows B 
in virtue of its slow speed relative to B, not in virtue of his intentional peculiar running strategy: 
 
(1) A follows B because he is slower than B. 
(2) A follows B follows because he intends to follow B. 
 
On my understanding, Kant makes a similar point here. The accompany relation does not 
come about by accompanying, but by synthesizing. I do not really accompany the I with different 
representations. That all my representations are accompanied by the I think does not mean that 
this effect is realized by the act of accompanying. 
Kant’s argument can be reconstructed as follows: 
 
(1) The analytic unity of self-consciousness can be explained by accompanying or by combination. 
(2) The analytic unity of self-consciousness instantiates some feature F. 
(3) The accompanying model cannot explain some feature F. 
(4) Therefore, the analytic unity of self-consciousness is explained by the combination model. 
 
For (1): Unlike Kant’s other disjunctive syllogism, the disjunction in (1) appears not to rest 
on the logical distinction and thus it seems to be not a priori true. Thus we do not know whether 
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the dichotomy between the accompanying is exhaustive, and we do not know whether there are 
still other models of explaining the phenomenon of the reference of all representations to me. If (1) 
is not a priori true, then this argument is an abductive inference in character. 
Yet, it seems that Kant does not satisfy with the abductive reasoning. Rather, he wants the 
reasoning to be deductive. Note that Kant says that “it is only because I can combine a manifold 
of given representations in one consciousness that it is possible for me to represent the identity of 
the consciousness in these representations itself” (B133). Here Kant’s diction “only because” is 
interesting. Although it certainly indicates the necessary condition, it does not mean that no 
sufficient condition could be determined. Rather, it means that only necessary condition concerns 
him. It is not difficult to see that Kant’s actual commitment is to both the sufficient condition and 
necessary condition. As I have indicated, the generative conception of the synthetic unity of self-
consciousness is the ground of its original conception, so it is unproblematic to make an abductive 
inference to the sufficient condition of the synthetic unity of self-consciousness in the original 
sense. Therefore, Kant here takes it for granted that synthesis is a sufficient condition for the 
synthetic unity of self-consciousness. 
Furthermore, by “only because” Kant does assume that there are only two models that can 
account for the accompanying of representations by the I. To make (1) a priori, the following 
assumption could be attributed to Kant: 
 
(1*) representations are taken up into consciousness either individually or collectively. 
 
According to this assumption, there are only two ways in which a representation is taken up 
into consciousness: either it is individually taken into consciousness or it is collectively taken into 
consciousness. The individually making-conscious way and the collectively making-conscious way 
are correspondent to the two models for explaining the analytic unity in question. Thus, there are 
only two possible models that can account for the phenomena of the identity of self-consciousness 
with respect to the manifold representations. 
For (2) and (3): Now Kant is obliged to provide philosophical reasons for his preference to 
the model of combining to the model of accompanying. He must show both (a) that the combining 
model is as good as the accompanying model in making I think to accompany my representation, 
and (b) that the combining model is even better than the accompanying model for other reason. Kant 
strategy is to show that the combining model is correct because it has more explanatory power. 
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The most important reason is that the empirical consciousness is by itself separate and 
dispersed. To accompany each of my representations with empirical consciousness cannot simply 
produce any genuine unity. 262  The second reason is less conspicuous. Kant repeats that 
representations belong to the self-consciousness in a strikingly exhaustive manner: 
 
For the manifold representations that are given in a certain intuition would not all together be my 
representations if they did not all together belong to a self-consciousness[.] (B132) 
 
[O]nly because I can comprehend their manifold in a consciousness do I call them all together my 
representations[.] (B134) 
 
The correct model of mental activity that yields the analytic unity in the identical 
accompanying sense should be able to meet the exhaustiveness criterion of taking representations 
into self-consciousness. The accompanying model of mental activity cannot bring about the 
genuine exhaustive accompanying relation. The exhaustive or ubiquitous accompanying is precisely 
met by the successive character of synthesis, and it is only a consequence of combination. If our act 
is merely to accompany representation with consciousness (the mere act of accompanying can only 
be aided by consciousness, not by the I), then the act of consciousness without reference to self-
consciousness is only selective. Only the successive synthesis can take all representations into the same 
self-consciousness without any gap. 
 
  
                                                     
262 The “unity of association” (A121) is obviously too weak.  
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Chapter 8  The Argument from Judgment 
8.1 Introduction 
In contrast to the A-Deduction, the arguably most striking feature of the B-Deduction is the 
introduction and incorporation of judgment into the argument that is entirely absent in the A-
Deduction. 
Unlike the previous two lines of argument, the argument from judgment is not easy to be 
separated from the jungle of the Transcendental Deduction, since it is incorporated as a part of a 
larger argument in the Transcendental Deduction and it has to make reference to the Metaphysical 
Deduction. Unlike the previous two lines of arguments, we cannot find an independent official 
argument from judgment; instead, we can only formulate different versions of the argument with 
reference to judgment drawing on diffused texts. 
In the dense section §16 Kant begins his transcendental deduction with the famous sentence: 
“[t] he I think must be able to accompany all my representations” (B131), and then he argues that 
the identity of self-consciousness presupposes, or includes, a synthesis, which ensures that all my 
representations are combined in one consciousness and thus are mine after all.263 If Kant were 
further to argue that the synthesis is governed by a priori rules, and these rules would be nothing 
other than categories, then this argument would turn out to be nothing other than a restatement 
of the argument from above in the A-Deduction. The perplexing fact is that, after the introduction 
of the notion of synthesis or combination in §16, Kant does not move his argument any further by 
following the suit, as if Kant has forgotten the efforts he has made in the A-Deduction. The even 
more perplexing fact is that in section §19 Kant makes an appeal to a full-blown definition of 
judgment. (B141) In the summary section §20, Kant continues to put judgment in the center of the 
discourse with no reference to the notion of synthesis, and it is only in this section, where categories 
are introduced for the first time into the argument in the B-Deduction. 
In fact, the introduction of judgment in the B-Deduction might seem sudden, but it is not 
drawn out of air at all. It is a result of Kant’s series of previous enthusiastic attempts after the 
publication of the 1781 Critique, which are recorded both by his publications such as the Prologomena 
(1783) and the Metaphysical Foundation (1786) and by his private notes compiled in Reflections.264 
Before the 1787 Critique, Kant was deeply obsessed with the prospect of the theoretical potential 
                                                     
263 I take combination and synthesis to be synonymous. For textual evidence see §26 in the 1787 Critique. 
264 See Guyer 2010 for the development of Kant’s published arguments centered on judgment between the two 
editions of the Critique. See R5925, R5928, R5929, R5931, R5932, and R5933 for the records of Kant’s exploration in 
his unpublished writings. 
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of judgment and he even promised in 1786 that “as I now understand it, [it can be solved with] just 
as much ease, since it can almost be accomplished through a single inference from the precisely 
determined definition of a judgment in general (an action through which given representations first 
become cognitions of an object)” (AA 4:475-476). Kant believes that the central status of judgment 
for the supposed success of transcendental deduction is beyond doubt. 
One natural question is why Kant introduces judgment in his transcendental deduction of 
categories. A quick answer is that the introduction of judgment in the B-Deduction is intended to 
remedy the deficiency of the A-Deduction, namely, the sudden identification of categories as a 
priori rules of synthesis without adequate justification, which all the previous versions of argument 
in the last two chapters leave untouched. Since judgment is the birthplace of the category, it is quite 
reasonable to clarify the nature of categories and make use of the inner connection of categories 
to judgment. With the introduction of judgment, the argument in the B-Deduction acquires the 
virtue of making use the results in the Metaphysical Deduction to establish the link between 
synthesis and categories, which is entirely absent in the A-Deduction.  
In the argument from judgment, Kant takes a detour to accomplish the argumentative objective. 
The aim of the Transcendental Deduction is to prove the validity of categories. As I have 
mentioned in Chapter 1, there is a systematic ambiguity in the notion of the “relation” or the 
“application” of categories to objects. It is with the introduction of judgment that the ambiguity 
displays itself clearer than anywhere else. In the previous attempts of argument, what Kant needs 
to do is to directly prove that categories as conditions of synthesis are instantiated by objects. By 
invoking to judgment, however, Kant must first prove that categories as higher-order concepts are 
employed in judgment, and then prove that categories as real relational properties are instantiated by 
things in space and time. In other words, the introduction of judgment presupposes a gap between 
the logical level of judgment or thinking and the metaphysical level of thing, or between truth and being.  
In response to this problem, Kant makes an appeal to the Instantiation Principle in the hope 
of bridging the gap between truth and being. The basic idea of the Instantiation Principle is that 
what contributes to the truth of the judgment is instantiated in reality. As we will see, however, it 
turns out that the well-received Instantiation Principle is implicitly yet vehemently criticized by 
Kant’s insistence on the irreducible distinction between logic and metaphysics. And we will see 
how Kant takes pains to carefully modify this principle and make it accommodated to his most 
committed metaphysical assumptions. 
In section 8.2, I will examine Kant’s two different conceptions of judgment and argue that 
they are compatible. In section 8.3, I will offer a detailed analysis of Kant’s identity thesis and the 
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complex issues involved in it, which lays a solid foundation for all the arguments with reference to 
the judgment. In section 8.4, I will argue that neither of Kant’s two arguments by judgment 
intended by him is desirable. In section 8.5, I will review one argument from true judgment 
proposed by Guyer. In section 8.6, I will critically consider Van Cleve’s knocking-down objection 
to Kant’s argument. In 8.7, I will examine a more radical objection to the Instantiation Principle 
and then outline one argument from judgment that could do justice to both Kant’s intention and 
the theoretical potential of judgment. 
 
8.2 Kant’s Conceptions of Judgment 
Given that this line of argument is based on the notion of judgment, we must be clear what 
judgment is for Kant before analyzing the argument. Kant has two conceptions of judgment, and 
they will be examined in turn.265 The definition of judgment in general in Kant’s Logic is spelled out 
as follows: “A judgment is the representation of the unity of the consciousness of various 
representations, or the representation of their relation insofar as they constitute a concept.” (AA 
9:101) This more mundane definition is supposed to be viewed as widely accepted by Kant’s 
contemporaries in Germany. Since this mature definition as well as other similar definitions appears 
in his works on logic, we could call it the logical definition of judgment. 
In the 1787 Critique, however, Kant offers another new definition in §19, which also contains 
Kant’s most intensive discussion of judgment in the Transcendental Deduction. According to the 
new definition, “a judgment is nothing other than the way to bring given cognitions to the objective 
unity of apperception” (B141). Since this definition appears in his principal work on the 
characteristic transcendental philosophy and it is formulated with reference to the transcendental 
apperception, it could be referred to as the transcendental definition of judgment.  
While Kant explicitly says that a judgment is “an action through which given representations 
first become cognitions of an object”, in order to better appreciate Kant’s motivation, it is 
worthwhile for us to have a survey of what precisely Kant has in mind when he understands “the 
precisely determined definition of a judgment in general” with reference to Kant’s other works and 
the 1787 Critique in particular. 
                                                     
265 The distinction between a logical conception and a transcendental one of judgment is not rare. See also 
Longuenesse 1998. As we will see later, I would like to use this pair of labels to stress the different natures of the 
consciousness to which they make reference. 
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What is intriguing in this definition is the generic notion “cognition” and the defined notion 
“the objective unity of apperception”. As I understand, they are correlated to each other for some 
essentials of this definition. Let’s first consider the generality of the notion of cognition. At the 
first glance, it appears that by using the generic notion “cognition” Kant intends to remedy one of 
the deficiencies of the traditional definition of judgment he identifies early in §19. According to the 
traditional definition, a judgment “the representation of a relation between two concepts” (B140). 
Kant objects that this definition is too narrow; it can only be applied to one species of elementary 
judgment, i.e., categorical judgment. Understood in this light, cognition refers to objective 
representation in general, and both concepts and judgments are included. The use of the generic 
notion of cognition is meant to include judgments in order to make the definition extended and 
applied to complex judgments of hypothetical and disjunctive judgments. 
However, a second reading shows that Kant is not interested in the incompleteness of the 
traditional definition of judgment at all. As Kant himself clarifies, he is not “quarreling here about 
what is mistaken in this explanation” (B141). In fact, for the sake of the simplification of the 
question, Kant even in the following takes over the idea or assumes that what is at stake is merely 
categorical judgment and that is adequate for the illustration of judgment in general. Rather, Kant 
is concerned with the question of “wherein this relation [(of the two concepts)] consists” (B141). 
In a nutshell, what Kant finds fault with the traditional definition is not that it is descriptively 
incomplete, but that it is explanatorily inadequate. 
What does Kant mean by “the objective unity of apperception”? An immediate answer to this 
question is supposed to be the logical form of judgment, in which concepts are combined according to 
different logical functions. The logical form of judgment in turn consists in the analytic and logical 
unity of consciousness. However, Kant suggests here that what is at stake is the objective unity of 
apperception. Kant even reformulates the notion of the logical form of judgment in terms of the 
objective unity of apperception. As the title of §19 indicates, “[t]he logical form of all judgments 
consists in the objective unity of the apperception of the concepts contained therein” (B140).266 If 
the chief function of the objective unity of apperception is to contain concepts in it, then it is 
nothing more than an articulation of the traditional logical definition of judgment, and there is 
nothing particularly interesting in it.  
Nevertheless, the suggestion in the title of §19 is somehow misleading. It turns out that the 
notion of the objective unity of apperception and the correspondent explanation of judgment are 
                                                     
266 Here concepts serve as counterexamples for my interpretation of cognition, yet they are nonetheless contrary to 
§20. 
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much stronger than that. The notion “the objective unity of apperception” is first introduced in 
§18, where Kant makes it clear that it is nothing other than the transcendental unity of apperception: 
“The transcendental unity of apperception is that unity through which all of the manifold given 
in an intuition is united in a concept of the object. It is called objective on that account[.]” (B139) 
By means of the objective unity of apperception, “the manifold given in an intuition” is united. 
What is peculiar to the definition of the judgment is its reference to the unity of intuition. Therefore, 
I contend that the objective unity of apperception should be distinguished from the analytic unity of 
consciousness in that what the latter stresses is that merely different concepts are united in a judgment. 
This reading could be confirmed by other texts. In his following analysis of the example 
“Bodies are heavy”, Kant does not allude to the combination of concepts, nor to the comparison 
of concepts. Rather, he attaches emphasis to the combination of intuitions: “these representations… 
belong to one another in virtue of the necessary unity of the apperception in the synthesis of 
intuitions” (B142). Kant’s incorporation of the synthesis of the manifold intuitive representations 
into the definition of judgment is further confirmed by Kant’s reaffirmation and clarification of 
the new definition of judgment in §20: “That action of the understanding, however, through which 
the manifold of given representations (whether they be intuitions or concepts) is brought under an 
apperception in general, is the logical function of judgments (§19)” (B143). As Kant makes clear, 
the logical functions of judgment, or judgments themselves, could not only bring concepts under the 
unity of apperception, but also bring intuitions under the unity of apperception. This reading is 
consistent with Kant’s definition of judgment in Metaphysical Foundation as “an action through which 
given representations first become cognitions of an object” (AA 4:475-476). 
Now we are in a position to explain what this “fully determined definition of judgment” that 
is introduced in Metaphysical Foundation and called upon in the 1787 Critique amounts to. Since the 
logical definition makes a claim to the combination of concepts, it appears to introduce a weak 
conception of judgment. Since the transcendental definition of judgment makes a claim not only 
to the combination of concepts, but also to that of intuitions, it appears to introduce a strong one. 
On my reading, the transcendental conception of judgment is not literally a definition of judgment 
at all. Rather, it is an account or an explanation of judgment.267 If there is an argument with reference 
to the transcendental conception of judgment, it is not an argument with reference to the definition 
of judgment, but an argument with reference to the object-claim of judgment. What it concerns is not 
what judgment is, but how a synthetic judgment is endowed with the claim to object. Accordingly, the logical 
                                                     
267 Indeed, Kant does not explicitly refer to it as definition, but as “explanation”, but this is not the reason why it is 
an explanation, for sometimes Kant uses explanation in a way similar to explication, and explication is closely related 
to definition. See R2950 (AA 16:585), R2994 (AA 16:606), and R3005 (AA 16:610-611). 
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and transcendental conceptions of judgment are not incompatible, since they are operated on 
different levels.268 
In spite of the compatibility, the transcendental conception of judgment does bring about a 
tension in the Transcendental Deduction. The general picture emerges that Kant employs two 
kinds of conceptual resources in the first part of the B-Deduction. From §15 to §18 figures the 
notion of synthesis, while from §19 to §20 figures the notion of judgment. In the summary section 
§20 the notion of synthesis does not appear at all. With the development of the Deduction, it seems 
that the role of judgment is squeezing the space of that of synthesis. Consequently, what Kant 
brings into view is not the relation of self-consciousness to synthesis, but the relation of 
apperception to judgments. The relationship between judgment and synthesis stands in the center 
of Kant’s theory of objective representation (cognition). Even in the 1787 Critique, Kant’s 
suggestions on this issue are not always consistent. The question as to what the nature of the 
relationship between synthesis and judgment is must be answered. 
The notion of knowledge is usually defined as the epistemically justified true belief. Judgment 
is a proposition-like entity, and therefore it is equivalent to belief. A true judgment of experience 
needs the testimony from experience, and thereby it is justified. Therefore, to have a true judgment 
of experience is to entertain or make assent to the justified true belief.  
An argument from the true judgment of experience amounts to a judgment from knowledge. 
The premise is too thick to be accepted by the skeptics. The skeptics will not agree that the 
knowledge that “every body is heavy” implicitly uses the concept of causation, nor will they agree 
that some the state of affairs is presupposed as the correlate of belief. Then, the old objection 
appears again that Kant simply begs the question of the skeptics, and his anti-skeptical project is 
doomed at the very beginning.269 
Again, as I have suggested, the argument from judgment should be primarily viewed as an 
attempt to explain judgment, or rather, to explain certain facts concerning judgment. In the case 
of self-consciousness, it is the ascription of representations to the identical self-consciousness that 
is at issue. In the case of judgment, as we will see, it is the claim of judgment to truth that is at issue. 
Construed in this light, the explanatory reading is perfectly amenable to the transcendental 
conception of judgment I have explicated above. In order to see how judgment must make 
                                                     
268 Nevertheless, the question of the claim of synthetic judgment to object is not thereby settled. In order to 
appreciate Kant’s point, we must refer back to the background theory of judgment and that of combination. 
269 This point is repeatedly made by Guyer, especially in his 1987. 
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reference to intuition, we must turn to Kant’s critically important Identity Thesis in the 
Metaphysical Deduction. 
 
8.3 The Identity Thesis 
Kant’s most systematic attempt to explain the relationship between judgment and synthesis 
and that between the forms of judgment and categories could be found in his Metaphysical 
Deduction. In an oft-discussed passage in §10, Kant articulates his Identity Thesis in the following 
way: 
 
(T1) The same function which gives unity to the different representations in a judgment also gives 
unity to the mere synthesis of different representations in an intuition, which, expressed generally, is 
called the pure concepts of understanding. (T2) The same understanding, therefore, and indeed by 
means of the very same actions through which it brought the logical form of a judgment in concepts 
by means of the analytical unity, also brings a transcendental content into its representations by means 
of the synthetic unity of the manifold in intuition in general, on account of which they are called pure 
concepts of the understanding that pertain to objects a priori[.] (A79/B104-105) 
 
The importance of this passage can hardly be overestimated. It reveals what Kant assumes as 
well as what Kant argues for. It presupposes Kant’s theory of cognition, the mereology, the semantics, 
the epistemology of cognition, or objective representation, and meanwhile it constitutes an explanation 
of certain crucial points in Kant’s theory of cognition. Relevant to our present concern, it includes 
a theory of judgment in view of transcendental logic. Given its overriding importance, I will offer 
a detailed analysis in what follows. 
The passage consists of two sentences (T1) and (T2), and they basically express the same thing, 
despite the differences in detail.270 In this highly compressed passage, Kant addresses four kinds of 
relationship: (i) the relationship between different representations and judgment, (ii) the 
relationship between different representations and intuition, (iii) the relationship between making 
a judgment and building (abbilden) an intuition, and (iv) the relationship between forms of 
judgments and pure concepts of understanding. 
The original context is meant to establish a parallelism between the table of forms of 
judgments and the table of categories. Therefore, Kant’s original motivation is merely (iv): to 
                                                     
270 Longuenesse (1998) emphasizes the difference between the two sentences by arguing that (T1) expresses a 
symmetrical relation, whereas (T2) expresses an asymmetrical relation in a twofold sense. I would rather say that they 
are mutually complementary. 
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introduce the notion of categories in the context where the forms of judgments have been 
introduced. Nevertheless, question (i), (ii) and (iii) constitute the necessary backdrop of Kant’s 
parallelism between forms of judgments and categories. To be sure, some attempts have been made 
to some extent in the last chapter. In this chapter, however, the formulation of the identity thesis, 
especially in the second sentence (T2), will give us a more complete picture of Kant’s 
representational mereology. In the following I will offer a detailed analysis by addressing the four 
kinds of relationship. 
 
8.3.1 Representations and Judgment 
Kant has explained the relationship between concepts and judgments in the preliminary 
section “on the logical use of understanding” in Analytic. The expression “different representations 
in a judgment” is supposed to refer specifically to different concepts. Different concepts are unified 
such as to produce a judgment. If this reading is correct, then it can be assumed that Kant is 
referring to judgments per se, judgments without reference neither to subject nor to object.  
Initially, the difference of concepts appears to mean something trivial. By “different” Kant is 
stressing the numerical difference, the opposite of numerical identity, as a demand on the plurality of 
the representations necessary for combination, for one single representation cannot be combined, 
and any minimum judgment needs at least two concepts. In my view, however, Kant’s emphasis on 
the difference of representations implies something stronger than the mere negation of the 
numerical identity of representations. What Kant stresses is the qualitative difference in the content of 
concepts. The requirement of the numerical difference of concepts has already been expressed by 
the plural form of “representations”. The requirement of the qualitative difference of concepts is 
expressed by “different”. By “different” Kant intends to preclude the cases where one concept is 
identical with the other. As Kant’s common practice, the identity of one concept with the other is 
not merely strictly identical such as ‘extended’ and ‘extended’, but one concept is analytically 
contained in the other such as ‘extended’ and ‘body’. The requirement of qualitative difference is 
consistent with the constraint Kant imposes on the combination in general in §15 added in 1787: 
 
Whether the representations themselves are identical, and whether therefore one could be thought 
through the other analytically, does not come into consideration here. The consciousness of the one, 
as far as the manifold is concerned, is still always to be distinguished from the consciousness of the 
other, and it is only the synthesis of this (possible) consciousness that is at issue here. (B131f) 
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Consequently, what the “function that gives unity to the different representations” can yield 
is only a synthetic judgment. In the previous section §15 “On the logical function of the understanding 
in judgments”, the table of judgments is true of judgment in general. At the very beginning of the 
section, Kant friendly reminds us that “we abstract from all content of a judgment in general, and 
attend only to the mere form of the understanding in it”. Both analytic and synthetic judgment 
share the same logical functions of judgment. Accordingly, the table of forms of judgment is 
located in general logic. At the beginning of section §10, by contrast, Kant explicitly restricts the 
discussion into transcendental logic: 
 
Transcendental logic, on the contrary, has a manifold of sensibility that lies before it a priori, which the 
transcendental aesthetic has offered to it, in order to provide the pure concepts of the understanding 
with a matter, without which they would be without any content, thus completely empty. (A76-
77/B102) 
 
In spite of the fact that the function of understanding “that gives unity to the different 
representations” holds also for analytic judgment, the scope of the judgment implicitly narrows 
from judgment in general down to synthetic judgment, and, in fact, even to empirical synthetic judgment. 
With the change of the scope of judgment, the scope of Kant’s Identity Thesis in the Metaphysical 
Deduction changes as well. Whatever the Identity Thesis means, its truth holds only for synthetic 
and empirical species of judgments. One consequence is that while the logical forms are essential 
to analytic judgments, analytic judgments are made without reference to categories. This restriction 
the scope is further confirmed by Kant’s latter explicit reference to the manifold of intuitions.271 
As for the relationship between representations and judgment, (T1) clarifies the relationship 
between judgment and its logical matter. (T2) makes further clarification about the relationship 
between the logical matter and the logical form of judgment. As I have explained in Chapter 7, a 
concept is an analytic unity. Here I propose that a judgment in general is also an analytic unity. This 
analytic unity reading of judgment is even true of the synthetic judgment. In effect, (T2) makes the 
following claim that the unity given to different concepts is analytic unity, which is identical with 
the logical form of judgment. 
                                                     
271 Consequently, transcendental logic is concerned with synthetic judgments, whereas general logic with judgment in 
general. 
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Longuenesse defends the unusual view that the unity in synthetic judgment is synthetic, for 
concepts are synthesized in one judgment.272 As I have explained in the last chapter, however, 
synthetic unity is systematically ambiguous, and it does not always mean the unity by synthesis. 
Furthermore, even if synthetic unity means the unity by synthesis, the context to which it is 
properly applied is intuition, rather than concept or judgment. According to my reading, the 
principal difference between analytic unity and synthetic unity lies in that the former is logical, while 
the latter is real. My interpretation is confirmed by the identity thesis, where Kant identifies the 
unity given to different concepts in (T1) as analytic unity in (T2). 
The judgment is an essentially composite representation. Concepts are immediate components 
of a judgment. Concepts are part-representations (Theilvorstellung) of which a judgment is a whole-
representation (Ganzvorstellung). As a whole-representation, judgment is essentially different from a 
complex concept. Judgment is not only a whole representation, but also a structured representation. 
Every judgment has certain logical forms that are much more fine-grained than the logical form of 
the concept.  
 
8.3.2 Representations and Intuition 
Kant says that “[t]he same function […] also gives unity to the mere synthesis of different 
representations in an intuition”. Here the function is operative not on the discursive level, but on 
the intuitive level. In the expression of “different representations in an intuition”, the generic 
notion “representations” does not refer to concepts, but to intuitions. Analogously, by “different” 
Kant intends to emphases the qualitative difference between one intuition and another that one 
cannot be analytically contained in one representation. One might worry whether the idea of 
analytical containment can be applied to intuition in addition to concept. Since the notion of 
analyticity in Kant’s footnote in §15 is concerned with intuitive representations, this worry could 
be dispelled. 
The second point is that the function brings the manifold of intuitions into the unity of intuition. 
This formulation is awkward, but the idea behind it is clear. On the discursive level, Kant explains 
what it is to make a judgment. Analogously, on the intuitive level, he explains what it is to build an 
intuition. The awkwardness lies in that it seems that building one intuition circularly presupposes 
                                                     
272 Longuenesse argues that analytic unity is applied only to concepts, which are merely the means to generate the 
judgment as the discursive synthetic unity. The motivation behind Longuenesse’s move is her deep conviction that 
the judgment-making and the intuition-building are literally identical, and that this identity cannot be explained if we 
do not identify the unity in judgment as analytic. On the bottom level, the difference between Longuenesse’s reading 
and mine lies in whether the same action is literally the same. See Longuenesse 1998, 201. 
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the existence of intuition. This interpretation is not charitable to Kant. The more plausible reading 
is to suppose that the term ‘intuition’ is systematically ambiguous in Kant. 273  Kant draws a 
terminological distinction between intuition as manifold and intuition as unity. It could be specified 
otherwise, for instance, as the distinction between indeterminate intuition and determinate intuition 
(A109), or as uncategorized intuition and categorized intuition. The analogue in pure representation is 
presupposed in the space arguments for apriority and the space arguments for singularity, and made 
explicit in the form of intuition and formal intuition, which I will discuss in Chapter 9.274 It turns 
out that the distinction is only conceptual, and in fact all manifold intuitions are unified by 
understanding. This, however, does not render the distinction useless. 
The intuition as the manifold is a given fact, traced back to the affection proper to sensibility. 
The intuition as unity, by contrast, involves the collaboration between sensibility and understanding. 
The building of one intuition is not simply a naturalistic process to receive a posteriori stimulus. 
Rather, it is an intellectual achievement involving a priori processing. 
As I have indicated in the last chapter, intuition is a whole-representation, which contains 
many marks as its part-representations. These marks are intuitive marks that should be 
distinguished from discursive ones, i.e., concepts.  In addition, intuition is also a structured 
representation. In an important sense, intuitions stand in the relation of space and time. However, this 
is not our present concern. One intuition is structured in the sense that it stands in both logical and 
real relation. The real relations are nothing but those relations specified by categories, e.g., that of 
inherence, causation, etc. 
 
8.3.3 Building Intuition and Making judgment: The Same Action Explained 
What calls attention in the passage is Kant’s repeated insistence on the identity by phrasing 
“[t]he same function”, “[t]he same understanding” and “the very same action”. I propose that the 
issue concerning “[t]he same function” in sentence (T1) and the issue concerning “The same 
understanding” as well as “the very same action” in sentence (T2), albeit related, are distinct. The 
former is concerned with the relationship between the forms of judgment and categories, while the 
                                                     
273 Sellars is one of the earliest who acutely notes and draws the distinction between intuition as manifold and intuition as 
unity. See Sellars 1968, 2-8. The Sellarsian distinction is called into attention and developed by Haag 2007, with apt 
reference to Kant’s theory of part-and whole-representation. I think that Sellars is completely correct on this point. It 
is more profitable to disambiguate Kant’s notion of intuition, than, say, to disambiguate the notion of cognition or 
experience. 
274 Allais offers a lucid account of in what sense the intuition alone could give object. However, it could be rejected 
by an intensional reading of Kant that there is no non-relational object. All representation of an individual (particular) 
must be taken under at least one real relational description with respect to the logical function of judgment. See 7.3.2. 
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latter is concerned with the relationship between judgment-making and intuition-building. I will 
first address the latter and then turns to the former. 
In sentence (T2) the expression “the same action” is intriguing, for it involves two conceptually 
distinct kinds of actions, namely, the action that making one judgment and that of building one intuition. 
The action that “brought the logical form of a judgment in concepts” is nothing but making a 
judgment, while the action that “brings a transcendental content into its representations” is nothing 
but building one intuition. Now the question is how we should understand the action of building 
one intuition and that of making a judgment.275 There could be two general views concerning the 
issue. 
On the first moderate reading, the identity between the making of one judgment and the 
building of one intuition is original identity, i.e., identity in origin. Both the action of making a 
judgment and that of building an intuition are traced back to a common source, namely, 
understanding, but they are two distinct actions of the same source. One characteristic feature of this 
reading is that one action is separable from the other. We could make a judgment without building 
an intuition, and we could build an intuition without making a judgment as well. At least one aspect 
of action presupposes the other: either (a) making a judgment presupposes building an intuition, 
or (b) building an intuition presupposes making a judgment. If either case hold, it suffices to 
establish the moderate original identity thesis. 
On the second strict reading, the identity between the making of one judgment and the 
building of one intuition is operative identity.276 According to this reading, the making of one judgment 
and the building of one intuition are two aspects of the same action. The building of an intuition and the 
making of a judgment are intrinsically inseparable, and one function presupposes the other. There 
is no judgment without intuition, and there is no intuition without judgment as well. In other words, 
judging and intuiting are always simultaneous. One might make an appeal to the transcendental 
definition of judgment to justify the operative identity reading. 
                                                     
275 Recently, Longuenesse (1998), Haag (2007), and Grüne (2009) convincingly defend the two-aspect view of 
understanding. 
276 Allison might be seen as a defender of this view. For instance, Allison claims that “it [the manifold of a given 
representation] is, by the same act, also unified in a judgment.”( 2004, 177) While the context of Allison’s claim is the 
summary section §20, it is also applied to §10, since the argument in the former draws on the Identity thesis in the 
latter. Longuensse’s view on categories and forms of judgment is intricate. On this issue, Longuenesse seems to 
embrace an operative identity view. For instance, Longuenesse holds that (T1) expresses a symmetry relation and 
that this symmetry “expresses the fact that the acts of thinking the discursive unity of concepts in judgment are the 
same as the acts of combining and ordering the sensible given in order to reflect universal representations combined 
in judgments” (1998, 200), and then she reaffirms this by saying that “the first expresses the identity between two 
acts of combination—the discursive combination of concepts and the intuitive combination of the sensible given” 
(1998, 201). 
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To attribute to judgment the operative identity is simply a misinterpretation of Kant’s 
transcendental definition of judgment. What Kant means by the transcendental definition of 
judgment is not that judgment metaphysically determines intuition by itself, which is wildly 
implausible, but that judgment must semantically make reference to intuition, in order to make the 
claim to truth. 
In spite of Kant’s verbal indication of identity, the operative identity reading is too strong. 
Rather, I maintain that the original identity reading is correct. If the separation of the combination 
of intuitions from the combination of concepts is made, the ensuing question is what action is 
prior. My contention is that the building of intuition is prior to the making of judgment. We can 
build an intuition without making a judgment, but we cannot make a judgment without building 
an intuition.  
On my view, the building of one intuition does not presuppose making a judgment. As I have 
argued in Chapter 6, cognition is not automatically equivalent to judgment; rather, it primarily refers 
to intuition, or the unified intuition, in contrast to the manifold intuitions. No matter what kind of 
representation is at issue, it must presuppose the existence of the object such that there is something to 
represent. According to Kant, it is the building one intuition that determines and gives an object 
in virtue of synthesizing manifold representations in the unity of self-consciousness.  
(1) To synthesize the manifold is to have an intuition. Kant says explicitly: “as far as the content is 
concerned… [t]he synthesis of a manifold, however, (whether it be given empirically or a priori) 
first brings forth a cognition” (A77/B103). As I have suggested, cognition is primarily intuition. 
When Kant explains the genesis of cognition, at the same time he is explaining the genesis of object. 
(2) To have an intuition is to determine an object. In the intuition of an object, we first individuate 
an object as a “this” and differentiate it from others. This individuation of object does not depend 
on concepts, and it could be accomplished by both the civil and the savage. Without intuition, both 
the singular use of concept and the singular judgment are impossible. 
However, making a judgment presupposes the building of one intuition. Then, in what sense 
does judgment require intuition? I propose that an intuition is a truth-maker of a synthetic judgment 
and that a true synthetic empirical judgment is a partial expression of a relevant intuition. As I have 
indicated, both judgment and intuition are composite and structured whole-representation that 
consists of part-representations. A categorical judgment consists of two predicates. In other words, 
a minimal whole-representation consists of two part-representations. An intuition is infinitely 
divisible, therefore it consists of an infinity of part-representations. Intuition is a possible complete 
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representation that is fully determinate to designate an object. However, neither concept nor 
judgment by itself is a possible complete representation. Essentially, they are partial representation. 
The truth of synthetic judgment requires that the world must be in some case to suffice to be 
a truth-maker. The two discursive marks as predicates in categorical judgment must be grounded 
in the relevant intuitive marks in intuition. Furthermore, these two part-representations should 
belong not to merely a collection of representations, but to one structured whole-representation, 
intuition or experience in their technical sense.  
The idea of mereology is illustrated in Kant’s Introduction to the Critique, and Kant makes a 
detailed analysis of the proposition ‘A body is heavy’ in the following paragraph: 
 
On the contrary, although I do not at all include the predicate of weight in the concept of a body in 
general, the concept nevertheless designates an object of experience through a part of it, to which I can 
therefore add still other parts of the same experience as belonging with the former. I can first cognize the 
concept of body analytically through the marks of extension, of impenetrability, of shape, and so forth, 
which are all thought in this concept. But now I amplify my cognition and, looking back to the 
experience from which I had extracted this concept of body, I find that weight is also always connected with 
the previous marks, and I therefore add this synthetically as predicate to that concept. It is thus 
experience on which the possibility of the synthesis of the predicate of weight with the concept of body 
is grounded, since both concepts, though the one is not contained in the other, nevertheless belong 
together, though only contingently, as parts of a whole, namely experience, which is itself a synthetic 
combination of intuitions. (A7-8/B12) 
 
From the passage, one could make the following observations. First, since experience is 
defined as “a synthetic combination of intuitions”, experience is equivalent to the unity conception 
of intuition. Hence, experience is a whole-representation consisting of parts, that is, intuitive marks. 
On my reading, an object of experience is not literally an object of experience where experience is taken 
as equivalent to cognition, since here experience itself is the object. Rather, it is more plausible to 
read the object of experience as an object in experience. More precisely, it is a part of experience that 
extends in a particular span of time and includes the object. 
Second, with reference to the generation of judgment, the minimal condition of this part of 
experience is that it must instantiate the subject concept and the predicate concept, that is, include 
the empirical intuitions of the two concepts in judgment. A concept could designate a part of 
experience as an object, in which this concept is instantiated and grounded by its relevant intuition, 
which functions as an intuitive mark of the whole intuition. This intuitive mark, however, does not 
exhaust a unified whole intuition. It must be combined with other intuitive marks to constitute the 
intuition as the whole-representation. 
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Third, the experience is the ground of the synthesis of subject concept and predicate concept. The predicate 
concept as a discursive mark is always connected with the subject concept as a discursive mark that 
contains many discursive marks under itself, whereby we think of the object of judgment.277 The 
combination of the predicate concept and the subject concept is grounded in their empirical 
intuitions, and these empirical intuitions as intuitive marks belong together with other intuitive 
marks to one and the same larger intuition as the whole-representation. In the following we will 
see, not only the concepts and their synthesis but also the determinate forms of the judgment are 
instantiated and grounded in intuition (or a particular part of experience). The Identity Thesis could 
be partly presented in the following table:  
 Structured whole-
representation 
Part-representation (mark) 
Partial representation Judgment Concept as discursive mark 
(Possible) complete 
representation 
Intuition Intuition as intuitive mark 
 
 
8.3.4 Category and Forms of Judgment: The Same Function Explained 
(a) Categories and Forms of Judgment 
Now let’s turn to the issue concerning “the same function”. Kant offers an explicit definition 
of the notion of function as “the unity of the action of ordering different representations under a 
common one” (A68/B39). First, the notion of function is defined in terms of the genus of unity. 
Second, the notion of function is broad, since the differentia “ordering different representations 
under a common one” in the definition are applied to both the logical unity and the transcendental 
unity.  
As it is clarified by (T2), the first “unity” is the analytic unity of a judgment, while the second 
“unity” is the synthetic unity of an intuition. As Kant writes explicitly, the function that “gives unity 
to the mere synthesis of different representations in an intuition” is the category. However, Kant 
does not say explicitly what the function that “gives unity to the different representations in a 
judgment” is. Since “the representations in a judgment” are obviously concepts, and concepts are 
taken as the logical matter of judgment, it is not difficult to infer that what is in play is the logical 
                                                     
277 It is noteworthy that Kant’s sliding from one level to another should not obscure the parallelism between two 
intuitive marks and discursive ones. 
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form of judgment, which is identified as the logical function. (A70/B95) The expression “the same 
function” seems to suggest that forms of judgment and categories are identical. How should we 
understand the nature of identity between forms of judgment and categories? 
According to a naïve reading, the category and the form of judgment are numerically identical. 
However, Kant’s words here cannot be taken literally. In spite of Kant verbal insistence on the 
identity, the forms of judgment are apparently conceptually distinct from categories, and therefore they 
must be numerically distinct from each other. It comes as no surprise that the reading of the 
relationship between the category and the form of judgment is supposed to stand in line with the 
previous reading of separating building one intuition from making one judgment. 
If the category and the form of judgment are not numerically identical, then a further question 
is what their relationship precisely is. Interestingly, in some other place Kant provides an alternative 
view of the relationship between the categories and the forms of judgment. In B159 Kant takes 
logical functions of judgment to be coincident with categories: “[i]n the metaphysical deduction the 
origin of the a priori categories in general was established through their complete coincidence 
(Zusammentreffen) with the universal logical functions of thinking” (B159). I think that the 
coincidence should be read not as the identity between two tables, but as their correspondence, or 
parallelism, which further implies that they are numerically distinct.  
Then, what is precisely this coincidence relationship? In the Paralogism Chapter in the 1781 
Critique, Kant offers a brief but illuminating review of the result of the Transcendental Logic: 
 
We have shown in the analytical part of the Transcendental Logic that pure categories (and among 
them also the category of substance) have in themselves no objective significance at all unless an 
intuition is subsumed under them, to the manifold of which they can be applied as functions of 
synthetic unity. Without that they are merely functions of a judgment without content. (A348-A349) 
 
Here Kant is discussing the relationship between the forms of judgment as the functions of 
judgment and the categories as the functions of synthetic unity. While Kant does not make it 
explicit, it is very plausible to take “functions of judgment” to be logical functions. In the Critique Kant 
never attributes any function other than the logical ones to judgments. In a number of texts Kant 
holds that what pertains to objects or things is real (metaphysical), whereas what pertains to 
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judgment is logical.278 In the 1781 Critique, by the logical functions of judgment Kant always refers 
to the forms of judgment. 
As this passage shows, categories are not numerically identified with the logical forms of 
judgment. What Kant is suggesting seems to be that categories have a twofold mode of the existence of 
the same thing. When intuitions are subsumed under categories, categories are “functions of synthetic 
unity”. When intuitions are not subsumed under categories, categories are logical functions of 
judgment, i.e., functions of analytic unity.279 Take H2O for example. H2O is water when the temperature 
is above zero, whereas H2O is ice when the temperature is below zero. No matter it is solid or 
liquid, it remains identical as H2O throughout the change of temperature. Far from being identical, 
categories as logical functions and categories as functions of synthetic unity are numerically distinct 
from each other. What Kant further implies is that the twofold mode of existence of categories 
seems to exclude the other.  
The identity thesis naturally invites the further question about whether categories precede the 
forms of judgment or the other way around. In my view, the answer is similar to the counterpart 
question in (iii): it is the operation of categories that is presupposed by the operation of forms of 
judgment. Yet, the issue is somehow more complex here. I would like to propose a dual relationship 
between categories and forms of judgment by distinguishing two distinct levels: on the one hand, 
the form of judgment is epistemologically prior to the category, and, one the other hand, the 
category is metaphysically prior to the form of judgment.280 
In his formulation of identity thesis, Kant uses the forms of judgment to introduce categories, 
not the other way around. The assumption behind this is that the logical forms of judgment are 
better known than categories. Remember that the original title of the so-called Metaphysical 
Deduction is “On the Clue to the Discovery of all Pure Concepts of the Understanding”. The clue 
by means of which pure concepts of understandings are determined is nothing but the logical forms 
of judgment. The theory of logical forms of judgment is familiar to Kant’s contemporaries. Kant’s 
contribution is not to propose, for the first time, that there exist forms of judgment, but to bring 
                                                     
278 For Kant’s distinction between the real and the logical see also R2994 (AA 16:606), R3716 (AA 17:259), R3747 
(AA 17:281), and R3814 (AA 17:302). 
279 For Kant the logical and the analytic are coextensive in most contexts. 
280 For a metaphysical priority reading see Longuenesse (1998, 201). Longuenesse holds that (T2) expresses an 
asymmetrical relation, and she believes that the generation of the category as the discursive representation 
presupposes the striving of making judgment. 
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the forms of judgment into completeness.281 In fact, this doctrine is a part not of his revolutionary 
transcendental philosophy, but of his logic.282   
From the fact that the logical form of judgment is epistemologically prior to the category, however, 
it does not follow that the former is also metaphysically prior to the latter. Rather, in the metaphysical 
sense the application of categories is presupposed by the determinate employment of forms of 
judgment. 
According to my previous interpretation, a judgment is grounded in an intuition. Now it could 
be extended as the following chain of presupposition. The category is presupposed by the empirical 
intuition; the empirical intuition is presupposed by the empirical concept, the empirical concepts 
is presupposed by the forms of judgment. 
 
(b) The Multiple Theoretical Roles of Categories 
Initially, it seems that the question (iv) is easier to handle, since it could be illuminated by the 
answer to the parallel question (iii). It turns out that the situation in “the same function” is more 
complex than that in “the same action”. The above account is not the end of question of “the same 
function”, because the issue is complicated by a relative clause included in the sentence (T1). By 
introducing this clause, Kant draws a further distinction between two different senses of categories: 
category as analytic unity and category as synthetic unity. Therefore, what the “the same function” 
in (T1) introduces is not a dyad relation, but a triad relation.  
According to my interpretation, in sentence (T1) the second “which” refers to the second and 
the proximate “unity” rather than to “synthesis” or to “function”. If the “which” refers to 
“synthesis”, then it would be incompatible with the fact that the “merely synthesis” includes no 
unity. If the “which” refers to “function”, then it would be too general to be differentiated from 
the first “unity”. This is the basis of all the following analysis. 
When Kant introduces the category in the name of “the pure concept of understanding”, 
Kant does not say that the unity is “the pure concept of understanding”, but that the unity, “expressed 
generally, is called the pure concept of understanding”. I contend that the expression “generally 
expressed” is by no means a loose locution; rather, it means something very specific: it is the 
abbreviated form for “expressed by general representation”. This way of expression is nothing other than 
representation, and the general expression is nothing but concept. Accordingly, it means that the 
                                                     
281 For further reading see Reich 1994. 
282 The doctrine is explicated in various transcripts of his lecture on logic. See Logic (AA 9:102) 
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unity in the form of general representation is the pure concept of understanding. In addition, it implies 
that the synthetic unity in intuition in itself is not a general representation, but a singular one. 
Combined together, what Kant says is that if the unity of intuition takes the discursive expression of 
concept, then it is identical with the pure concept of understanding as the analytic unity. Category 
and synthetic unity of intuition stand in a semantic relation: a category is the concept of the unity 
of intuition, and the unity of intuition is the extension of a category. Here the pure concept of 
understanding is taken in a strict sense that it is the general and clear representation. Generality and 
clarity are the two basic conditions for it to be explicitly used in making judgment. This is consistent 
with what Kant writes previously in §10: 
 
Now pure synthesis, generally represented, yields the pure concept of the understanding. By this 
synthesis, however, I understand that which rests on a ground of synthetic unity a priori; thus our 
counting (as is especially noticeable in the case of larger numbers) is a synthesis in accordance with 
concepts. (A78/B104) 
 
Again, “generally represented” should be taken as referring to the general representation of 
something. Kant affirms that the general representation of pure synthesis is the category. In other 
words, pure synthesis is the singular representation of category, or it is the sensible instantiation of the 
category as general and clear representation. While it is unobjectionable to say that a concept is a 
general representation of a singular intuition, and an intuition is a singular representation of a 
concept, in any case they are not generatively symmetrical. By claiming that pure synthesis yields 
the pure concept, Kant further implies the generative priority of synthesis as singular representation 
to the categories as general representation, which is consistent with Kant’s more general view of 
the priority of intuition to concept. Note that the second sentence in this quotation does not mean 
that the pure synthesis presupposes a further condition of synthetic unity a priori; rather, it means that 
pure synthesis includes a synthetic unity a priori. Otherwise, it would be inconsistent with the previous 
text.283 
The above analysis is primarily based on Kant’s 1781 Critique. In the 1787 Critique, Kant 
ascribes to the category a new theoretical role of determining the concepts in judgment. It has been 
shown that the logical forms are essential to judgment in general. Kant’s new contention is that the 
concepts standing in the forms of judgment are further determined by categories, which could be 
viewed as higher-order concepts.  
                                                     
283 For the ambiguity of synthesis see §10 and §15 in the 1787 Critique. 
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In explaining the idea of determining concepts in judgment, Kant writes in his “explanation 
of the categories” in the B-Deduction: “[t]hrough the category of substance, however, if I bring 
the concept of a body under it, it is determined that its empirical intuition in experience must always 
be considered as subject, never as mere predicate; and likewise with all the other categories.”(B129) 
When I bring the concept of body under the category of substance, I am not bringing a lower 
concept under a higher one in virtue of logical subordination.284 If it were the case, it would still 
pertain to the logical use of understanding.  
Therefore, the category plays a twofold role in determining representation. On the one hand, 
it determines the position of the empirical intuition in one intuition (experience). On the other 
hand, it determines the position of the empirical concept in one empirical judgment. The former 
could be called the logical determination, since it concerns the concepts in judgment on the logical 
level, while the latter could be called the real determination, since it concerns the determination of 
the empirical intuition in experience.  
If the concept of body is brought under the category of substance, it does not make possible 
the determination of its empirical intuition of the concept of body. Rather, the subsumption of the 
concept of body is only a symptom. It presupposes that the determination of the empirical intuition 
of the concept, rather than the concept of the empirical intuition. Therefore, it is the real 
determination of an empirical intuition as a part in one empirical intuition (experience) as a whole 
that grounds the logical determination of its empirical concept as a part in one empirical judgment 
as a whole. 
This theoretical role of categories is tricky. On the one hand, the determining function of 
categories is not reducible to the logical use of understanding. On the other hand, the determination 
of forms of judgment by categories nonetheless counts as the logical determination, which should be 
distinguished from the real determination of intuitions. 
Therefore, it must be admitted that Kant’s conception of categories is complex and 
controversial. Kant seems to assign a variety of theoretical roles to categories. In the 1781 Critique, 
categories play the following theoretical roles: (a) the logical function of judgment, (b) concept of 
object in general (the transcendental significance of categories), (c) the function of synthetic unity, 
namely, the schematized categories (the empirical significance), and (d) the formal unity of the 
synthesis of transcendental imagination. What makes things more complex is the fact that Kant’s 
construal of categories evolves between the two editions of the Critique. In the 1787 Critique, Kant 
                                                     
284 See Kant’s Logic (AA 9:96-97) for logical subordination. See also Chapter 9. 
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assigns a new role to categories: (e) the determining function of the logical function of judgment. 
Therefore, we must be very cautious about what Kant has in mind when he speaks of categories. 
 
8.4 The Argument by Judgment 
In the following I will consider two species of argument with reference to judgment: the 
argument by judgment, and the argument from judgment. The former species is the argument 
developed with reference to the original context of the Critique, while the latter one is the argument 
developed independently of the context by exploiting the theoretical potential of judgment. 
Kant’s original intention is to make judgment-introducing a step within the B-Deduction to 
form one single large argument. In effect, this argument is virtually a revised version of the 
argument from above with reference to judgment. Since the B-Deduction starts with the premise 
of the identity of self-consciousness, this species of argument typically takes the form of the 
argument by judgment, which means that judgment is not employed as a premise. It must be 
cautioned that this version of argument does not reflect the way in which the judgment plays its 
role in the argument in Deduction.285 Remember that the structure of the argument from above is 
as follows: 
 
(AA1) The manifold of intuition stands under the synthetic unity of self-consciousness. 
(AA2) The synthetic unity of manifold in an intuition implies synthesis. 
(AA3) Synthesis implies a priori rules. 
(AA4) A priori rules are identical with categories. 
(AA5) The synthetic unity of manifold in an intuition implies categories. 
 
The crucial step is to introduce judgment as a justificatory move to link synthesis and categories. 
In one most straightforward way, the original argument from above could be extended into the 
following one: 
 
                                                     
285 Van Cleve makes attempt to explore this possible line of argument and criticize it. See van Cleve 1999, 87-90. 
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(AbJ1) The manifold of intuition stands under the synthetic unity of self-consciousness. 
(AbJ2) The synthetic unity of manifold in an intuition implies the synthesis. 
(AbJ3) The synthesis implies judgment. 
(AbJ4) The judgment implies category. 
(AbJ5) The synthetic unity of manifold in an intuition implies category. 
 
According to this argument, the premises (AbJ3) and (AbJ4) judgment play the role of linking 
synthesis and categories. Unfortunately, this straightforwardly revised argument suffers from 
serious objections in both of the introduced premises. Now I will put aside the objection to the 
claim (AbJ4) that the judgment implies the category, and concentrate on the claim (AbJ3) that 
synthesis implies the judgment. The principal objection to (AbJ3) is that it presupposes a 
conception of judgment that is too weak to be acceptable. One might wonder why judgment as a 
discursive action of understanding is so cheap that every synthesis could imply it. In fact, there are 
abundant texts to show that for Kant we could synthesize intuitions without presupposing 
synthesizing concepts, i.e., making a judgment. In other words, not all cognitions take the form of 
judgment. 
Another version of the argument by judgment does appear in the text. The highly compressed 
§20 in the B-Deduction is a summary section of the previous sections from §15 to §19. In §20 Kant 
sketches a line of the argument by judgment, which could be formulated as follows: 
 
(AbJT1) The manifold of intuition stands under the synthetic unity of self-consciousness. 
(AbJT2) The manifold of intuition is determined by the logical functions of judgments. (by 
definition in §19) 
(AbJT3) The logical functions of judgments are categories. 
(AbJT4) The manifold of intuition is determined by categories.286 
                                                     
286 The §20 of the 1787 Critique reads as follows: “The manifold that is given in a sensible intuition necessarily 
belongs under the original synthetic unity of apperception, since through this alone is the unity of the intuition 
possible (§17) That action of the understanding, however, through which the manifold of given representations 
(whether they be intuitions or concepts) is brought under an apperception in general, is the logical function of 
judgments (§19) Therefore all manifold, insofar as it is given in one empirical intuition, is determined in regard to 
one of the logical functions for judgment, by means of which, namely, it is brought to a consciousness in general. 
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This argument is identical with the previous enlarged argument from above in the premise 
(AbJT1) and the conclusion (AbJT4), and therefore it is also an argument by judgment. However, 
(AbJT2) and (AbJT3) indicate that judgment plays a quite different role in this version of the 
argument by judgment. Here judgment does not link the inference from synthesis to categories; 
rather, it replaces the role of synthesis. This move suggests that in this argument judgment is 
identified with synthesis in question.287  
The supplement of synthesis with judgment is not unfounded. Many textual confirmations 
for the identity of synthesis and judgment could be gleaned. First, both judgment and synthesis are 
functionally similar. On the one hand, Kant gives such characterization of combination: 
“Combination… is rather only an operation of the understanding, which is itself nothing further 
than the faculty of combining a priori and bringing the manifold of given representations under 
unity of apperception.” (B134/B135) On the other hand, the characterization of judgment is 
likewise characterized: “[t]hat action of the understanding, however, through which the manifold 
of given representations (whether they be intuitions or concepts) is brought under an apperception 
in general, is the logical function of judgments.” (B143) Obviously, since both are characterized 
as essentially combining the manifold into one self-consciousness, it is tempting to identify one with the other. 
Moreover, judgment and synthesis are interchangeably used. For instance, Kant explicitly writes: 
“They [Categories] are only rules for an understanding whose entire capacity consists in thinking, 
i.e., in the action of bringing the synthesis of the manifold that is given to it in intuition from 
elsewhere to the unity of apperception” (B145). Some commentator believes that in §26 Kant 
makes it clear that judgment is the intellectualized form of synthesis. 
In (AbJT2) and (AbJT3) Kant makes two bold contentions respectively that the logical 
function of judgment determines the manifold given in an intuition by bringing them under the 
synthetic unity of apperception, and that the logical functions of judgment are identified with 
categories. With the introduction of (AbJT2) and (AbJT3), however, Kant’s official formulation of 
the argument by judgment in §20 becomes mysterious, if not disastrous, for both (AbJT2) and 
(AbJT3) seem wildly implausible.288 The objection to the contention (AbJT2) is that the conception 
                                                     
But now the categories are nothing other than these very functions for judging, insofar as the manifold of a given 
intuition is determined with regard to them (§13). Thus the manifold in a given intuition also necessarily stands under 
categories.” (B143) 
287 It cannot be synthesis in general, but one species of synthesis. For Kant’s discussion of synthesis in general see 
§10, and for Kant’s discussion of the variety of synthesis see §15. 
288 The claim that judgment makes possible the synthetic unity of the manifold of intuition is surprising. It amounts 
to claiming that judgment makes object possible. 
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of judgment operative in the premise is too strong to be intuitive.289 Here the notion of “determine” 
should be understood as metaphysical determination. Then, what is an intuitive definition of 
judgment? As I understand it, an intuitive definition of judgment is to capture the idea that to make 
a judgment is to combine or manipulate concepts which obviously falls short of causal efficacy. Kant’s 
logical definition of judgment perfectly satisfies this criterion. In contemporary jargon, to make a 
judgment is akin to entertain a belief, or to make assent to a belief.  
One of our most basic philosophical intuitions is that the world is doxa-independent. In other 
words, the world is simply not influenced by our merely entertaining one or another doxastic 
propositional attitude.290 This intuition stands independently of whether the world is interpreted 
by realistic or idealistic theory. Although this intuition appears to be congenial to realists, it is 
certainly also true of idealists who hold that the world is dependent on mind. Note that the idea of 
mind-dependence takes the form of perception-dependence, instead of doxa-dependence.291 It is 
also true even of Kant, to whom certain kind of conceptual idealism is occasionally attributed.292 Even 
Kant is a conceptual idealist, he would certainly reject the widely implausible view that categories 
as general and reflected concepts consisting in the analytic unity of consciousness are constitutive of 
reality. Concepts per se, no matter empirical or pure, are not and cannot be the condition of 
experience. To be sure, categories structure the world, but they do so not as categories per se, but 
as schemata, i.e., the quasi-perceptual entities.293 Therefore, we are confronting a dilemma that the 
definition of judgment is either too strong or too weak for the argument by judgment. As a linker, the 
judgment either implies the synthesis, or is implied by the synthesis. In the former case the 
conception of judgment is too weak, whereas in the latter case the conception of judgment is too 
strong. 
One could circumvent this objection by insisting this is not what Kant literally says. What 
Kant says is that the manifold of intuitions is determined by logical functions of judgment, rather than 
by judgment itself. However, the proposal that logical functions of judgment determine the intuitions is 
even more unintelligible. Then one might reasonably ask how it is possible for those logical 
functions of judgment to determine the manifold of intuition in some way without first 
                                                     
289 For a similar view see Van Cleve 1999, 87. 
290 Here we are not concerned with the justification or the ground of the content of the propositional attitude. 
291 Many celebrated idealists do hold that the world is concept or idea-dependent. But they are adherent to a radically 
different version of idealism: objective idealism or absolute idealism. For one thing, for these idealists concepts are 
Ideas or objective being of a distinctive Platonic origin. Most importantly, their idealism is teleological idealism, and the 
dependence in question must be understood teleologically, which is obviously different from the notion the 
dependence in question. For absolute idealism and its reaction to subjective idealism see Beiser 2009. 
292 In my view, at least the metaphysical version of conceptual idealism should not be attributed to Kant, even 
though some epistemic version of conceptual idealism makes sense. 
293 The extraction of clear concept from obscure rules in experience or conditions of experience will be discussed 
later in this chapter. 
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presupposing that judgment has already been at play. If making a judgment presupposes the 
working of logical functions, then at least Kant owes us an account of how the working of logical 
functions determines the manifold of intuitions. Then, the same old problem emerges in a new 
guise; Kant is guilty of identifying logical functions of judgment with rules of synthesis without 
justifying it. Furthermore, as I have mentioned earlier, Kant explicitly says that “merely functions 
of judgment” are “without content”, i.e., that they are empty. (A349) It leaves unexplainable how 
the empty forms of judgment can add determinations to the object.  
The objection to Kant’s contention (AbJT3) is that, as I have argued, the forms of judgment 
and categories are not identical. The form of judgment is the function that gives unity to many 
representations in a judgment, while the category is the function that gives unity to many 
representations in an intuition. Both of the forms of judgment and categories fall under the 
category of the function of understanding. The judgment and the intuition are the contexts to 
which they are applied, and the context is precisely the very thing that differentiates their identity. 
Therefore, they cannot exchange their functions, not to mention identify their functions. 
In fact, both (AbJT2) and (AbJT3) are even not consistent with what Kant says in some other 
place. Let us further consider a passage equally added to the 1787 Critique: 
 
They [(categories)] are concepts of an object in general, by means of which its intuition is regarded as 
determined with regard to one of the logical functions for judgments. (B128) 
 
Note that Kant’s formulation is very careful here: the intuition of an object in general is 
determined by means of categories with regard to logical functions of judgments. At least, three 
points are included in this compressed sentence. First, it is intuitions, rather than concepts, or anything 
else, that are determined. Second, the ground of the determination is categories, rather than logical 
functions of judgment. Third, the content of the determination must be specified with reference 
to the content of the logical functions of judgment. The second claim that intuitions are determined by 
categories is inconsistent with the premise (ABjT2) that intuitions are determined by logical functions. 
Consequently, it implies that categories are not numerically identical with the forms of judgment 
since they do not share at least one property. It is surprising that both texts added in 1787 are flatly 
inconsistent with each other. I am convinced that the former formulation is too hasty, and the 
latter formulation is Kant’s considered view.294  
                                                     
294 I will delay the relevant discussion for a while. 
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8.5 The Argument from True Judgment  
The rejection of the argument by judgment does not mean that any attempt to invoke 
judgment in the Transcendental Deduction is hopeless. In spite of Kant’s intention to form a large 
argument by taking into account the theoretical potential of judgment, we could formulate an 
independent argument premised upon the notion of judgment that bypasses the notion of identity of 
self-consciousness. This move of liberating judgment from the premise of the identity of self-
consciousness could be justified by the fact that Kant is implicitly employing two different 
conceptions of self-consciousness or apperception in the B-Deduction. 
The basic idea in §16 is that the numerical identity of self-consciousness is possible only under 
the condition of the combination which could bring all the manifold representations into self-
consciousness. In Kant’s words, the analytical unity of self-consciousness presupposes its synthetic 
unity. The basic idea in §19 and §20 is that judgment could bring the manifold under apperception. 
Kant does not ground the objective validity with reference to the identity. Rather, Kant brings into 
view the objective validity that is vindicated by the logical function of judgment. In short, two 
discourses presuppose two lines of argument. One line of argument is from the fact of the identity 
of apperception to synthesis, while the other line is from the definition or the object-claim of 
judgment to its achievement in objective validity.295 Therefore, the two lines of argument from 
synthesis and the argument from judgment rest on these two different conceptions.296 
The liberation of the judgment from the numerical identity of self-consciousness comes at 
the price of losing the theoretical advantage of introducing the identity of self-consciousness, 
namely, to refute skepticism. For instance, Guyer argues that Kant’s commitment to judgment 
amounts to the knowledge of object, which is precisely what Kant intends to argue for. Therefore, 
Guyer concludes that the argument from judgment simply begs the question of skepticism.297 
However, I believe that the weight of the anti-skepticism in the Transcendental Deduction is 
overrated. If there is any kind of skeptics who casts into question the logical operation of judgment 
and the semantic property of truth, he would be the last kind of skeptics Kant would argue with. If 
we do not take Kant’s arguments to be primarily anti-skeptical, this kind of charge soon disappears.  
                                                     
295 See also Guyer 1987, 73-86, and Henrich 1994, 155-164. Guyer traces this to Kant’s alleged commitment to two 
different conceptions of apperception, and he argues that in the course of argument Kant simply conflates self-
consciousness with object-consciousness, or even with knowledge of object. Henrich believes that the identity of self-
consciousness could make up for the inner deficiency of the objectivity of judgment to form a successful argument. 
296 The problem is different from that of the relationship between the argument from above and the argument from 
below, where it is quite easy to sort out two arguments. 
297 See Guyer 1987, 91-92. 
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As I have proposed, Kant’s argument is explanatory in nature, and accordingly Kant must be 
committed to a set of assumptions. It is quite plausible to assume that we have the synthetic 
judgments of experience, that these judgments are truth-apt, and that in most cases we can tell true 
judgments from false ones. Furthermore, when we think of the fact that Kant acknowledges the 
actuality of science as synthetic a priori judgments, then the acknowledgment of the actuality of 
science as empirical synthetic judgment becomes much less alarming. 
Guyer reconstructs one version of argument based on the Metaphysical Deduction.298 The 
argument runs as follows: 
 
(G1) We have some cognition of objects. 
(G2) Cognition always takes the form of true judgments.  
(G3) Judgments can only be made in a fixed variety of logical forms. 
(G4) Judgments with such structures can only be made about objects if the concepts of objects are 
themselves structured in certain ways. 
(G5) The general ways in which the particular concepts of objects must be structured if those 
objects are to be the objects of judgments are nothing other than the “pure concepts of the 
understanding” or the categories. 
(G6) Categories have some actual application to objects of cognition. 
 
Guyer believes that the conclusion is “not something that should be very difficult to prove” 
(2010, 121). This line of argument takes a straightforward route to the conclusion, and it is clear 
and powerful. Premise (G1) is obviously a fact Kant assumes from the very start, which we have 
discussed in Chapter 6. It is important to note that true synthetic judgment is the premise, rather 
than inferred in the argument. This new start attributes no particular anti-skeptical intention to 
Kant. 
 In (G2) Guyer seems to assume cognition to be equivalent to propositional knowledge. 
Given that, the argument from judgment is virtually an argument from true judgment. Since Kant’s 
                                                     
298 Guyer reconstructs many versions of argument with reference to judgment, which are based on Kant’s different 
texts. Most of these arguments could be found in Guyer 1987, 94-102. For Guyer’s final versions of the argument 
with reference to the Metaphysical Deduction see Guyer 2006, 78-80, and Guyer 2010, 120-122. The above 
reconstruction is primarily based on Guyer 2006 and Guyer 2010. 
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conception of cognition radically differs from propositional knowledge or any belief-like entities, 
the assumption is arguably false.299 Nevertheless, propositional knowledge can be regarded as a 
species of cognition, and therefore (2) does not affect the general point made in the argument, and 
at least a restricted conclusion can be drawn. 
(G3) is based on Kant’s hylomorphic analysis of judgments in terms of matter and form. Kant 
maintains that his table of judgments exhausts all the forms of judgments. (4) is the most burdened 
premise centered on Kant’s key idea of the determination of the forms of a judgment in §14, which 
is developed between the two editions of the Critique. In (G4) and (G5) Guyer assumes that the 
forms of judgment make the demand that the concepts of objects must be structured. One plausible 
interpretation is that what Guyer means is that the objects, or the intuition, must be structured. 
The reason why it is called concepts of objects is nothing other than that the reference to the 
objects of intuition implies that it includes a concept, which is consistent with the similar usage in §17, 
where Kant says that in the concept of an object the manifold of intuition is united. In this light, 
categories are nothing other than the various specific forms of the concept of an object. 
If this version of the argument from judgment were adequate for the argumentative objective, 
then it would make the entire Transcendental Deduction superfluous. The conclusion (G6) shows 
it is not. According to Guyer, there are two differences between the conclusion of the Metaphysical 
Deduction and that of the Transcendental Deduction. First, the Metaphysical Deduction shows 
that categories have application to some objects, whereas the Transcendental Deduction proves that 
categories apply to all objects. Second, the Metaphysical Deduction can only prove that categories 
have the actual application, whereas the Transcendental Deduction proves that categories have 
necessary application. The actuality of application seems to be derived from the premise that we have 
cognition of objects. Since this premise is a contingent truth, the conclusion should also be a 
contingent truth provided that the argument is valid. At best, we can prove that categories are 
necessary for the cognition of objects, but from this it does not follow that the application of 
categories is necessary. In a nutshell, the conclusion is restricted in both its scope and its modal 
strength: categories have objective reality to some objects of experience and in an actual way.300 
Guyer’s evaluations of the argument from judgment are interesting. The evaluations seem to 
undergo a substantial change. In Guyer 1887 the assessment is certainly negative, where categories 
are viewed as extra-logical constraints. Contrary to his early harsh criticisms on this line of thought, 
                                                     
299 In many places, however, Kant argues that cognition consists of judgment. This kind identification is particularly 
conspicuous in his attempts to explore the potential of judgment to complete deduction of categories after the 1781 
Critique. 
300 Guyer 2010, 120-122. 
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more recently in Guyer (2008) and (2010) the assessments are positive. Guyer is convinced that the 
way Kant argues is broadly satisfactory, at least compared to the other lines of argument to which 
Guyer mounts harsh criticisms. Guyer believes that the argument from true judgment does achieve 
something substantial. While the Transcendental Deduction aims to prove that categories necessarily 
apply to any and all experience that we might have, the Metaphysical Deduction does make progress 
by showing that categories have some actual application to objects of cognition. Therefore, the 
difference between the aim of the Metaphysical Deduction and that of the Transcendental 
Deduction is merely a matter of degree. 
In effect, Guyer levels two criticisms to the argument from judgment itself by drawing on the 
resources of the Metaphysical Deduction. On the one hand, its conclusion is too weak, since it 
cannot prove that all categories must be objectively real, therefore it does not live up to Kant’s 
expectation; on the other hand, its premise is too strong, since it assumes the knowledge of object, 
therefore it cannot refute the Humean variant of skepticism. 
I do not think that Guyer’s criticisms are tenable. In the following I will first briefly comment 
on the first objection and then focus on the second one. The first objection to the weakness of the 
conclusion is misleading. In order for all categories to be related to objects of experience, Kant 
must subscribe to the assumption that there is at least one true judgment in its species of different 
logical forms. This assumption is not controversial. Guyer holds that the argument from true 
judgment is limited in result. As we will see later, the real question that plagues this version of 
argument is that it does not achieve any result at all. 
As for the second objection, I think that it is not obligatory to have an anti-skeptical reading 
of the Transcendental Deduction. Before I develop my criticism I would like to have a survey to 
help the readers to understand Guyer’s motivation and its relation to skepticism. Guyer’s generosity 
to and confidence on the plausibility of the argument from true judgment seem to be motivated by 
his broader consideration of the structure of Analytic. We might call this “the problem of the 
structure”. Guyer warns us that this problem of the structure should be distinguished from the old 
one. The former is concerned with the structure of Analytic, whereas the latter is confined to the 
structure of the Transcendental Deduction. In addition to the official division of the structure 
within the Transcendental Deduction, one could unify the Metaphysical Deduction and the 
Transcendental Deduction from a higher standpoint such that one could make sense the inner 
connection between the Metaphysical Deduction and the Transcendental Deduction. 
This perspective has an interpretative bonus: it enables us to be in a better position to see the 
nature of the argument in the Transcendental Deduction. The positive assessment of the argument 
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from judgment encourages an anti-skeptical reading. The partial success of the Metaphysical 
Deduction leaves unmotivated the regressive reading of the master argument in the Transcendental 
Deduction, namely, the argument from self-consciousness. As Guyer observes, if the Metaphysical 
Deduction establishes that categories apply to the objects of cognition, then it has already contained 
a regressive argument by analysis of the necessary conditions of cognition of objects in the form of 
judgment. Provided the argument from self-consciousness in the Transcendental Deduction is also 
a regressive one, as Ameriks has suggested, then it seems to be rendered redundant by the 
Metaphysical Deduction. Therefore, it is profitable, though not obligatory, to read the argument 
from self-consciousness as a progressive argument against Humean skepticism. 
Along this line of reading, Guyer obviously assumes (1) that the Metaphysical Deduction 
accomplishes the argumentative objective to some extent. And Guyer further unobjectionably 
assumes (2) that the Metaphysical Deduction and the Transcendental Deduction should be 
assigned with different tasks, and (3) that the Transcendental Deduction should be not trivial, and 
it must prove more than the Metaphysical Deduction, though the former does not necessarily 
presuppose the latter. Then, quite reasonably, Guyer concludes that the Transcendental Deduction 
is supposed to be anti-skeptical. This reading, if correct, constitutes an initial argument for the anti-
skeptic motivation of the master argument in the Transcendental Deduction. 
As I have argued in Chapter 7, Kant’s premise is not Cartesian, nor is his conclusion anti-
Humean. This broader view of the structure of the Metaphysical Deduction and the Transcendental 
Deduction is not an argument for anti-skepticism reading, rather it is an argument from it. This 
reading is a result of the move of first assuming that the Transcendental Deduction is anti-skeptical. 
Furthermore, the argument is not far from conclusive. To subscribe to the anti-skepticism reading 
is not the only way out of danger of redundancy of the Transcendental Deduction. One could 
happily grant that the result of the argument from judgment is limited, yet only limited in the sense 
it falls short of meeting the argumentative objective of the Transcendental Deduction, and 
meanwhile not to attribute to the Transcendental Deduction an anti-skeptical task. 
 
8.6 The Objection from False Judgment 
In his analysis of the Transcendental Deduction in the 1787 Critique, Van Cleve mounts “the 
really fundamental criticism” to judgment part in the B-Deduction and he believes that it “has not 
received the attention it deserves” (1997, 89). I think that Van Cleve’s evaluation here is fair and 
his insight is of great value. Due to its importance, I will quote this criticism at full length: 
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Even if Kant could show that some of his categories must be employed in any judgment we make (and 
that all of them must be employed on some occasion or other), this would not be enough for his 
purposes. For that result in conjunction with the rest of the Transcendental Deduction would yield no 
conclusion stronger than this: all my representations are connected in judgments that use Kant’s 
categories. But Kant wants to show that the categories are objectively valid—that they actually apply to 
objects of experience. To reach this conclusion he needs the further premise that any categories used 
in judging are actually exemplified by the items judged about. But we have only to state this premise to 
see how implausible it is. If I judge that the shining of the sun has caused the warming of the stone, 
there is no guarantee that the category of cause applies to the events connected in my judgment—for 
my judgment may not be true. (1997, 89) 
 
In this passage, it is not immediately clear what precisely Van Cleve’s objection is, for he 
seems to raise a number of different objections to the conclusion of Kant’s argument for its falling 
short of the objective of Deduction. Some commentators believe Van Cleve’s objection is that 
Kant’s conclusion falls short of the required necessity.301 According to this objection, Kant simply 
conflates necessary condition for instantiation with necessary instantiation. The argument at best shows that 
the employment of categories in judgments is necessary for the objective reality of categories, but it does 
not follow that categories are necessarily objectively valid. For instance, Gomes writes: “[y]et Van 
Cleve’s objection to this argument holds good: the most that follows from this argument is that in 
unifying the manifold I must apply the categories – something which is compatible with the claim 
that the categories do not apply to the objects of experience. Failure to show that the categories 
must apply is a failure to show that they are objectively valid.”302 
If this reading is correct, then Van Cleve’s verdict of Kant’s argumentative inadequacy seems 
to be too hasty, and even arbitrary. Exegetically, one easy way to handle this objection is to take 
into consideration Kant’s own distinctive design of the structure of the B-Deduction. Van Cleve’s 
objection results from the fact that he simply overlooks the proof-structure peculiar to the B-
Deduction. It is noteworthy that Van Cleve’s reconstruction is based on Kant’s first part of the B-
Deduction without taking the second part of the B-Deduction into consideration. Given this 
obvious limitation, commentators who are sympathetic to Kant’s arguments would feel happy to 
recognize the fundamental limitation of the conclusion in §20. As Allison makes clear in his 
explanation of the official structure of the B-Deduction: “Although this might be thought sufficient 
for Kant’s purposes, we shall see that it is not. The essential point, which necessitates a second 
part, is that the Deduction aims to show that the categories are conditions of experience, which 
                                                     
301 Gomes, 2010; Schulting, 2017. 
302 See Gomes 2010, 129. 
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requires more than discursive thought.”303 In the first part, Kant only shows that categories are 
only valid of objects of thoughts or judgments. In Allison’s words, the specter is left untouched in 
the first part. It is only in the second part that Kant proves that categories are applied to objects of 
experience. The second part of the B-Deduction definitely lives up to Van Cleve’s expectation.304 
The consideration of the proof-structure is important, yet I will delay the relevant discussion to the 
next chapter.305 
This reading of Van Cleve’s objection is mistaken, however. On my reading, Van Cleve’s 
objection is rather that Kant’s conclusion falls short of genuine objectivity: even though categories 
are employed in judgment, it does not suffice to imply that categories are instantiated in experience. 
Van Cleve later hints that this mistake might arise out of the overlook of the distinction between 
‘we must apply categories’ to ‘categories must apply’. 306  Initially, this distinction seems to be 
targeted at the Kant’s conflation of pragmatic level of concept use and semantic level of concept 
subsumption. It soon becomes clear that Van Cleve’s diagnosis is that Kant conflates the semantic 
level where categories are employed as concepts in judgment with the metaphysical level where 
categories are instantiated as properties in objects in experience.  
Van Cleve acutely notes that there is a gap in the inference from the employment of categories 
in judgment and the instantiation of categories in things. In order to close the gap between two 
levels, Kant must implicitly assume an additional premise, according to which categories employed 
in judgment must be instantiated in things. However, this required premise is widely implausible, 
for obviously categories in false judgment could not possibly be instantiated in objects. Van Cleve’s 
diagnosis is important, for he detects an assumption any version of argument from judgment must 
embrace. 
Van Cleve’s precise point of rejecting the inference in interesting. Van Cleve’s objection is 
that in the case of false judgment we are not justified to make the inference from (1) to (2). Van Cleve 
                                                     
303 See Allison 2015, 329. 
304 Gomes believes that the A-Deduction suffers from the objection that Van Cleve mounts. This assessment is 
curious. Van Cleve’s reconstruction obviously rests on the first part of the B-Deduction. The problem is that Van 
Cleve ignores the second part of the B-Deduction, as Gomes has correctly pointed out. It is more plausible to say 
that the first part of the B-Deduction is vulnerable to this objection. Gomes suggests that “the A deduction is 
structurally equivalent to the argument of §§15–19 of the B-Deduction” (2010, 133). It is true that the first step of 
the B-Deduction is modeled on, or originated from the argument from above. However, it is difficult to find 
counterpart in the first step the argument from below in the A-Deduction. 
305 If this reading is correct, then it seems the next step is to inquire into whether there is some promising line of 
thought within Kant’s theory of judgment that can make Kant immune from the charge of inferential gap. 
306 Van Cleve writes as follows: “I fear that some may have overlooked this obvious point because of the easy verbal 
slide from ‘we must apply categories’ to ‘categories must apply’. One may slip without noticing it from one to the 
other, but between the two there is no small distance. It is the distance between our using a category and its being 
instantiated, or between our making a judgment and its being true.” (1999, 89) 
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does not hold that in any case the inference cannot go through from the logical level of judgment to 
the metaphysical level of objects; rather, he believes this kind of inference works, but it works only 
for true judgment. 
In other words, Van Cleve commits himself to the assumption that only true synthetic 
judgments entail the instantiation of the categories in objects. It is not only false but also impossible 
for the employment of categories in false judgments to entail the exemplification of categories in 
objects. In effect, the required additional premise is not discarded, but modified. This modified 
result is nothing other than the Instantiation Principle that links true predication with instantiation, 
according to which the employment of concepts in true judgment entails their instantiation in 
objects. 
Facing Van Cleve’s charge, we are bogged into a dilemma for the scope of Instantiation 
Principle: (i) either only true judgment can entail the instantiation of categories; (ii) or else even 
false judgment could entail instantiation of categories. This dilemma concerns whether the 
employment of categories in false judgments entails their instantiation in objects. Before addressing 
the dilemma, we should ask the logically prior question of whether categories are employed in false 
judgment. Now it is widely accepted that the employment of categories in judgment does not entail 
the truth of judgment. Rather, the employment of categories in judgment is merely making 
judgment truth-capable.307 Since categories make judgment truth-capable, it implies that categories 
are equally employed in false judgment. In my view, another reason to endorse such a view is that 
it is appealing to our intuition. When we are making judgments, we are making judgments without 
determining or knowing their truth-values. The fact is that categories as concepts are employed in 
false judgment just as they are in true judgment. The mere employment of categories seems to 
stand independently of whether we use categories in judgment reflexively or non-reflexively (or 
whether it is used as a clear concept or not).308 In other words, we do not know whether we 
correctly use the categories in advance. The correct use of categories is incidental. 
Now I will consider the two horns one by one. The first horn of dilemma has already been 
considered by Van Cleve himself: “Kant could get around the present objection by qualifying the 
needed extra premise thus: any categories used in making true judgments must apply to or be 
instantiated by the items judged about.” But he quickly forestalls such a rejoinder: “if we make this 
change here, we must make a correlative change elsewhere in the Deduction to preserve its validity 
as a whole. We must now say (in the Synthesis Premise) that a necessary condition of our 
                                                     
307 It could be taken as a received view. See Prauss 1971 and Thöle 1991. 
308 For the introduction of the dimension of obscure concepts see Grüne 2009, 97-102. 
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representations being U-related is not simply our having synthesized them, but our having 
synthesized them by means of true judgments. This is a claim for which Kant has advanced no 
argument whatever.” (1997, 89-90.) 
I agree that a correlative change else must be made, but I do not think that it is made in the 
way Van Cleve suggests, namely, to change the condition of synthesis.309 The problem of Van 
Cleve’s diagnosis lies in his misunderstanding of the relationship between judgment and synthesis. 
Van Cleve assumes that it is the judgment that makes the synthesis possible, and thereby he 
commits himself to a strong conception of judgment that he has denied before. As Van Cleves 
writes: “One half of it is plausible—if representations are connected in a judgment, then they are 
U-related. But the converse half, which is what the bypass argument would need, is not plausible 
at all.” (1998. 87)310 As I have mentioned, judgment is not synthesizing; rather, it is synthesized.  
As for the second horn, one could argue that even false synthetic judgment is somehow 
grounded in experience. Here we must answer the question of whether categories employed in 
false judgment are instantiated in objects. However, the question is thornier, because we are 
challenging the Instantiation Principle when we claim that categories employed in false judgment 
are instantiated in objects. 
The solution to the problem is to propose that the ground of synthetic judgment could extend 
from the actual experience to the possibility of experience. The modal notion of the possibility of 
experience is subject to quantificational analysis in terms of possible-world. Here a possible world 
is not a logically possible world, a maximum of logically consistent states of affairs. Rather, it is a 
really possible world, a maximum of nomologically consistent states of affairs. The laws of a really 
possible world are individuated by Kant’s synthetic a priori principles. Kant’s synthetic a priori 
principles that structure the possible world are extraordinarily general in content and limited in 
number311, and therefore they still permit a wide range of possible worlds. 
A synthetic judgment is true when it obtains in the actual world. A synthetic judgment is false 
when it does not obtain in the actual world. It does not mean that it does not obtain in any world. 
A false yet really possible judgment is simply an expression of a state of affairs in another really 
possible experiential world. Remember that the employment of categories is the necessary 
                                                     
309 As we will see later, Kant’s transcendental explanation of judgment seems to be introduced precisely for this. In the 
master argument from self-consciousness, Kant has shown that synthesis is necessitated by the synthetic unity of 
manifold in one intuition. 
310 In effect, Van Cleve rejects the view that the combination of representations in one self-consciousness implies 
judgment. 
311 The principle here is not the judgment-like entity, but the instantiated laws in the world. The principle as truth 
cannot make possible experience as being; otherwise, it would be a categorical mistake.  
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condition for a synthetic judgment to be a judgment at all. According to this line of thought, the 
employment of categories is the necessary condition for a synthetic judgment to be obtainable in 
some possible world.312 
 
8.7 The Objection to Instantiation Principle and a New Argument 
8.7.1 The Instantiation Principle 
The above objection from false judgment should not dwarf one far more radical charge, one 
that does not only plague all attempts by appealing to judgment, but also concerns the fundamental 
assumptions of the transcendental path. Remember that the argument from true judgment is 
limited in result. According to this charge, however, this version of argument does not achieve any 
result at all.  The new argument from judgment in question is also inescapably vulnerable to it. This 
negative verdict is based on the following consideration: the very basic idea of the argument from 
judgment is misleading, for the assumption of the Instantiation Principle is inconsistent with some 
of Kant’s most cherished metaphysical commitments. Thereby, we will see why any version of 
argument with reference to judgment is doomed to fail. 
Now in what follows I will take under scrutiny the validity, scope and ground of Instantiation 
Principle. In its most purified and least controversial form, the Instantiation Principle claims that 
the employment of concepts in true judgments implies their instantiation in objects. For instance, if the judgment 
“all bodies are heavy” is true, then the property of heaviness are instantiated in all bodies. 
The simplest form of Instantiation Principle could be extended from the logical matter to the 
logical form of judgment. The forms of judgment are necessary for any judgment, and specifically 
they are necessary for determining the truth-value of any judgment. Without forms of judgment, 
concepts are just a heap of unstructured general representations, and no claim to truth could ever 
be made. The argument simply cannot run like this: 
 
(1) Forms of judgment are employed in judgment. 
(2) Categories are instantiated in objects. 
                                                     
312 The introduction of the notion of really possible world seems to commit Kant to the existence of property, which 
is repeatable across a number of really possible world. As I have mentioned, Kant is a resolute detractor of Platonism 
of property. A closer consideration indicates that Kant’s idealist account of property is compatible with repeatable 
entities, though the latter revive in Kant’s philosophy in a new form. 
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Take substance for example, committed to the following Instantiation Principle of substance: 
 
For any x, x is instantiated as a substance in experience if and only if the concept ‘x’ stands in the 
subject-place of categorical judgment. 
 
In fact, this is how Aristotle discovers the existence of categories. To sum up, we could have 
an unrestricted version of the Instantiation Principle: 
 
For anything x, x is instantiated if and only if it makes a semantic contribution to true synthetic 
judgment. 
 
However, the Instantiation Principle is vulnerable to counterexamples. It seems that there 
could exist concepts which make a semantic contribution for determining the truth-value of 
judgments without being instantiated. Among them the most preeminent are logical connectives. 
All logical connectives are characteristically truth-functional and thereby they make a semantic 
contribution to the truth-value of judgments. In spite of their semantic contribution, some of them 
are not instantiated in the world. For instance, when the connective of the conjunction “and” is 
employed in a complex judgment, it partially determines the truth of the complex judgment in 
virtue of its meaning. However, it is not thereby instantiated in concreto. 
Likewise, one might conjecture that the same objection could be extended and applied to the 
forms of judgment. While some forms of judgment are necessary for the possibility of judgment, 
there is nothing to prevent the forms of judgments from being uninstantiated. Why? This has 
something to do with Kant’s rejection of the Platonism with regard to logic. Again, take logical 
connectives for instance. Let’s suppose that Kant’s framework of logic could absorb a theory of 
logical connectives whose logical behaviors are fully specified by classical propositional logic. If 
Kant wants to have a theory of logic, he should bestow certain metaphysical underpinning to logical 
connectives. Given his conceptualism of universal, in Kant’s framework of logic the logical 
connectives are not Platonic entities. Rather, logical connectives are no more than the general and 
symbolic mental representations, namely, functions of subjective thinking. 
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If they are not instantiated, they still remain to be “the subjective condition of thinking”. What 
Kant is asking in the Transcendental Deduction is precisely how these subjective conditions could 
have relation to object. Even if it is shown that forms of judgments are indispensable for the validity 
of judgments, the task of the Transcendental Deduction has not yet been accomplished at all. 
In order to save the Instantiation Principle, one could modify this principle in the following 
way. On the one hand, the logical matter of judgment can be instantiated. On the other hand, not 
all logical forms can be instantiated, for logical forms are concerned with the relations of concepts 
and judgments. In contemporary jargon, Kant is claiming that all non-relational predicate can be 
instantiated, whereas not all relational predicate can be instantiated. Consider the following 
example: “All bodies are heavy.” According to this interpretation, the concepts ‘body’ and ‘heavy’ 
are be instantiated, whereas it leaves open whether the relation of inherence is instantiated. 
However, this proposal does not work. The thrust of Kant’s objection could not be explained 
merely by the difference between logical matter and logical form. This interpretation is misled by 
being confined to the cases of empirical judgment whose logical matter is empirical. Consider 
Kant’s rational judgments in the Dialectic. A judgment is a rational one if at least one of its 
predicates is the pure concept of reason. Within rational judgments a further distinction between 
analytic and synthetic judgment can be drawn. One instance of analytic rational judgments is ‘God 
is omnipotent’. One instance of synthetic rational judgment is ‘I am a substance’. In both cases, 
the concept of ‘God’ and the concept of ‘I’ cannot be instantiated, or in Kant’s own words, they 
cannot be given in intuition and do not have objective reality. It is not difficult to generalize the 
objection to a most devastating one: it is possible that all the elements in judgment make a semantic 
contribution to the truth-value of judgment without being instantiated.  
 
(b) The Distinction between Metaphysics and Logic 
Kant’s rejection of the unrestricted version of the Instantiation Principle is merely an instance 
of his overall rejection of the logicist approach to metaphysics, the assumption that logic is a secure 
and sufficient guide of metaphysics. This logicist metaphysics is encapsulated in logico-
metaphysical isomorphism, whose fundamental idea is that the structure of thought is mapped into 
the structure of being. The long tradition of logicist metaphysics is initiated by Aristotle. Its modern 
representative is Leibniz, the greatest early modern Aristotelian, and its contemporary descendent 
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is early Wittgenstein. All of them are convinced that there is an isomorphism between logic and 
metaphysics such that logic is the sole and sufficient guidance to metaphysics.313 
In contrast, Kant holds that there is a clear-cut distinction between the discipline of logic and 
that of metaphysics,314 and that logic by itself is not a sufficient and secure guide to metaphysics. 
Kant traces the tradition back to Aristotle and raises his objection in R4450 dated to between 1772 
and 1778: 
 
Aristotle erred by including in logic a division of general concepts by means of which one can think 
objects; this belongs to metaphysics. Logic has to do with concepts whatever they might be, and 
deals only with their relation. (AA 17:556) 
 
In his other writings, Kant praises Aristotle for the invention of logic in one single strike, and 
also for the completeness of logic. Here Kant’s criticism is directed against Aristotle’s conflation 
of logic with metaphysics. This criticism to Aristotle is more severe than his attack on the incidental 
character of Aristotle’s gleaning of the table of categories. Kant does not merely point out the 
difference between logic and metaphysics, but also further reaffirms where the distinction between 
logic and metaphysics lies: logic is concerned with the relations of concepts, while metaphysics with 
the reference to the objects of concepts.  
In what follows I will discuss what Kant’s conceptions of logic and of metaphysics are with 
reference to the structure of Analytic and Dialectic, in which this distinction lies at the heart. Kant’s 
conception of logic is spelled out at the very beginning of Analytic, where Kant depicts the structure 
of the discipline of logic.315 Consider the following passages: 
 
The former [general logic] contains the absolutely necessary rules of thinking, without which no use 
of the understanding takes place, and it therefore concerns these rules without regard to the difference 
of the objects to which it may be directed. (A52/B76) 
                                                     
313 It is dangerous to underrate the complexities of the thoughts of philosophers. The logical strand is perhaps best 
evidenced in Leibniz’s Discourse of Metaphysics. The logicist reading of Leibniz’s metaphysics is powerfully developed 
and defended by Russell (1992). Due to the complexity of Leibniz’s thought, however, now this reading has been 
widely rejected for its oversimplification. Wittgenstein remarks that philosophy consists of metaphysics and logic, 
and that logic is its essence. Famously, Wittgenstein himself rejects the logico-metaphysics in his later works. 
Nonetheless, some aspects or some phases of their thought do reflect a general tendency to do metaphysics with the 
aid of logic. 
314 First, it could be found in Kant’s publications that appear no later than Inaugural Dissertation. Furthermore, this is 
recorded in his repeated distinction between the logical and the real or the metaphysical in different forms. 
315 In the following what I have in mind by logic is the general pure logic, which is our present concern. 
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general logic[…] considers representations, whether they are originally given a priori in ourselves or 
only empirically, merely in respect of the laws according to which the understanding brings them into 
relation to one another when it thinks[.] (A56/B80) 
 
First of all, as far as its scope is concerned, general logic is formal, for it abstracts from all objects 
of cognition. Therefore, it only has something to do with the mere form of thinking. (A54/B78) 
The forms of thinking are articulated in terms of the logical relations spelled out in the Amphiboly, 
namely, of identity and difference, of agreement and conflict, of matter and form, and of internal 
and external. One consequence of the formality character of logic is that it must be distinguished 
from metaphysics. Second, as pure logic it is a priori, for it is free from the empirical condition. The 
consequence of the apriority character of logic is that it must be distinguished from psychology. 
In contradistinction to general logic, Kant conjectures that there would be “a logic in which 
one did not abstract from all content of cognition” (A55/B80). It is nothing but the famous 
transcendental logic. While transcendental logic is nominally a branch of logic, strictly speaking, it 
belongs to metaphysics.316 Transcendental logic is ontology, or it serves as a successor discipline of 
traditional ontology. (A247/B303) 
On the orthodoxical rationalist’s understanding, metaphysics is fundamentally analytic. Kant’s 
conception of metaphysics is characterized by its irreducible reference to object.317 The reference to 
object implies that the pure concepts in the ontology should be instantiated in experience. 
The irreducible distinction between logic and metaphysics provides a broad framework in 
which we could grasp Kant’s own approach to isomorphism. A further question is what Kant’s 
ontological account of logic is. In his contrast of general logic and transcendental logic, Kant concisely 
remarks that logic consists of the “rules of thinking”, but he does not delve into this further 
question. In order to appreciate this we had better turn to Dialectic, where Kant writes: “such a 
principle does not prescribe any law to objects and does not contain the ground of the possibility 
of cognizing and determining them as such in general, but rather is merely a subjective law of 
economy for the provision of our understanding[.]”(A305-306/B362) 
Although Kant speaks of reason and inferences here, the same conclusion could be extended 
and applied to understanding and judgments. What differs transcendental logic of understanding 
                                                     
316 Kant takes over the Wolffian distinction between special metaphysics and general metaphysics. Special 
metaphysics includes rational psychology, rational cosmology and rational theology, while general metaphysics 
includes ontology. 
317 This is evidenced by Kant’s formulation of the secret of metaphysics, which I have discussed in Chapter 1. 
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from the transcendental illusion of reason is merely Kant’s manner of presentation along the course 
of his unfolding of his views: Kant is positive on the metaphysical use of understanding, while he 
is negative on the metaphysical use of reason, though he has yet to prove how the metaphysical 
use is impossible. As far as the logical use is concerned, however, Kant’s position is consistent 
throughout both understanding and reason, or judgment and inference, though not always explicit 
and emphatic: the forms of judgment and inference are formal and thereby they are subjective. For 
instance, the “formal and logical procedure of reason in syllogisms” (A306/B363) is labeled as “merely 
a subjective law” (A306/B362). 
In spite of its unparalleled success, the fact that logic is subjective in character is largely 
overlooked.318 It must be determined in what sense logic is subjective. First, the origin of logic has 
seat in the human mind. The move of defining logic as the rules of thinking is to link the logic as 
a science with thinking as a human faculty. The ontological implication is that logic is merely the form 
of thinking. Second, rules or laws of logic are not automatically applied to objects. Combined with 
a Kantian explanation of general logic, logic is deeply subjective because it concerns with the sheer 
form of cognition. Or put it more straightforwardly, it is concerned with the relations of cognition or of 
concepts. Finally, Kant would conclude that reason is “a merely subordinate a faculty that gives to 
given cognitions a certain form, called ‘logical’ form, through which cognitions of the 
understanding are subordinated to one another, and lower rules are subordinated to higher ones 
(whose condition includes the condition of the lower rules in its sphere), as far as this can be 
effected through comparing them” (A305/B362). 
Therefore, the paradoxical nature of logic emerges. On the one hand, logic is the form for all 
kinds of cognition. On the other hand, logic is rejected as the form of all kinds of objects; rather, it is 
regarded as merely the form of subjective thinking. Kant rejects the inference from the form of cognition 
of object to the form of objects: if logic is the condition of cognition, then it must be the condition of objects. For 
Kant, the universality of logic does not mean that it is instantiated in everything. Rather, it means 
that it is instantiated in nothing. The subjectivity of logic is important, for it defines the relationship 
of metaphysics and logic as that between being and thinking.  
 
(c) Rejecting the Logicist Metaphysics. 
                                                     
318 It is not surprising that Kant has different conceptions of subjectivity or objectivity in different periods. See 
R3970 (AA 17: 370), and 3974 (AA 17:371) for the objectivity of logic. 
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The principal reason for Kant’s deviation from the logicist metaphysics in general and 
German rationalist metaphysics in particular lies in their irreconcilable conflict with his own 
metaphysical commitments. Kant would ask, if there is such isomorphism, what the ground of the 
isomorphism of thinking and being is. If there is an isomorphism, then there must be a ground of 
the isomorphism; if there is a ground of the isomorphism, it must be that either thinking grounds 
being, or being grounds thinking. If we are justified to make such inference from the logical realm 
to the real realm, then it implies that there exists a necessary connection between the structure of 
thought and the structure of the world.319 
In light of these assumptions, an isomorphism without grounding is simply mysterious. Giving 
a fact without giving an account is collapsing into the abyss of the ignorant, the opposite of 
explanatory rationalism. Now it becomes apparent that the ungrounded isomorphism rehabilitates 
pre-established harmony, to which Kant is always alarming. Moreover, it is also a quasi-Crusian 
version of intellectual pre-established harmony between thinking and things outside of thinking, 
which Kant explicitly and emphatically rejects in the Prologomena and the 1787 Critique. 
Remember that at the end of the B-Deduction Kant mentions “a middle way” (B167) and he 
offers a complementary argument against Crusian pre-established harmony in the name of 
preformation system. To be sure, Kant never explicitly ties his attack on pre-established harmony 
to his rejection of logicist metaphysics, and he never intends his argument against Crusian pre-
established harmony as a criticism against the line of argument from the forms of judgment. 
Nevertheless, it is all-too reasonable to believe that the logicist metaphysics underlying this line of 
argument is incompatible with Kant’s most underlying metaphysics commitments, in the same way 
the Crusian pre-established harmony is incompatible with his metaphysical commitments: causal 
theory of knowledge in particular and causal realism in general, which constitute the foundation of 
his rejection of any kind of pre-established harmony. 
One worry is that whether Kant’s disentanglement of the tight relation of metaphysics from 
logic is consistent with Kant’s derivation of categories from forms of judgments. It should be noted, 
however, that Kant’s disentanglement of the tight relation of metaphysics from logic is restricted. 
Kant does not claim that logic and metaphysics are irrelevant at all. In his Metaphysical Deduction 
logic still serves as the thread lines for the discovery of the concepts by means of which one can 
think objects. What Kant is stressing is that the logical functions of judgment cannot automatically 
be logically or conceptually identified with the concepts of the object in intuition. 
                                                     
319 On this point idealism by itself would not help. 
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One pressing question is whether the identity thesis is subject to pre-established harmony 
objection. I believe it is not. Given the worry of pre-established harmony, Kant seems to subscribe 
to it with reservation. What kind of the Instantiation Principle does Kant embrace? One plausible 
interpretation is that Kant is committed to the conditional version of Instantiation Principle. His 
commitment is conditioned, for it rests on his assumption of causal realism. Again, let us take 
substance for example. Kant would endorse such a conditional Instantiation Principle: 
 
For any x, x is a substance in experience if and only if the concept of x stands in the subject-place 
of categorical judgment and it is related to experience. 
 
In this conditional principle, the relation to experience could take in two forms: either it is 
borrowed from experience or it makes experience possible. Or we could put it in the more familiar 
form: either concepts ground experience or experience grounds concepts. No instantiation or 
correlation holds without having a ground. 
Given the above objections, the arguably best argument from judgment could be reformulated 
as follows: 
 
(AJ1) The synthetic empirical judgment lays a claim to truth. 
(AJ2) The truth-maker of synthetic empirical judgment is the possible intuition. 
(AJ3) The logical form of judgment is determined by categories as the higher-order concept. 
(AJ4) This determination in judgment must be grounded in the real determination in intuition. 
(AJ5) The intuition must be determined by real relations that are individuated as categories. 
(Instantiation Principle) 
(AJ6) Categories are applied to appearances. 
 
In other lines of argument, Kant attempts to prove directly that the manifold of intuitions is 
synthesized and categorized. In this line of argument from judgment, however, Kant must first 
prove that categories as analytic unity in judgment must be instantiated in the synthetic unity of 
intuition, and then argues that such intuitions are synthesized and categorized. Now the fate the 
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argument depends on whether the inference from (AJ3) to (AJ5) could be justified with the help 
of a conditional Instantiation Principle. While the conditional Instantiation Principle by itself is 
unproblematic to Kant, the appeal to it in the argument from judgment seems to precisely beg the 
question of the Transcendental Deduction, because what the Principle assumes is precisely what 
Kant would like to prove. 
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Chapter 9  The Argument From Perception 
9.1 Introduction 
It is noteworthy that the argument from perception is the only original argument in the B-
Deduction, which is compressed in the concluding section §27. The argument from cognition is 
unique to the 1781 Critique. The argument from self-consciousness appears in both the 1781 Critique 
and the 1787 Critique. Whereas the argument from judgment is absent in the 1781 Critique, it is 
unmistakably anticipated by the Prologomena. As far as I know, the argument from perception can 
find itself neither in Kant’s official publications nor in his personal notes. 
In fact, the argument from perception could be seen as Kant’s official argument in the B-
Deduction. In previous chapters, I distinguish several lines of Kant’s arguments, each of which 
draws on different theoretical and conceptual resources. Those arguments are developed as if they 
stand independently of each other, without taking into consideration Kant’s own official proclaim 
of his intention. In the transitional §21 of the B-Deduction, Kant does offer some elucidating 
official proclaims about his strategy and the design of the structure for achieving the objective of 
the Transcendental Deduction. It becomes more apparent that the separation of the previous 
arguments from the strategic context brings the risk of missing Kant’s original intention. Let’s call 
the argument that runs from §15 to §27 the official argument since it respects Kant’s official claim 
about the structure and strategy of the B-Deduction. 
The argument from perception is the only one that is located after Kant’s elucidation of the 
structure and strategy of the B-Deduction. It might be debatable how we should read these official 
claims back into the previous arguments, and it is quite reasonable to expect that the argument 
from perception will be restricted by Kant’s official claim. Hence, the question of the structure and 
strategy of the B-Deduction and that of the argument of perception are closely related. 
While the argument is compressed, it is surprisingly informative. The argument from 
perception starts with an analysis of the conception of perception. In the course of the argument, 
however, Kant introduces the other premises that have been established in previous sections and 
independent from perception.320 While the argument from perception is located in only one section, 
it could refer back to and make use of all the previous results. Therefore, the official argument 
could be identified with the argument from perception. 
                                                     
320 The notion of perception is neither the sole nor the main conception on which Kant rests his argument. It seems 
difficult to find one central conception that dominates this argument. For the sake the convenience I will still reserve 
the name for it. 
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Again, I find the argument has little anti-skeptical potential. While the notion of perception 
might seem acceptable to skeptics, it is far from clear that the other premises Kant introduces are 
as thin as the perception premise. It is difficult to conceive, for example, that skeptics would accept 
Kant’s substantial claims concerning the singularity of space and time. In fact, a response to the 
anti-skeptical reading looks redundant, for few have attributed an anti-skeptical reading to this 
argument by trying to find something useful in the very concluding section of the B-Deduction. 
The argument from perception displays strikingly synthetic character. The premises of the 
argument could be roughly classified into four groups: Perception Premises, Space-time Premises, 
Synthesis Premises, and Categories Premises. In this light, the argument can be reconstructed as 
follows: 
 
Perception Premises 
(AP1) Perception is the representation of objects in sense. (Definition) 
(AP2) Perception presupposes the synthesis of apprehension. (Radical Manifold) 
Space-time Premises  
(AP3) Space and time are the forms of intuition. (Apriority) 
(AP4) Space and time are the formal intuitions of unity. (Singularity) 
Synthesis Premises: 
(AP5) The unity of space and time are conditioned by the synthesis of understanding. 
(Conceptualism) 
(AP6) Everything in space and time is conditioned by the synthesis of understanding. (From AP5) 
(AP7) The perception is conditioned by the synthesis of understanding. (From AP6 ) 
Categories Premises: 
(AP8) The synthetic unity of space is the synthetic unity of intuition in general. (Identification) 
(AP9) The synthetic unity of intuition in general is conditioned by categories. (From Step 1) 
(AP10) The synthesis of understanding is conditioned by categories. (Analogy) 
Conclusion: 
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(AP11) Perception is conditioned by categories. (from AP7 and AP10) 
(AP12) Experience consists in connected perceptions. (Definition) 
(AP13) Experience is conditioned by categories. (From (AP11) and (AP12)) 
 
This chapter could be broken into two parts. In the first part I will address the structure and 
the strategy of the B-Deduction, and in the second part I will examine the argument from 
perception with reference to the result of the first part of the B-Deduction.  
In section 9.2, I will formulate the general criteria of being a proof and being a step of either 
part of the B-Deduction with respect to the problem of its structure, and then I will examine and 
reject two rival readings respectively: the triviality reading and Henrich’s reading. In section 9.3, I 
will provide my own reading that intuition in general is the abstracted intuition and its objects are 
ens rationis, and categories are merely forms of thought. 
In section 9.4, I will inquire into Kant’s final argument from perception, which heavily relies 
on the singularity of space to attain the required synthetic unity. In section 9.5, I will examine 
Kant’s argument for the singularity of space in the Metaphysical Exposition. In section 9.6, I will 
argue for a conceptualist reading of the unity of space by explaining away the exegetically motivated 
objection. In the concluding section 9.7, I will point out that on the basis of the result of the first 
step, Kant makes a non-deductive inference by analogy to achieve his argumentative objective. 
 
9.2 The Question of Structure  
9.2.1 Phenomena of Distinct Parts and the Spectrum of Positions  
The tension between what one says and what one does is not rare even in philosophers; Kant 
is no exception. Now the question is how seriously we should take Kant’s official claims on his 
strategy and the structure of the argument. When we do not take Kant’s official claims seriously at 
all, problems appear. First, the dismissal of Kant’s official methodological considerations stands in 
conflict with the general interpretative principle of charity. Second, with the aid of Kant’s 
explanation of his strategy we do make sense of some texts in the Transcendental Deduction. In 
§19 and §20 Kant does seem to execute his strategy, and the turn of focus to judgment is amenable 
to the requirement of abstraction. 
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When we take Kant’s official claims too seriously, problems also arise. For instance, Kant’s 
strategy requires the manifold of intuition to be abstracted from spatiotemporal forms. However, 
his abstraction strategy seems not consistent: the numerical identity of self-consciousness in §16 
seems to implicitly make reference to states in temporal sequence, the illustration of drawing a line 
in §17 makes explicit reference to spatial determinations; the discussion of the empirical unity of 
apperception explicitly mentions “pure form of intuition in time” (B140) in §18. Furthermore, if 
we are convinced that Kant has only one single argument in the Transcendental Deduction, then 
both the earlier discussed argument from apperception and that from judgment and the later 
discussed argument from perception are only pieces of this large argument. Isolated from the 
methodological context, each of these lines of arguments would lose its independence. 
While Kant does not execute his strategy as strictly as possible, I nonetheless believe that we 
should respect what Kant claims and it is worthwhile to see what emerges if we take seriously 
Kant’s strategy and structure. In the following I will attempt to steer a middle way between the two 
cliffs to figure out the problem of structure. 
The Transcendental deduction in the 1787 Critique ranges from §15 to §27. One of its most 
striking features is that Kant seems to draw the desired conclusion twice. Let me call the two results 
in the two parts respectively as (C1) and (C2). In §20, Kant claims that (C1) “the manifold in a 
given intuition also necessarily stands under categories” (B143). In §26, Kant claims that (C2) “the 
categories are conditions of the possibility of experience, and are thus also valid a priori of all objects 
of experience” (B161). 
Despite the difference in their formulations, both claims seem to be qualified as conclusions. 
For as far as the objective of transcendental deduction is concerned, both affirm that categories 
are valid to a certain range of objects. Therefore, it is plausible to conclude that the general structure 
of the B-Deduction could be regarded as consisting of two distinct parts. The first part of the 
argument ranges from §15 to §20; the second step of the argument ranges from §22 to §27; and 
between the two parts is the transitional section of §21. 
As for the controversy over the structure of the B-Deduction, there exist two main 
alternatives: (A) they are two proofs, and (ii) they are two steps in one proof. The observation that B-
Deduction has two parts by itself implies neither that the two parts are two proofs nor that they are 
two steps within one proof. In order to settle the issue, we must delve into the text to see what Kant 
says and what he does. Given the existence of the two parts in the B-Deduction, the controversy 
over the structure of the B-Deduction comes down to two questions: 
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(a) Whether the first part is an adequate argument for the desired conclusion (C).  
(b) Whether the second part is an independent argument for the desired conclusion (C). 
 
In order for the B-Deduction to contain two independent proofs, the criteria of being two 
proofs could be spelled out in terms of (a) adequacy and (b) independence as follows. For two-
proof proposal: (i) (C1) entails (C), and (C2) entails (C); in other words, both of them must be at 
least no weaker than (C); (ii) (C1) and (C2) are drawn from different premises such that they are 
different proofs. For one-proof proposal, the criterion is quite simple: (ii) (C1) & (C2) entails (C), 
and (ii) either (C1) or (C2) does not entail (C). For the two-steps proposal, however, the criteria are 
more complex. There are generally two routes (R1) and (R2): either to weaken (C1) or to weaken 
(C2). According to (R1), the criteria are: (i) (C1) or (Pi) is insufficient yet necessary for (C), and (ii) (C2) 
entails (C). According to (R2), the criterion is: (C1) entails (C). 
 
9.2.2 One Proof or Two Proofs? 
(a) Two-Proofs Proposal 
The two-proofs proposal was the received view, yet now it has been replaced by the one-
proof proposal since Henrich’s 1969 influential paper.321 It is now generally agreed that the B-
Deduction is a unified single proof consisting of two steps. However, commentators do not reach 
the consensus concerning the reading of what the specific relationship between two steps is. Like 
many interpreters, I embrace a loose one-proof proposal of the structure of the B-Deduction in 
general. Nevertheless, I believe that the two-proofs proposal is a very plausible view that is worthy 
of surveying, though few explicitly endorses it. In order to settle the issue, I will first formulate the 
general criteria of being one proof or two proofs, and then examine the exegetical reasons for two 
proposals. Then, I will provide my own reading of the two-steps structure of the B-Deduction. I 
believe that the two steps are bridged not by a deductive inference, but by an inference by analogy. 
That is, the link between the first part and the second part of the B-Deduction is much looser than 
other readings might permit. That is partly the reason why I am sympathetic to the two-proofs 
proposal. 
                                                     
321 See Henrich 1969. 
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The old and dominant interpretative hypothesis claims that the B-Deduction contains two 
independent proofs. In fact, the two-proofs proposal is not surprising at all. First of all, there is no 
reason to assume that one section can only contain one argument. In the Aesthetic, Kant provides 
different arguments for the ideality of space and time. Take space in the 1787 Critique for example. 
In the Metaphysical Exposition, Kant accounts for the ideality of space and time from the 
phenomenal feature of spatial and temporal experience. In the Transcendental Exposition, Kant 
argues for the ideality of space and time from the modal feature of geometry.322 Starting from 
different premises, Kant draws the same conclusion about his famous space idealism. 
It is even more so when we take into consideration the general structure of the Transcendental 
Deduction in the 1781 Critique. After the preparatory section of threefold synthesis, the A-
Deduction contains an argument from above and an argument from below, and these two 
arguments are usually considered as mutually independent ones. Anticipated and encouraged by 
the A-Deduction, it seems that nothing can prevent people from thinking that there can also be 
more than one independent argument in the rewritten the Transcendental Deduction in the 1787 
Critique. 
It is assumed that the two superficially similar results (C1) and (C2) yielded in §20 and §26 are 
identical, but the premises of (C1) and (C2) are different. The argument for the claim (C1) in §20 
starts from the premise of transcendental apperception, while the argument for the claim (C2) in §26 
starts from the premise of empirical perception. If one same conclusion is drawn twice from different 
premises, it is natural to suppose that there are distinct arguments. It appears that the B-Deduction 
is precisely the case. 
For those who are convinced of the deep continuity between two editions of Critique, it is 
attracting to read the B-Deduction as a rework of the A-Deduction that even inherits the two-
proof structure of the latter. In the B-Deduction, the first part from §15 to §20 constitutes an 
argument from above, while the second part from §22 to §27 constitutes an argument from below. 
Both parts are correspondent respectively to the more famous two official arguments in the A-
Deduction. This line of interpretation is defended by Erdmann and Vleeshauwer.  
Henrich’s criticisms of the Erdmann-Vleeshauwer proposal is that in both arguments “the 
manifold of a sensible intuition is mentioned first” and thereby there is no reason to suppose that 
the argument in § 20 is literally an argument from above. This criticism is unfair. The argument 
from above does not mean that the manifold of intuitions must enter the argument in the last stage. 
                                                     
322 Guyer holds that these two species of argument for idealism vary in the strength of the conclusion. See Guyer 
2006, 58-67. 
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The argument from above is an argument from apperception, and the argument from below is an 
argument from perception. Since one central issue in Kant’s discussion is the relationship between 
faculties and the given manifold, may it be pure self-consciousness or empirical consciousness, the 
reference to the given manifold is doomed to come into view at a quite early stage. Even though 
Henrich’s rigid standard of argument from above is adopted and Kant’s argument in §20 is rejected 
as one from above, it does not imply that B-Deduction does not contain two distinct proofs. What 
it shows is at best that there is overlap in both sets of premises of the two parts in the B-Deduction, 
which does not imply that their premises are the same set. 
When encouraged by Kant’s allusion to the distinction between a subjective deduction and 
an objective deduction in the A-Preface, the friends of the two-proof proposal would find that it 
is even more profitable to read Kant as fulfilling his promise by presenting two proofs in the B-
Deduction. This the line of interpretation is defended by Adicks and Paton. 
What makes the two-proofs proposal fail lies in that (C1) does not entail (C), therefore it does 
not satisfy the criterion (Ai), albeit it does not satisfy (Aii). 
 
(b) One-Proof Proposal  
In his 1969 famous paper, Henrich argues that the proof of the B-deduction is one proof with 
two steps, instead of two independent proofs. As Henrich points out, “[t]he interpretation must 
show that, contrary to the initial impression that the two conclusions merely define the same 
proposition… sections 20 and 26 offer arguments with significantly different results, and these 
together yield a single proof of the transcendental deduction. We shall call this task the problem of 
the two-steps in one proof.”323 Henrich’s two-step proposal is so successful that it has replaced the 
old and dominant interpretative hypothesis to become a received view concerning the proof-
structure of the B-Deduction in contemporary literature. 
In what follows I will give several reasons for the plausibility of this view. While the superficial 
resemblance between the two claims of (C1) and (C2) is supposed, on a closer reading, (C1) and 
(C2) are not identical with each other. Kant officially assigns different objectives to the two parts 
of the B-Deduction. In §26 Kant writes: 
 
[…] in the transcendental deduction, however, their possibility [(the possibility of a priori categories)] 
as a priori cognitions of objects of an intuition in general was exhibited (§§ 20, 21). Now the possibility of 
                                                     
323 Henrich 1969, 642. 
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cognizing a priori through categories whatever objects may come before our senses […] is to be 
explained. (B159-160) 
 
The domain of (C1) in § 20 is concerned with the “objects of an intuition in general”, while 
the domain of (C2) in § 26 is concerned with the “objects may come before our senses” (B159). 
As Henrich calls into attention, “sections 20 and 26 offer arguments with significantly different 
results”, the difference in the validity of the domain of objects constitutes a primary reason to hold 
that (C1) and (C2) are different claims. (C1) and (C2) could be reformulated as follows: 
 
(C1) categories are valid of the objects of an intuition in general. 
(C2) categories are valid of the objects of our empirical intuition. 
 
It is noteworthy that two different results do not immediately imply two proofs. In order to 
be two proofs of the same aim (C), (C1) and (C2) as the results of two parts do not have to be 
identical. It is possible that either of them is not identical with the other, but the desired conclusion 
(C) is logically or conceptually entailed by both (C1) and (C2). Suppose that (C1) claims that 
categories are applied to all kinds of sensible intuition, while (C2) claims that categories are applied 
to perception. (C1) and (C2) are not identical, but both of them entail the desired conclusion (C). 
As I have mentioned, the difference in the results of both parts is far from the decisive 
evidence for the one-proof proposal. The singleness of proof is further evidenced by Kant’s official 
claim in the transitional §21: “[i]n the above proposition, therefore, the beginning of a deduction of 
the pure concepts of the understanding has been made” and there is more to be shown “[i]n the 
sequel”. (B144) The diction of “beginning” indicates that Kant has not yet put the argument to an 
end. And the contrast between “beginning” and “sequel” implies the singleness of proof between 
what has said before and what will be said. According to the criteria we have formulated, it amounts 
to saying that it satisfies the criterion (Bii) that (C1) or (Pi) is insufficient for (C). 
While what Kant says in §21 is the primary inspiration for the conviction that Kant intends to 
formulate one single proof in the B-Deduction, the most decisive evidence for this proposal stems 
from what Kant does in the actual presentation of his argument in the second part of the B-Deduction. 
In §26 Kant writes: 
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But this synthetic unity can be none other than that of the combination of the manifold of a given 
intuition in general in an original consciousness, in agreement with the categories, only applied to 
our sensible intuition. (B161) 
 
This passage constitutes the most crucial evidence for the view that some claim in the first part of 
the B-Deduction is essentially presupposed by the second part of the B-Deduction. Kant identifies 
the unity of space and time that is established in §26 with the unity of the manifold of intuition in 
general that is first established in §16 and §17 and then encapsulated in §20. Without this 
identification, Kant cannot bridge the unity of space and time with categories, and thereby he 
cannot draw the desired conclusion of transcendental deduction. According to the criteria of one-
proof, Kant here shows that it satisfies the criterion of (Biii) that the first part is necessary for the 
second part of the B-Deduction to attain the final aim. 
 
9.2.3 Triviality Reading 
The acceptance of the one-proof proposal merely marks the beginning of a new controversy 
about what the two steps amount to. In the following, I will survey three readings of the one-proof 
proposal: the triviality reading, the Henrich reading, and my own reading. 
Now suppose that we accept the proposal that (C1) the first part of the B-Deduction is 
concerned with the objects of sensible intuition in general, while (C2) the second part with the 
objects of our human sensible intuition. The key to determining the relationship between (C1) and 
(C2) is to clarify what intuition in general means. Taken literally, intuition in general refers to any 
kind of intuition whatsoever. Although Kant does not often make explicit the sensible character of 
intuition in general, his following remarks indicate that intellectual intuition is not his very 
concern.324 
Based on this most natural reading of the intuition in general, we can obtain an a priori 
conceptual truth that human intuition is a species of intuition in general. Obviously, (C1) 
conceptually implies (C2) with the aid of the additional, and trivial, premise that our human sensible 
intuition is obviously a species of sensible intuition in general as the genus. The outline of the 
argument in the B-Deduction will be presented in the following manner: 
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(T1) All sensible intuitions in general imply the application of categories. 
(T2) Human empirical intuition is one species of sensible intuition in general. 
(T3) Our human intuition implies the application of categories. 
 
Note that the claim (T2) appears to be introduced as an additional premise. But (T2) is not 
stated explicitly by Kant in anywhere of the B-Deduction. It is not arbitrary to attribute this quite 
trivial conceptual truth to Kant, of which little textual evidence is required. Although Kant never 
explicitly makes such an easy inference, in effect, the claim (T1) is adequately strong to entail the 
claim (T3).325 
Although there is no inherent philosophical problem in this reading, it suffers from the 
interpretative challenges. The most interpretative challenge is that, if it is Kant’s view, it leaves 
unmotivated the fact that Kant bothers himself to write the bulk of the second part of the B-
Deduction. It is natural to assume that Kant makes substantial claims in the second part and that 
some of these substantial claims are indispensable for the completion of transcendental deduction. I 
believe that almost all commentators are adherent to both assumptions. The trivial reading stands 
in conflict with both the assumption that Kant says something substantial in the second step and 
the assumption that it is indispensable for the B-Deduction.  
At least, the triviality reading is obliged to offer an additional account of the nature of the 
second part of the B-Deduction. In contrast, the one-proof proposal is not inflicted by this 
problem, since it affirms that the second part is a step within one single proof. To be sure, after the 
determination of the nature of the second part it can be further debated on other questions. But it 
is not a debate on the nature of the second part. It is a further question to determine the nature of 
the second step. 
Given these considerations, it is suggested that the first part of the B-Deduction constitutes 
one independent proof. To be sure, the independence of the first part of the B-Deduction does not 
imply the independence of the second part of the B-Deduction and thereby it does not result in 
the two-proofs proposal. For the sake of argument, however, it seems to render the second part 
redundant. 
                                                     
325 In fact, the genus-reading seems that it is simply not Kant’s own view; no text indicates that Kant claims that 
intuition in general is the genus of our human sensible intuition. 
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The concession to this interpretative alternative undermines the commitment to the two-steps 
reading in general. It violates one of the one-proof criteria that (C1) is insufficient to draw the 
desired conclusion (C). While it does not immediately imply a resurrection of the two-proofs 
proposal, it leaves room for it. 
The presumably most natural interpretation of the structure of the B-Deduction poses an 
additional and general interpretative challenge for all proposals, and all proposals should meet this 
challenge, whether negatively or positively. In fact, all interpretations of the relationship between 
the two steps of the B-Deduction could be seen as dividing themselves in terms of how to respond 
to this triviality challenge. As I have indicated, there are two basic routes of responses to this 
challenge. 
(R1): One might accept that the argument in the first step is adequate for the aim of the 
transcendental deduction, and meanwhile simply reject the implied triviality as a genuine challenge. 
Making this move is to bite the bullet by saying that the first step is essentially complete and the 
second step is indeed trivial. But here the triviality should be properly understood. The second step 
is trivial not in the sense that it is uninformative, for it makes a number of substantial claims; rather, 
it is trivial in the sense that it is argumentatively unnecessary, for the basic argumentative aim has been 
attained in the first step. Along this interpretive route, there could be two readings. On one reading, 
in the first part of the B-Deduction Kant has already successfully established his desired conclusion 
that categories are necessarily applied to objects of sensible intuition in general. The second part of 
the B-Deduction is merely to spell out how categories are necessary so. On another reading, the 
first part of the B-Deduction establishes that categories are valid of objects of experience, while 
the second part draws the conclusion that categories are only valid of objects experience.326 
(R2): One could reject the argument in the first part as adequate for the aim of the 
transcendental deduction, and thereby meet the triviality challenge by assigning a distinctive task 
for the second part of the B-Deduction. Most commentators adopt the second route that (2) the 
first step is inadequate. According to this interpretative direction, it is argued that the conclusion (C1) 
in the first step falls short of the aim of transcendental deduction in different ways. In the following 
I will consider two readings of the general structure of the B-Deduction. The former is offered by 
Henrich,327 and the latter by Allison.328 
 
                                                     
326 The textual support could be found in in §23. 
327 See Henrich 1969 and 1984. 
328 See Allison 2004 and 2015. 
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9.2.4 Henrich’s Reading 
(a) An Analysis 
On Henrich’s view, Kant first establishes a restricted conclusion that the manifold of intuition 
stands under categories only insofar as a unity has already been contained in the intuition; and then 
an unrestricted conclusion is established that all the objects of human sensible intuition stand under 
the categories after the restriction is overcome by introducing the fact that we do have this unity 
in our intuition. Henrich himself seems not to realize the triviality challenge, but his characteristic 
reading appears to precisely immune from the triviality objection. Consider Henrich’s verdict in 
the following crucial passage: 
 
(T1) The result of proof in section 20 is therefore valid only for those intuitions which already contain 
unity. (T2) That is, wherever there is unity, there is a relation which can be thought according to the 
categories. (T3) This statement, however, does not clarify for us the range within which unitary intuitions 
can be found. (1969, 645) 
 
As I understand, Henrich’s proposal is ambiguous, since it invites three readings: it could be 
read as stressing the restriction of the domain of the objects of the claim, or it could also be read 
as stressing the conditional necessity of the claim, or else it could be read as the combination of 
the two former readings. In the following, I will examine them one by one. According to (T1), we 
can have a scope reading of the general structure of the proof in the B-Deduction, and thereby we 
have a counter-intuitiveness objection to it:  
 
(Hs1) Categories are valid of the objects of the intuitions of unity. 
(Hs2) Categories are valid of objects of intuitions.  
 
It does not consider the way in which the restriction is removed. According to (T2) and (T3) in the 
quotation, we can have a conditionality reading of the structure of the proof in the B-Deduction, 
and thereby we have a non-actuality objection to it:  
 
(Hc1) If intuition is of unity, then it implies the application of categories. 
(Hc2) In fact, our human intuition is of unity. 
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(Hc3) Our human intuition implies the application of categories. 
 
According to Henrich’s interpretation, (Hc1) is the conclusion of the first step, and (Hc2) is 
the claim established in the second step, and then the conclusion (Hc3) is drawn from the premise 
(1) and (2). If both (H1) and (H2) are true, then it logically follows that (H3) is true by modus ponens. 
Combining (T1), (T2) and (T3), a final reading of Henrich’s proposal could be reconstructed as 
follows: 
 
(Hf1) All objects of intuition with unity are subsumed under categories. 
(Hf2) Some of our intuitions are of unity. 
(Hf3) Some objects of our intuition are subsumed under categories. 
(Hf4) All objects of our intuition are of unity. 
(Hf5) All objects of our intuition are of unity. (from Hf1 and Hf4)329 
 
One obvious merit of Henrich’s proposal is that it avoids the triviality objection. The triviality 
objection says that in order to infer from (C1) to (C2) no substantial claim needs to be made in the 
second step. However, the premise (H2) is precisely introduced in the second step by Kant and it 
lays substantial claims on the nature of space and time and therefore it is by no means trivial.  
Furthermore, Henrich’s reading does not only avoid the triviality objection, but it also 
constitutes the most balanced reading of the two parts of the B-Deduction. Both the first step and 
the second step of the B-Deduction establish substantial and necessary claims for the final aim of 
transcendental deduction. As we will see, both Allison’s reading and my reading seem to be driven 
by the triviality objection to the opposite direction that entices the trivialization of the first step of 
the B-Deduction. 
Based on the philological analysis, Henrich’s proposal brings a general interpretative bonus 
by calling into attention the difference between an intuition and one intuition. One intuition implies 
the intuition has been subsumed under categories, while an intuition leaves undetermined its 
                                                     
329 Henrich does not say that Kant does not show the actuality of the unity for any intuition. His formulation leaves 
room for avoiding the problem. 
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relation to categories. A similar distinction between the manifold of intuition and the unity of 
intuition is made conspicuous by Wilfred Sellars.330 
The conditional claim (H1) that any unitary intuition implies the application of categories is 
of vital importance. No matter how we read the structure of the B-Deduction, the link between 
the unity of intuition and the application of categories plays an indispensable role in §26. In §26 
Kant explicitly identifies “this synthetic unity” as “that of the combination of the manifold of a 
given intuition in general in an original consciousness, in agreement with the categories” (B161), 
and thereby links the synthetic unity of space and time with categories. 
Along this line of reasoning, another kind of triviality in inference emerges. According to 
Henrich’s proposal, the second step is not trivial, and it instead respects the substantial claim Kant 
makes in the second step. Nonetheless, the triviality of an inference could be understood in two 
significantly different senses. In one sense, the premise involved in the inference is trivial. In the 
other sense, the inference to the conclusion is trivial. The triviality in the second sense is by no means 
harmful; it is instead desired for its logical validity. The reason I single out this kind of triviality is 
not that it is undesirable, but that it is the general route adopted by almost all commentators. 
While the followers of the first route are bothered by this new triviality, the followers of the 
first route involve triviality in two different senses. The common strategy adopted by the followers 
the second route is to incorporate some claim in the first step into the second by considering it as 
the indispensable premise to entail the conclusion as the logical consequence of their conjunction 
with some other premise established in the second part. If Kant does reason in this way, he is 
strengthening, rather than weakening, his argument. 
Although the followers of the second route meet the triviality challenge by rejecting the 
second part as inadequate for the aim of the transcendental deduction, they cannot escape the 
triviality in the second sense.  Nevertheless, this route still revives the genus-species on another 
level. 
 
(1) Every unity implies the application of categories. 
(2) Space and time and thereby the manifold within them are of unity. 
(3) Everything in space and time implies the application of categories. 
                                                     
330 Sellars 1968, 2-8. 
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(b) Particular Objections 
Allison charges that Henrich’s view is counter-intuitive. On Henrich’s proposal, the first step 
contains a restriction, and the second step removes the restriction. Allison argues that, if Henrich’s 
reading is correct, then it implies that the claim (C1) of the first step is broader than the claim (C2) 
in the second step. According to the text, however, the objects of sensible intuition in general in 
the first step seems broader than human sensible intuition in particular.331   
As I understand it, Allison’s view is too simplistic. The domain of the claim cannot be 
determined merely with the aid of the literal meaning of “removal of restriction”. The removal of 
a restriction does not automatically make a claim broad. As I have formulated before, Henrich’s 
proposal does not have to be understood in the light of the Scope Reading. It could instead be 
understood as a hypothetical syllogism in the light of the Conditionality Reading. In this syllogism, 
(H1) does not entail (H3), nor does the converse hold. It is hasty to attribute to Henrich the view 
that (H1) is broader than (H3). 
If we do not understand the breadth of the scope of the claim in terms of genus-species 
relation, it seems that, in a loose sense, (H1) is broader, or stronger, than (H3). (H1) holds that 
categories are valid of all objects of sensible intuition as long these intuitions are of unity. In 
contrast, (H3) merely claims that categories are valid of the objects of human sensible intuition. 
While Henrich’s formulation is somehow misleading, his proposal does not violate the supposed 
basic intuition Allison embraces. 
The restriction that is to be removed can be understood as the antecedent of a conditional. If 
the removal of the restriction implies the transition of a narrow claim to a broad claim, it amounts 
to saying that the consequent, or its logical consequence, is broader than the conditional, which 
obviously makes no sense. 
 
(c) General Objections 
In my view, the price Henrich’s proposal pays is that it seems that it is not Kant’s view. In the 
above syllogism the major premise (H1) is true, but it is not the result of the first step of the B-
Deduction. Although there is a distinction between intuition with unity and intuition without unity 
                                                     
331 Allison 2015, 327-329. 
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in Kant’s text, it does not follow that this is what Kant would stress on the issue of the relationship 
between the two parts. 
Henrich’s interpretation can find textual support from the B-Deduction. First of all, before 
Kant officially introduces the notion of the unity of intuition, in §16 Kant has used the locution 
repeatedly: “the manifold representations that are given in a certain intuition” (B132), “these 
representations given in intuition” (B134), and “the manifold given in an intuition” (B135). 
Nevertheless, Kant does not affirm that the intuition in which the manifold representations are 
given has the property of unity. In other words, Kant does not say explicitly that those manifold 
are given in one intuition, i.e., intuition with unity. As I have argued in Chapter 7, in §16 Kant proves, 
rather than assumes, that all representations are combined in one and the same self-consciousness. 
Furthermore, Henrich (1981) quotes the important footnote in §21 to justify his emphasis on 
the unity of intuition: 
 
The ground of proof rests on the represented unity of intuition through which an object is given, 
which always includes a synthesis of the manifold that is given for an intuition, and already contains 
the relation of the latter to unity of apperception. (B144f) 
 
With technical device Kant unmistakably stresses the importance of the “unity of intuition” and 
explicitly specifies its role as the ground of proof (Beweisgrund). It seems to be a decisive support 
for Henrich’s interpretation.332 
My objection goes as follows. According to the previous reconstruction, what is at issue is the 
relationship between sensible intuition in general and human sensible intuition. It is natural to 
suppose that sensible intuition in general is the genus of human sensible intuition. If that holds, it 
presupposes that the notion of intuition in both terms are identical in type. On Henrich’s proposal, 
however, what is at stake seems to be the relationship between the intuition with unity and the 
intuition without unity, viz., intuition in radically different types. The use of the hypothetical 
language is just to indicate that it is a condition for categories within the first step rather than to 
suggest that it is a condition to be removed by introducing another fact from without. 
It is far from clear, however, that the “ground of proof” is the result of proof in the first step. It 
seems to be a mistake of the premise for the conclusion. By the “the represented unity of intuition 
through which an object is given” Kant establishes the link between the unity of intuition and the 
                                                     
332 See Henrich 1984. 
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notion of object. By the link Kant alludes to his move in §17 to establish the link by defining that 
“[a]n object, however, is that in the concept of which the manifold of a given intuition is united” 
(B137). 
Moreover, the most serious problem afflicting Henrich’s proposal is that he is convinced that 
the claim is only a hypothetical, not a categorical one. To be sure, Kant does affirm that all manifold 
stands under the categories insofar as they are given in a unified intuition. However, the actuality of 
the original unity of apperception and thereby the synthetic unity of intuition has already been 
achieved in §16 and in §17. Specifically, Kant does not suppose that in the manifold representations 
the numerical identity of self-consciousness can be encountered; rather, he asserts it as an a priori 
truth. There is no reason to suppose that Kant merely affirms a conditional truth. 
 
9.3 The Abstraction Reading Recommended 
9.3.1 The Abstracted Intuition 
Alternatively, I suggest that the meaning of intuition in general should be understood with 
reference to Kant’s characteristic abstraction strategy. Kant explains his strategy in the transitional 
part as follows: 
 
…since the categories arise independently from sensibility merely in the understanding, I must 
abstract from the way in which the manifold for an empirical intuition is given, in order to attend only to 
the unity that is added to the intuition through the understanding by means of the category.(B145)333 
 
As Kant indicates, the way in which the manifold is given to the empirical intuition is abstracted 
away, and what is left is the sensible intuition without space and time as its form. It sheds light on 
how one should understand the notion of intuition in general in conclusion (C1).  
The concept of intuition in general is not one whose extension includes all the actual sensible 
intuitions and thus the human intuition in particular. Nor does it include all possible sensible 
intuitions as long as the conceived intuition is logically coherent under the definition. Rather, 
intuition in general should be understood as abstracted intuition, that is, the intuition whose 
particular forms are abstracted away, and thus those elements contingent to the definition of 
intuition are abstracted away. After the abstraction of the form of our sensible intuition, what is 
                                                     
333According to Kant’s Anthropology, attention and abstraction are the two forms of consciousness. (AA 7:131) In the 
B-Deduction Kant employs this pair of concepts in a methodological manner. 
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left for us is a new kind of intuition, the abstracted intuition. Accordance to the definition, this 
abstracted product is sensible intuition, for the two definitive features of referential immediacy and 
extensional singularity are true of abstracted sensible intuition. 
Nonetheless, this kind of abstracted intuition cannot be instantiated. It cannot be encountered 
in any species of finite being equally of sensible intuition characteristic of different forms. The 
form of sensible intuition is essential and fundamental to it. Kant seems to embrace the assumption 
that all sensible intuitions are subject to hylomorphic analysis. Accordingly, the matter without 
form simply does not exist. Take an example for illustration. When a biologist begins his study of 
panda, he could abstract from the color and attend to the biological properties and behaviors of a 
panda. However, the concept of the uncolored panda simply cannot be instantiated.334 
 
9.3.2 Objects of Abstracted Intuition 
What are the objects of intuition in general? I propose that the objects of intuition in general 
are noumena in the negative sense. Consider Kant’s definition of noumena in the negative sense: 
 
If by a noumenon we understand a thing insofar as it is not an object of our sensible intuition, 
because we abstract from the manner of our intuition of it, then this is a noumenon in the negative 
sense. (B307) 
 
As Kant makes clear, when we abstract from the manner of our intuition, the objects of the 
abstracted intuition are noumena in the negative sense. And Kant emphasizes that objects of 
abstracted intuition are not objects of our sensible intuition. 
The reference to the Phenomena-Noumena chapter is crucial for understanding the structure 
of B-Deduction and the relevant questions. Kant’s use of abstraction as well as the forms of 
thought is absent in the 1781 Critique and is later added to the 1787 Critique. It is not implausible to 
even conjecture that the B-Deduction and Kant’s distinction between the negative sense and the 
positive sense of noumenon are composed nearly at the same time when Kant has a more 
comprehensive understanding of these two issues. 
Even if one might doubt that the terminology of abstraction does not suffice to support the 
conjecture that Kant has the same thing in his mind when he uses this term, I believe that the worry 
                                                     
334 The natural reading of intuition in general conflates the abstracted object with the abstracted concept. What I am 
suggesting is that we should distinguish between them. 
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could be dispelled by Kant’s following remark that “categories… have significance only in relation 
to the unity of intuitions in space and time” (B308). That is precisely how Kant argues in §26 for 
the objective reality of categories with reference to the unity of space and time.  
Then, we must determine the precise meaning of the noumenon in the negative sense. In the 
next crucial paragraph, Kant writes: 
 
Now the doctrine of sensibility is at the same time the doctrine of the noumenon in the negative sense, 
i.e., of things that the understanding must think without this relation to our kind of intuition, thus not 
merely as appearances but as things in themselves, but about which, however, it also understands that 
in this abstraction it cannot consider making any use of its categories, since they have significance only 
in relation to the unity of intuitions in space and time, and can even determine this unity a priori through 
general concepts of combination only on account of the mere ideality of space and time. (B307-B308) 
 
The concept of a noumenon, i.e., of a thing that is not to be thought of as an object of the senses but 
rather as a thing in itself (solely through a pure understanding), is not at all contradictory; for one 
cannot assert of sensibility that it is the only possible kind of intuition. (B310) 
 
In addition, Kant offers various characterizations of noumena in the negative sense. Noumena 
in the negative sense are “things that the understanding must think without this relation to our kind 
of intuition” (B307); noumena are “beings of understanding” (B308). In his table of nothingness, 
Kant characterizes noumena in the negative sense as ens rationis335:  
 
(1) To the concepts of all, many, and one there is opposed the concept of that which cancels everything 
out, i.e., none, and thus the object of a concept to which no intuition that can be given corresponds 
is = nothing, i.e., a concept without an object, like the noumena, which cannot be counted among the 
possibilities although they must not on that ground be asserted to be impossible (ens rationis),c or like 
something such as certain new fundamental forces, which one thinks, without contradiction, to be 
sure, but also without any example from experience even being thought, and which must therefore not 
be counted among the possibilities. (A290-291/B347) 
 
Kant’s different characterizations of noumena in the negative sense seem to result in a logical 
inconsistency. One the one hand, if noumena in the negative sense are things of understanding, 
they are merely thought-entity without any reality. On the other hand, if noumena in the negative 
sense are things in themselves, then they are of some non-physical metaphysical reality. 
                                                     
335 For an analysis of Kant’s thought-thing see Rosefeldt 2000, 75-77. 
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Note that Kant does not say that things of understanding or objects of abstracted sensible 
intuition are not appearances, but things in themselves. What Kant says is that objects of abstracted 
sensible intuition are “not merely as appearances but as things in themselves” (B307).336 Kant is 
committed to the view that if the form of our sensible intuition is abstracted from it, then the 
appearances and things in themselves are numerically identical. 
The claim on the identity of appearances and things in themselves is perplexing. One familiar 
way of identifying appearances with things in themselves is to adopt the metaphysical theory of 
transcendental realism. However, the noumena in the negative sense here stand independently of 
idealism-realism spectrum. Now the problem is that Kant seems to suggest that there is another way 
of identifying appearances with things in themselves. 
I suggest that we could resolve the problem in the following way. Noumena in the negative 
sense are appearances because they are the objects of intuition. According to Kant’s definition, 
appearances are the undetermined objects of intuition. The notion of appearances is by definition 
deeply relational; different kinds of sensible intuition have different kinds of appearances. It is 
groundless to suppose that appearances can only be appearances for our human beings. To be sure, 
the abstracted sensible intuition cannot be instantiated. We nonetheless can postulate objects for 
it, though these objects can never be given to human or any other sensible beings. By definition 
these objects of abstracted sensible intuition are nothing but appearances. Accordingly, things in 
themselves and appearances under two different kinds of description converge together. 
The objects of intuition in general are thought-things, whereas the objects of human intuition 
are the things in space and time. In this light, the domain of the objects of intuition in general is an 
entirely distinct set of objects from that of the objects of human intuition. The two sets of objects 
must have no intersection with each other. Or rather, they are the objects of two distinct worlds 
available to us under different cognitive condition. Therefore, one cannot simply jump from (C1) 
to (C2) by a deductive inference by interpreting intuition in general as the genus of sensible intuition. 
One might raise the objection that the scope of logical objects is broader than that of real 
objects. This objection assumes that non-contradiction is the only condition of being thought-thing. 
This seems to be supported by Kant’s own remarks that “I can think whatever I like, as long as I 
do not contradict myself, i.e., as long as my concept is a possible thought” (Bxxvi). 
However, non-contradiction is not the sufficient condition for something to be a thought-thing. 
The other negative yet necessary condition for being thought-thing is that it must not be the objects 
                                                     
336 Occasionally, Kant’s uses “not only” for “not”. 
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of cognition. If some thought-thing can be given in intuition, it is not a thought-thing. The point 
is that there exists a disanalogy between the logical possibility/real possibility distinction and the 
thought-thing/things in space and time distinction. While all objects of cognition must be logically 
possible, one cannot draw a parallel conclusion that an object of cognition must be a thought-
thing.337 
Therefore, it seems that my proposal creates an interpretative puzzle why Kant takes a detour 
to first show that categories are valid of a domain of objects that is irrelevant to the very domain of 
objections at issue. One might doubt what argumentative utility the first step of the argument has. 
However, we should not draw such a hasty pessimistic conclusion. The deductive inference is not 
the only respectable inference. As I will show at the end of this chapter, Kant makes uses of the 
inference by analogy to achieve his final argumentative objective.  
 
9.3.3 Forms of Thought and Intellectual Synthesis 
What is the Kant’s inner logic between the two steps of the B-Deduction? I believe that it is 
profitable to make an appeal to Kant’s crucial distinction between thought and cognition to understand 
the relationship between the two steps of the B-Deduction. Along this line of interpretation, in the 
first step Kant intends to establish that categories as forms of thought are valid of the objects of 
thought, while in the second step he intends to establish that categories are valid of the objects of 
cognition.338 
Kant’s principle of cognition remains unchanged throughout the two editions of the Critique. 
The principle of cognitions claims that through concept an object is thought, and through intuition 
an object is given. We might call intuition the sensible condition of cognition, and concept (or 
thought) the intellectual condition of cognition. Kant’s systematic and emphatic explication of the 
difference between cognition and thought can only be found in the 1787 Critique. Kant’s discussion 
of the distinction between thought and cognition is pervasive in §22, §23, and §24 of the second 
step of the B-Deduction. At the very beginning of §22, Kant writes explicitly: 
 
To think of an object and to cognize an object are thus not the same. For two components belong 
to cognition: first, the concept, through which an object is thought at all (the category), and second, 
the intuition, through which it is given[.] (B146) 
                                                     
337 All really possible objects are logically possible objects. However, not all logically possible objects are thought-things. 
338 For similar views see Allison 2015. It is surprising that Allison does not make appeal to the important distinction. 
Based on this distinction, my view on the status of the first step of B-Deduction is more pessimistic. 
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The technical term “intuition in general” does not stand alone; rather, there are systematically 
related terminologies in the B-Deduction. Kant dubs and introduces into the 1787 Critique the 
technical term “forms of thought (Gedankensformen)” that is absent in the 1781 Critique in the hope 
of marking the distinctive status of categories in cognition. One might suppose that the 
introduction of forms of thought is meant to be a parallel to the forms of intuition 
(Anschauungsformen). If intuition is necessary for cognition, and the forms of intuition are necessary 
for intuition, then forms of intuition are necessary for cognition. The same line of reasoning could 
be extended to thought. Forms of thought as the intellectual condition of cognition is indispensable 
for the cognition of objects as well.  
Kant’s remarks on the forms of thought can only be found in Kant’s new addition in the 1787 
Critique. Consider the following passage: 
 
The pure concepts of the understanding are related through the mere understanding to objects of 
intuition in general, without it being determined whether this intuition is our own or some other but 
still sensible one, but they are on this account mere forms of thought, through which no determinate 
object is yet cognized. The synthesis or combination of the manifold in them was related merely to the 
unity of apperception, and was thereby the ground of the possibility of cognition a priori insofar as it 
rests on the understanding, and was therefore not only transcendental but also merely purely 
intellectual. (B150) 
 
This pivotal passage is illuminating for two reasons. For one thing, it confirms my previous 
proposal of the abstraction reading of the intuition in general. Kant explicitly says that in intuition 
in general we are not in a position to determine whether it is ours or not, which can be seen as a 
refutation of the genus conception of intuition in general that underlies the triviality reading of the 
structure of the B-Deduction. Note that no determinate cognition does not suggest that there is 
indeterminate cognition. 
For another, it helps clarify the conceptual relation between categories, forms of thought, and 
the objects of intuition in general. Here Kant claims that categories are delegated as the forms of 
thought, and that the forms of thought are introduced to designate the nature of categories when 
they are related to objects of intuition in general. Kant makes it explicit that in the first step of the 
B-Deduction categories are nothing but merely forms of thought, and the objects are abstract 
correlates of intuition in general. 
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One might wonder what the forms of thought are. A natural interpretation seems to identify 
forms of thought with forms of judgment.339 This view is rejected by Kant, however. Kant explicitly claims 
that the synthesis or combination of the manifold takes place in “forms of thought” (B150). In a 
note that appears at the start of the Phenomena-Noumena Chapter in Kant’s copy of the 1781 
Critique, Kant writes that categories “are only forms of thought for bringing the manifold of 
intuitions to synthetic unity of apperception” (AA 23:35). In the General Note on the System of 
Principles added to the 1787 Critique, Kant writes that “the categories are not by themselves 
cognitions, but mere forms of thought for making cognitions out of given intuitions” (B288-
B289). Forms of judgment cannot make cognition out of given intuitions. Since the forms of 
thought are used for combining the manifold of intuitions in the unity of apperception in order to 
produce a cognition, and, as I have proposed, the cognition in the Transcendental Deduction refers 
to the unified intuition, the forms of thought are not the forms of judgment, but the categorical 
form of intuition. 
In addition to forms of thought, Kant also coins another term “intellectual synthesis (synthesis 
intellectualis)” to match with the intuition in general. Kant discusses the intellectual synthesis in 
contrast to the figurative synthesis:  
 
This synthesis of the manifold of sensible intuition, which is possible and necessary a priori, can be 
called figurative (synthesis speciosa), as distinct from that which would be thought in the mere category 
in regard to the manifold of an intuition in general, and which is called combination of the 
understanding (synthesis intellectualis)”[.] (B151) 
 
Figurative synthesis is generally regarded as one that is operative in the second step of the B-
Deduction and responsible for making a causal difference on sensibility. It is quite plausible to 
suppose that intellectual synthesis plays a role in the first step of the B-Deduction. The notion of 
figurative synthesis is familiar to us; its new and precise name of figurative synthesis is another 
expression of transcendental synthesis in the A-Deduction. However, it is not so easy to determine 
what intellectual synthesis is. According to one interpretation, intellectual synthesis is identified 
with the action of making a judgment or the logical functions of judgment.340 Insofar as a judgment is 
                                                     
339 Longuenesse defends such a view. See Longuenesse 1998, 243. 
340 According to Longuenesse, synthesis intellectualis is “achieved by logical functions of judgment, according to its 
logical forms”. (1998, 245) Longuensse’s reading the structure of B-Deduction is guided by her crucial two-aspect 
view of the understanding, and she believes that the structure of the B-Deduction is correspondent to the structure 
of the understanding. The first step is concerned with the discursive aspect of understanding as judging, and the 
second step is concerned with the intuitive aspect of understanding as sensible synthesis. On my view, this neat 
parallelism cannot be found in Kant. The first step can hardly be one argument with reference to merely the 
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both spontaneous and discursive, this interpretation does have initial plausibility. This initial 
plausibility soon disappears when Kant claims that intellectual synthesis is “thought in the mere 
category in regard to the manifold of an intuition in general”. 
Both misunderstandings could be traced back to the identification of thinking with judging. 
Kant famously defines the understanding as the faculty for judging in the following passage: “[w]e 
can, however, trace all actions of the understanding back to judgments, so that the understanding 
in general can be represented as a faculty for judging.” (A69/B94) In what follows Kant offers a 
second characterization of the understanding as “faculty for thinking”. Kant continues that 
“according to what has been said above it is a faculty for thinking. Thinking is cognition through 
concepts. Concepts, however, as predicates of possible judgments, are related to some 
representation of a still undetermined object” (A69/B94). 
Kant specifies the essential aspect of thinking as the employment of concept. Here the concept 
does not refer to the category. All cognitions, whether they are through concept or not, require the 
category to think an object. If so, Kant’s specification of “cognition through concepts” would be 
too indiscriminate. As Kant makes clear, by concepts he refers to ordinary empirical concepts 
which can function as the predicate in judgment.341 Given these considerations, it is very natural to 
suppose that the difference in Kant’s characterizations of the understanding respectively as the 
faculty of judging and as the faculty of thinking is merely verbal.342 His substantial view is instead 
that thinking is identical with judging. 
However, I believe that this line of thought is vulnerable to the following objections. First, it 
is difficult to see that the judgment characterization exhausts all the functions of thinking. As the 
title of this section “On the logical use of the understanding in general” makes clear, in this section 
Kant is concerned not with understanding in general, but merely with its logical use, i.e., its capacity 
in building a concept and making a judgment. It is reasonable, and indeed widely recognized, to 
characterize the understanding as judging and conceptual or discursive thinking. It does not follow, 
however, that Kant’s characterization of thinking in terms of judging is complete or essential. 
Furthermore, Kant’s systematic introduction of the notion of forms of thought only makes 
an appearance and obtains fixed meaning in the 1787 Critique. It is not implausible to conjecture 
                                                     
discursive aspect of understanding, since the logical functions of judgment cannot determine the manifold in intuition 
without reference to synthesis. 
341 According to Kant’s Logic, “[c]ognition through concepts is called thought (cognitio discursiva)” (AA 9:91). 
342 Kant offers various characterizations of the understanding at the end of A-Deduction: “We have above explained 
the understanding in various ways – through a spontaneity of cognition (in contrast to the receptivity of the 
sensibility), through a faculty for thinking, or a faculty of concepts, or also of judgments” (A126). 
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that the notion of thinking undergoes a substantial change between the two editions. Therefore, it 
is suspicious whether it is proper to invoke Kant’s view in 1781 to justify his view in 1787. 
If thinking is not exclusively, nor even primarily, judging, then what is it?  In the 1787 Critique, 
Kant has a clear-cut conception of thinking as combining or synthesis: 
 
They [Categories] are only rules for an understanding whose entire capacity consists in thinking, i.e., 
in the action of bringing the synthesis of the manifold that is given to it in intuition from elsewhere to 
the unity of apperception[.]” (B145) 
 
Kant not only characterizes the capacity of understanding as thinking, but also explicitly 
characterizes thinking as relating the manifold in intuition to the unity of apperception. It becomes 
apparent that what is essential to thinking is not whether its action is discursive (by means of 
concepts), but whether the action of the understanding is spontaneous. Construed in this light, 
some passage might look differently. When Kant says that “through which [the concept] an object 
is thought at all (the category)” (B146), what Kant has in mind is not to subsume an object under 
a concept, but to combine the manifold in a concept of an object (category). The reading of 
thinking as pre-discursive synthesis, rather than discursive thought, is consistent with my previous 
view that for Kant synthesis is the primary function of human understanding.343 
 
9.4 The Project of Argument and Perception Premises 
9.4.1 Preliminaries 
Now let’s turn to Kant’s argument from perception in the B-Deduction. As I have 
reconstructed, the argument from perception is quite lengthy and complex. As Kant’s final 
argument, it draws on groups of premises: Perception Premises, Space-time Premises, Synthesis 
Premises, and Categories Premises. They are divided in terms of the functions they perform to 
meet the requirements of the aim of the Transcendental Deduction that categories are a priori valid 
of objects. In what follows I will offer a brief analysis. 
First of all, the Perception Premises (AP1) and (AP2) are introduced as meeting the 
requirement of reality to guarantee the scope of the application of categories. In § 22 Kant writes: 
“Consequently the categories do not afford us cognition of things by means of intuition except 
                                                     
343 See Chapter 5. 
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through their possible application to empirical intuition, i.e., they serve only for the possibility of 
empirical cognition. This, however, is called experience. The categories consequently have no other 
use for the cognition of things except insofar as these are taken as objects of possible experience.” 
(B147-B148) 
Second, the Space-time Premises are aimed at introducing the synthetic unity into the 
argument. As a routine, Kant will take some synthetic unity given a priori as the entrance to the 
argument. Then the ensuing argument follows the same pattern: where there is unity, there is 
synthesis and thereby there are categories.344 In the master argument in Chapter 7, the entrance is 
the identity of self-consciousness. In the easy argument in Chapter 8, the entrance is the analytic 
unity of synthetic judgment. Now in the final argument discussed in this Chapter, the entrance to 
the argument is the singularity of space and time. Although Kant introduces synthetic unity, he 
does not invoke the identity of self-consciousness. As it has been stressed, the identity of self-
consciousness is merely one way, far from the only way, to the entrance of synthetic unity. 
Third, the Categories Premises serve to introduce categories into the argument. It is in the 
very final stage that the results in the first step of the B-Deduction are incorporated into the second 
step. In order to establish the link between transcendental imagination and categories by modeling 
on the link between the synthesis of understanding and the forms of thought. Therefore, the two 
steps are much looser than one might expect, since their link is not established by a deductive 
inference, but by an inference by analogy.  
The final argument from perception in §26 exhibits a striking synthetic character in method. 
With introducing these three groups of premises, the sensible condition and the intellectual 
condition are considered and studied separately in Aesthetic and the first part of the Transcendental 
Deduction as well as Metaphysical Deduction. Kant synthesized these previous lines of thoughts 
into one whole. 
Finally, I would like to remind the readers of the peculiar route of the argument Kant adopts 
for the objective reality of categories. At the end of §26, Kant writes: 
 
Consequently all synthesis, through which even perception itself becomes possible, stands under the 
categories, and since experience is cognition through connected perceptions, the categories are 
conditions of the possibility of experience, and are thus also valid a priori of all objects of experience. 
(B161) 
                                                     
344 In the Introduction, I have proposed that all Kant’s arguments follow this suit. 
320 
 
 
Kant arrives at the conclusion that perception is conditioned by categories. According to the 
definition of experience, perception is presupposed by experience. Then, Kant infers to the claim 
that categories are also the conditions of experience. Kant’s line of reasoning is interesting. In 
conjunction with the definition of experience, Kant infers from a strong claim that categories are 
conditions of perception to a weak claim that categories are the conditions of perception. In other 
words, it is not the case that Kant first argues for a weak conclusion by an easy argument, and then 
makes a further argument for a new strong conclusion on the basis of this old weak conclusion. 
Rather, Kant takes a difficult path by arguing first for a strong conclusion, and then he draws a 
weak conclusion through a trivial inference.345 
 
9.4.2 The Perception Premises 
(a) Domain 
Kant’s option of perception as his point of departure is not a coincidence. Rather, it is required 
by his official claim of the aim of the second half of the B-Deduction; As Kant writes, “the 
possibility of cognizing a priori through categories whatever objects may come before our 
senses… is to be explained.” (B159) As Kant makes clear, the domain is targeted at “everything 
that may ever come before our senses” (B160). The key to this problem is to note that for Kant 
“whatever objects may come before our senses” are co-extensive with the objects of perception. 
In § 26, perception is explicitly defined as “empirical consciousness of it [the composition of 
the manifold in an empirical intuition] (as appearance)” (B160) 
 
The first thing that is given to us is appearance, which, if it is combined with consciousness, is called 
perception (without the relation to an at least possible consciousness appearance could never become 
an object of cognition for us, and would therefore be nothing for us, and since it has no objective 
reality in itself and exists only in cognition it would be nothing at all). (A120) 
 
In other places Kant’s remarks are even apter: 
 
                                                     
345 The conclusion that categories are necessary for perception seems so strong that many commentators take it as 
one of most decisive support to the conceptualist reading of Kant. As McLear points out, it is one of most important 
texts for conceptualist reading. See McLear 2014. 
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Sense represents the appearances empirically in perception[.] (A115) 
 
Now since all possible perception depends on the synthesis of apprehension, but the latter itself, this 
empirical synthesis, depends on the transcendental one, thus on the categories, all possible perceptions, 
hence everything that can ever reach empirical consciousness, i.e., all appearances of nature, as far as 
their combination is concerned, stand under the categories[.] (B164-B165) 
 
Since the objects of perception and the objects before our senses our coextensive, then it is 
no wonder that if all objects of perception are conditioned by categories, then “whatever objects 
may come before our senses” are also conditioned by categories. 
 
(b) Comparison with Argument from Cognition 
Since this argument starts with Kant’s conception of perception, it is reminiscent of Kant’s 
so-called “argument from below” discussed in Chapter 6. As I have shown, the argument from 
below seems to start with the weak premise that is centered on Kant’s conception of perception, 
which betrays some anti-skeptical promise. On my abductive analysis of the text, however, it turns 
out that what is at play is a strong conception of cognition, the conscious representation to object. 
With the unfolding of the argument, a variety of component requirements are involved. 
In contrast, the argument from perception in § 26 does not presuppose a strong conception 
of cognition or anything like that. To be sure, Kant introduces the space and time as a condition 
of perception in the ensuing argument. To explore the condition of some kind of representation is 
a common practice in Kant’s transcendental philosophy. Kant’s move of exploiting the 
argumentative potential of perception is only a practice of this general principle. As Kant himself 
intends, the condition of space and form flows from perception and its condition, rather than from 
something else. At any rate, Kant does not implicitly replace the weak premise of perception with a 
strong premise of cognition. Even if there is something with which Kant potential opponents 
would disagree, in my view, it is not with how Kant introduces the condition of the form of 
intuition, but with his introduction of the unity of formal intuition. 
Kant further argues that “by the synthesis of apprehension I understand the composition 
of the manifold in an empirical intuition, through which perception” (B161). I believe that in this 
very step Kant’s inference from perception to the synthesis of apprehension is driven by the same 
motivation of the radical manifoldness in his apprehension argument in the argument from 
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cognition. Only from the next move onward, the salient difference between these two arguments 
can be revealed.346 
 
9.5 The Space-time Premises: A New Entrance to Synthetic Unity 
9.5.1 From Apprehension to The Forms of Intuition 
In his first argument from cognition, Kant infers from the synthesis of apprehension to the 
synthesis of reproduction, for the former by itself falls short of satisfying some requirement of cognition. 
In this final argument from perception, by contrast, Kant makes a decisively different move from 
that in the argument from cognition by introducing the space and time, the argument thus runs 
into a quite different direction. Since the manifold appearances are in space and time, and space 
and time are the forms of our intuition, Kant takes a seemingly uncontroversial step to infer that 
the synthesis of apprehension is conditioned by space and time. 
The introduction of space and time brings Kant in a position to exploit the theoretical 
potential of space and time, just as he does when he introduces the identity of self-consciousness. 
Kant writes that “space and time are represented a priori not merely as forms of sensible intuition, 
but also as intuitions themselves (which contain a manifold), and thus with the determination of 
the unity of this manifold in them (see the Transcendental Aesthetic)” (B160-B161). Kant employs 
the explicit technical device to mark the three claims standing in two inferential relations: 
 
(ST1) Space and time are represented a priori as the forms of sensible intuition. 
(ST2) Space and time are represented a priori as intuitions themselves. 
(ST3) Space and time are represented a priori with the unity of this manifold in them. (from (ST 2)) 
 
Kant clarifies the twofold character of space and time further in the footnote by introducing the 
distinction between the form of intuition and formal intuition: 
 
Space, represented as object (as is really required in geometry), contains more than the mere form of 
intuition, namely the comprehension (Zusammenfassung) of the manifold given in accordance with the 
                                                     
346 As I have noted in Chapter 6, the peculiarity of the argument is that reproduction and association that are 
supposed to be inextricably entwined with apprehension are not taken into the argument. See Chapter 6 for my 
explanation. 
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form of sensibility in an intuitive representation, so that the form of intuition merely gives the 
manifold, but the formal intuition gives unity of the representation. (B160f-Bf161f) 
 
Kant draws the distinction between the form of intuition and the formal intuition, which is 
absent in Aesthetic. Then, what is the difference between the form of intuition and formal 
intuitions? Their essential difference, according to Kant, is that “the form of intuition merely gives 
the manifold, but the formal intuition gives unity of the representation”.347 One the one hand, 
Kant claims that (T1) “space and time are represented a priori as intuitions themselves (which 
contain a manifold)”. On the other hand, Kant claims that (T2) “the form of intuition merely gives 
the manifold”. Both the form of intuition and the formal intuition have something to do with the 
manifold.  
This initial similarity should not obscure the difference in the relation of the form of intuition 
and the formal intuition to the manifold. Kant’s formulations are very careful: the form of intuition 
gives manifold, whereas the formal intuition contains manifold. Their difference is not verbal, but 
substantial. To say that the form of intuition gives manifold is to say that it grounds mereological 
property. Since form does not have a part, it does not contain manifold within it. In other words, the 
form does not have mereological property. In virtue of space as a form of intuition we “represent 
them as outside <and next to> one another, thus not merely as different but as in different places” 
(A23/B38). Space renders the sensations manifold and discrete in space. 
To say that formal intuition itself contains manifold is to say that it instantiates mereological 
property. Since only an individual object can instantiate property, it implies that space is a thing, 
i.e., an object of representation, rather than a way of representation. The pure manifold given, or 
made possible, by the form of intuition is nothing other than the manifold contained by the formal 
intuition. 
 
9.5.2 Reference to the Transcendental Aesthetic 
Unfortunately, Kant does not draw the terminological distinction between the form of 
intuition and the formal intuition in the Transcendental Aesthetic as he does in §26 and its 
footnote.348 It does not imply that the idea of formal intuition is utterly novel and it does not appear 
                                                     
347 This distinction is a parallel to the distinction between indeterminate intuition and determinate intuition, or 
intuition as the component of cognition and intuition as species of cognition, which I have elaborated in previous 
chapters. 
348 Since Kant explicitly equates the form of intuition with the pure intuition, the pure intuition in Aesthetic and the 
formal intuition in B-Deduction are not identical. 
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until the second edition of the Critique. I believe that Kant’s conception of formal intuition has 
already played an essential role in both editions of the Metaphysical Exposition. For illustrative 
purpose, in the following I will only address Kant’s four space-arguments in the Metaphysical 
Exposition in the 1787 Critique. Kant’s merely introducing the distinction in Deduction is nothing 
other than a clarification of a previous ambiguity, it does not add anything new. 
In the Metaphysical Exposition, the two arguments for apriority can be seen as arguing for 
space to be the form of intuition, and the two arguments for singularity can be seen as arguing for 
space to be the formal intuition. The arguments for the apriority of space focus on the relation 
between space and extended bodies and concludes that space is the condition of extended bodies, 
which means nothing but that space is the form of intuition. The arguments for the singularity of space 
focus on the relation between space and the manifold in it, which suggests that space is of unity, 
and space is the formal intuition. 
In Chapter 8 I have argued that Kant has two different conceptions of intuition. 349 Now I 
would like to propose that they are respectively operative in the apriority arguments and in the 
singularity arguments in the Aesthetic. We must be clear what conception of intuition underlies the 
latter two space-arguments. According to Kant, intuitions are singular representations. In his 
attempt to prove that space is intuition, Kant is trying to argue for the singularity of the 
representation of space.350 With this aim, what Kant has in mind is the unity conception intuition, 
rather than the manifold conception of intuition. According to this full-blown unity conception, 
intuition is a species, of which cognition is a genus. It is not an ingredient of cognition.351 When 
this unity conception of intuition is applied to space, then it is nothing other than the formal intuition. 
 
9.5.3 The Singularity of Space 
The question of whether Kant’s claim that space is the formal intuition with unity can be 
answered by appealing to the Metaphysical Exposition, where Kant provides two arguments for 
the singularity of space. Before entering the arguments, I would like to have a general evaluation 
of Kant’s singularity argument in the Aesthetic. The following discussion is not meant to be a 
conclusive analysis of Kant’s arguments. Rather, it merely takes into account those aspects relevant 
to and even paralleled with my previous analysis such as Kant’s notion ‘I’ (e.g. the singular discourse 
and the distinction between analytic unity and synthetic unity). On my reading, Kant is not always 
                                                     
349 See Wilfred Sellars 1968. 
350 Faulkenstein (2000) argues that the intuition in singularity arguments is merely a historical relic of Kant’s 
conception of intuition in Inaugural Dissertation. 
351 In the singularity arguments, space is not a way of representation; it is instead the object of representation. 
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careful to distinguish space as representation from the representation of space. This is not an accident, since 
for Kant space itself is a representation. The representation of space is a concept of representation. 
Here the concept is not used in a characteristic Kantian technical sense, otherwise it commits us 
to the view that space is a concept, which is precisely rejected by Kant. Rather, the concept is used 
in an ordinary sense, and it is similar to the notion ‘term’ in logic and the philosophy of language. 
On my reading, Kant’s two lines of arguments for the singularity of space both entwine these the 
semantic property of the notion of space and the mereological property of space itself together. 
 
(a) First Argument 
Kant’s first argument for the singularity of space reads as follows: 
 
Space is not a discursive or, as is said, general concept of relations of things in general, but a pure 
intuition. (T1) For, first, one can only represent a single space, and if one speaks of many spaces, one 
understands by that only parts of one and the same unique space. (T2) And these parts cannot as it 
were precede the single all-encompassing space as its components (from which its composition would 
be possible), but rather are only thought in it. (T3) It is essentially single; the manifold in it, thus also 
the general concept of spaces in general, rests merely on limitations. From this it follows that in respect 
to it an a priori intuition (which is not empirical) grounds all concepts of it. (A24-25/B39) 
 
I propose a semantic reading of the first part (T1) in this argument, and I believe that Kant is 
arguing for the referential singularity of the concept ‘space’. Kant contends that the concept ‘space’ 
refers to one single object space, rather than to a plurality of spaces. Nonetheless, in practice we 
do use the plural form ‘spaces’, which seems to suggest that there are more than one spaces. Kant 
argues, however, that is not the case: the concept in the plural form does not refer to the existence 
of many spaces; rather, it is taken as referring to the parts of a single space. The ordinary discourse 
of the plural form ‘spaces’ can be paraphrased into the discourse of singular form ‘space’. When 
someone says: 
 
(1) The space in my room is smaller than the space in your room. 
 
For Kant, the sentence should not be read literally as ontologically committed to the view that 
there are at least two spaces respectively in my room and in your room. The sentence should be 
paraphrased so as to eliminate the two different referents of the expression “the space in my room” 
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and the expression “the space in your room”. Therefore, it could instead be paraphrased with 
reference to the uniqueness claim of space: 
 
(2) The part of space in my room is smaller than the part of space in your room. 
 
In this paraphrased sentence, the plural ‘spaces’ is paraphrased away by the singular term 
‘space’. As it makes clear, ‘spaces’ does not refer to more than one object; rather, it refers to one 
single object with more than one occurrences. In order to insist on the uniqueness claim of space, Kant 
introduces the mereological relationship to explain away the discourse with reference to ‘spaces’ in 
plural form. The ontological simplicity is saved at the cost of mereological complexity. 
However, the paraphrasing at best shows that there is one way to make sense of our space 
discourses with the ontology of one space. That is, all of our space discourses could be read as 
ontologically committed to one single space, rather than to a plurality of spaces. It does not show 
that it is the only way to make sense of all our space-discourses, neither does it show that it is true 
that there is only one space. What it shows is rather that the single space ontology is our best theory. 
It implies that (1) should be understood literally, whereas the paraphrased (2) is redundant. 
Therefore, it could be argued that out of pragmatic reason we should ontologically commit to the 
one-space ontology in spite of its mereological complexity. Unfortunately, this theory-choice 
reading is not Kant’s view, because Kant does believe that there is only one space, and that it is the 
only correct description of the reality. 
What Kant further argues in (T2) and (T3) could be viewed as an attempt to complete the 
argument by showing the irreducibility of different spaces into one single encompassing space. On 
a close reading of it, Kant merely reasserts the mereological priority of whole to part without 
justifying that it is the only way to understand the relationship between the whole and the parts in 
the case of space. One line of justification might be like this: 
 
(1) Assuming for reductio that space-whole is reducible to its parts, that is, the space-whole is 
constructed by its parts. 
(2) The reductive account of space implies the irreducible space part. 
(3) However, space is infinitely divisible. 
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(4) The atomic space does not exist. 
(5) Therefore, (1) is false, and it is concluded that the space-whole is prior to any part of it in the 
sense that it is not a construction from them. 
 
According to the argument, there is only one single space, since the idea of reducing space 
results in the self-defeating notion of atomic space. Then, we still need an account of how the space 
parts are possible. Kant gives an account that the manifold parts of space are merely the limitations 
of it. Therefore, the whole-priority account of space is better than the part-priority account of space 
since the former explains not only what the latter fails to explain, but also what the latter can explain. 
 
(b) Second Argument 
In the 1787 Critique Kant rewrites the second argument for the singularity of space: 
 
Space is represented as an infinite given magnitude. Now one must, to be sure, think of every concept 
as a representation that is contained in an infinite set of different possible representations (as their 
common mark), which thus contains these under itself; but no concept, as such, can be thought as if 
it contained an infinite set of representations within itself. Nevertheless, space is so thought (for all 
the parts of space, even to infinity, are simultaneous). Therefore, the original representation of space 
is an a priori intuition, not a concept. (B39-40) 
 
In this second argument, Kant intends to first employ the crucial distinction between 
“contained under” (equivalently, “contained in”) and “contained within” to establish a general 
criterion that can differentiate concept from intuition, and then argues that by the criterion the 
term ‘space’ is not a concept but an intuition. The outline of the argument goes as follows: 
 
(1) A representation r is a concept if and only if r is contained in an infinite set of different possible 
representations, and r does not contain infinitely many representations within itself. 
(2) Space contains infinitely many representations within itself. 
(3) Space is not a concept. 
(4) Space is an intuition 
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The basic idea of the argument is quite clear, and the most important of the argument step is 
(1). It is noteworthy that Kant offers two criteria to specify what it is to be a concept. As Kant 
conceives, the distinction between “contained under” and “contained within” is mutually exclusive 
and jointly exhaustive. In the 1787 Critique, Kant confers so much hope on this distinction to 
elucidate the essential difference between intuition and concept by discussing it at least three times. 
Except in the Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant alludes to it in the footnote to §17: 
 
Space and time and all their parts are intuitions, thus individual representations along with the 
manifold that they contain in themselves (see the Transcendental Aesthetic), thus they are not mere 
concepts by means of which the same consciousness is contained in many representations, but rather 
are many representations that are contained in one and in the consciousness of it; they are thus found to 
be composite, and consequently the unity of consciousness, as synthetic and yet as original, is to be 
found in them. This singularity of theirs is important in its application (see § 25). (B136f) 
 
Kant also mentions it in the footnote of §26, which is the starting point of our present 
discussion: “[s]pace […] contains […] the comprehension of the manifold [given in accordance with 
the form of sensibility] in an intuitive representation” (B160f).352 
The distinction between ‘containment under’ and that of ‘containment within’ are as clear as 
they initially appear. On the one hand, Kant’s explicit discussion of the notion of ‘containment 
under’ is included in his discussion of the content (Inhalt) and the scope (Umfang) of concept in his 
Logic, where it forms a contrast with “contained in”. In §7 of the Logic titled “Content and scope of 
concepts”, Kant writes: 
 
Every concept, as partial concept, is contained in the representation of things; as ground of cognition, i.e., as 
mark, these things are contained under it. In the former respect every concept has a content, in the other 
a scope. (AA 9:95) 
 
As indicated in Logic, both ‘containment under’ and ‘containment in’ are semantic relations 
between concepts and things. Kant further indicates the inverse relationship between ‘containment in’ 
and ‘containment under’. As Kant continues: “The content and scope of a concept stand in inverse 
                                                     
352 Note that in the latter two cases, Kant is speaking of “contained within” when he speaks of “contained in”. I keep 
the loose term “contained in” for the inverse relation of “contained under”, therefore, I think that a same relation 
could both be specified with “contained under” and “contained in”, which will be shown in the following. 
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relation to one another. The more a concept contains under itself, namely, the less it contains in 
itself, and conversely.” (AA 9:95) Hence, Kant’s notion of “contained under” can be defined as: 
 
For anything x and any concept C, x is contained under the concept C if and only if C is a predicate 
of x such that C(x) is true. 
 
In a different yet important sense, a concept has the analogous relation to other concepts. As Kant 
writes in §9 of the Logic: “Concepts are called higher (conceptus superiores) insofar as they have other 
concepts under themselves, which, in relation to them, are called lower concepts.” (AA 9:96) In §10 
Genus and species of the Logic, this relation between concepts is called ‘subordination under’: “higher 
and lower concepts […] are distinguished […] only in regard to their relation to one another (termini 
a quo or ad quod) in logical subordination” (AA 9: 97). The idea could be illustrated as follows. The 
concept C1 is contained in its conjunction with any other compatible concepts, say, C1&C2, 
C1&C3, C1&C4, and so forth. This ‘containment in’ can be spelled out by ‘part-concept’ relation. 
Since the concept C1 can make up an infinite set of complex concepts, C1 is a part concept of an 
infinite set of complex concepts. The distinction between partial concept and part-concept has 
been discussed in Chapter 8.  
On the other hand, Kant discusses “contained within” in a straightforwardly mereological sense. 
Here Kant is not talking about the concept or the term ‘space’; rather, he is talking about space 
itself. Space as the object of representation does not have any referential force. It only has the 
mereological property of containing an infinite set of parts. The definition of “contained within” 
could be formulated as:  
 
For any representation r and R, r is contained within R if and only if r is a mereological part of it. 
Kant’s introduction of the distinction between ‘contained under’ and ‘contained within’ 
appears to commit him to the conflation of the semantic and the mereological level.353 When Kant 
speaks of ‘containment under’, he is speaking of the relation between concept and thing on the 
semantic level. When Kant speaks of ‘containment within’, Kant is speaking of the mereological 
relation between whole and part and thereby leaping onto a different mereological level. If Kant 
                                                     
353 One might object that what Kant focuses on is the relationship between intuition and concept with respect to 
infinity. So the attack on the conflation of the two levels simply misses Kant’s point. 
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were to contrast intuitions with concepts on the semantic level, he should have characterized 
intuition with the negation of ‘containment under’ relation: a representation r is intuition only if it is 
not the case that it contains an infinite set of representations under it. Kant seems to commit himself 
to the assumption that ‘containment under’ and the negation of ‘containment within’ are co-
extensive. When Kant is talking about “containment” on two different levels, there is an intensional 
difference in the notion of “containment” between the two criteria.354 Indeed, this intensional 
distinction could be coincident with the extensional distinction, but the former does not justify the 
latter. However, I think it does not threaten Kant’s argument. Kant could justify his move by 
suggesting that the negation of the containment of an infinite set of many referents under a 
representation is the containment of only one referent under it, provided that he assumes that the 
representation at issue is not empty. 
Nevertheless, the relationship between “contained under” and “contained within” is not 
thereby settled. Along the above line of justification, the second singularity argument only shows 
that the term ‘space’ is singular. It leaves it undetermined whether the referent of ‘space’ is a space-
part or a space-whole. The criterion of “contained within” does not help either, since both space-
part and space-whole contain an infinite set of representation within it. Consequently, Kant’s 
second argument for singularity does not show that the priority of whole to part. That the space-
whole contains within itself an infinite set of representations seems to be an analytic truth that 
whole contains part, which holds even independently of Kant’s mereological view of the priority 
of whole to part. Therefore, in the second argument Kant makes an even weaker claim on the 
mereological property of space, not to mention justify it. 
 
9.6 The Synthesis Premises: The Source of Unity and Conceptualism 
In the second step of the B-Deduction, Kant does say something new concerning formal 
intuition. Here Kant makes an important clarification, if not a correction: 
 
In the Aesthetic I ascribed this unity merely to sensibility, only in order to note that it precedes all concepts, 
though to be sure it presupposes a synthesis, which does not belong to the senses but through which 
all concepts of space and time first become possible. For since through it (as the understanding determines 
the sensibility) space or time are first given as intuitions, the unity of this a priori intuition belongs to 
space and time, and not to the concept of the understanding (§ 24). (B160f-161f) 
                                                     
354 This intensional difference is the same with the ambiguity of “in” in the original sense of analytic unity and 
synthetic unity. 
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This latter half of the footnote arouses interpretative controversy. Kant seems to make two 
contradictory claims on the source of the unity of space and time at the same time: 
 
(1) The synthetic unity of space is ascribed to sensibility. 
(2) The synthetic unity of space is ascribed to understanding. 
 
Most commentators believe that there is no inconsistency in this footnote by suggesting that 
either (1) or (2) is incorrectly attributed to Kant. Both the camp of conceptualism and non-
conceptualism can find crucial support from this footnote. Initially, this footnote seems to be 
favorable for conceptualists. On some other reading by non-conceptualists, however, this could be 
turned against conceptualists. 
There are two exegetical reasons for non-conceptualists to embrace (1). First, Kant says that 
(T1.1) “[i]n the Aesthetic I ascribed this unity merely to sensibility, only in order to note that it 
precedes all concepts”. Second, Kant claims that (T1.2) “the unity of this a priori intuition belongs to 
space and time, and not to the concept of the understanding”. The textual evidence for (2) is that 
(T2.1) “[the unity] presupposes a synthesis, which does not belong to the senses” and that (T2.2) 
“the understanding determines the sensibility”. 
I myself believe that Kant is not guilty of inconsistency and that he makes a commitment to 
(2). The debate between conceptualists and non-conceptualists cannot be settled down here. In 
this section I will only discuss the exegetical evidence for conceptualist reading of this passage with 
reference to Kant’s strategy of abstraction and his model of mind. In particular, I will show how 
the two texts in support of non-conceptualism could be read otherwise. 
 
(a) (T1.1) Explained Away 
As for (T1.1), the term “concepts” in “precedes all concepts” is ambivalent. The term 
“concepts” could be understood in general sense. In this sense, by precedence Kant is referring to 
the priority of synthetic unity to analytic unity. Since the priority of synthetic unity to analytic unity 
has been discussed in Chapter 7, I will not discuss it here anymore. It is more plausible to believe 
that the term “concepts” is referring to the following “concepts of space and time”. In this sense, 
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by precedence Kant is referring to the mereological priority of whole to part. The expression “all 
concepts of space” is interesting. Kant does not only use concept, but he uses ‘concept’ in the plural 
form. Remember in Aesthetic Kant claims that “[the space] is essentially single; the manifold in it, 
thus also the general concept of spaces in general, rests merely on limitations” and that “if one 
speaks of many spaces, one understands by that only parts of one and the same unique space” 
(A25/B39). Obviously, the referents of the concepts are parts of one single space. In space it is the 
whole that makes the part possible. 
In fact, the non-conceptualist conviction that unity is ascribed to the sensibility rather than to 
the understanding is motivated by something deeper. Non-conceptualists are committed to the 
assumption of the completeness of the Transcendental Aesthetic in one way or another. They believe 
that the Transcendental Aesthetic is self-contained and does not susceptible to revisions or 
supplements. This assumption has important consequences. First of all, non-conceptualists believe 
that the Critique proceeds in a linear order; the narrative order of Kant’s presentation is the logical 
order of Kant’s theory. Accordingly, it must be assumed that the Transcendental Analytic presupposes 
and rests upon the conclusion in the Transcendental Aesthetic that intuition, by itself and independently 
from concepts, presents the individual object to us. Moreover, non-conceptualists believe that if there 
is any tension between the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Transcendental Deduction, the move 
we should make is to adapt Kant’s doctrine of the understanding to his doctrine of the sensibility, 
not the vice versa. However, the idea that sensible intuition can perform cognitive function 
independently of concepts leaves the Transcendental Deduction unmotivated. Therefore, the non-
conceptualists are eager to reinterpret the distinctiveness of the Transcendental Deduction by 
assigning a different job to it.  
In order to appreciate the deeper reason why the Transcendental Aesthetic is incomplete and 
why the unity of space is ascribed to sensibility, one should be aware of Kant’s analytic-synthetic 
method in presenting his transcendental philosophy. With this strategy Kant first provides a provisional 
conclusion in the Transcendental Aesthetic and later draws a different but genuine conclusion in the 
Transcendental Deduction.355 
As I have mentioned, the Metaphysical Exposition has a twofold goal: on the one hand, Kant 
has to show that space is a priori representation; on the other hand, Kant has to show that space is 
an intuition. Correspondent to these two goals, there are two different conceptions of intuition 
                                                     
355 Longuenesse calls it as a rereading of Aesthetic. (1998, 214-227) 
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operative in the Metaphysical Exposition. In particular, Kant inevitably resorts to unity to justify 
that space is a singular representation, and therefore it is intuition rather than concept. 
Kant employs the strategy of abstraction respectively in the Aesthetic and the Deduction. In 
the Transcendental Aesthetic, the understanding is methodologically separated from the discussion. 
As Kant explained,  
 
So if I separate from the representation of a body that which the understanding thinks about it, such as 
substance, force, divisibility, etc., as well as that which belongs to sensation, such as impenetrability, 
hardness, color, etc., something from this empirical intuition is still left for me, namely extension and form. 
These belong to the pure intuition, which occurs a priori, even without an actual object of the senses 
or sensation, as a mere form of sensibility in the mind. (A20-A21/B35) 
 
Therefore, in the Transcendental Aesthetic the doctrine of the understanding has not yet been 
introduced and elaborated.  
One might be tempted to think that it is reasonable to suppose that Kant tacitly assumes that 
the unity is sensible in origin, for otherwise it is difficult to explain why Kant does not make explicit 
in the Aesthetic that the unity of space and time is intellectual in origin, which is something quite 
unusual in the framework of the Aesthetic. The answer to the question is simply that given his 
methodological consideration, Kant is not in a position to give an account of the source of unity. 
At any rate this is not the only place where Kant leaves his account of something in the 
Aesthetic to the Analytic. Kant famously does not give any account of the paradox of inner 
affection in the Transcendental Aesthetic. Kant introduces the problem as early as in §5 of the 
Transcendental Aesthetic, but Kant does not have resources to cope with the problem there. The 
solution to the puzzle is put forward as late as in the latter half of the Transcendental Deduction; 
in §24 Kant admits “[h]ere is now the place to make intelligible the paradox… how this presents even 
ourselves to consciousness only as we appear to ourselves, not as we are in ourselves, since we 
intuit ourselves only as we are internally affected”. (B152-153) 
I believe that the non-conceptualist reading simply misses Kant’s radically novel idea in his 
revolutionary theory of mind in history. According to the Platonic tradition, the distinction between 
the sensibility and the understanding is drawn in terms of the fact that two faculties have distinct 
domains of objects. Their different respective functions can be explicable either directly in terms 
334 
 
of the different domains of objects,356 or indirectly in terms of different phenomenal qualities of knowing, 
which in turn can be further explicable in terms of the different domains of the objects.  
Early modern philosophers take over the general picture of making distinctions in cognitive 
faculties. For Descartes, our pure intellect perceives size, shape, motion, etc., which are the primary 
qualities amenable to mathematical description, whereas our sense perceives color, smell, taste, etc., 
which are the secondary qualities unamenable to mathematical description. For Leibniz, the 
distinction between the sensibility and the understanding is of merely quantitative difference. 
Sensibility is capable of obscure and confused cognition, while the understanding is capable of clear 
and distinct cognition. The pre-critical Kant even revives the Platonic distinction: the sensibility 
provides us with the sensible cognition of phenomena, while the intellect provides us with the 
intellectual cognition of noumena.357 
In reaction to the Platonic tradition, the critical Kant radically transforms the landscape of the 
individuation conditions of the sensibility and the understanding. In the critical period the 
understanding is defined as the spontaneous faculty of which spontaneity is its essential property, 
and the sensibility is defined as the receptive faculty of which receptivity is its essential property. 
The Kantian distinction between the sensibility and the understanding is drawn not due to that 
they have distinct domains of the objects of cognition, but due to that they play distinct yet complementary roles 
in forming any kind of the cognition of the object. For Kant, our cognition is primarily conceived as a 
synthetic unity of manifold representations in one intuition. It does not mean that there is the 
faculty of cognition. The notion of cognition requires further analysis. By analysis we find that, say, 
the element of “the manifold” cannot be reduced into the element of “the unity”, and vice versa. 
And then we conclude there must be two distinct faculties responsible for these two elements in 
cognition, and so on and so forth. 
Therefore, Kant’s distinctive model of mind marks a fundamental departure from the 
Cartesian model of the human mind. A faculty is postulated not as a result of the existence of some 
kind of cognition. Rather, a faculty is postulated as a result of the analysis of the elements of cognition. 
The sensibility and the understanding provide irreducible elements of cognition. As Kant suggests, we 
should pursue the path of “seeking two entirely different sources of representation in the 
                                                     
356 It could be two realities or two aspects of one same reality. 
357 In this picture, the place of empirical concepts is insignificant, since they only serve as ectypes derived from 
perception and do not expand our knowledge in virtue of expanding the domain of knowledge. 
335 
 
understanding and the sensibility, which could judge about things with objective validity only in 
conjunction” (A271/B327).358 
 
(b) (T1.2) Explained Away 
The second exegetical reason for non-conceptualist reading lies in Kant’s claim (T1.2) that 
“the unity of this a priori intuition belongs to space and time, and not to the concept of the 
understanding”. Initially, Kant appears to suggest that the synthetic unity of space is not a product 
of the operation of understanding. Contrary to this initial impression, however, it is critically 
important to appreciate the meaning of “belong to”. In this context, I suggest that by “belong to” 
Kant understands the instantiation of property. If a property F belongs to an object x, x instantiates 
F. Intuitively, x’s instantiation of a property F is different from y’s causation of the property F. The 
property F can be instantiated by one thing, but caused by another thing. If I get a burning, I could 
say that I have a burning or I instantiate a burning. It does not imply that it is not the sun, fire, or 
something else that causes the burning. When Kant says that unity belongs to space, Kant is saying 
that space instantiates the property of unity. From this it does not follow that Kant is implying that 
the instantiation of the property of unity is an unexplained brute fact, nor does it not imply that 
the unity is grounded in the sensibility.  
We might have a better understanding of Kant’s claim by considering his own reason to say 
so. Kant makes such a move precisely because “through it (as the understanding determines the 
sensibility) space or time are first given as intuitions”. This sentence can be understood as follows: 
by some determining ground space and time first instantiate certain determinations such as to be classified 
into certain kind of entity. While Kant technically emphasizes “given”, on my understanding the 
emphasis should be attached to “as intuitions”. It is this unity that qualifies space and time to be 
intuitions as genuine immediate and singular representations. This can be regarded as a clarification 
of the conception of intuition that underlies the singularity of arguments.   
In fact, Kant offers two alternatives: one is “space and time”, the other is “the concept of 
understanding”. As far as the possibility of human cognition is concerned, our pure representations 
can only be divided into these two kinds. Both pure intuitions and pure concepts instantiate the 
property of unity.359 Now Kant intends to answer the question of what kind of pure representation 
                                                     
358 Kant’s rejection of resemblance thesis is also evidence by the following passage: “All intuitions, as sensible, rest 
on affections, concepts therefore on functions. By a function, however, I understand the unity of the action of 
ordering different representations under a common one.” (A68/B93) 
359 See Chapter 7 and Chapter 8. 
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this synthetic unity should be attached to.  What Kant stresses is that the synthetic unity at stake is 
displayed on the intuitive level, rather than on the conceptual level. As I have argued in Chapter 7, 
the synthetic unity of space is the unity that is in reality, not in thought. 
 
(c) The Unity of Synthesis and the Synthesis of Apprehension. 
Now let’s turn to Kant’s inference to link the unity of space and time to the synthesis of 
apprehension, which is encapsulated in the following compact sentence: “even unity of the 
synthesis of the manifold… is already given a priori, along with (not in) these intuitions, as 
condition of the synthesis of all apprehension” (B161). Here Kant claims that the synthesis of 
apprehension is conditioned by the unity of the synthesis of space and time. This compact sentence 
is comprised of the following train of thoughts: (1) The unity of synthesis is given a priori; (2) The 
unity is given as a fact; (3) The unity presupposes a synthesis of understanding; (4) The combination 
of everything in space and time is given a priori; (5) The synthesis of the apprehension of 
conditioned by the synthesis. 
 
9.7 The Categories Premises: Identity or Analogy? 
With the development of his argument, Kant writes that “this synthetic unity can be none 
other than that of the combination of the manifold of a given intuition in general in an original 
consciousness, in agreement with the categories, only applied to our sensible intuition” (B161). 
This sentence is precisely the place where the conclusion of the first step is involved in, and it 
becomes more apparent when we see the underlining of both “intuition in general” and 
“sensible intuition”. It is also precisely the place where the link between two steps of the B-
Deduction is established by the phrase “be none other than”. It is also the very place where the 
synthetic character of Kant’s method in the B-Deduction exhibits.  
The question now is what precisely the relation between the two kinds of unity or what the 
“be none other than” in quotation precisely means. The verb “be” in quotation could be read 
differently: it can be read as the is of identity, and it can also be read as the is of predication. Based 
on this ambiguity, Kant is either suggesting that the unity of space and time is identical with the unity 
of intuition in general, or he is suggesting that the former is a species of the latter. In fact, the 
conspicuous expression “be none other than” does not only unmistakably emphasize the crucial 
link between two steps, but also easily gives readers the impression that Kant appears to identify the 
unity of space and time with the unity of intuition in general. And meanwhile the predicative use 
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of “be” does not make sense in this context. Consequently, it is tempting to conclude that the two 
kinds of unity are identical. 
If my previous proposal of the structure of the B-Deduction is correct, however, this cannot 
be the case. As I have suggested, intuition in general is abstracted intuition that is thinkable yet 
uninstantiable. The unity of abstracted intuition cannot be instantiated, either. The unity of space 
and time is “given a priori” and instantiated in the sensible world; in fact, they are not only 
instantiated, but also as the condition of the instantiation of objects. Therefore, the two kinds of 
unity cannot be numerically identical. In the same vein, the unity of our sensible intuition is not a 
species of the unity of intuition in general as a genus. 
The serious consequence of the denial of these two possibilities is that the supposed link 
between the first step and the second step breaks off. One the one hand, the first part seems to 
play no argumentative role in the second part of the B-Deduction. Although on my reading Kant 
circumvents the triviality in a twofold sense, it meanwhile eliminates the possibility of deductive 
inference altogether. On the other hand, the second part seems to offer no adequate justification 
for the inference to categories. The B-Deduction also commits the old sin of establishing a 
convincing connection between the synthesis of transcendental imagination and categories. 
In order to save Kant’s claim on identity, we could interpret the identity differently. As far as 
the source of unity is concerned, the unity of space and time and the unity of the manifold of intuition 
in general are identical. On this origin-identity reading, Kant is committed to the assumption that any 
synthetic unity is originated from the understanding. In order for this rejoinder to be tenable, the 
significance of the first step is to make the following two claims. (1) Any unity is intellectual in 
origin. (2) Any unity implies the application of categories. The essence of the move is nothing but 
to postulate a higher unity as the genus under which both the unity of space and time and the unity 
of abstracted intuition as species can fall. 
How should we understand this crucial “be”? I propose that the “be” should not be taken 
literally as “be” of identity or “be” of subsumption. What Kant makes here by identification is not 
a deductive inference, but an inductive inference, namely, it is an inference by analogy. Kant does not 
infer from a claim on a genus to the claim on a species of the genus. Rather, he infers from one 
species to another species.  
Of course, the inference by analogy falls short of logical validity. But the deductive reasoning 
is not the only way that makes the argument convincing. In fact, many good arguments make use 
inference by analogy as the way out of thorny philosophical problems, among which one of the 
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most notable is the argument for the existence of other’s mind. Here I will not burden myself with 
justifying the argumentative utility of inference by analogy. The case I would like to make is that, 
contrary to the literal meaning of the text and readers’ initial impression, the best way to make 
sense of Kant’s reasoning here is to attribute to him an inference by analogy to link the two kinds 
of unity in particular and the two steps of the proof in general. 
On my reading, the first step establishes a model of the discursive understanding for the second step. 
It surveys the nature and the working of discursive thought under a simplified ideal condition which 
cannot possibly be met in reality. For any discursive mind, there must be the manifold given in 
intuition on the one hand and the unity of apperception on the other hand. The model of the 
discursive understanding is only an ens rationis that can never be instantiated. It is a model not in 
the sense of generality; what is true of the model is also true of all the instances of the model. Rather, 
it is a model in the sense of paradigm; all the instances of the model must realize it in different ways 
without being identical with it. 
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Conclusion 
According to one popular narrative, Kant’s system is a synthesis of empiricism and 
rationalism. Kant criticizes the bad, yet incorporates the good into his own system. By 
reconstructing Kant’s philosophical spectrum, we come to see how crude this popular picture is. 
On the one hand, Kant’s system is by no means a reaction merely to empiricism and rationalism since 
Kant is making responses to a surprisingly wide range of systems; on the other hand, it is less a 
synthesis of the previous systems since Kant decisively distances himself from all his predecessors. 
Underlying Kant’s philosophical spectrum is the leading question of the ground of the relation 
of the representation to the object, which assumes the absolutely central place in Kant’s vision of 
metaphysics. On the one hand, Kant is convinced that every metaphysical system must assume 
some kind of the grounding model, which determines the promise of their projects. On the other 
hand, Kant believes that every difficult metaphysical question has a bearing upon this grounding 
model, and that the fixing of this model helps in resolving other metaphysical problems. 
I see Kant primarily as an Enlightenment philosopher. Kant’s main philosophical and 
scientific interests were shaped in the Enlightenment, in which the repercussions of the scientific 
revolution can even be felt and the eager to ground or to emulate science is widely shared. Kant 
made dialogues with most of his preeminent predecessors and contemporaries: Descartes, 
Malebranche, Locke, Leibniz, Berkeley, Wolff, and Hume, for they share a basically same context. 
When Kant outlived both his contemporaries and the Age of Reason, he lost his interlocutors 
and entered into a new era: the Age of Revolution. It is no wonder that the context in which the 
Critique is read underwent dramatic transformations, and the reception of the question of the 
grounding relation of representation to object finally ran in a direction that is neither intended nor 
expected by Kant. While the younger idealist philosophers were enthusiastic in drawing on Kant, 
they had their own preoccupations and projects. Finally, the results of the critical philosophy were 
retained, while motivations of critical philosophy were forgotten. 
It seems that we cannot be sympathetic to Kant’s project without retrospecting its past. While 
Kant’s commitments to explanatory rationalism, causal realism, and epistemic atheism are taken as 
assumptions without proof, they are not drawn out of the air. Rather, they have their seeds in 
Kant’s pre-critical philosophy. Furthermore, Kant seems to never give up the idea that there are 
irreducible real relations in the world, and the ground of the real relations is something outside the 
world. In addition, Kant’s new grounding model of representations seems to be nothing other than 
a critical substitute for his dogmatic idea of God as the ultimate ground. In order to understand 
340 
 
Kant, we must not look forward to grasp the spirit of the critical philosophy in its idealistic future, 
but look backward to discover the root of in its dogmatic past. 
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